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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTLON 
The S tu f f  of Co l l ec t ive  Action 
1765 was a l i v e l y  year  i n  England. a s  i t  was i n  America. News coming 
i n  from t h e  American co lon ie s  desc r ibed  t h e  usun l  c o n f l i c t s :  run- ins  between 
smugglers and customs men, sk i rmishes  of Ind ians  wi th  s e t t l e r s ,  a t t empt s  
of f ront iersmen t o  tnke t h e  law i n t o  t h e i r  own hands. But t h e  b i g  news 
from America was the  r e s i s t a n c e  t o  t h e  British-imposed Stamp Act. The use  
of c o s t l y  stamped paper f o r  o f f i c i a l  t r a n s a c t i o n s  was supposed t o  begin  on 
t h e  f i r s t  of November. Long bePore . then,  anonymous n o t i c e s  and determined 
crowds th rea t ened  anyone who showed s i g n s  of w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  comply wi th  t h e  
Stamp Act. In  Roston and elsewhere, 'groups of c i t i z e n s  produced c o l o r f u l  
s t r e e t  t h e a t e r ,  complete w i th  gal lows,  hand- le t tered s i g n s ,  and e f f i g i e s  
of roya l  o f f i c i a l s .  Sometimes they sacked the .  houses o r  ou tbu i ld ings  of 
des ignated stamp agen t s  and government o f f i c e r s .  They succeeded i n  blocking 
t h c  Ac t ' s  npp l i ca t ion  i n  t h e  American co lon ie s .  With t h e i r  a l l i e s  i n  Eng- 
lnnd,  they obta ined r e p e a l  i n  March, 1766. That concer ted r e s i s t a n c e  
s t a r t e d  t en  yea r s  of nea r ly  cont inuous  s t r u g g l e  w i t h i n  t h e  American co lon ie s ,  
and ended i n  a g r e a t  s t r u g g l e  between t h e  c o l o n i e s  and England. America 
was a l r eady  on its way t o  r e v o l u t i o n .  
I n  Englnnd, t h e r e  was some sympathet ic  r e a c t i o n  t o  t h e  American 
cause. For exnmple, a t  t h e  beginning of March, 1766, " . . . a body of 
upwards of two hundred mcmbers of t h e  house of Commons c a r r i e d  up t h e  b i l l  
t o  t h e  house of Pee r s ,  f o r  r epea l ing  t h e  American stamp-duty a c t ;  an in-  
s t a n c e  of such a number going up wi th  a s i n g l e  b i l l ,  ha s  no t  been known 
i n  t h e  memory of t h e  o l d e s t  man" (Annual Reg i s t e r  1766: 72).  Never theless ,  
i n  1765 and I766 most of England's v i s i b l e  c o n f l i c t  concerned domestic 
i s s u e s .  T a i l o r s  went on s t r i k e ,  weavers marched on Par l iament  t o  demand 
t h e  e x c l u ~ i o n  o f  fo re jgn  compet i t ion,  t h e  s h e r i f f s  of London paraded t o  
p e t i t i o n  f o r  government i n t e r v e n t i o n  a g a i n s t  high food p r i c e s ,  country- 
men se i zed  and s o l d  food a t  t h e i r  own p r i c e s ,  townsmen.attacked t h e  co l -  
l e c t o r s  appointed f o r  England's own ve r s ion  of t h e  Stamp Act. 
That was no t  a l l .  Near lpswich, on t h e  12 th  of August: 
Seve ra l  persons  r i o t o u s l y  assembled t o  p u l l  down t h e  house. 
of i ndus t ry ,  l a t e l y  e rec t ed  a t  Nncton . . . c a r r i e d  t h e i r  bold- 
n e s s  t o  such l eng th  t h a t ,  n e i t h e r  t h e  expos tu l a t ions  of t h e  
mag i s t r a t e8  a g a i n s t  t h e  i l l e g n l i t y  of t h e i r  des ign ,  which they 
openly avowed, t h e  consequences of t h e  r i o t  proclamation a c t  
being r ead ,  which were expla ined t o  them, nor t h e  appearance of 
a body of r e g u l a r  ho r se  end f o o t ,  c a l l e d  i n  a s  p o r t  of t h e  posse 
comita tus ,  seemed t o  make t h e  l e a s t  impression on them; nny, 
though t h e  proclamation was then read t o  them wi th  an aud ib l e  
v o i c e ,  and they seemed t o  hea r  i t  wi tb  a t t e n t i o n .  not  o man s t i r r e d  
(Annual Reg i s t e r  1765: 116-117). 
On t h e  con t r a ry .  A s  t h e  t roops  r ead ied  themselves f o r  t h e  a t t n c k ,  t h e  
crowd o f  a hundred o r  s o  " f e l l  upon both ho r ses  and men wi th  such arms 
a s  they had, peasemakes, hedge-stakes, cudgels ,  e t c . ,  but i n  f i v e  minutes 
t h e  a f f a i r  was over." The s o l d i e r s  a r r e s t e d  seven men a s  examples, and 
d i spe r sed  t h e  r e s t .  
Was t h a t  a r i o t ?  I n  t h e  t echn ica l  l e g a l  s ense ,  i t  was: twelve o r  
more people  had, indeed,  assembled wi th  on appnrent  i n t e n t  whtch l o c a l  o f -  
f i c i a l s  could reasonably regard a s  i l l e g a l ;  they had not  d i spe r sed  wi th in  
t h e  hour t h e  law a l l o t t e d  them from t h e  time t h a t  t h e  a u t h o r i t i e s  hod 
rend t h e  r i o t  a c t .  I n  t h e  loose r  s ense  o f  f r enzy ,  confusion o r  wanton 
d e s t r u c t i o n ,  however, t h e  event  does not  q u a l i f y  a s  a r i o t .  Both s i d e s  
appa ren t ly  knew what they were doing,  and d id  i t  a s  b e s t  they could .  
That was gene ra l ly  t r u e  of t h e  many "disorders"  r epo r t ed  i n  t h e  Annual 
Reg i s t e r  f o r  1765. 
In  t h e  case  of Nacton, t h e  "house of indust ry"  t h e  crowd proposed 
t o  des t roy  was a  r ecen t ly -bu i l t  workhouse. Poor Engl ish  v i l l a g e r s  had 
long drawn r e l i e f  from t h e i r  own pa r i shes  wh i l e  l i v i n g  a t  home. The pay- 
ments were miserable ,  but  they a s su red  s u r v i v a l .  And t h e  payments were 
a  r i g h t .  That was "outdoor r e l i e f . "  "Indoor r e l i e f "  was now th rea t en ing  
t o  d i s p l a c e  t h e  o l d e r  system. From t h e  1730s onward, many Engl ish  l o c a l  
a u t h o r i t i e s  responded t o  t h e  i n c r e a s i n g  numbers of poor w i th  two important  
innovat ions:  l ock ing  up t h e  poor t o  work under pub l i c  supe rv i s ion ;  com- 
b in ing  t h e  poor-law e f f o r t s  of a  number of ad j acen t  pa r i shes  i n t o  a  
s i n g l e  admin i s t r a t ion .  Par l iamentary  l e g i s l a t i o n  had l e g a l i z e d  both  e f -  
f o r t s .  The bu i ld ing  of workhouses f o r  m u l t i p l e  pa r i shes  combined t h e  two 
of them. It a l s o  pe rmi t t ed  many p a r i s h e s  t o  reduce t h e i r  r e l i e f  payments 
and t o  s h i p  t h e i r  l o c a l  paupers elsewhere. The poor fought  indoor  r e l i e f  
i n  t he  name of e s t a b l i s h e d  r l g h t s .  
In  t he  17508, t h e  l and lo rds  and parsons  of t h e  pa r i shes  nea r  lpswich,  
i n  Su f fo lk ,  caught tlie reform feve r .  Admire1 Vernon donated a  s i t e  on 
Nacton lleath f o r  a  new workhouse. A blue-ribbon committee supervised its 
cons t ruc t ion .  The Nncton House of Indus t ry ,  a  model of i ts kind,  s t a r t e d  
e n r o l l i n g  paupers from a  number of ad j acen t  pa r i shes  i n  1758. The p a r i s h  
poor went t o  work weaving sacks ,  making cordage and sp inn ing  wool (Webb 6 
Webb 1963: 127) .  By 1765. however. t h e  e l i t e  supe rv i s ion  had s lackened.  
I t  had proved d l f f l c u l t  t o  f i nd  p r o f i t a b l e  work f o r  t h e  inca rce ra t ed  pau- 
pers .  The cooperat ing pa r i shes ,  fur thermore,  had dumped i n t o  t h e  poorhouse 
young and o l d ,  s i c k  and w e l l ,  r e g a r d l e s s  of t h e i r  a b i l i t y  t o  work. Small 
wonder t h e  poor people of Su f fo lk  r e s i s t e d  t h e  extension of t h e  sy8tem. 
The move a g a i n s t  t h e  Nacton poorhouse was one of many ouch c o n f l i c t s  
i n  1765. As The Gentleman's Magazine r epor t ed  f o r  t h e  week be fo re  tl ic 
Nacton conf ron ta t ion :  
Some thousands of r i o t e r s  assembled i n  t h c  neigllborliood oE 
Saxmundham i n  Suf fo lk ,  and dest royed t h e  industry-liousc, i n  which 
t h e  poor were employed. The i r  p re t enae  was t o  r e l e a s e  t h e  poor t o  
a s s i s t  i n  t h e  h a r v e s t u o r k ;  bu t  t h e  f n c t  was t o  d e f e a t  a  l a t e  a c t  of 
pa r l i amen t ,  l a t e l y  obta ined f o r  t h e  r e l i e f  of t h c  poor of t h e  hun- 
d reds  of Wilford ,  and e, e t c .  I n  t h i s  r i o t .  t h e  m i l i t a r y  ware 
c a l l e d  i n ,  and s e v e r a l  l o s t  t h e i r  l i v e s  be fo re  t h e  r i o t e r s  were 
d i spe r sed  (GM 1765: 392). 
A t  Saxfnundham, not  on ly  t h e  poor, but  a l s o  many of t h e i r  l e s s  impoverished 
neighbors  considered t h e  new i n s t i t u t i o n  improper and i n t o l e r a b l e .  
During t h e  second week of August, 1765, i n  f n c t ,  much of Su f fo lk  was 
a l i v e  wi th  r e b e l l i o n .  A l a r g e  crowd o f  people f i r s t  anthered a t  Wickham 
Market, when tlie D i r e c t o r s  of t h e  Poor f o r  Loes and Wilford Hundreds met 
t o  plan a  new poorhouse; t h e  crowd forced t h e  D i r e c t o r s  t o  s i g n  a  repudia- 
t i o n  of t h e i r  plan. For a  week. t h e  group went from workhouse t o  workl~ouse 
t e a r i n g  t h e  bu i ld ings  down and demanding t h a t  t h e  ove r see r s  commit them- 
s e l v e s  no t  t o  r ebu i ld .  They demanded " tha t  t h e  poor should be maintained 
a s  u sua l ;  t h a t  they should range a t  l i b e r t y  and be t h e i r  own mnstcrs" 
(Webb 6 Webb 1963: 141-142). R io t s  t hese  were. i n  t h e  l e g a l  s ense  of tlie 
word. They were c l e a r l y  much more than t h a t .  
The conf ron ta t ions  a t  Nacton and Snxmundham ac t ed  o u t  pe rvas ive  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of e ighteenth-century c o n f l i c t s  i n  G r ~ a t  B r i t a i n  a s  a  whole. 
While David Nume and Adam Smith worked ou t  t h e  r e l e v a n t  t h e o r i e s ,  o rd ina ry  
Bri tons  fought  about  who had t h e  r i g h t  t o  d i spose  of l and ,  l a b o r ,  c a p i t a l  
and commodities. At tacks  on poorhouses, concer ted r e s i s t a n c e  t o  enc losu res ,  
food r i o t s  and a  number of o t h e r  common forms of e ighteenth-century c o n f l i c t  
a l l  s t a t e d  an i m p l i c i t  two-part theory:  t h a t  t h e  r e s i d e n t s  of a  l o c a l  
community had a  p r i o r  r i g h t  t o  t h e  r e sources  produced by o r  conta ined 
wi th in  t h a t  community; t h a t  t h e  community a s  such had a  p r i o r  o b l i g a t i o n  
t o  a i d  i t s  weak and r e source l e s s  members. The r i g h t  and t h e  o b l i g a t i o n  
should t ake  p r i o r i t y  over  t h e  i n t e r e s t  of any p a r t i c u l a r  i nd iv idua l  and 
over  any i n t e r e s t  o u t s i d e  t h e  community. It should.even t ake  p r i o r i t y  
over t h e  i n t e r e s t  of t h e  Crown, o r  of t h e  country  a s  a  whole. That was, 
i n  E.P. Thompson's terms,  t h e  i l l - a r t i c u l a t e d  bu t  powerful theory of t h e  
"moral economy. " 
Meanwhile, many merchants,  manufncturers ,  l a n d l o r d s  and l o c a l  author-  
i t i e s  favored ano the r ,  newer, four-par t  theory:  t h a t  a l l  goods, i nc lud ing  
l abo r  power, should be d i sposab le  p rope r ty ;  t h a t  t h e  ind iv idua l  p rope r ty  
owner had , the  r i g h t ,  and t o  some e x t e n t  t h e  o b l i g a t i o n ,  t o  use  i t  t o  h i s  
own advantage;  t h a t  t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  i n t e r e s t ,  a s  s r t i c u l a t e d  by t h e  s t a t e ,  
had p r i o r i t y  over  pa roch ia l  i n t e r e s t s ;  t h a t  on t h e  whole t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  in.- 
t e r e s t  w i l l  b e s t  be served by t h e  r a t i o n a l ,  unconstra ined p u r s u i t  of in-  
d i v i d u a l  i n t e r e s t s .  C.B. Macpherson has  c a l l e d  i t  t h e  theory of "posses- 
s i v e  individual ism."  The four-par t  theory i s  f a m i l i a r  nowadays. It ex- 
p re s ses  some founding p r i n c i p l e s  of our  own e r a .  But i n  t h e  e igh teen th  
cen tu ry  t h e  theory of posses s ive  ind iv idua l i sm was s t i l l  new and con te s t -  
a b l e .  To become dominant, i t  had t o  d i s p l a c e  t h e  r i v a l  theory of t h e  
"moral economy." Although they d i d  not  dream of saying i t  i n  t hose  terms,  
t h e  c o n t e s t a n t s  a t  Nacton, Saxmundham and many o t h e r  p l aces  i n  e igh teen th -  
cen tu ry  B r i t a i n  were f i g h t i n g  t h e  l o s i n g  b o t t l e  of t h e  moral economy 
a g a i n s t  t h e  r i s e  of posses s ive  individual ism.  
Not t h a t  t h e  f i g h t e r s  on e i t h e r  s i d e  were mere t h e o r i s t s ,  s imple  
ideologues ,  hap le s s  v i c t i m s  of shared de lus ions .  Real i n t e r e s t s  were i n  
play.  The p a r t i c i p a n t s  saw them more o r  l e s s  c l e a r l y .  A t  two c e n t u r i e s '  
d i s t a n c e ,  we may f i n d  some of t h e i r  pronouncements qua in t ,  incomprehensible,  
o r  hope le s s ly  romantic.  In  comfor table  r e t r o s p e c t ,  we may ques t ion  t h e  
means they used t o  forward t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s :  s co f f  a t  t e a r i n g  down poor- 
houses, anger a t  t h e  use  of t roops  a g a i n s t  unarmed crovds. Yet i n  r e t r o -  
spec t  we a l s o  s e e  t h a t  t h e i r  a c t i o n s  followed a  b a s i c ,  v i s i b l e  l o g i c .  
The more we l e a r n  about  e ighteenth-century changes i n  Great  B r i t a i n ,  t h e  
c l e a r e r  and more compel l ing t h a t  l o g i c  becomes. 
The s t r u g g l e  d id  not  simply p i t  d i f f e r e n t  wnys of t i l inking about  t h e  
world a g a i n s t  each o t h e r .  Two modes of s o c i a l  o rgan iza t ion  locked i n  a  
b a t t l e  t o  t h e  death .  The o l d  mode ves t ed  power i n  land and l o c a l i t y .  
The new mode combined t h e  expansion o f  c a p i t a l i s t  proper ty  r e l a t i o n s  
wi th  t h e  r i s e  of t h e  n a t i o n a l  s t a t e .  Many o t h e r  changes flowed from t h a t  
f a t e f u l  combination: l a r g e r - s c a l e  o rgan iza t ions ,  i nc reas ing  commercinliza- 
t i o n ,  expanded communications, t h e  growth of a  p r o l e t s r i a t ,  a l t e r a t i o n e  
of t h e  very t e x t u r e  of d a i l y  l i f e .  The new mode won. The world of t h e  
moral economy d i s so lved .  But when o rd ina ry  e ighteenth-century B r i m n s  
a c t e d  c o l l e c t i v e l y  a t  a l l ,  u sua l ly  they ac t ed  a g a i n s t  one f e a t u r e  o r  
ano the r  of t h i s  new world. On t h e  whole, they ac t ed  i n  de fense  o f  p a r t i c -  
u l a r  f e a t u r e s  of t h e  moral economy. 
The e f f o r t  t o  understand t h e  even t s  of 1765 thus  t akas  us  i n  s e v e r a l  
very  d i f f e r e n t  d i r e c t i o n s .  It r e q u l r e s  some knowledge of t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  
c i rcumstances  i n  which t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  found themselves: t h e  problems 
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they faced,  t h e  enemies b e f o r e  them. t h e  means of a c t i o n  a t  t h e i r  d i a -  
posa l ,  t h e i r  d e f i n i t i o n s  of what was happening. In  e ighteenth-century 
B r i t a i n ,  t h e  m a g i s t r a t e s '  e f f o r t s  t o  conso l ida t e  poor law admin i s t r a t ion .  
t h e  v u l n e r a b i l i t y  of t h e  l a n d l e s s  poor t o  swings i n  p r i c e s ,  t h e  s t r e n g t h  
of o  t r a d i t i o n  invo lv ing  l o c a l  d i r e c t  a c t i o n  a g a i n s t  ma le fac to r s  a r e  a l l  
c r u c i a l .  Understanding 1765 a l s o  c a l l s  f o r  an a n a l y s i s  of t h e  l a rge -  
s c a l e  changes behind t h e  c o n f l l c t s  of t h e  moment; i n  t h e  e igh teen th  
century we can s o r t  o u t  l i t t l e  of t h e  p a t t e r n  of c o n f l i c t  u n t i l  we d e t e c t  
t h e  conJo in t  expansion of c a p i t a l i s m  and r i s e  of t h e  s t a t e .  I t  t a k e s  u s ,  
f i n n l l y ,  t o  a  gene ra l  cons ide ra t ion  of t h e  ways t h a t  people a c t  t oge the r  
i n  p u r s u i t  of shared i n t e r e s t s .  I t  t akes  u s ,  t h a t  i s ,  i n t o  t h e  s tudy  of 
c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  
Studylng C o l l e c t i v e  Action 
The t h i r d  Inqu i ry  -- t h e  s tudy  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  -- is t h e  ch ie f  
concern o f  t h i s  book. I w i l l  o f t e n  i l l u s t r a t e  from s p e c i f i c  h i s t o r i c a l  
c i rcumstances  and w i l l  f r equen t ly  propose explanations involving s t s t e -  
making, t h e  expansion of c a p i t a l i s m ,  i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n ,  o r  some o t h e r  b i g  
s t r u c t u r n l  change. But t h e  pages t o  fol low w i l l  concen t r a t e  on t h e  gen- 
e r a l  a n a l y s i s  of c o l l e c t i v e  o c t i o n .  
The a n a l y s i s  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  is a  r i s k y  adventure .  For one 
th ing ,  t h e r e  o r e  t oo  many e x p e r t s  around. It is a  b i t  l i k e  food, o r  s ex ,  
o r  speech. Almost a l l  of us  know enough obout food, s ex  and speech t o  su r -  
v i v e  i n  our  own environments,  and none of us  l i k e s  t o  be  t o l d  he is ig-  
norant  i n  any of t h e  t h r e e  regards .  Yet from a  s c i e n t i f i c  po in t  of view, 
we a l l  have l o t s  t o  l e a r n  about  a l l  t h r e e .  The same is t r u e  of c o l l e c t i v e  
o c t i o n .  Like t h e  e ighteenth-century people  of Nacton, we a l l  draw on a  r i ch .  
conc re t e  exper ience of a c t i n g  on shared i n t e r e s t s .  Among us ,  fur thermore,  
seasoned o rgan ize r s  a r e  around t o  s h a r e  --,and even t o  l e c t u r e  us  on -- 
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t h e  l e s s o n s  of t h e i r  p r a c t i c a l  exper ience.  As wi th  t h e  s tuden t  of food, 
o r  s ex ,  o r  speech,  t h e  determined s tuden t  o f  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  runs  t h e  
r i s k  e i t h e r  o f  l a b e l i n g  t h e  obvious o r  o f  u rg ing  hypotheses which common 
sense  c o n t r a d i c t s .  
It i s  more d e l l c a t e  than t h a t .  Deep i n  every d i scuss ion  of c o l l e c -  
t i v e  a c t i o n  stirs t h e  l ava  of a  vo lcan ic  e rup t ion :  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  is 
obout power and p o l i t i c s :  i t  i n e v i t a b l y  r a i s e s  ques t ions  of r i g h t  and 
wrong, j u s t i c e  and i n j u s t i c e ,  hope and hopelessness ;  t h e  very s e t t i n g  of 
t h e  problem is l i k e l y  t o  i nc lude  judgments about  who has t h e  r i g h t  t o  a c t .  
and what good i t  does. Consider t hese  words from s newspopcr e d i t o r i a l  
(De t ro i t  F ree 'P reas  October 15 ,  1975): 
Present-day l i b e r a l i s m  had i t s  r o o t s  i n  t h e  19 th  cen tu ry  f a i t h  
i n  t h e  i d e a  of human p rogres s ;  t h a t  t h e  l i v e s  of men could be made 
b e t t e r  by c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  In  its extreme form, It was always a  
na ive  f a i t h ,  based on a  na ive  view of human na tu re .  
The 20th  century has  been a  more tumultuous time. and i t  has  
meant cons ide rab le  d i s i l l u s ionmen t  wi th  t h e  idea  of chong.lng t h e  
human cond i t i on .  Consider i ts m u l t i p l e  t r aged ie s :  Two world wars ,  
t h e  Great  Depression, t h e  o f t e n  bewilder ing impact of technology on 
people ,  t h e  a f t e r e f f e c t s  of co lon ia l i sm and i n a t i t u t i o n o l i z c d  racism,  
t h e  growth i n  t h e  concen t r a t ion  of weal th  and in f luence ,  t h e  11-bomb, 
t h e  Cold War, t h e  near-breakdown of mony c i t i e s .  
("Heavy s t u f f ,  t h a t  C o l l e c t i v e  Action!" s a i d  t h e  no te  inked on t h e  e d i t o r -  
i a l  when someone tacked i t  on our  r e sea rch  g roup ' s  b u l l e t i n  board.) In  
some s e n s e , ' e v e r y  p o s i t i o n  one t akes  on t h e  d e s i r a b i l i t y .  f e a s i b i l i t y  o r  
e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  i s  a  p o l i t i c a l  poa i t i on .  The tone of 
l a t e r  d i scuss ions  i n  t h i s  book is gene ra l ly  h o s t i l e  t o  t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  ac- 
t i o n  of governments and f avor sb le  t o  t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  of o rd ina ry  
people; t h a t ,  t oo ,  is a  p o l i t i c a l  s t a n c e .  
These r i s k s  provide,  a l a s ,  a  s t r o n g  temptat ion t o  d r e s s  up t h e  t o p i c  
i n  fancy,  obscure  terminology and fearsome a b s t r a c t  models. Yet p l a i n  
t a l k  a l s o  h a s  i t s  disadvantages:  people  o f t e n  respond more t o  t h e  over- 
tones  and under tones  than t o  t h e  s o l i d  informat ion.  Without some s tandsrd-  
i z a t i o n  of terms and some e f f o r t  a t  a b s t r a c t i o n  we run t h e  f u r t h e r  r i s k  
of bogging down i n  more and more fastidious d e s c r i p t i o n  of tlie d e t a i l s  of 
p a r t i c u l a r  a c t i o n s .  We must f i n d  t h e  ba l ance  po in t  between imprecis ion 
and obsci~rant iam.  
Another r j s k  r e s u l t s  from t h e  f a c t  t h a t  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  s t r a d d l e s  
s d i v l d e  which o r d i n a r i l y  Reparates  one major kind of socLal  
a n a l y s i s  from ano the r .  That is t h e  d i v i d e  between c a u s a l  and purposive  
exp lana t ion  ( see  Coleman 1973: 1-5). We may choose t o  cons ide r  t h e  a c t i o n  
of an  i n d i v i d u a l  o r  of a  group a s  t h e  r e s u l t a n t  of fo rces \ ex te rna l  t o  t h e  
ind iv idua l  o r  group; those  e x t e r n a l  f o r c e s  supposedly cause t h e  behavior .  
In  t h i s  ca se ,  we a r e  l i k e l y  t o  t h ink  we have a  good exp lana t ion  when a  
c a r e f u l  look a t  t h e  a c t o r ' s  s i t u a t i o n  permits  u s  t o  deduce more o r  l e s s  
a c c u r a t e l y  how t h e  a c t o r  w i l l  behave. 
A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  we may cons ide r  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  o r  group t o  be  making 
choices  according t o  some s e t  of r u l e s ,  i m p r i c i t  o r  e x p l i c i t ;  t h a t  approach 
is purposive .  Then we a r e  l i k e l y  t o  t h ink  we have a  sound exp lana t ion  
when we can impute t o  t h e  a c t o r  a  r u l e  which l e a d s  l o g i c a l l y  t o  most o r  
a l l  of t h e  cho ices  we observe t h e  a c t o r  making. I n  t h e  realm of co l l ec -  
t i v e  a c t i o n ,  i t  is hard t o  bu i ld  c a u s a l  models which g ive  s e r i o u s  a t t e n -  
t i o n  t o  t h e  i n t e r e s t s ,  g r i evances  and a s p i r a t i o n s  of t h e  a c t o r s .  It is 
a l s o  hard t o  bu i ld  purposive  models which s p e c i f y  t h e  c o n s t r a i n t n  l i m i t i n 8  
t h e  p u r s u i t  of i n t e r e s t s ,  g r i evances  and a s p i r a t i o n s .  
So why n o t  t r y  a  syn thes i s?  Why not  combine cnusa l  models of con- 
s h a i n t s w i t h  purposive  models o f  cho ices  among a v a i l a b l e  cou r ses  of a c t i o n ?  
The s y n t h e s i s  i s  s u r p r i s i n g l y  d i f f i c u l t  t o  ach ieve .  Before t h i s  book j s  
ove r ,  we w i l l  have spen t  a  good d e a l  of time o s c i l l a t i n g  between t h e  two 
a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  and t r y i n g  t o  draw them toget t ier .  
The Components of C o l l e c t i v e  Action 
The a n a l y s i s  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  has  f i v e  b i g  componcnts: i n t e r e s t .  
o rgan iza t ion ,  mob i l i za t ion ,  oppor tun i ty  and c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  i t s e l f .  T l ~ e  
i n t e r e s t s  which concern u s  most e r e  t h e  g a i n s  and l o s s e s  r e s u l t i n g  from a  
g roup ' s  i n t e r a c t i o n  wi th  o t h e r  groups. La te r  on we w i l l  have t o  worry 
about  what c o n s t i t u t e s  a  r e l e v a n t  group. and how t o  i d e n t i f y  o r  measure 
r e a l ,  du rab le  i n t e r e s t s .  
The o rgan iza t ion  which concerns  us  most is t h a t  a spec t  ol: a  g roup ' s  
s t r u c t u r e  which most d i r e c t l y  a f f e c t s  its capac i ty  t o  a c t  on i t s  t n t c r e s t s .  
C lea r ly  one of t h e  problems is t o  determine which fentclres of o rgnn izo t ion  
do make a  d i f f e r e n c e .  Is i t  p o s s i b l e ,  f o r  example, t h a t  how committed mem- -
b e r s  a r e  makes l i t t l e  d i f f e r e n c e  t o  tl ie form and i n t e n s i t y  of t h e i r  col -  
l e c t i v e  a c t i o n ?  Is i t  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  t h e  nea tnes s  of an o rgan iza t ion ' s  
d i v i s i o n  of l abo r  m a t t e r s  g r e a t l y ?  
Hobi.lizstion i s  t h e  p rocess  by which a  group acqu i r e s  c o l l e c t i v e  
c o n t r o l  over  t h e  r e sources  needed f o r  a c t i o n .  Those r e sources  may be l abo r  
power, goods, weapons, v o t e s  and any number of o t h e r  t h i n g s ,  j u s t  s o  long 
a s  they a r e  u sab le  i n  a c t i n g  on shared i n t e r e s t s .  Sometimes a  group such 
,- a s  s community has  a  complex i n t e r n a l  s t r u c t u r e ,  bu t  few pool.ed r e sources .  
Sometimes i t  is r i c h  i n  r e sources ,  but  t h e  r e sources  a r e  a l l  under i nd iv id -  
ual control. The analysis of mobilization deals witti the ways that groups 
acquire resources and make them available for collective action. 
Opportunity_ concerns the relationship between a group and the world 
around it. Changes in the relationship sometimes threaten the group's in- 
terests. They sometimes provide new chances to act on those interests. 
The trouble with studying opportunity is that it is hard to reconstruct the 
opportunities realistically available to the group at the time. Knowledge 
of later outcomes makes it too easy to second-guess a group's action, or 
inaction. We con minimize that disadvantage by looking only at contempor- 
ary collective action or by concentrating on situations in which the op- 
portunities are rigorously defined and strictly lindted. But then we lose 
our ability to follow large-scale changes, in their real complexity, over 
considerable periods of time. 
Collective action consists of people's acting together in pursuit of 
common interests. Collective action results from changing combinations of 
interests, organization, mobilization and opportunity. The most persistent 
problem we will face in analyzing collective action is ita lack of sharp 
edges: people v ~ r y  continuously from intensive involvement to passive 
compliance, interests vary from quite individual to nearly universal. To- 
ward the end of this book, we will pursue that complexity into the analysis 
of revolutionary processes. Our chief effort, then, will flow along the 
lines going from organization to mobilization to collective action to rev- 
olution. Especially from mobilization to revolution. 
In dealing with each of these problems, the analyses which follow 
make serious, debatable choices. With respect to interests, they give 
priority to economic and politico1 life. They favor a group's own articu- 
lation of its interest over the assumptions of contemporary observers and 
over our own retrospective judgment as to what would have been best for 
the group. Witti respect to organization, they focus on relntl.vely well- 
defined groups. They therefore neglect two fascinating sorta of questions: 
how new groups oriented to new world-views come into being, nnd under wl~ot 
conditions ill-defined sets of people such as pnnsersby or friendship nct- 
works become important collective actors. In regard to mobilization. they 
atress the factors of production -- land, labor, capital, technology -- 
and neglect the possibility that attitudes are more important resources 
for collective action than any of these. On the side of opportunity, tlie 
analyses in this book atress political opportunity. coalitlon, repression. 
relations among governments and well-defined contenders for power over 
those governments. When it comes to collective action as such, most of 
the concrete discussion deals with contentious gatherings: publicly visible 
assemblies in which conflicting interests are cle~rly in play. 
Groups, Events and Movements 
We find our subject-matter in the overlaps of three intersecting 
areas. Sometimes we are interested jn a particulnr population in its own 
terms. For example, we want to know what was happenlng to poor people in 
eighteenth-century Suffolk. Sometimes we are chiefly concerned with a set 
of beliefs. For instance, we wont to follow the r i ~ e  and fall of ideas 
about the proper treatment of the poor and incompetent. Sometimes certain 
kinds of action attract our attention; we might want to understand the con- 
ditions in which people take the law into their own hands. The study of 
collective action ordinarily requires us to deal with nt least two of these 
areas at once. We could dlagram tlie situation like tl~is: 
Figure  1-1 Units  i n  t h e  Study of C o l l e c t i v e  Action 
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We can t ake  groups a s  our  b a s i c  u n i t s  f o r  t h e  s tudy of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  
Then we t y p i c a l l y  s t a r t  w i th  s populat ion which has  some common s t r u c t u r e  
and shared b e l i e f s .  We a r e  l i k e l y  t o  accent  t hose  nc t ions  whicll we th lnk  
r e s u l t  from t h a t  combination of s t r u c t u r e  and b e l i e f s .  We pay r e l n t l v e l y  
l i t t l e  a t t e n t i o n  t o  o t h e r  v e r s i o n s  of t h e  some b e l i e f s  o r  t o  o t h e r  n c t i o n s  
of t h e  same kind. H i s t o r i e s  of t h e  working c l a s s  o f t e n  t ake  t h i s  form: 
much a t t e n t i o n  t o  changes i n  l i v i n g  cond i t i ons ;  work and i n t e r n a l  organiza-  
t i o n ;  p l en ty  of m a t e r i a l  on b e l i e f s  and out look;  a n a l y s i s  of t hose  a c t i o n s  
which appear t o  exp res s  t h e  c h a r a c t e r  of t h e  working-class populat ion and 
i ts b e l i e f s .  
We can a l s o  t ake  even t s  a s  o u t  s t a r t i n g  p o i n t .  We begin  wit11 a  
p a r t i c u l a r  r evo lu t ion ,  ceremony o r  con f ron ta t ion .  Or we begin  wi th  a  c l a s s  
of events :  a t t a c k s  on poorhouses, demonstra t ions ,  revolutions i n  gene ra l .  
I n  e i t h e r  c a s e ,  we become concerned about  popu la t ions  and h e l i e f s  t o  t h e  
e x t e n t  t h a t  they a r e  involved d i r e c t l y  i n  t h e  even t s .  Analyses of "col- 
l e c t i v e  behavior" comnonly t ake  t h i s  t ack .  At t h e i r  a b s t r a c t  extreme. 
they s t r i v e  f o r  gene ra l  laws governing a l l  a c t i o n s  of c e r t a i n  kinds  of 
populat ions:  l a r g e  crowds. f o r  example, o r  people  h i t  by d i s a s t e r .  . 
The no t ion  of a  "movement" i s  more complicated than t h e  l d e a s  of 
groups and even t s .  By a  s o c i a l  movement we o f t e n  mean a  group of people  
i d e n t i f i e d  by t h e i r  a t tachment  t o  some p a r t i c u l a r  s e t  of b e l i e f s .  In t h a t  
c a s e ,  t h e  populat ion i n  ques t ion  can change d r a s t i c a l l y ,  bu t  s o  long a s  
some group of people  i s  s t i l l  working wi th  t h e  same h e l i e f s ,  we cons ide r  
t h e  movement t o  su rv ive .  Thus t h e  Women's Movement s u r v i v e s  major changes 
i n  composition and i n t e r n a l  o rgan iza t ion .  But movement a l s o  commonly means 
a c t i o n .  People w r i t i n g  h i s t o r i e s  of t h e  women's movement a r e  q u i t e  l i k e l y  
t o  i nc lude  pas t  he ro ines  who were q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  i n  b e l i e f s  and pe r sona l  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  from c u r r e n t  a c t i v i s t s ,  j u s t  s o  long a s  t h e i r  a c t i o n s  were 
s i m i l a r  o r  had s i m i l a r  e f f e c t s .  The f a c t  t h a t  populat ion,  b e l i e f  and ac- 
t i o n  do no t  always change toge the r  causes  s e r i o u s  problems f o r  s t u d e n t s  of 
s o c i a l  movements. When they d ive rge ,  should  we fo l low t h e  b e l i e f s ,  whatever 
popu la t ions  and a c t i o n s  they become as soc ia t ed  wi th?  Should we fol low t h e  
populat ion.  wliotever b e l i e f s  and a c t i o n s  i t  adopts?  Should we fo l low t h e  
a c t i o n ,  r e g a r d l e s s  of who does i t  and wi th  what i deas?  
What You W i l l  Find Here 
This  book w i l l  g e n e r a l l y  avoid  t h e  a n a l y s i s  of s o c i a l  movements a s  
such. Never theless ,  p l en ty  of m a t e r i a l  o t h e r  people have analyzed under 
t h a t  heading w i l l  come i n t o  t h e  d i scuss ion .  We w i l l  a l t e r n a t e  between 
groups and even t s  a s  our  s t a r t i n g  p o i n t s  f o r  t h e  a n a l y s i s  of c o l l e c t i v e  ac- I 
t i o n .  Sometimes we w i l l  begin  by a sk ing  what peasan t s  a r e  up t o ,  and how 
t h a t  help8 us  understand r u r a l  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  Sometimes we w i l l  be- 
t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  of poor people. Sometimes we w i l l  t r y  t o  s t a r t  
both p l aces  a t  once, s ea rch ing  f o r  connect ions  between food r i o t s  and pea- 
s a n t  s o c i a l  l i f e ,  o r  between some o t h e r  c l a s s  of even t s  and some o t h e r  kind 
of s o c i a l  group. 
g i n  by a sk ing  what food r i o t s  a r e  about ,  and how t h a t  he lps  us  understand 
From Mobi l iza t ion to Revolution o f f e r s  both a  p a r t i a l  s y n t h e s i s  and -
I 
a  proposal  f o r  f u r t h e r  i nqu i ry .  A s  o  r e s u l t ,  i t  does  no t  con ta in  a  sus-  
t a ined  a n o l y a i s  of a  s i n g l e  body of evidence.  The i l l u s t r a t i o n s  and 
f i n d i n g s  run from brawls  t o  s t r i k e s  t o  r evo lu t ions .  A t  one po in t  o r  w- 
o t h e r  t h e  d i scuss ion  ranges  over  much of t h e  world. Most of t h e  m a t e r i a l .  
however, comes from t h e  expe r i ences  of Western Europe end North America 
over  t h e  l o s t  few c e n t u r i e s .  That focus  g i v e s  u s  much oppor tun i ty  t o  con- 
s i d e r  s ta temaking,  t h e  expansion of c a p i t a l i s m ,  i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n ,  urbani- 
z a t i o n ,  e l e c t o r a l  p o l i t i c s  and formally-organized i n t e r e s t  groups. A l l  of 
them have f igu red  impor t an t ly  i n  t h e  modern Europenn and American expe r i -  
ences  wi th  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  
The focus  on t h e  modern West a l s o  c o a t s  us  something. I t  g i v e s  u s  
l i t t l e  chance t o  t h ink  about  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  i n  t h e  absence of a  a t rong  
s t a t e ,  about  people  whose s o c i a l  r e l a t i o n s  a r e  orgnnized mainly around kin- 
s h i p ,  about  e x o t i c  movements such a s  ~ e l a n e s i a t i  cargo c u l t s .  The conclu- 
s i o n s  may, a t  b e s t ,  apply  on ly  t o  t h e  modern u rban - indus t r l a l  world. S t i l l .  
making sense  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  i n  t h a t  world i s  a  b i g  enough t a sk  f o r  
one book. 
The remaining chap te r s  fol low a  s imple  plan.  Cllspter 2 c a t a l o g s  
competing t h e o r i e s  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  i n  o rde r  t o  l a y  ou t  t h e  cho ices  
be fo re  u s  and t o  i d e n t i f y  t h e  major d isagreements  and u n c e r t a i n t i e s .  
Chapter 3 p r e s e n t s  and i l l u s t r a t e s  a  s imple  s e t  of concepts  and models f o r  
t h e  a n a l y s i s  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n ,  then works ou t  t h e i r  implications f o r  
t h e  ways groups a c q u i r e  t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  a c t ;  t h a t  chap te r  dwe l l s  on l n t e r -  
e s t s ,  o rgan iza t ion  and mob i l i za t ion .  Chapter 4 adds oppor tun i ty  t o  t h e  
a n a l y s i s ;  i t  dwe l l s  on c o n f l i c t ,  r ep re s s ion  and s t r u g g l e s  f o r  p w e r .  
Chapter 5 c l o s e s  i n  on t h e  s p e c i f i c  forma of c o l l e c t i v e  oc t ion :  how they 
vary,  how they r e l a t e  t o  each o t h e r .  and h w  they a l t e r  under t he  impact 
of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n ,  s ta temaking and o t h e r  b i g  s o c i s l  changes. Chnpter 
6 c l o s e s  i n  on v i o l e n t  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  wh i l e  Chapter 7 a p p l i e s  t h e  gene ra l  
l i n e  of reasoning t o  r e b e l l i o n s  and r evo lu t ions .  Chapter 8 then sums up 
conclus ions ,  and i n v e n t o r i e s  new problems encountered a long  t h e  way. 
CIIAPTER 2: TIIEORIES AND DESCRIPTIONS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 
Marx on 1848 
Well over  a  century ago. Kar l  Narx s e t  ou t  h i s  a n a l y s i s  of t h e  
French Revolution of 1848, and of t h e  i n t e r n a l  s t r u g g l e s  which engaged 
France f o r  t h e  next  fou r  yea r s .  To Marx, t h e  r evo lu t ion  was t h e  work 
of a  temporary c o a l i t i o n  among t h e  P a r i s i a n  p r o l e t a r i a t ,  t h e  p e t t y  
bourgeo i s i e  and an en l igh tened  fragment of t h e  bourgeois ie .  Among 
tlie mnny segments of t he  populat ion wi th  i n t e n s e  g r i evances  a g a i n s t  
t h e  e x i s t i n g  s t a t e  of a f f a i r s ,  t h e s e  were t h e  ones who combined a  
high degree  of i n t e r n a l  communication, a  consciousness  of common 
i n t e r e s t s ,  and a  c o l l e c t i v e  v i s i o n ,  however f l e e t i n g ,  of f u t u r e  
t ransformut ions  which could improve t h e i r  l o t .  
Altliough each group had i t s  own communications s t r u c t u r e ,  i t s  
own i n t e r e s t s  and i t s  own v i s i o n ,  i n  Marx' a n a l y s i s  tlie c r i s i s  of 
1846-47 drove them toge the r  and made t h e  regime vu lne rab le .  Thus 
they jo ined i n  t opp l ing  t h e  regime, a s  a  mi se rab le  bu t  incoherent  
peasantry  s o t  by, a s  t h e  bourgeois  of f i nance  and b ig  indus t ry  wrung 
t h e i r  hands, a s  t h e  g r e a t  l and lo rds  looked f o r  t h e i r  own ways t o  
p r o f i t  by t h e  d e s t r u c t i o n  of a  regime which had shunted them a s i d e .  
The c l a ~ s  base  of each p a r t i c i p a n t  l i m i t e d  i t s  r evo lu t iona ry  
v i s i o n  and checked i t s  a c t i v i t y .  The c l a s s  bases  of t h e  r evo lu t iona ry  
c o a l i t i o n  a s  a  whole, Marx thought.  condemned i t  t o  d e f a u l t  on t h e  
promises of s p r i n g  1848. Despi te  t h e  extension of t h e  r evo lu t iona ry  
c o a l i t i o n  t o  p r o l e t a r i a n s  and bourgeois  i n  a  few advanced c e n t e r s  
o u t s i d e  of P a r i s ,  t l ie r evo lu t iona ry  l eade r sh ip  compromised. I t  f a i l e d  
t o  expand i ts program o r  i t s  power. The c o a l i t i o n  began t o  d i s i n t e g r a t e  
a s  t h e  workers and t h e  bourgeois  w i th in  i t  headed s e p a r a t e  ways. A 
conse rva t ive  c o a l i t i o n  of l and lo rds  and bourgeois  formed, wit11 pas s ive  
support  from t h e  more comfor table  segments of t h e  peasantry .  Thus 
began t h e  process  which l ed  t o  Louis Napoleon's coup d ' 6 t a t  and t h e  
e s t ab l i shmen t  of an  empire, an  empire devoted t o  cancel ing t h e  g a i n s  
of t h e  r e v o l u t i o n  and i n s u r i n g  a g a i n s t  its recurrence.  Morx' accottnt 
conta ined a  good d e a l  more -- no t  l e a s t  t h e  r e l e n t l e s s  w i t  he t r a ined  
on t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  p e r s o n a l i t i e s  of '48 -- bu t  t h e s e  a r e  t h e  main l i n e s  
of t h e a n a l y s i s .  
Twelve decades of h i s t o r i c a l  work have i d e n t i f i e d  some gaps and 
e r r o r s  i n  Marx' a n a l y s i s .  For one example, Marx d id  no t  s e e  t h a t  many 
French workers were a l r eady  sympathet ic  t o  Bonaporte i n  1848. For 
ano the r ,  he  n e i t h e r  app rec i a t ed  t h e  e x t e n t  of t h e  armed r e s i s t a n c e  
t o  t h e  1851 coup nor recognized t h e  cons ide rab le  involvement oE 
l andwning  peasan t s  i n  t h a t  i n s u r r e c t i o n .  Yet t h e  arguments Morx 
s t a t e d  i n  The Eiuhteenth  Brumaire of Louis  Bonaparte and The Claos 
S t rugg le s  i n  France have s tood t h e  passage of t ime r a t h e r  we l l .  In 
h i s  book-length conf ron ta t ion  of Marx' account wit11 t h e  Second Republic 
s c h o l a r s  have come t o  k n w ,  Roger P r i c e  o f f e r s  many a  c a v i l  and no t  a  
few nuances, bu t  ends up i n  b a s i c  agreement.  The brood l i n e s  of Marx' 
* 
a n a l y s i s  have survived more then a  hundred y e a r s  of h i s t o r i c a l  c r i t i c i s m .  
* For a  determined a t tempt  t o  review and r e v i s e  Morx' arguments 
concerning t h e  dctermlnonts  of worker mi l i t nncy ,  which concludes  
wi th  a  more ex tens ive  r e s t a t emen t  than P r i c e  f i n d s  necessary  f o r  
1848, s e e  J .  A .  ~ a n k s '  Marxist Sociology i n  Action. 
Few i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  of h i s t o r i c a l  even t s  l a s t  a s  long a s  a  
century.  Some endure because s c h o l a r s  l o s e  i n t e r e s t s  i n  tlie events .  
o t h c r s  because they f i t  p r e v a i l i n g  p re jud ices  and doc t r ines .  t h e  
remaining few because they exp la in  what happened b e t t e r  than t h e i r  
avai . lable  compet i tors  do. Although t h e  r i s e  of Marxist d o c t r i n e s  
and p o l i t i c a l  movements has  undoubtedly promoted t h e  acceptance of 
Morx' h i s t o r i c a l  ana lyses  a s  we l l ,  i t  has  a l s o  d i r e c t e d  c r i t i c i s m  
and new re sea rch  t o  h i s  main arguments. That they hove survived 
t e s t i f i e s  t o  t h e i r  explanatory power. 
I f  t h a t  is s o ,  we might pay a t t e n t i o n  t o  Marx' mode of a n a l y s i s .  
Tmpllc i t ly .  Harx divided t h e  e n t i r e  populat ion i n t o  s o c i a l  c l a s s e s  
based on t h e l r  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  t o  t h e  p r e v a i l i n g  means of product ion.  
E x p l i c i t l y ,  he i d e n t i f i e d  t h e  major v i s i b l e  a c t o r s  i n  t h e  p o l i t i c s  
of t h e  time wi th  t h e i r  c l a s s  bases ,  o f f e r l n g  judgments of t h e i r  b a s f c  
i n t e r e s t s ,  conscious  a s p i r a t i o n s ,  a r t i c u l a t e d  g r i evances  and c o l l e c t i v e  
r cad ines s  f o r  a c t i o n .  C la s ses  a c t ,  o r  f a i l  t o  a c t .  I n  gene ra l ,  
i n d i v i d u a l s  and i n s t i t u t i o n s  a c t  on behalf  of p a r t i c u l a r  s o c i a l  
c l a s s e s .  (There is an important  except ion:  i n  analyzing Louis  
Napoleon's s e i z u r e  of power. Marx allowed t h a t  t hose  who run t h e  
s t a t e  may a c t ,  a t  l e a s t  f o r  a  wh i l e ,  i n  t h e i r  own p o l i t i c a l  i n t e r e s t  
w i t l ~ o u t  r e f e rence  t o  t h e i r  c l a s s  base . )  I n  ana lyz ing  r ead ines s  t o  
a c t .  Uarx a t t ached  g r e a t  importance t o  t h e  e a s e  and d u r a b i l i t y  of 
communications wi t t~ i . n  t h e  c l a s s ,  t o  t h e  v i s i b l e  presence of a  c l a s s  
enemy. When Morx' p o l i t i c a l  a c t o r s  a c t e d ,  they d id  s o  o u t  of common 
i n t e r e s t s ,  mutual awareness and i n t e r n a l  o rgan iza t ion .  
A s  compared wi th  o t h e r  a n a l y s t s  of t h e  same even t s ,  Harx a t t ached  
l i t t l e  importance t o  gene ra l i zed  t ens ion ,  momentary impulses o r  
pe r sona l  d i so rgan iza t ion .  While he  saw t h e  Lumpenprole tar ia t  o s  
l i a b l e  t o  crime and d i s o r d e r ,  he a l s o  sow a  world of difference between 
, brawling and making r evo lu t ions .  I f  you want t o  analyze major c o n f l i c t s ,  
we hear  him t e l l i n g  u s ,  i d e n t i f y  t h e  major c l a s s e s  and i n t e r e s t s  which 
emerge from t h e  o rgan iza t ion  of product lon.  Catalogue t h e  r c s u l t l n g  
c o n f l i c t s  of i n t e r e s t .  Examine each c l a s s  you have enumerated i n  terms 
of i t s  preparedness  t o  a c t  on i ts i n t e r e s t s .  Work o u t  tlie c l a s s  bases  
of t h e  ch ie f  i n s t i t u t i o n s  and l e a d e r s  involved i n  t h e  c o n f l i c t .  Wntch 
ou t  f o r  c r i s e s  which make t h e  dominant c lo s sea  vu lne rab le ,  sod expect  
t h e  organized unde rc l a s ses  t o  s t r i k e .  There is much more t o  i t ,  bu t  
t hose  a r e  Marx' e s s e n t i a l  i n s t r u c t i o n s .  
We a r e  dea l ing  wi th  a  theory of c o l l e c t i v e  ac t ion :  of t h e  
cond i t i ons  i n  which people  a c t  t oge the r  i n  p u r s u i t  of common ends .  
Harx' theory of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  i s  deba tab le .  It i s  not  s e l f -  
ev iden t  t h a t  s o c i a l  c l a s s e s  and t h e i r  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  a r e  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  
a c t o r s  i n  p o l i t i c s .  It i s  no t  n e c e s s a r i l y  t r u e  t h a t  pr ior  o rgan iza t ion  
s t r o n g l y  a f f e c t s  a  group'a r ead ines s  t o  nc t .  It can e a s i l y  be 
mainta ined,  con t r a ry  t o  Harx, t h a t  p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  mass movements 
tend t o  i gnore  t h e i r  own t r u e  i n t e r e s t s .  The Morxinn theory emplinsizes 
t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  r a t i o n a l i t y  of p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n .  
Nowadays, ~ a r x '  theory sounds f a m i l i a r .  I n  some wnyu i t  seems 
obvious. Yet i n  tlie n ine t een th  century.  i t  broke d e c i s i v e l y  wl th  tlie 
p r e v a i l i n g  sccoun t s  of mass a c t i o n .  Other t h e o r i e s  t r e n t e d  " the  
people" a s  i ncapab le  of cont inuous ,  c a l c u l a t i n g  p u r s u i t  of t h c i r  
c o l l e c t i v e  i n t e r e s t s ,  a s  responding mainly t o  impulses -- good impulses 
o r  bffd -- and t o  manipula t ion by e l i t e s .  Today t h e  Hdrxlon view aga in  
has  important  compet i tors .  The condescending nineteenth-century view 
of mass action has remained popular with critics of democracy. It 
has lingered on in academic analyses of "mass society." And that theory. 
too, has rivals. 
Among processional students of politics, at least three additional 
lines of argument have acquired eloquent advocates. We can identify 
the lines loosely with three other nineteenth-century and early 
twentieth-century figures: Emile Durkheim. John Stuart Mill and Max 
Weber. Figure 2-1 sketches out the general logic of Marxian, Durkheim- 
Ian, Millian and Weberisn analyses. The Marxisn analysis, as we have 
just seen, generally traces collective action back to solidarity 
within groups and conflicts of interest between groups, considers 
the solidarity and tlie conflicts of interest to reinforce each other, 
and bases both of them on the organization of production. Durkheim 
treated collective action as a relatively direct response to processes 
of integration and disintegration in whole societies. As the diagram 
suggests, his followers have developed rather different explanations 
of routine and non-routine collective action. The non-routine forms. 
according to Durkheimians, grow from the discontent and pursuit of 
individual interests produced by disintegration of the division of 
labor; under conditions of routine integration, on tlie other hand, 
aolidnrity leads to collective action, which in its turn reinforces 
solidarity. Mill rooted collective action in the strictly calculating 
pursuit of individual interest. The distinctive approach of Millians, 
as the diagram indicates, is the analysis of the various decision 
rules which translate individual interests into individual action and 
which aggregate individual actions into collective action. Max Weber, 
finally, portrayed collective action as the outgrowth of commitment to 
Figure 2-1: Competing Analyses 
of Collective Action 
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c e r t a i n  systems of b e l i e f .  Weberians, l i k e  Durkheimions, tend t o  propose 
d i f f e r e n t  exp lana t ions  f o r  r o u t i n e  and non-routine c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n :  
i n  t h e  non-routine forms t h e  shared b e l i e f s  of t h e  group have a  s t rong ,  
d i r e c t  impsct on t h e  g roup ' s  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n ,  wh i l e  a s  a c t i o n  r o u t i n i z e s  
two th ings  happen: o rgan iza t ion  grows up t o  mediate  between t h e  b e l i e f s  
and t h e  a c t i o n ,  and group i n t e r e s t s  p lay a  l a r g e r  and more d i r e c t  r o l e  
i n  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  
Marx. Durkheim, M i l l  and Neber had d i s t i n c t i v e l y  d i f f e r e n t  views 
of t h e  world, and bequeathed t o  thei ;  h e i r s  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  
ana lyses  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  Let  us  review c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  ana lyses  
i n  t he  Durkhcimian, Mi l l i on  and Weberian t r a d i t i o n s  be fo re  r e t u r n i n g  t o  
t h e  Mnrxian l i n e  of argument. 
Durkheim 
Durkheim c r y s t a l l i z e d  a  widespread nineteenth-century view o f .  
what i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n  was doing t o  t h e  world. He fashioned i t  i n t o  
a  s e t  of arguments which have remained dominant i n  sociology,  e s p e c i a l l y  
h e r i c a n , s o c i o l o g y ,  up t o  our  own time. A s  T a l c o t t  Parsons  put  i t :  
. . . i t  was t h e  problem of t h e  i n t e g r a t i o n  of t h e  s o c i a l  system, 
of wliat l ~ o l d s  s o c i e t i e s  t oge the r ,  which was t h e  most p e r s i s t e n t  
preoccupat ion of Durkheim's c a r e e r .  I n  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  of t h e  time, 
one could no t  have chosen a  more s t r a t e g i c  focus  f o r  c o n t r i b u t i n g  
t o  s o c i o l o g i c a l  theory.  Moreover, t h e  work Durkheim d id  i n  t h i s  
f i e l d  can be  s a i d  t o  have been nothing s h o r t  of epoch-making; he 
d id  not  s t and  e n t i r e l y  a lone ,  bu t  h i s  work was f a r  more sha rp ly  
focused and deeply  p e n e t r a t i n g  than t h a t  of any o t h e r  au tho r  of 
h i s  t imc (Parsons 1960: 118) .  
In  The Div i s ion  of Labor i n  S o c i e t y  and i n  Su lc ide ,  Durkheim l n i d  o u t  
a  view o f  something c a l l e d  a  "socie ty"  d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g  uns t ead i ly  i n  
response t o  a  v a r i e t y  of p re s su res .  Spenking a b s t r a c t l y ,  Durkheim 
summed up those  p re s su res  a s  a  growth i n  t h e  volume and d e n s i t y  of 
s o c i e t y .  Speaking c o n c r e t e l y ,  he d i scussed  occupot ionol  changes. 
The p re s su res  emphat ical ly  included t h e  i n t e r n a l  l o g i c  of Lndus- 
t r i a l i z a t i o n .  On t h e  very f i r s t  page of Divis ion of Labor, Durkhcim 
t e l l s  us  
We need have no f u r t h e r  i l l u s i o n s  about t h e  t endenc ie s  of modern 
indus t ry :  i t  advances s t e a d i l y  towards powerful mochines. 
towards g r e a t  concen t r a t ions  of f o r c e s  and c a p i t o l ,  and consequent ly  
t o  t h e  extreme d i v i s i o n  of l abo r .  Occupations a r e  i n f i n i t e l y  
s epa ra t ed  and s p e c i a l i z e d ,  not  only  i n s i d e  t h e  f a c t o r i e s ,  but  
each product is  i t s e l f  a  s p e c i a l t y  dependent upon o t h e r s  (Durkhelm 
1933: 39).  
The " soc ie ty , "  according t o  Durkheim, e x e r t s  its c o n t r o l  over  i n d i v i d u a l s  
v i a  t h e i r  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  a  shared consciousness .  A s  Durkheim p u t s  i t ,  
"The t o t a l i t y  of b e l i e f s  and sent iments  common t o  average c i t i z c n s  of t h e  
same s o c i e t y  forms a  de t e rmina te  system which has  i t s  own l i f e ;  one may 
c a l l  i t  t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  o r  common conscience" (Durkheim 1933: 79). The 
advancing d i v i s i o n  of l a b o r ,  he s a y s ,  t h r e a t e n s  t h e  shared consciousness  
based on t h e  e s s e n t i a l  s i m i l a r i t y  of i n d i v i d u a l s ,  and thereby t h r e a t e n s  
t h e  primacy of t h e  needs and demands of t h e  s o c i e t y  a s  a  whole over  t h e  
impulses and i n t e r e s t s  of t h e  i n d i v i d u a l .  A new shared consciousness  
based on in terdependence and common f a t e  is both problemat ic  and slow 
t o  emerge. I n t o  t h e  gap between t h e  l e v e l  of d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  and t h e  
l e v e l  of shared consciousness  moves e. 
To be precise, anomie is Durkheim's name for that gap between the 
degree of differentiation and the extent of regulation of social relations; 
from it he derives a set of undesirable results: individual disorienta- 
tion, destructive social life, extensive conflict. Uis concrete examples 
again come almost entirely from the industrial world. They are the 
economic crash, the conflict between management and labor, the separation 
of work arid family life, and so on through the standard concerns of 
nineteenth-century reformers. 
In Suicide. Durklieim sketches the consequences of a rapid growth in 
power and wealth: 
Time is required for the public conscience to reclassify men and 
things. So long as the social forces tlius freed have not regained 
equilibrium, their respective values are unknown and so all 
regulation is lacking for a time . . . Consequently, there is no 
restraint upon aspirations . . . With increased prosperity desires 
increase. At the very moment when traditional rules have lost 
thcir autl~ority, the richer prize offered these appetites stimulates 
them and makes them more exigent and impatient of colitrol. The 
state of de-regulation or anomy is thus further heightened by 
passions being less dlsclplined, precisely when they need more 
disciplining (Durkheim 1951: 253). 
We begin to see that Durkheim not only propounded a theory of social 
chnnge, but also proposed a theory of collective action. 
In fact, he proposed two or three of each. When it comes to the 
link between large-scale social change and collective action, we find 
Durkheim distinguishing sharply between the orderly pursuit of shared 
interests which occurs when the division of labor is not outrunning the 
shared consciousness, and the free-for-all which results from anomie. 
Later. in The Elementary Forms of the Religious E, we find Durkheim 
analyzing the solidarity producing consequences of ritualized, approved 
forms of collective action. In an amazingly anthropomorphic passage. IIC 
says: 
When a society is going through circumstances which sadden, perplex 
or irritate it, it exercises a pressure over its members, to make 
them bear witness, by significant acts, to their sorrow, perplexity 
or anger. It imposes upon them the duty of weeping, groaning or 
inflicting wounds upon themselves or others, for these collective 
manifestations, and the moral communion which they show and 
strengthen, restore to the group the energy which circumntances 
threaten to take away from it, and tlius they enable it to hecome 
settled (Durkheim 1961: 459). 
The basic Durkheimisn idea presents s society strained by a continuous 
struggle between forces of disintegration (notably rapid differentiation) 
and forces of integration (notably new or renewed commitment to al~sred 
beliefs). From the basic notion Durkheim derives models of three 
different kinds of collective action: let us call them routine, snomic. 
and restorative. 




Fjgure  2-2: Durklieim's Analysis  
of C o l l e c t i v e  Action 
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The shaded a r e a  above t h e  d i agona l  is nnfe;  t h e r e ,  t h e  development of 
shared b e l i e f  is equa l  t o  or g r e a t e r  than t h e  s t r e s s  imposed by 
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  and o t h e r  c a l a m i t i e s .  The a r e a  below the  dingonnl  is 
dangerous: t h e r e ,  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  o u t s t r i p s  t h e  e x t e n t  of shared b e l i e f .  
Routine c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  goes  on i n  t h e  s a f e  a r e a ,  and renews shared 
b e l i e f  r o u t i n e l y .  Anomic c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  i n c r e a s e s  a s  t h e  noc ie ty  
s l i d e s  down from tlie d iagonal .  and pe rpe tua t e s  i t n e l f  by shaking slinred 
b e l i e f s  even more tlian they were a l r eady  shaken. Res to ra t ive  co l . l ec t ive  
a c t i o n  occu r s  near  t h e  d i agona l ,  and moves t h e  s o c i e t y  back i n t o  t h e  s a f e  
a r ea .  Although t h e  language ts a  l i t t l e  odd, tlie argument is very f a m i l i a r .  
Durkheim'a theory,  i n  c o n t r a s t  t o  Marx'. l e a d s  u s  t o  expect  anomic 
and r e s t o r a t i v e  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  t o  r i s e a s d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  acce l e rn t en .  
I t  l e a d s  us  t o  a n t i c i p a t e  f i n d i n g  tlie populat ions  newly c rea t ed  o r  d i s -  
placed by d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  a t  t h e  c e n t e r  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  It 
p r e d i c t s  s c l o s e  a s s o c i a t i o n  among s u i c i d e ,  cr ime,  violence rind non- 
r o u t i n e  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  In  t h e  twen t i e th  century.  most t h e o r i e s  
f o r c o l l e c t i v e  behavior  embody some ve r s ion  of t l ie Durkhejmian argument. 
Indeed, t h e  s t anda rd  ana lyses  of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n ,  u rbsn ien t Ion ,  deviance. 
s o c i a l  c o n t r o l ,  s o c i a l  d i s o r g a n i z ~ t i o n  and c o l l e c t i v e  behavior which 
e m e r g e d i n t h e  twen t i e th  century a l l  bbre  t h e  Durkheimian stomp. 
The Durkheimian T r a d i t i o n  
To s e e  t h i s  c l e a r l y ,  we need only  exnmine an i n f l u e n t i n 1  book from 
the  19608: Samuel Hunt ington 's  P o l i t i c a l  Order i n  Changlng S o c i e t i e s .  
Huntington a rgues  t h a t  t h e  ex tens ive  domestic con f l . i c t  i n  developing 
c o u n t r i e s  a f t e r  World War I1 r e s u l t e d  from t h e  f a c t  t h a t  p o l i t t c a l  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  developed only  s lowly,  wh i l e  r ap id  s o c i n l  change both  
placed new s t r a i n  on e x i s t i n g  p o l i t i c a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  and promoted tlie 
participation of new, demanding groups in political life. Concretely: 
Social and economic change -- urbanization, increases in literacy 
and education, industrialization, mass media expansion -- extend 
political consciousneaa, multiply political demands, broaden political 
participation. These changes undermine traditional sources of 
political authority and traditional political institutions; they 
enormoua1.y complicate the problems o,F cresting new bases of political 
association and new political institutions combining legitimacy and 
effectiveness. The rates of social mobilization and the expansion 
of political participation are high; the rates of political organization 
and institutionalization are low. The result is political instability 
and disorder (Huntington 1968: 5 ) .  
Tlle larger the discrepancy between institutionalization and modernization. 
the greater the disorder. At the extreme lies revolution: "The 
political essence of revolution is the rapid expansion of political 
consciousness and the rapid mobilization of new groups into politics 
at a speed which makes it impossible for existing political institutions 
to assimilate them" (Huntington 1968: 266). 
In this formulation, either a speedup of instittltionalization or a 
slowdown of modernization will decrease the amount of disorder. But if 
political institutions are very rigid, they will inhibit essential social 
change. Schematically, Huntington's analysis takes the pattern of Figure 
2-3. Furthermore, the argument describes different paths through these 
possibilities, depending on the pace of social change: 
Figure 2-3: Iluntington's 
Basic Argument 
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Figure 2-4: Trajectories of Slow and Rapid Social 
Change in Huntington's Argument 
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Slow social cl~onge, then, is likely to be orderly throughout its course. 
Rnpid social change brings a likelihood of disorder, and a possibility 
L 
of revolution. The similarity to Durkheim is impressive. Institutional- 
ization takes the place of Durkheim's shared beliefs, modernization the 
place of Durklieim's differentiation. Huntington's model is much more 
clearly political than Durkheim's. On the one side of Huntington's , 
argument, the capacity of political institutions (not of society in 
general) to handle new demands becomes crucial. On the other, the 
political mobilization of new groups and the production of new political 
problems are the chicf means by which modernization incites disorder. 
Yet Durkheim could not have disagreed very vociferously; at most he 
would hove insisted on the importance of non-political restraints, 
especially religion, ritual, and occupational organization. The 
Durkheimian argument is very much alive. (For an empirical evaluation 
of onc part of Huntington's argument -- casting doubt on rapid mobiliza- 
tion as a major source of political disorder -- see Przeworski 1975). 
Another version from the 1960s appears in Chalmers Johnson's 
Revolutionary Change. Johnson identifies three clusters of causes for 
revolution: 
1. A disequilibrated social system, especially one with power 
deflation: "the fact that during a period of change the inte- 
gration of a system depends increasingly upon the maintenance and 
deployment of force by the occupants of the formal authority 
statuses" (Johnson 1966: 90). 
2.  Inability of authorities to develop policies which mnintaln the 
confidence of ordinary people. 
3 . .  Events, often fortuitous, which deprive tlie elite of thetr 
means of enforcing conformity, or which lead revolutionary groups 
to believe they can deprive the elite of those means. 
Johnson then links these very general phenomena to individual behavior 
through the sequence: 
rapid change 
systemic disequilibrium \ 
overtaxing of existing means of homeostatic and purposive 
response to change . \ 
individual disorientation 
-panic-anxiety-shame-guilt-depression, ctc. \ formation of movements of protest 
True to his Durkheimian heritage, he proposes the suicide rate as o 
prime index of disequilibrium. 
The Durkheimian kernel in Johnson's scheme hns around it a husk 
of post-Durkheimisn,words and ideas. Johnson's analysis of revolution 
differs from Huntington's in several important regards. It is even more 
strictly political than Huntington's. The pivotal vnriablc is tlie 
authority of the established elite. Yet the central idea treots disorder 
as the outcome of a process in which social change weakens the controls 
and attachments which under more stable conditions hold people in their 
places. 
Let us take a third recent example: Ted Gurr's Why Men Rebel. 
Gurr seeks to provide a general explanation of "political violence." 
Political violence includes all collective attacks on major political 
a c t o r s  -- e s p e c i a l l y  agen t s  of t h e  s t a t e  -- w i t h i n  a  p a r t i c u l a r  community. 
In s t ead  of e l a b o r a t i n g  a  theory of how p o l i t i c a l  communities ope ra t e ,  
however, Gurr concen t r a t e s  on exper iences  which happen t o  i n d i v i d u a l s  
nnd then cumulaee i n t o  mass a c t i o n .  
Gur r ' s  c e n t r a l  arguments concern a  psychological  process .  Ind iv idua l s  
nnger when they sense  a  l a r g e  gap between what they g e t  and what they 
deserve.  That can happen through a  d e c l i n e  i n  what they g e t ,  o r  s r i s e  
i n  what they f e e l  they dese rve .  Given t h e  chance, angry people  r e b e l .  
Whcn many people go through t h a t  same exper ience of i n c r e a s i n g  Re la t ive  
Deprivat ion p lus  widening oppor tun i ty  f o r  r e b e l l i o n  a t  t h e  same time. 
p o l i t i c a l  v io l ence  gene ra l i ze s .  Gurr once summarized t h e  argument i n  
t h i s  way: 
blsgnitude of 
poJ . i t i ca1  = RD + (RD x JUST x BALANCE) + 
v io lence  
"wl~ere R D  is  t h e  scope nnd i n t e n s i t y  of r e l a t i v e  dep r iva t ion  ( d i s -  
con ten t )  i n  a  popu l s t ion ;  JUST is t h e  scope and i n t e n s i t y  of b e l i e f s  
i n  t h a t  populat ion about  t h e  j u s t i f i a b i l i t y  and u t i l i t y  of engaging 
i n  o v e r t  s t r i f c ;  BALANCE r e f e r s  t o  t h e  balance of o rgan iza t ion  and 
coe rc ive  c a p n c i t i e s  between d i s s i d e n t s  and regimes; and is an e r r o r  
term" (Curr h Duval 1973: 137). S imi l a r  i deas  hove o f t e n  emerged i n  
t h e  a n a l y s i s  of American g l ~ e t t o  r e b e l l i o n s .  of La t in  Anlerican pa l ace  
coups, and of t h e  French Revolution. We saw p a r t  of t h e  argument 
formulated i n  Durkhelm's t rea tment  of s u i c i d e .  Gurr has  exp l i ca t ed  t h e  
l o g i c  of t h i s  l i n e  of n n a l y s l s ,  and developed means of measuring n  
number of t he  v a r i n b l e s  involved -- al though n o t ,  na i t  happens, t o  
measure RD and JUST d i r e c t l y .  
Gurr complements h i s  argument w i th  an a n a l y s i s  of 1 ,100 " s t r i f e  
events"  which occurred i n  114 s t a t e s  o r  co lon ie s  from 1961 through 1965. 
In  t h e  f i r s t  round of a n a l y s i s ,  Gurr t akes  t h e  r e s u l t s  a s  conf i rming t h e  
i n f l u e n c e  of some of t h e  v a r i a b l e s  which presumably produce RD, some 
v a r i a b l e s  measuring behavior  which presumably r e f l e c t  JUST and, 
e s p e c i a l l y ,  a  c l u s t e r  of v a r i a b l e s  o u t s i d e  t h e  co re  theory:  S o c i a l  
and S t r u c t u r a l  F a c i l i t a t i o n .  A l a t e r  formulat ion c o n t a i n s  much l e s s  
psychology. I n  t h e  new s e t  of models, t h e  major p r e d i c t o r s  t o  t h e  
magnitude of p o l i t i c a l  v io l ence  r ep resen t  " ' c leavages '  and d i sc r imina to ry  
i n e q u a l i t i e s  . . . r e l a t i v e  impoverishment and fo re ign  economic exp lo i -  
t a t i o n  . . . shor t - term d e c l i n e s  i n  economic condf t ions  . . . rcgimc 
imposi t ion of new p o l i t i c a l  s a n c t i o n s  . . . h i s t o r i c a l  p e r s i s t e n c e  of 
d i s s i d e n t - i n i t i a t e d  c o n f l i c t s  . . . l e v e l  of economic development . . . 
e x t e r n a l  i n t e r v e n t i o n  on behalf  of d i s s i d e n t s "  (Gurr h Duval 1973: 
138-139). These v a r i a b l e s  do appear t o  account Jo i r l t l y  f o r  a  good d e a l  
of t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  v a r i a t i o n  i n  major domestic c o n f l i c t s  from 1961 
through 1965. I n  t h i s  r e fo rmula t ion ,  Ilowever, t h e  Durkl~elmlsn Lint  has  
almost bleached away. To t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  t h e  models embody a  c e n t r a l  
argument, t he  argument accen tua t e s  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  a c t o r s '  i n t e r c a t s  and 
capac i ty  t o  a c t .  
The s t anda rd  Durkheiminn arguments,  a s  we have seen ,  s e l e c t  heav i ly  
from among t h e  determinants  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  - organ iza t ion ,  
mob i l i za t ion ,  oppor tun i ty  and i n t e r e s t s .  On t h e  whole, they neg lec t  
t h e  a n a l y s i s  of o rgan iza t ion  and mob i l i za t ion  i n  favor  o f  a vlcw of 
c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  a s  a  r e s u l t a n t  of i n t e r e s t  p l u s  oppor tuni ty .  The 
p reva len t  ve r s ion  of i n t e r e s t ,  fur thermore,  is n t t i t u d i n a l :  t h e  
mot iva t ions ,  a n x i e t i e s  and needs of i nd iv idua l s .  Opportunl ty ,  i n  t h e  
Durkheimian l i n e ,  c o n s i s t s  mainly of t h e  presence o r  absence of s o c i a l  
c o n t r o l s  dver  t h c  expres s ion 'o f  t hose  mot iva t ions ,  a n x i e t i e s  and needs. 
Tf we t ake  Durkheimian arguments s e r i o u s l y ,  we w i l l  expect  t o  f i n d  
sha rp  d i s c o n t i n u i t y  between r o u t i n e  and non-routine c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n ;  
t h e i r  causes ,  con ten t  and consequences w i l l  a l l  d i f f e r  s i g n i f i c a n t l y .  
We w i l l  hypothesize  t h a t  t h e  f a s t e r  and more ex tens ive  t h e  s o c i a l  change, 
t h e  more widespread the  onomic and r e s t o r a t i v e  forms of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n ;  
conc re t e ly ,  we w i l l  expect  r ap id  i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n  o r  u rban iza t ion  t o  
produce excep t iona l ly  high l e v e l s  of c o n f l i c t  and p r o t e s t .  We w i l l  
srlppose t h a t  i nd iv idua l  d i s o r d e r  and c o l l e c t i v e  p r o t e s t  a r e  c l o s e l y  
t i e d  t o  each o t h e r ,  and sometimes i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e .  We w i l l  argue 
t h a t  t h e  more coherent  and compelling a  group 's  b e l i e f s ,  t h e  l e s s  l i k e l y  
i t  is t o  engage i n  d i s o r d e r l y  behavior .  We w i l l  imagine t h a t  s h i f t s  i n  
i nd iv idua l  d l s s o t i n f a c t i o n s  and a n x i e t i e s  a r e  t h e  s t r o n g e s t  and most 
r c l i a b l e  p r e d i c t o r s  of c o l l e c t i v e  con ten t ion .  
Some ve r s ion  of t h e  Durkheimian formulat ion hns been the  dominant 
exp lana t ion  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  -- e s p e c i a l l y  con ten t ious  and non- 
rou t ine  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  -- f o r  c l o s e  t o  a  century.  I t  sti l l  appea l s  
t o  many people today. Never theless ,  even i n  America, Durkheim's a n a l y s i s  
hns never q u i t e  squeezed out  i t s  major r i v a l s :  arguments i n  t h e  t r a d i -  
t i o n s  of M i l l .  Weber and Marx. 
M i l l  and t h e  U t i l i t a r i a n s  
John S t u a r t  M i l l  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  t reatment  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  a s  
a  s t r i c t l y  c a l c ~ ~ l a t i n g  p u r s u i t  of i nd iv idua l  i n t e r e s t .  Among t h e  Engl ish  
U t i l i t a r i a n s ,  we f ind  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  acqu ie sc ing  i n  a  s e t  of b inding 
p o l i t i c a l  arrangements (n s t e t e ,  t h e  r u l e s  of t h e  game o r  some system 
of cooperat ion)  a t  t h e  expense of some of h i s  shor t - run i n t e r e s t s .  He 
does so  i n  o r d e r  t o  i n s u r e  t h e  p u r s u i t  of h i s  i n t c r e s t s  i n  t h e  long run. 
As Buchanan and Tul lock say of Mill's most d i s t i ngu i shed  predccesnor: 
Hume recognized,  of cou r se ,  t h a t  were i t  poossible, t h e  i n d i v l d ~ l a l ' s  
own i n t e r e s t  would b e s t  be  served by t h e  adher ing t o  t h e  convcnt ional  
r u l e s  of e l l  o the r  persons  bu t  himself wh i l e  remaining f r e e  t o  v i o l a t e  
t hese  r u l e s .  However, p r e c i s e l y  because such r u l e s  a r e  s o c i a l l y  
de r ived ,  they must apply  gene ra l ly .  Ilence each ind iv idua l  must 
recognize  t h a t ,  were he t o  be  f r e e  t o  v i o l a t e  convent ion,  o t h c r s  
must be s i m i l a r l y  f r e e ,  and a s  compared wi th  t h i s  c h a o t i c  s t a t e  of 
a f f a i r s ,  he  w i l l  r a t i o n a l l y  choose t o  accep t  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on h i s  
own behavior  (Buchsnan h Tullock 1962: 315): 
The key a n a l y t i c  ques t ions  concern t h e  determinants  of i nd iv idua l  
d e c i s i o n s ,  t he  c o l l e c t i v e  consequences of a l t e r n a t i v e  dec i s ion  r u l e s ,  
and t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n  between t h e  two. 
M i l l  and t h e  U t i l i t a r i a n s  a r e  imperfect  exemplars of t he  r e l evan t  
twent ie th-century l i n e  of argument. The i r  account of collective a c t i o n  
d e a l t  almost exc lus ive ly  wi th  t h e  s t a t e .  I t  gave nlmost no a t t e n t i o n  
e i t h e r  t o  t h e  s t r i v i n g  of groups between t h e  ind iv idua l  and t h c  s t a t e  
a s  a  determinant  of p o l i t i c a l  d e c i s i o n s  o r  t o  t h e  exp lana t ion  of t h e  
behavior  of t h e  groups themselves. "The ind iv idua l i sm of t h e  u t i l i t o r i o n s .  
t h e i r  exp lana t ion  of s o c i a l  phenomena by e  humah psychology supposedly 
p r i o r  t o  s o c i e t y , "  colmnents John Plamenatz (1949: 158). "nlso  made 
them i n d i f f e r e n t  t o  s o c i a l  c l a s s e s .  They conceived of ~ o c i e t y  a s  
composed of a  number of competing indivldr lnls  and not  of r i v a l  g r o ~ ~ p s . "  
For John S t u a r t  M i l l ,  i t  would be more a c c u r a t e  t o  s ay  Ile feRred 
c l a s s  a c t i o n  than t o  say be ignored i t .  In  a  chap te r  of h i s  9 r c s e n t a t i v e  
Government titled OF THE INFIRMITIES AND DANCERS TO WllICH REPRESENTATIVE 
GOVERNMENT IS LIABLE, Mill wrote "If we consider as a class, politically 
speaking, any number of persons who have the same sinister interest -- 
that is, whose direct and apparent interest points toward the same 
description of bad measures; the desirable object would be that no class, 
and no combination of classes likely to combine, should be able to 
' exercise a preponderant influence in the government" (Mill 1950: 342). 
(The term "sinister interest" comes from Bentham.) At some points in 
hia political career. Mi11 feared the class action of landowners: at 
others, of landless laborers (Duncan 1973: chapter 6). But at all 
points he considered it natural and inevitable that a class given an 
opportunity to act on a particular narrow interest would do so. The 
task of government -- and of a theory of representative government -- 
was to forestall that opportunity, to make likely action on the common 
interest of the entire population. 
tlill's liberal solution and his cautious optimism foreshadowed 
those of twentieth-century pluralists: 
The reason why, in any tolerably constituted society, justice 
and the general interest mostly in the end carry their point, 
is that the separate and selfish interests of mankind are almost 
always divided: some are interested in what is wrong, but some, 
also, have their private interest on the side of what is right; 
and those who are governed by higher considerations, though too 
few and weak to prevail against the whole of the others, usually 
after sufficient discussion and agitation become strong enough 
to turn the bnlance in favour of the body of private interests 
which is on the some side with them (Mill 1950: 343). 
A good constitution and a valid theory of political obligation, 
thought Mill, would facilitate that outcome. 
By contrast with Mill, twentieth-century theorists of indivldunl 
interests show relatively little interest in the general problem of 
political obligation. Instead, they show much interest in two other 
problems: the consequences of alternative decision rules and tlie 
causes and effects of different forms of interest-group politics. Yet 
Mill is a useful symbol for a line of argument which leads us to expect 
collective action to fluctuate largely as a consequence of changing 
decision rules and the changing costs of accomplishing various individ- 
ual interests. 
Collective Choice 
The clearest contemporary expressions of this view appenr in 
models of collective choice: the determinants of alternative outcomes ' 
in situations in which two or more parties make choices affecting the 
outcomes. In a sense, all of microeconomics deals with collective 
choice. Microeconomic models have been tlie best developed and most 
popular in the field. Nonetheless, political scientists, psychologists, 
sociologists, logicians, statisticians and mnthemtlcinns have all 
accompanied the economists in their search. Come theory, some forms 
of voting analysis, some approaches to formal organization, many 
treatments of public goods and a few analyses of power illustrate 
the relevant work within this tradition (for a careful review, see 
Taylor 1975). 
James Coleman's general treatise on collective choice offers the 
following examples of applications: a simple legislature, realization 
of interests as a func'tion of their conceqtrntion, paying the cost of 
o pub l i c  facility, formation of a  c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  p a t t e r n s  of i n f luence  
i n  informal  groups, exchange between r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  and c o n s t i t u e n t s ,  
o  por l iamcntary  system, money a s  power i n  l e g i s l a t i v e  i s s u e s ,  committee 
s t r u c t u r e  i n  a  l e g i s l o t u r e , , ~  s imple  bu reauc ra t i c  s t r u c t u r e  (Colemon 
1973: 96-126). I n  a l l  t h e s e  c a s e s ,  Coleman works wi th  some ve r s ion  
o f  a  b a s i c  equat ion:  
i n w b i c h v  is t h e  value  of a  g iven event  w i t h i n  an a r r a y  of k  p o s s i b l e  
i 
even t s .  j X j i  i s  t h e  sum over  j a c t o r s  of i n d i v i d u a l  i n t e r e s t s  i n  
t h a t  even t ,  vk i s  t h e  va lue  t o  an i n d i v i d u a l  a c t o r  of a  p a r t i c u l a r  
even t ,  and ckj is t h e  c o n t r o l  a c t o r  j has  over  event  k .  
In  example 6 ,  t h e  exchange between a  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  and h i s  
c o n s t i t u e n t s ,  Coleman assumes o  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  who is t o t a l l y  i n t e r e s t e d  
i n  r e e l e c t i o n  and s i x  b locs  of v o t e r s  who have no i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  
outcome of t he  e l e c t i o n  o s  such bu t  have varying i n t e r e s t s  w i th  r e s p e c t  
t o  a  half-dozen d i f f e r e n t  l e g i s l a t i v e  a c t i o n s ,  a s  we l l  a s  varying 
degrees  of c o n t r o l  over  t h e  e l e c t i o n ' s  outcome. He i s  a b l e  t o  show 
good t h e o r e t i c a l  grounds f o r  expect ing t h e  l e g i s l a t o r  t o  fol low t h e  
cons t i t uency  where t h e r e  is consensus. Less obviously ,  he g ives  
grounds f o r  a t t r i b u t i n g  g r e a t e r  chances of succes s  t o  t h e  a c t o r  whose 
i n t e r e s t s  a r e  concentra ted i n  few l e g i s l a t i v e  a c t i o n s  and/or  a l l i e d  
wi th  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  of o t h e r  o c t o r s  (Colemon 1973:.  115-117). 
Colemon has  extended t h e  same s o r t  of i nqu i ry  t o  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  
of s o c i e t y  a s  a  whole. Ile p u t s  t oge the r  two c r u c i a l  obse rva t ions :  
f i r s t ,  i n  t h e i r  very  na tu re  co rpora t e  a c t o r s  each a t t e n d  t o  a  narrower -
range of i n t e r e s t s  than n o t u r a l  persons do; t h a t  is t h e i r  r a t i o n a l e ,  
p a r t  of t h e  s e c r e t  of t h e i r  success ;  second, i n  our own age on enor- 
mously inc reas ing  s h a r e  of important  r e sou rces  has  been coming under 
t h e  c o n t r o l  of co rpo ra t e  a c t o r s .  Consequence: " . . . among the  v a r i e t y  
of i n t e r e s t s  t h a t  men have, t hose  i n t e r e s t s  t h a t  have been s u c c c s s f u l l y  
c o l l e c t e d  t o  c r e a t e  co rpora t e  o c t o r s  a r e  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  t h a t  dominate 
t h e  soc i e ty"  (Coleman 1974: 49).  We a r e  no longe r  deo l ing  wltli t h e  
consequences of d e c i s i o n  r u l e s  i n  any s imple  sense .  Yet t h e  problem is 
very s i m i l a r .  ~ o l e m n  is s t i l l  ana lyz ing  how t h e  method of agg rega t ing  
i n t e r e s t s  a f f e c t s  t h e  r e a l i z a t i o n  of t hose  i n t e r e s t s  -- wliotever t hose  
i n t e r e s t s  a r e .  Under t h e  cond i t i ons  Coleman d e s c r i b e s ,  an inc rcos ing  
s h a r e  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n ,  and e s p e c i a l l y  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  t l ia t  
changes t h i n g s ,  is  c a r r i e d  on by, w i th in ,  o r  a g a i n s t  co rpo ro te  o c t o r s .  
H i l l i a n  a n a l y s i s  i d e n t i f i e s  a  s i t u a t i o n  which H i l l  would have obhorred. 
A lbe r t  Hirschmon s u p p l i e s  a complement t o  Co lemn ' s  a n a l y s i s .  I n  
t h e  very t i t l e  of Exit, Voice, and Loyol ty ,  he  i d e n t i f i e s  t h e  t h r e e  
main responses  t h e  members o r  c l i e n t s  of a  co rpo ro te  a c t o r  m y  g ive  t o  
i t s  d e c l i n i n g  performance. The c o n s t i t u e n t s  of o  co r rup t  s t o t c  m y ,  
a t  a  p r i c e ,  v o t e  w i th  t h e i r  f e e t ;  they may m. They may t h e t r  
d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  more o r  l e s s  agg res s ive ly ;  t l ia t  response,  t oo ,  w i l l  hove 
i t s  p r i c e .  Or they may wa i t  o u t  t h e  bod t imes i n  hopes of b e t t e r  - 
r e m i n  a. Loyolty, 'too, has  o  p r i c e :  endur ing t h e  substondord 
performance. A l l  t h r e e  responses  c o s t  something. The a n a l y t i c  problem 
is t o  s p e c i f y  t h e  t r s d e o f f s  among e x i t ,  vo i ce  and l o y a l t y ,  and t o  s e e  
how t h e  t r a d e o f f s  vary. 
For t h e  a n a l y s i s  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n ,  H i r s c l ~ m n ' s  formulet ion 
improves g f e a t l y  on a  s imple  analogy wi th  a  p r i c e  system. In  a  s implc  
p r i c e  system, t h e  i n e f f i c i e n t  f i rm  f a c e s  t h e  l o s s  of i t s  customers t o  
i t s  compe t i to r s ,  but  no o t h e r  s anc t ion .  The model of a  s imple  p r i c e  
system o f t e n  a p p l i e s  poor ly  t o  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n ,  s i n c e  t h e  c o s t s  of 
e x i t  a r e  f r equen t ly  too  high. When tlie government is  c o r r u p t ,  most 
a c t o r s  have t o  c l~oose  between s t a t i n g  t h e i r  oppos i t i on  and s u f f e r i n g  
i n  ~ i l e n c e ,  between voice  and l o y a l t y .  However, tlirschman a rgues ,  
voice  i s  a t  i t s  most e f f e c t i v e  when e x i t  i s  poss ib l e  (and t h e r e f o r e  
a  r e a l i s t i c  t h r e a t )  but  not  s o  easy  t h a t  people rush away a s  soon a s  
perrormnnce d e c l i n e s .  Voice then c a r r i e s  t h e  t h r e a t  of e x i t .  A 
modicum of l o y a l t y  -- of r e luc t ance  t o  l eave  -- s t r eng thens  t h e  c o r r e c t i v e  
e f f e c t  of voice .  Hirschmnn c l a r i E i e s  tlie s t r a t e g i c   choice^ f o r  c o l l e c t i v e  
s c t i o n  i n  a  world of g l a n t  co rpo ra t e  a c t o r s .  
Mirschman's a n a l y s i s  s t e e r s  us  i n t o  t h e  world of c o l l e c t i v e  goods, 
ns w e l l  a s  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  A c o l l e c t i v e  good is  " . . . any good 
s u c l ~  t h a t ,  i f  any person Xi i n  a  group X1 . . . Xi . . . X consumes i t ,  
i t  cannot f e a s i b l y  be wi thheld  from t h e  o t h e r s  i n  t h a t  group" (Olson 
1965: 14 ) .  Examples a r e  a  smog-free environment and m i l i t a r y  defense .  
Mancur Olson t r e a t s  c o l l e c t l v e  a c t i o n ,  i n  e s sence ,  a s  t h e  e f f o r t  t o  
produce c o l l e c t i v e  goods. That permits  him t o  apply  tlie economic 
theory of pub l i c  goods t o  s new domain: t h e  a c t i o n s  of l a b o r  unions ,  
i n t e r e s t  groups and s i m i l a r  o rgan iza t ions .  One r e s u l t  i s  Olson's 
s e r i o u s  cha l l enge  t o  s common assumption: t h a t  t h e  e x l s t e n c e  and a c t i v i t y  
of s o c l ~  o rgan iza t ions  flows n a t u r a l l y  from t h e  r a t i o n n l  p u r s u i t  of 
shared i n t e r e s t s .  
I n  most c i rcumstances ,  according t o  Olson 's  a n a l y s i s ,  t h e  average 
group member's es t imated a d d i t i o n a l  r e t u r n  from p n r t i c i p a t l o n  i n  t h e  
e f f o r t  w i l l  be l e s s  than t h e  c o s t  of t h e  e f f o r t  i t s e l f .  If c o l l e c t i v e  
a c t i o n  does occur ,  t hen ,  i t s  exp lana t ion  must l l e  o u t s i d e  t h e  r a t i o n a l  
s e l f - i n t e r e s t  of t h e  average p a r t i c i p a n t .  One l i k e l y  cand ida t e  whlct~ 
Olson i d e n t i f i e s  i s  t h e  p rov i s ion  of s e l e c t i v e  incen t ives  o t h e r  than 
t h e  outcome of t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  t o  particular members of t h e  group. 
Another is  coercion,  which is t h e  nega t ive  coun te rpa r t  of s e l e c t i v e  
incen t ives .  It is  a l s o  poss ib l e  t h a t  people  a r e  a c t i n g  i r r a t i o n a l l y  -- 
b u t  then we must exp la in  why. 
Many o t h e r  s t u d e n t s  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  have t r i e d  t o  p i ck  up 
t h e  problem where Olson l e f t  i t .  Some c r i t i c i z e  Olson's a n a l y s i s .  
Some t r y  t o  r e f i n e  and q u a l i f y  i t .  Some go buck t o  t h e  c l s s s i c  p o l i t i c a l  
i dea  of a  government ( o r  ano the r  o rgan iza t ion  wi th  powers o f  compulsion) 
which o v e r r i d e s  i nd iv idua l  i n t e r e s t s  t o  s e r v e  t h e  common good; i n  t h a t  
ca se ,  i t  does no t  ma t t e r  whether t h e  coe rc ive  o rgan iza t ion  came i n t o  
being through a  d e l i b e r a t e  p r i o r  agreement,  a  conquest ,  a  decept ion o r  
something e l s e .  
Other people have t r i e d  t o  i d e n t i f y  a s p e c t s  of r a t i o n a l i t y  which 
Olson neg lec t ed .  One promising sugges t ion  s e p a r a t e s  1 )  t h e  average 
p a r t i c i p a n t ' s  r e t u r n  from c o l l e c t i v e  a c t l o n  and 2) t h e  p o s s i b l e  r e t u r n  
t o  tlie p o l i t i c a l  en t r ep reneur  who o rgan izes  on a c t i o n .  A s  F roh l l ch ,  
Oppenheimer end Young (1971: 6) put  i t ,  c o l l e c t i v e  goods "wilJ be 
supp l i ed  when someone f i n d s  i t  p r o f i t a b l e  t o  s e t  up an o rgan iza t ion  ( o r  
make use  of some e x i s t i n g  o r g a n i z a t i o n ) ,  c o l l e c t  r e sou rces ,  ond supply 
t h e  goods i n  question." The en t r ep reneur  a r r anges  f o r  t h e  supply of 
t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  good i n  r e t u r n  f o r  dona t ions ,  e x t o r t i o n s ,  purchases  nnd 
t axes .  If t h e  sum of dona t ions ,  e x t o r t i o n s ,  purchases and t axes  1s 
sma l l e r  than t h e  va lue  of t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  good t o  n l l  r e c i p i e n t s ,  y e t  
l a r g e r  than t h e  en t r ep reneur ' s  c o s t  i n  supplying i t ,  t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  
a c t i o n  s e r v e s  t h e  i n t e r e s t  of t h e  en t r ep reneur  a s  we l l  ns t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  
i n t e r e s t  . 
Froh l i ch ,  Oppenheimer and Young work o u t  t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l  imp l i ca t ions  
oE such an approach i n  microeconomic language. The theory l e a d s  t o  
some interesting hypotheses concerning c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  For example: 
"The more a  p o l i t i c a l  l e a d e r  depends upon donat ions ,  t h e  more 
wary he  w i l l  be of c o l l e c t i v e  goods t h a t  a r e  du rab le  o r  have 
high i n i t i a l  c o s t s  of supply ."  
"A p o l i t i c a l  en t r ep reneur  w i l l  d i v e r s i f y  h i s  a c t i v i t i e s  more and 
more I n t o  t h e  p rov i s ion  of p r i v a t e  goods a s  t h e  s i z e  of h i s  o v e r a l l  
ope ra t ion  i n c r e a s e s  . . . " 
"If h i s  chances of v i c t o r y  a r e  nea r  ze ro ,  a n  oppos i t i on  l eade r  
w i l l  d i f f e r e n t i a t e  h i s  program sha rp ly  from t h a t  of t h e  incumbent 
l e a d e r ,  and/or  p lan h i s  a c t i o n s  t o  maximize t h e  s u r p l u s  he can 
o b t a i n  from remaining i n  opposi t ion."  
"Competitors o p e r a t i n g  under s d e c i s i o n  r u l e  w i l l  p l ace  a  h lghe r  
premium on f i rm commitments on the  p a r t  of t h e i r  suppor t e r s  
than those  who do not  ." 
"Whenever s compet i tor  makes a  d e f i n i t e  promise t o  supply a  
c o l l e c t i v e  good i n  exchange f o r  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  from a  given 
suppor t e r  o r  group of  suppor t e r s ,  he  w i l l  t r y  t o  h i d e  t h i s  
f a c t  from a s  many people a s  poss ib l e . "  (F roh l l ch ,  Oppenheimer 
and Young 1971: 139-141.) 
Thus tlie t a c t i c a l  s i t u a t i o n  of p o l i t i c a l  en t r ep reneur s  becomes n  major 
p a r t  of t h e  exp lana t ion  of t h e  form and i n t e n s i t y  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  
A s  i n  most M i l l i a n  work. t h e  i n t e r e s t s  i n  ques t ion  a r e  given and f ixed .  
Yet t h e  a n a l y s i s  permits  both unce r t a in ty  and s t r a t e g i c  i n t e r a c t i o n  
concerning a l t e r n a t i v e  cour ses  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  
The same emphasis on t h e  i n c e n t i v e s  and t a c t i c a l  problems OF 
p o l i t i c a l  en t r ep reneur s  appears  i n  t h e  r ecen t  work of John UcCarthy 
and Mayer Zald. Looking 'e t  American s o c i s l  movements, ElcCnrthy and Zald 
observe tlie r i s e  of p ro fe s s iona l ly - s t a f f ed  movement o rgan iza t ions  such 
a s  Common Cause and t h e  Nat ional  Council of Senior  C i t l z e n s  f o r  I lce l th  
Care through S o c i a l  S e c u r i t y .  Re f l ec t ion  on such o rgan iza t ions  l e a d s  
them t o  two c r i t i c i s m s  o f  c l a s s i c  ana lyses  of s o c i a l  movements: 
1 )  t h e i r  s t r o n g  emphasis on gr ievances  and s t a t e s  of mind a s  opposed 
t o  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  end t a c t i c a l  problems; 2) t h e i r  assumption of an  
i d e n t i t y  among t h e  aggr ieved populat ion,  t h e  support  f o r  a  movement, 
and t h e  sou rces  of l e a d e r s h i p  o r  ac t iv i sm.  Against t h e  " c l a s s i c  model" 
they argue t h a t  a l l  movement o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  whatever t h e  gr ievances  t o  
which they respond, f a c e  t h e  common, p re s s ing  problems of acqu i r ing  
enough r e sources  t o  do t h e i r  work. I n  a  s i m i l a r  environment,  t h e  
common problems tend t o  produce common s o l u t i o n s ,  such a s  t h e  pro- 
f e s s i o n a l i z a t i o n  of t h e  s t a f f  and t h e  tu rn ing  t o  people  o u t s l d e  t h e  
aggr ieved populat ion f o r  suppor t .  The common s o l u t i o n s ,  i n  t u r n ,  
produce t h e i r  own problems - f o r  example, r e s l ' c o n f l i c t s  among t h e  
i n t e r e s t s  of t h e  movement o rgan iza t ion  a s  such,  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  of t h e  
o u t s i d e r s  who provide major suppor t  f o r  tlie o rgon lza t ion ,  and t h e  I n t e r -  
e s t s  f o r  whose b e n e f i t  t h e  o rgan iza t ion  presumably f i r s t  n rose .  I f  
we a r e  a  long way from Mill's concern wi th  t h e  cond i t i ons  f o r  good 
government, we a r e  a  very long way from Durkheim's anomic ind iv idua l s .  
The a n a l y s i s  is s t i l l  e s s e n t i a l l y  Mi l l i an ;  i t  t ends  t o  t ake  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  
f o r  g ran ted ,  and t o  emphasize t h e  causes  and e f f e c t s  of d i f f e r e n t  means 
of a c t i o n  on those  i n t e r e a t s .  
S t r a t e g i c  I n t e r a c t i o n  
We have followed t h e  path  from John S t u a r t  M i l l  which l e a d s  t o  
s o c i a l  movements v i a  c o l l e c t i v e  choice  and c o l l e c t i v e  goods. There 
a r e  o t h e r ,  l e s s  t rodden,  pa ths ,  which could  t ake  us t o  t h e  same 
d e s t i n a t i o n .  The most important  pas s  through t h e  s tudy  of s t r a t e g i c  
i n t e r a c t i o n :  ba rga in ing ,  warmaking, game-playing and the  l i k e .  Here 
we tend t o  t ake  both  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  and t h e  o rgan iza t ion  of our  a c t o r s  
a s  g iven,  and t o  concen t r a t e  on t a c t i c s  and s t r a t e g y  a s  func t ions  of 
varying o p p o r t u n i t i e s  and of varying informat ion about  t hose  o p p o r t u n i t i e s .  
I m p l i c i t l y ,  most s t u d i e s  of s t r a t e g i c ' i n t e r a c t i o n  begin  wi th  some 
ve r s ion  of t h e  fol lowing scheme: 
B GAINS 
A  LOSES A GAINS 
B LOSES 
In  t h e  s imple  two-party i n t e r a c t i o n  wi th  a  s i n g l e  outcome, an end po in t  
anywhere i n  quadrant  2 means t h a t  A  ga ins  wh i l e  B l o s e s ,  an , end  po in t  
B- 
i And we can d e s c r i b e  some extreme types  of i n t e r a c t i o n  by p l a c i n ~  
boundar ies  around a l l  poss ib l e  outcomes: 
I n  t h e  pu re -conf l i c t  ca se ,  no poss ib l e  outcome provides  g a i n s  f o r  
I both p a r t i e s .  In  t h e  pure-cooperation c a s e ,  t h e  wors t  t h a t  can 
happen is t h a t  n e i t h e r  gains .  In  t h e  open case ,  a l l  f ou r  quadrants  
a r e  a v a i l a b l e .  
'The same diagram s e r v e s  t o  t r a c e  t h e  patli of a  s t r a t e g i c  i n t e r -  
a c t i o n  through a  s e r i e s  of i n t e rmed ia t e  outcomes: 
i n  quadrant  3 means t h a t  both  l o s e ,  and s o  on. The p o s s i b l e  outcomes 
of a  zero-sum i n t e r a c t i o n  w i l l  f a l l  i n t o  a  s t r a i g h t  l i n e :  
\\ BOTH 
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In  t h i s  i n s t a n c e  (adapted from Kenneth Boulding ' s C o n f l i c t  and Defense, 
p.  50). t h e  sho r t - s igh ted  i n t e r e s t  of each pa r ty  i s  t o  arm a g a i n s t  t h e  
o t h e r ,  and t h e  sho r t - s igh ted  equ i l i b r ium has  both worse o f f  because of 
arming. The do t t ed  l i n e  r ep resen t s  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of a  longer-s ighted,  
more advantageous cqu l l l b r ium through disarmament. 
I n  its many v a r i a n t s ,  t h i s  approach c l a r i E i e s  t h e  a n a l y s i s  of out-  
I 
comes and pa ths  t o  outcomes. ks i n  s t u d i e s  of c o l l e c t i v e  choice ,  t h e  
a n a l y s t  t y p i c a l l y  manipula tes  t h e  r e l evan t  i n c e n t i v e s ,  informat ion.  
d e c i s i o n  r u l e s  and a v a i l a b l e  s t r a t e g i e s .  He does no t  a t tempt  t o  
exp la in  how and why i n c e n t i v e s ,  informat ion,  dec i s ion  r u l e s  and avn i l -  
a b l e  s t r a t e g i e s  vary. That i s  gene ra l ly  t r u e ,  f o r  example. of t h e  
theory of games. I t  is  "a gene ra l  framework f o r  t h e  a n a l y s i s  of i n t e r -  
a c t i o n s  among s e v e r a l  agen t s  who a r e  mutual ly  in terdependent  . . . and 
whose i n t e r e s t s  a r e  t o  some degree  c o n f l i c t i n g "  (Kramer and l ler tzberg 
1975: 379). Game t h e o r i s t s  t y p i c a l l y  o rgan ize  t h e i r  ana lyses  around 
a ' p a y o f f ' m a t r i x .  I n  an  e lementary  ve r s ion ,  we have two sharpshoot ing 
p i r a t e s ,  Hook and Blackbeard, d u e l l i n g  over  a  thousand-dol lar  c h e s t  of 
gold .  Nei ther  one eve r  misses  h i s  mark, both  f i r e  st once,  bu t  t h e i r  
o l d  p i s t o l s  f a i l  one t ime  o u t  of two. The s u r v i v o r ,  i f  any. t akes  t h e  
gold;  i f  both  su rv ive ,  they s p l i t  t h e  t r e a s u r e  evenly. The payoff 






( I n  each case ,  t h e  payoff t o  Hook l i e s  above tlie d i agona l ,  t h e  payoff 
t o  Blackbeard below t h e  diagonal . )  Le f t  i n  t h i s  form, t h e  d u e l  i s  n o t  
much of a  game. Each p i r a t e  has  two chances i n  fou r  of dying,  one 
chance of ga in ing  a  thousand d o l l a r s ,  and one chance of ga in ing  500. 
I f  each va lues  h i s  own l i f e  a t  a  thousand d o l l a r s ,  i n  t h e  i n s t a n t  be fo re  
f i r i n g  each p i r a t e  aliould e s t i m a t e  h i s  probable  gairi a s  
Not very encouraging. Without a  chance t o  run away, t o  ba rga in  o r  
t o  c h e a t ,  neve r the l e s s ,  t h e  s i z e  of t h a t  e s t i m a t e  w i l l  no t  a f f e c t  Hook's 
o r  Blackbeard's behavior .  
To conver t  t h i s  con f ron ta t ion  i n t o  an i n t e r e s t i n g  game, we muat 
g ive  each p i r o t e  a  cho ice  of s t r a t e g i e s ,  and in t roduce  some unce r t a in ty  
about  which s t r a t e g y  each w i l l  choose. We can do t h a t  by a )  g iv ing  
each p i r a t e  t h e  choice  between f i r i n g ,  a s  be fo re ,  o r  t r y i n g  t o  run o f f  
w l th  t h e  chea t  w l ~ l l e  t h e  o t h e r  p i r a t e  is loading h i s  gun, b)  n o t i c i n g  
t h a t  one is a  slower runner ,  t h e  o t h e r  a  worse sho t .  One p l a u s i b l e  
ma t r ix  r e s u l t i n g  from those  changes is: 
BLACKBEARD 
FTRE CRAB AND RUN 
FIRE 
G M  
AND 
RUN 
Overa l l ,  grab-and-run is a  more f avorab le  a t r a t e g y  f o r  e i t h e r  p l r a t e .  
But i f  Hook is s u r e  t h a t  Blackbeard w i l l  g rab and run,  he  may be 
tempted t o  f i r e .  I f  Blackbeard is s u r e  t h a t  llook w l l l  run,  he w l l l  be 
i n c l i n e d  t o  grab and run h imse l f ;  Hook, being f o s t e r ,  is more l i k e l y  
t o  escape wi th  t h e  l o o t ,  bu t  t h e r e  i s  some chance Blackbenrd w i l l  g e t  
t h e r e  f i r s t ,  a  good chance t h a t  they w i l l  s p l i t  t h e  t r e a s u r e ,  and no 
chance t h a t  e i t h e r  w i l l  d i e .  
Th i s  f a n c i f u l  i l l u s t r a t i o n  makes t h e  e s s e n t i a l  po in t :  a  game- 
t h e o r e t i c a l  a n a l y s i s  po r t r ays  a s t r a t e g i c  i n t e r a c t i o n  a s  t h e  outcome 
of one o r  more wel l -def ined,  d e l i b e r a t e  dec i s ions  on t h e  p a r t  of each 
of t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s .  The dec i a ion  is a  func t ion  of t h e  outcomes each 
p a r t i c i p a n t  cons ide ra  l i k e l y  t o  fol low from t h e  va r ious  poss ib l e  com- 
b i n a t i o n s  of h i s  own a c t i o n  and t h e  a c t i o n  of t h e  o t h e r  pa r t i c ipo t i t e .  
So f a r ,  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n s  of game theory t o  t h e  a n a l y s i s  of c o l l e c t i v e  
a c t i o n  have been i n d i r e c t .  At its b e a t ,  game theory l ie lps  us  under- 
s t and  t h e  s t r a t e g i c  problems of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t o r s ,  and he lps  us  s e e  
how tlie a v a i l a b l e  means of i n t e r a c t i o n  l i m l t  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  of 
r e a l i z i n g  t h e  bea t  i n t e r e s t s  of any p a r t i c u l a r  a c t o r ,  o r  of a l l  
a c o t r s  t oge the r .  
Analyses of ba rga in ing  l i kewise  concen t r a t e  on outcomes and pa ths  
t o  outcomes. Ashenfe l t e r  and Johnson, f o r  example, analyze s t r i k e  
a c t i v i t y .  They begin  wi th  a  t h ree -pa r ty  bargaining model which invo lves  
a  f i rm,  its workers and t h e  workers '  union l eade r sh ip .  The s t r i k e ,  
i n  t h a t  model, is a  consequence of t h e  f i r m ' s  unreadlnesa  t o  accede t o  
wage demands p r i o r  t o  open c o n f l i c t ,  which i n  t u r n  depends i n  p a r t  on 
t h e  discrepancy between what t h e  workers want and what t h e  union l e a d e r s  
t h i n k  they can g e t .  The f i rm-level  model t h e r e f o r e  inco rpora t e s  a  
series of conditions (the size of wage illcrease acceptable to the workers, 
the speed at which the workers' expectations decline during a strike, 
and so on) which predict to that unreadiness. 
For lack of evidence to test their models at the level of the firm, 
Ashenfelter and Johnson make some plausible inferences to determinants 
of strike activity at s larger scale. At the level of the labor force , 
os a whole, they build models involving unemployment levels, previous 
changes in real wages and corporate profits. Estimating their principal 
equations on numbers of strikes reported quarterly in the U. S. from 
January 1952 through June 1967, they achieve a good fit to the observed 
time series. They conclude thst strike activity is, in fact, mainly 
a function of the tightness of the labor market and of previous rates 
of change in real wages (Ashenfelter and Johnson 1969: 47). (All the 
substantial work done so far points to a general tendency for strike 
activity in contemporary western countries to rise in good times and 
to decline in bod.) In both the emll-scale model they formulate 
and the large-scale model they estimate, Ashenfelter and Johnson por- 
tray strike activity as one outcome of a coherent bargaining process 
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in which all parties watch closely their opportunities to act on their 
interests. The Cormul.ation differs from those of game theory, but the 
tone of the analysis is still resolutely Millian. 
Mill and Pseudo-Mill 
At the edge of the Millian tradition stand s number of quantitative 
analyses of conflict and collective action. We might better call them 
pseudo-Millisn. They resemble the work of collective-choice ond col- 
lective-goods theorists in that the models and estimating procedures 
typically take on econometric form. They are pseudo-Millian because of 
their theoretical content, or lack of it. Some (like Ted Curr's 
earlier work) attempt to estimate essentially sttitudinal models in an 
econometric style. Some (like Gurr's reformulation of his initial 
argument) are eclectic efforts to assemble individually plausible 
variables into equations which state their joint effects and inter- 
relations. In either case, we find relatively little of the MillCan 
concern with the effects of alternative decision rules in the context 
of fixed interests and changing opportunities to act on those ioterests. 
Douglas Hibbs' cross-national study of "mass political violence" 
exemplifies the best in pseudo-Million onolyseo. Hibbs analyzes counts 
of riots, armed attacks, political strikes, ossassinstions. deaths 
from political violence and antigovernment demonstrations in 108 countries 
summed for two adjacent decsdes: 1948-57 and 1958-67. Via factor 
analysis, Hibbs combines these diverse events into two dimensions: 
Collective Protest and Internal War. Then he combs the existing 
literature for proposed predictors of these variables, cautiously 
working them into causal models. One of Hibbs' diogroms of the cstimted 
causal relationships (expressed here os standardized regression co- 
efficients) appears in Figure 2-5. The diagram indicates, among other 
things, thst the negative sanctions (censorship, restrictions on political 
activity) imposed by the government during tlie second decade predicted 
strongly to the country's level of internal war and of collective 
protest, while the membership of the nstlonsl Communist Party in 1960 
predicted weakly to the level of collective protest during the second 
decade. 
~ibbs' work is representative in that it formulates and tests 
general arguments by means of comparisons of aggregated measures for 
Figure 2-5: One of Douglas Hibbs' 
Causal Models of Political Violence 
Elite Electoral Internal War D2 
Product pc 1960 Sanctions D2 
Membership 1960 
(Abbrcviatlons: In = log-normal transformation; D2 = second decade, 
1958-67; pc - per capita) 
considerable numbers of whole countries. It does not examine variation 
within countries, among groups or from one time period to another; it 
does not treat the determinnnts of particulsr events or deal with their 
internal development. With the expanded use of computers, multivariate 
statistical analysis and international banks in the 19608, a large 
number of studies in the same style appeared. tlibb's study summarizes 
and improves upon the entire lot. 
As compared with Durkheimlan work, Million analyses of collective 
action have regularly involved careful. formalization and statistical 
estimation of their arguments. Where Durkheimians postulate two or 
three rather distinct types of collective action arising out of different 
patterns of social change, Millians tend to think of all collective 
action as expressing the same fundamental rationality. The price of 
these advantages has been some loss of richness, some concentrnti'on on 
situations in which the choices and interests are exceptionally clear, 
some tendency to emphasize variables which are easy to quantify. So 
far we have a good deal of rigor, but no models of revolution so 
suggestive as those of Huntington or Johnson. The Millinn emphasis on 
the rational pursuit of interests is a welcome antidote to notions of 
crowd action as impulsive and irrational. Yet so far the followers of 
Mill have'not given us much insight into the way those interests arise 
and change. They have not said much about the way people define, 
articulate and organize their interests. For further ideas on those 
questions, we may turn to the tradition of Max Webcr. 
Weber -
In Max Weber's treatment , groups commit themselves to coll.ective 
definitions of the world and of themselves. The definitions incorporate 
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goa l s ,  e n t a i l  s t anda rds  of behavior ,  and inc lude  j u s t i f i c a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  
power of a u t h o r i t i e s .  Cons t i t u t ed  a u t h o r i t i e s  a c t  on behalf  of t h e  
groups. Sometimes t h e  a u t h o r i t i e s  a c t  on t h e  b a s i s  of t h e i r  t r a d i t i o n a l  
r o l e s ,  sometimes on t h e  b a a i s  of t h e i r  r a t i o n a l - l e g a l  des igna t ion  a s  
agen t s  f o r  t h e  group, sometimes on t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e i r  ex t r ao rd ina ry  
pe r sona l  c h a r a c t e r  -- t h e i r  charisma. Which of t heae  bases  t h e  group 
adopts  s t r o n g l y  a f f e c t s  i ts o rgan iza t ion  and i ts f a t e .  Whether i n  
t r a d i t i o n a l ,  cha r i sma t i c  o r  r a t i o n a l - l e g a l  form, however, t h e  j u a t i f i -  
c a t i o n s  a l l  c o n s t r a i n  t h e  a u t h o r i t i e s '  a c t i o n s .  I n  Weber's account ,  
t h e  s t r u c t u r e  and a c t i o n  of t h e  group a s  a  whole s p r i n g  l a r g e l y  from t h e  
i n i t i a l  commitment t o  a  p a r t i c u l a r  k ind  of b e l i e f  system. B e l i e f s  
hnve t h e i r  own l o g i c  and fo rce .  
Weber o f f e r e d  h i s  f u l l e s t  account  of t h e  o r i g i n s  of t h e  fundamental 
b e l i e f s  i n  h i s  d i scuss ions  of charisma: t h e  d i v i n e  g i f t  of g race  and 
i t s  s e c u l a r  equ iva l en t s .  According t o  Weber, r e l i g i o u s  and i d e o l o g i c a l  
v i r t u o s o s  o r e  c o n t i n u a l l y  formulat ing new d e f i n i t i o n s  of t h e  world and 
of themselves. Only a  few, however, a t t r a c t  anyone beaides  t h e i r  
i nven to r s .  I n  those  few c a s e s ,  a  group of fo l lowers  commit themselves 
both t o  t h e  b e l i e f  system and t o  an  acknowledgment of t h e  charisma - 
t h e  excep t iona l  moral q u a l i t i e a  -- of t h e  l e a d e r s ,  o b j e c t s  and r i t u e l s  
consecrated by those  b e l i e f s .  
Where many more people ,  f o r  whatever r ea son ,  f i n d  t h a t  t h e  new 
d o f i n i t i o n s  of t h e  world provide more coherent  answers t o  t h e  problem 
of meaning they f a c e  than do t h e  o ld  d e f i n i t i o n s  a l r eady  a v a i l a b l e  t o  
them, they j o i n  and t h e  group expands. Then t h e  group a s  a  whole 
f aces  t h e  problem of t h e  "rout inizat l .on of charisma". (Weber's German 
f o r  r o u t i n i z a t i o n  is Vern l l t i g l i chung  -- l i t e r a l l y  t h e  "everydaying" 
of t h e  charisma i n  ques t ion  -- which s t a t e s  d rama t i ca l ly  t h e  process  of 
t u rn ing  something ex t r ao rd ina ry  i n t o  something o rd ina ry ,  i n t o  something 
unders tood and c o n t r o l l a b l e . )  The r o u t i n i z o t i o n  of charisma invo lves  
r e c o n c i l i a t i o n  of t h e  b e l i e f s  wi th  t h e  ex igenc ie s  of o rgan iza t ion ,  
development of r e l i a b l e  means f o r  d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  t r u e  and f a l s e  ve r s ions  
of t h e  b e l i e f s ,  p rov i s ion  f o r  succes s ion  t o  t h e  l eade rah ip .  
Weber s e e s  s i x  main mechanisms by which cha r i sma t i c  groups s o l v e  
t h e  problem of succes s ion  (Weber 1972: 143-144): 
1. a  sea rch  f o r  ano the r  chs r i ama t i c  l eade r  o f  t h e  same type;  
2.  r e v e l a t i o n  through some procedure honored by t h e  group; 
3. t h e  o l d  l eade r ' s  personal  des igna t ion  of a  succes so r ,  w i th  
t h e  group'a approval ;  
4. r i t u a l  des igna t ion  by t h e  body of su rv iv ing  l ende ra ;  
5 .  r e l i a n c e  on k insh ip ,  wi th  t h e  idea  t h a t  charisma i s  i n h e r i t a b l e ;  
6. t r a n s f e r  of charisma t o  t h e  o rgan iza t ion ,  t h e r e f o r e  t o  i t a  
o f f i c i a l s  and r i t u a l s .  
The cho ice  among t h e s e  s t r a t e g i e s  then l i m i t s  what t h e  group can do 
next .  But a l l  t h e  cho ices  r e q u i r e  t h e  c r e a t i o n  of a  c e r t a i n  amount of 
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e ,  w i t h  its own momentum and i ts own exigencies .  
I f  t h e  group su rv ives  t h a t  procesa ,  we have another  du rab le  collective 
a c t o r  ope ra t ing  under t h e  d i r e c t i o n  of its own constituted a u t h o r i t i e s .  
Weber's d i scuss ion  of t h e  "everydaying" of charisma f i t s  n e a t l y  
i n t o  h i s  gene ra l  theory of s o c i a l  change. Weber po r t r ays  t r a d i t i o n a l  
a u t h o r i t y  a s  a  s o r t  of equ i l i b r ium i n t o  which s o c i a l  l i f e  tends  t o  
f a l l  i f  no s t r enuous  d i s r u p t i o n  occurs .  But two opposing sou rces  of 
d i s r u p t i o n  a r e  always poss ib l e :  t h e  power of r a t i o n a l i t y  and tho 
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power of charism. Each represents the force of a coherent idea, of a 
pure principle, when applied to history. 
Bureaucratic rationalization, says Weber, "can be a revolutionary 
force of tlie first rank against tradition, and often has been. But it 
revolutionizes by means of techniques . . . from outside, things and 
arrangements first" (Weber 1972: 657). The rational rearrangement of 
the environment eventually transforms people and their world-views. 
Chnrl.sma, in Weber's analysis, works in exactly the opposite way: first 
transforming tlie inner life, then leading people to transform their 
worlds. "It is in this purely empirical and value-free sense the 
supremely and specifically 'creative' force in history" (Weber 1972: 
6 5 8 ) .  As Frnncesco Alberoni points out, in Weber's view "Charisma 
does not grow from bureaucracy, but counterpoises itself to bureaucracy; 
it appears as something gratuitous, miraculous, irrational" (Alberoni 
1968: 15). 
As Alberoni also points out, Weber's theorizing stops at exactly 
that point. Weber gives us a dramatic, compelling sense of social 
change as a product of the irruption of charisma into history and of 
the diffusion of rationalization through history. Me provides a sense 
of tlie historical power of a movement oriented to a coherent idea. Yet 
lie offers no theory of the circumstances under which charismatic move- 
ments arise. His giant comparison of civilizations gives us a heroic 
historical analysis of the way one rationalizing movement -- that of 
modern western Europe -- developed, but no manageable general scheme for 
the explanation of rationalizing movements. As a result, Weber's followers 
have had to complement their Weberian treatments of the life-courses of 
movements with non-Weberion explanations of why people formed and joined 
the movements in the first place. 
Nevertheless, Weber's formulation agrees with Durkheim's in sug- 
gesting that rapid social change (hence, presumably greater likelihood 
that existing beliefs will become inadequate as guides to routine social 
life) will produce widespread non-routine collective action. Then 
Weber goes his own way in implying that there are really two main 
categories of collective actors. those oriented to deviant beliefs and 
those oriented to beliefs which hove won general acceptonce; routinizotion 
and diffusion turn one into the other. By extension, the Weberian theory 
also suggests that commitment to a group is on incentive, rather than a 
barrier, to participation in collective action -- including non-routine 
collective action. Today, political analysts commonly invoke essentlnlly 
Weberian explanations of tlie collective actions of notional states and 
complex organizations. They are less likely to apply Weber to tlie actions 
of crowds, political movements or revolutionary groups. 
Social Movements 
Studies of collective action within the Weberian tradition hove 
commonly employed the framework of the social movement. In his brief 
conceptual work on the subject. Paul Wilkinson defines a sociol movement 
. . . a deliberate collective endeavour to promote change in any 
direction and by any means, not excluding violence, illegality, 
revolution or withdrawal into 'utopian' community . . . A social 
movement must evince a minimal degree of organization, though this 
may range from a loose, informal or partial level of organization 
to the highly institutionalized and bureaucratized movement and the 
corpora t e  group . . . A s o c i a l  movement's commitment t o  change and 
t h e  r a i son  d ' k t r e  of its o rgan iza t ion  a r e  founded upon t h e  conscious  
v o l i t i o n ,  normative commitment t o  t h e  movement's aims o r  b e l i e f s ,  
and a c t i v e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  on t h e  p a r t o f t h e  fo l lowers  o r  members 
(Wilkinson 1971: 27). 
This  d e f i n i t i o n ,  a l though c l e a r e r  than most of t hose  one encounters  on 
e  t ou r  through t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  of s o c i a l  movements, conveys t h e  usua l  
meaning of tlie term. The under lying concept ion r e f l e c t s  t h a t  o f  Weber: 
a  group of people somchow o r i e n t  themselves t o  t h e  same b e l i e f  system 
and a c t  t oge the r  t o  promote change on tlie b a s i s  of t h e  common o r i e n t a t i o n .  
Thus t h e  s tandard ques t ions  become: llow do such systems of b e l i e f s  
a r i s e  and a c q u i r e  fol lowings7 How do they c o n s t r a i n  t h e i r  adherents7  
How do they and t h e  groups which form around them change, r o u t i n i z e ,  
d isappear7 
We a r e  not  s u r p r i s e d ,  then,  t o  f i n d  Michael Useem beginning h i s  
d i acuss ion  of t h e  Resis tance,  t h e  American movement of t h e  1960s a g a i n s t  
m i l i t a r y  consc r ip t ion ,  wi th  t h e s e  words: 
The formati,on of a  p r o t e s t  movement is gene ra l ly  con t igen t  on 
t h e  p reex i s t ence  of a  group of people un i t ed  around a  s e t  of 
p o l i t l c a l  p r i n c i p l e s  dea l ing  wi th  a  s o l u t i o n  t o  a  s o c i a l  problem. 
Some p r o t e s t s  e r u p t  spontaneously  and r e f l e c t  l i t t l e  conscious  
e f f o r t  by a  p o l i t i c i z e d  l eade r sh ip .  But many movements, t h e  
Resis tance included,  a r e  i n s t i t u t e d  only  a f t e r  a lengthy maturat ion 
process  i n  which a  s u b s t a n t i a l  number of people  come t o  view a  
new p r o t e s t  program a s  v a l i d  and r e a l i s t i c  (Useem 1973: 37 ) .  
Given t h a t  beginning,  Useem's own inqu i ry  i n t o  American d r a f t  r e s i s t a n c e  
proceeds l o g i c a l l y :  t h e  c h a r a c t e r  of campus d i s c o n t e n t ,  consc r ip t ion  a s  
a  r e a l i t y  and a s  an i s s u e ,  t h e  base  and p rocess  of recrui tment  t o  t h e  
movement, o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  problems and t ransformat ions  o f  t h e  movemcnt. 
p o l i t i c a l  outcomes of movement a c t i o n s .  For example, Useem p o l n t s  o u t  
t h e  g r e a t  importance of t h e  f r a g i l e  s t u d e n t  d r a f t  deferment a s  s s t imu lus  
t o  j o i n i n g  t h e  movement. For ano the r ,  he ana lyzes  t h e  s . ignlf lcance of 
temporary c o a l i t i o n s  between Resis tance and o t h e r  p r o t e s t  groups seeking 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  goa l s ;  i n  h i s  view, t h e  decay of c o a l i t i o n s  wi th  
such groups a s  SDS a c c e l e r a t e d  t h e  d e c l i n e  of Resis tance a s  a  movement. 
Useem's agenda is c l a s s i c .  We f ind  i t  d i r e c t i n g  s t u d i e s  of revolu-  
t i o n a r y  movements, r e l i g i o u s  movements, e t h n i c  movements. movcmcnta of 
reform. Useem himself has  app l i ed  t h c  same scheme t o  a  wide v a r i e t y  of 
American p r o t e s t  movements. He ends t h a t  survey wi th  two major complaints  
about  e x i s t i n g  a n a l y t i c e l  schemes: 1 )  a l though t l ~ c y  provide a  rensonable  
g r i p  on t h e  i n t e r n a l  development of a  movemcnt once i t  has  begun, they 
c o n t a i n  no s e r i o u s  exp lana t ion  of t h e  genes i s  of p r o t e s t  movements; 
2) t h e i r  accounts  of t h e  process  by which such movements mobi l ize  f o r  
a c t i o n  a r e  q u i t e  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y .  . "At tent ion must be  d i r ec t ed . "  concludes  
.Useem. "a t  t h e  c o n f l i c t s  w i t h i n  major i n s t i t u t i o n a l  systems i n  America, 
both  a s  sou rces  of p r o t e s t  and a l s o  f o r  t h e  r o l e  they play i n  s l ~ a p i n g  
t h e  program, o rgan iza t ion ,  and growth of tlie movemcnt. Since  mnny 
types  o f  c o l l e c t i v e  behavior  and s o c i a l  movements do no t  s h a r e  such r o o t s ,  
a t t empt s  t o  develop a  s i n g l e  theory f o r  exp ln in ing  a  f u l l  range of 
c o l l e c t i v e  phenomena a r e  bound t o  over look f a c t o r s  t h a t  p lay a  r o l e  i n  
p r o t e s t ,  bu t  not  o t h e r  types  o f ,  movements" (Useem 1975: 51) .  
Anyone who runs through the many writings on American social 
movements will notice, in fact, a good deal of agreement about tlie 
characteristic life histories of movements and widespread disagreement 
about why and how movements arise in the first place. Joseph Gusfield's 
Symbolic Crusade, a thoughtful analysis of the American Temperance 
movement, distinguishes among three types of movement: class, status 
and expressive. The class movement, according to Gusfdeld, organizes 
instrumentally around some specific interest of its public. The status 
movement orients itself toward the enhancement or maintenance of the 
group's prestige. Expressive movements "are marked by goalless behavior 
or by pursuit OF goals which are unrelated to the discontents from which 
the movement had its source" (Gusfield 1966: 23). In all three cases 
the character of tlie public and the character of the goal provide the 
major explanations of the movement's content. 
Temperance, in Gusfield's view. is largely a status movement; it 
arose as a defense of old elites against their declining prestige. In 
the twentieth century: 
The polarization of the middle classes into abstainers and moderate 
drinkers is port of a wider process of cultural change in which 
traditional values of the old middle class are under attack by 
new components of the middle stratum. In this process of change, 
Temperance is coming to take on new symbolic properties as a 
xehicle of status protest (Gusfield 1966: 139). 
Gusfield sees post-Prohibition Temperance as coalescing with a new 
fundamentalism against self-indulgent, morally lax, consumption- 
oriented modernism - and thus expressing the status anxieties of the 
old middle class in the twentieth century. 
Roberta Ash embeds her own brief discussion of Temperance in a 
survey of nineteenth-century middle-class movements. They were more 
or less interchangeable, she says, but Temperance mingled "a desire to 
ameliorate the lot of workers, to destroy a less genteel life style 
and perhaps unconsciously express frustration st the loss of political 
power . . . " (Ash 1972: 136). The characterization differs somewhat 
from Gusfield's, but the basic pro~edure is the same: account Eor the 
movement's genesis and content by means of the structural situation in 
which the adherents find themselves at the start. In her general 
analysis of social movements in America, Ash portrays changes in the 
organization of production as producing new structural problems for 
different social groups; when ideologically legitimate means for acting 
on those problems are not available, the groups tend to create social 
movements for the solutions of their problems. She eventually comes to 
the' conclusion that the "status politics" which ark so important to 
Gusfield's analysis actually turn out to be class politics, misdirected 
or in disguise. 
The analyses of Gusfield and Ash are only loosely Weberian. They 
accept the Weberian idea of a social movement with its own rotionole, 
momentum and life history. Yet they do not assign such s compelling 
, . parer to the idea around which the movement organizes in the first 
i place, and they expend much of their effort in tracing the correspondences 
I 1 between the social situations of the actors and the contents of the 
t movements they form or join. Furthermore, Ash self-consciously adopts 
Marxian ideas concerning the origins of structural change. Yet in 
identifying the social movement as a coherent object of study and in 
treating its formation as a break with legitimate, routine social life, 
both Ash and Guafield align themselves with Max Weber. 
The Weberian tradition has been rich in inspiration for case studies 
and poor in inspiration for further theorizing. In both regards it 
differs from the Durkheimian and Millian traditions: both of them have 
stimulated reformulation after reformulation, but have proved very hard 
to apply to individual, concrete cases. Alberoni and Useem have already 
identified the problem for us. Weber left almost untouched the analysis 
of the genesis and mobilization of charismatic movements. At the same 
timc, he taught that such movements had their own logic, and represented 
a sharp break with routine, legitimate social life. The assumptions 
of autonomy and separateness make it awkward for the student of a movement 
to fill the gap in Weber's analysis by appealing to the everyday interests 
of the participants. 
Nevertheless, students of social movements who were serious about 
origins and mobilizntion have normally gone outside the Weberian frame- 
work for their explanations. Ash turns to an unexpected combination: 
neo-Marxism and the work of Edward Shils. Useem's proposal to study 
"institutional contradictions" is Marxist in inspiration. Anthony 
Oberechall's general work on Social Conflict and Social Movements 
essentially breaks the subject into three parts: 1) an analysis of social 
conflict, which is quite eclectic in its theoretical origins; 2) an 
nnalysia of the mobilization of conflict groups, which relies especially 
on the Millian framework of Mancur Olson; 3) an analysis of the life 
histories of conflict groups, which resembles classic treatments of 
social movements. In Oberschsll's analyses, the strong emphasis on 
real interests and strategic problems with regard to social conflict 
end mobilization wars against the autonomy end separotencss inllcrcnt in 
the idea of a "movement." In this case, the interests nnd strategy 
win; the notion of a social movement as anything more thnn a set of 
mobilized conflict groups collapses. 
So why bother with Weber? Because Weber and the Weberians have 
pursued several problems in collective action more persistently and 
effectively than have the followers of Durkheim and Hill. People 
sometimes group around distinctive definitions of thc world and of 
themselves: why and how? There something about the growth of 
Temperance or Abolitionism that neither an analysis of whole social 
classes nor a study of specific associations exhausts: what is It? 
A group's conception of its aims and rights does inform its action 
and influence its very readiness to act: can't we take that into 
account? Weber left us an important agenda. 
Marxian Analyses since Morx 
The classic Marxist analysis derives shared interests from common 
position in the organization of production, changes in interest from 
shifts in the organization of production. Any set of people in a 
common relationship to the means of production form a class, but 
classes very greatly in internal structure and common consciousness. 
Shared aims and beliefs emerge from shared interests, as mediated by 
a class' internal structure and its relationship to other classes. 
Collective action likewise results from shared interests, ss mediated 
by internal structure, relationship to other classes end common conscious- 
ness. Thus the broad logic runs: 
organ iza t ion  
product ion 
consciouaneaa 
t o  o t h e r  
Marxian ana lyses  s i n c e  Marx have va r i ed  considerably  i n  t h e  r e l a t i v e  
weight and autonomy they have ass igned t o  t h e s e  v a r i a b l e s .  They have 
a l s o  va r i ed  i n  how much they have recognized o t h e r  s i g n i f i c a n t  a c t o r s  
than s o c i a l  c l a s sea :  s t a t e s ,  e t h n i c  groups ,  r e l i g i o u s  movements, and 
s o  on. The s t r i c t e r  t h e  Marxism, t h e  l e s s  s i g n i f i c a n c e  a t t r i b u t e d  t o  
t hese  o t h e r  a c t o r a .  By a  s t r i c t  s t anda rd ,  many people i n  t h e  Marxian 
t r a d i t i o n  do n o t  q u a l i f y  a s  Marx i s t s  a t  a l l .  Nonetheless ,  they s t and  
o u t  from the  fo l lowers  of Durkheim, M i l l  and Weber by i n s i s t i n g  on t h e  
,. 
p r i o r i t y  of m a t e r i a l  i n t e r e s t s  and by fol lowing t h e  gene ra l  l o g i c  of 
Marx' exp lana t ion  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  Although t h e r e  a r e  s t r i c t l y  
contemporary examples, two of t h e  most u s e f u l  i l l u s t r a t i o n s  f o r  our  
pu rposes ' a r e  t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  syn theses  of Barr ington Moore, Jr. and 
Er i c  Wolf. 
The complex web of Moore's S o c i a l  Or ig ins  of D i c t a t o r s h i e d  
Democracy hangs on two pegs: 1 )  t h e  i d e a  t h a t  t h e  c l a s s  c o a l i t i o n s  
involved i n  t h e  g r e a t  modernizing r e v o l u t i o n s  -- hence the  c h a r a c t e r  
of t hose  r evo lu t ions  -- have depended e s p e c i a l l y  on t h e  f a t e s  of t h e  
a g r a r i a n  c l a s s e a  i n  t h e  cour se  of t h e  c o m e r c i a l i z a t i o n  of a g r i c u l t u r e  
and the  growth of t h e  a t n t e ,  w i th  t h e  l i q u i d a t i o n  of t h e  peasantry  and 
the  coop ta t ton  of t h e  a r i s t o c r a c y  and gen t ry ,  f o r  example, being c r u c i a l  
i n  England; 2) t h e  f u r t h e r  i d e a  t h a t  t h e  c l a s s  c o a l i t i o n  mnklng t h e  
r e v o l u t i o n  has  s t r o ~ ~ g l y  inf luenced t h e  subsequent p o l t t i c n l  o rgan iza t ion  
of t h a t  country ,  w i th  a  c o a l i t i o n  of bu reauc ra t s  and l and lo rds ,  f o r  
i n s t ance .  tending t o  produce fascism.  Thus par l iamentary  democracy 
becomes t h e  h i s t o r i c a l l y - s p e c i f i c  consequence of t h e  e a r l y  emergence 
of a g r a r i a n  c a p i t a l i s m  i n  c e r t a i n  c o u n t r i e s ,  a  c i rcumstnnce perhops 
never  t o  be  repeated again .  Moore provides  evidence f o r  h i s  twtn 
t h e s e s  v i a  extended compariaona of t h e  h i s t o r i e s  of England. France. 
t h e  United S t a t e s .  China. Japan and I n d l a ,  p lus  numerous excur s ions  
t o  Germany and Russia.  
Revolut ion t a k e s  on an  i n t e r e s t i n g  r o l e  i n  Moore's scheme. The 
major r e v o l u t i o n  -- t h e  English C i v i l  War, t h e  French Revolutton. and 
s o  on -- a c t s  a s  a  c r u c i a l  swi tch i n  t h e  t r a c k  a long wl~ich a  p a r t i c u l a r  
country  moves. Yet r e v o l u t i o n  d i s s o l v e s  a s  a  phenomenon & gene r i s .  
f o r  i t  becomea simply t h e  maximum moment of c o n f l i c t s  which endure 
long be fo re  and long a f t e r  t h e  t r a n s f e r  of power; indeed,  t h e  cnse  of 
Germany shows t h a t  t h e  fundamental t r a n s f e r s  of power which occupy 
t h e  c e n t e r  of Moore's a n a l y s i s  can occur wi thout  any r e v o l u t i o n  a t  
a l l  i n  t h e  convent ional  s ense  of t h e  word: 
The no t ion  t h a t  a  v i o l e n t  popular r evo lu t ion  is somehow necessary  
i n  o rde r  t o  sweep away "feudal" o b s t a c l e s  t o  i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n  
i a  pure  nonsense, a s  t h e  cour se  of German and Japanese  h i s t o r y  
demonstra tes .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand, t h e  p o l i t i c a l  consequences 
from dismounting t h e  o l d  o r d e r  from above a r e  decidedly  d i f f e r e n t .  
As they proceeded wi th  conse rva t ive  modernlzat ion,  t l ~ e s e  semi- 
par l iamentary  governments t r i e d  t o  p re se rve  a s  much of t h e  o r i g i n a l  
social structure as they could, fitting large sections into the 
new building wherever possible. The results had some resemblance 
to present-day Victorian houses with modern electrical kitchens 
but insufficient bathrooms and leaky pipes hidden decorously 
behind newly plastered walls. Ultimately the makeshifts collnpsed 
(Moore 1966: 4 3 8 ) .  
We find ourselves at the opposite pole from Chalmers Johnson's "dis- 
equilibration" and "dysfunction." In Moore's analysis, the major 
conElicts which occur -- including the revolutions themselves -- are 
port of the very logic of the political systems they shake apnrt. 
The second case in point is Eric Wolf's Peasant Wars of the Twentieth 
Century. Wolf takes on the revolutions of Mexico;Russia, China, Viet 
Nam, Algeria nnd Cuba. He extracts from them importnnt lessons about the 
response of peasants the world over to being drawn into the capitalist 
world economy. Even less concerned to lay out an explicit theoretical 
structure thnn Moore, Wolf nevertheless builds a powerful analysis of 
the structural foundations of peasant life, the precise ways in which 
the expansion of national and internationnl markets shakes those 
foundations, the conditions under which peasants resist the threat with 
force, and the circumstnnces under which that resistance (however 
reactionary its inception) serves revolutionary ends. 
The most general argument is simple and telling: 
The major aim of the peasant is subsistence and social status gained 
within a narrow range of social relationships. Peasants are thus 
unlike cultivators, who participate fully in the market and who 
commit themselves to a status game set within a wide social network. 
To ensure continuity upon the land and suatenance for his household, 
the peasant most often keeps the market at arm's length, for unlim- 
ited involvement in the market threatens tiis hold on his source of 
livelihood. He thus cleaves to traditional arrangements which 
guarantee his access to land and to the labor of kin and neigh- 
bors . . . Perhaps it is precisely when the peasant con no longer 
rely on his accustomed institutional context to reduce his risks, 
but when alternative institutions are either too chaotic or too 
restrictive to guarantee a viable commitment to new ways, that 
the psychological, economic, social and politico1 tensions all 
mount toward peasant rebellion and involvement in revoli~tion 
(Wolf 1969: xiv-w). 
From that springboard. Wolf lesps to a close examination oE the experience 
of the peasantry in each of his countries, to scrutiny of the conditions 
under which each of the revolutions in question broke out. and to com- 
parative analyses of the determinants of the considerably different 
forms of involvement of these various peasant populations in their 
national movements. 
Some common features emerge: the crucial role of the middle 
peasants, rather than the rural proletarians or the kulaki; the in- 
fluence of alliances with-disaffected intellectusla; the initially 
defensive and inward-looking character of all the peasant rebellions; 
the frequent occurrence of a deadlock of weak contenders for power, 
ultimately favorable to well-organized central groups allied with 
military power; the final inability of peasants to accomplish their 
political ends, however successful their rebellions in the short run. 
in the absence of strong alliances with determined and organized non- 
peasants. 
Wolf's sense of the variables involved will probably contribute 
more to our understanding of political conflict than his enumeration of 
the conatants. He shows very effectively (in a line of argument similar 
to Moore's) that the coalitions formed by rebellious peasants strongly 
affect whether their actions go beyond the immediate redress of grievances. 
that where comercialization has proceeded so far as to dissolve the 
traditional organization of the peasant community, rebellion does not 
occur (contrary to the mass-society notion that atomized and anguished 
people make ideal rebels), that a center-outward pattern of rebellion, 
as in Russia, China, and Viet llam, favors the expanded power of a single 
party, as opposed to on army andlor a national bourgeoisie. 
The Collective History of Collective Action 
Both Barrington Moore and Eric Wolf are non-historians who turned 
to history for evidence concern processes going on in the contemporary 
world. They have plenty of companions within the hiatorical profession. 
Among recent historians of collective action. Marxian thinking has 
prevailed. Georges Lefebvre, the great, long-lived historian of the 
French Revolution, provided much of the inspiration, if not much of the 
techniques. He forwarded the idea of multiple, semi-autonomous revolutions 
. . 
converging into a single Revolution. He demonstrated that the semi- 
autonomous revolutions -- especially the peasant revolution -- were 
accessible to study from the bottom up. But he did not systematize the 
study of the populations involved. 
Albert Soboul did. Soboul has no doubt been Eefebvre's most 
influential heir in both regards. His 1958 thesis. & sans-culottes 
pariaiens en l'an 11, shone a torchlight on faces previously deep in 
shadow: the faces of the day-to-day activists of the Parisinn sections. 
(The "sections" were essentially neighborhood governmenta and political 
associations.) It did so mainly through the straightforward but extremely 
demanding analysis of the papers of the sections themselves, and the 
painstaking reconstitution of their membership. 
At about the same time. Richard Cobb was carrying out a close study 
of the composition and characteristics of the volunteer Revolutionary 
Armies which played such a crucial role in the early yearsof theRevolution. 
K8re Tdnnesaon was following the Parisian sans-culottes through the Yenr 
111. George Rudd was analyzing the composition of the revolutionary crowds 
on the great Journ<es, Adeline Dnumard. Louis Chevalier and Fmnsois 
Furet were closely scrutinizing the changing composition and wealth of 
the Parisian population from the late eighteenth century to 1848, and 
RQmi Gossez was applying many of the same microscopic procedures to the 
Revolution of 1848. These historians varied greatly in preconceptions. 
techniques and subject matter. What brought them together, with dozens 
of their compatriots, as exponents of s new brand of history is the 
deliberate accumulation of uniform dossiers on numerous ordinary indivi- 
uals in order to produce solid information on collective chsracteristica 
not readily visible in the experiences of any one of them. The solid 
information was often numerical. although the quantification involved was 
ordinarily elementary. 
The adoption of this sort of "collective historyv did not guarantee 
success. It could have been a terrible waste of time. Indeed, it 
have been a waste of time, if old theories about the blind spontaneity 
of the masses were correct. As it turned out, however. collecrive history 
yielded great returns when applied to French political conflicts. llistorians 
nar understand how wide and deep was the political mobilization of ordinary 
Frenchmen in 1789 and 1848, how coherent the action of the so-called mob, 
how sharp the rifts within the coalition which made the Revolution of 1789 
lied become by 1793. The Marxist approach to the study of French political 
conflicts gained new strength, both because Marxists were more inclined 
than others to take up the close study of the "little people" which this 
sort of collective history involved, and because the Marxist tradition 
provided more powerful means of analyzing major divisions within the 
population than its rivals did. 
Outside of France, the greatest impact of collective history on 
the study of collective action appeared in England. England has its own 
tradition of collective biography, exemplified by the parliamentary 
analyses of Lewis Namier. In the field of collective action, however, 
the distinctive English contribution did not consist of formal individual- 
by-individual analysis of participants. It was the application of the 
logic of collective hiogrnphy to events, complemented by the identification 
and analysis of evidence concerning the character, outlook and behavior 
of ordinary participants in major conflicts and movements. As a prime 
example of the first we have Hobsbawm and Rudd's Captain Swinp; the book 
reports a thorough systematic study of the many local conflicts comprising 
the Swing Rebellion, the great agricultural laborers' revolt of 1830. 
As the dominant work of the second type we have E. P. Thompson's The 
Making of the English Working Class, a richly-documented portrayal of 
workers' struggles from the period of the French Revolution to the 
beginning of Chartism. 
A recent English example combines the Hobsbawm-Rudd and Thompson 
approaches. John Foster's Class Struggle and the Industrial Revolution 
traces the development of class consciousneaa and working-class collective 
action in three industrial tarns -- Oldl~am. Northampton and South 
Shields -- during the first half of the nineteenth century. Severs1 
features of Foster's study are extraordinary. He is meticulous and self- 
conscious in his theorizing; he carefully spells out the empirical 
implications of an essentially Leninist argument: a labor aristocrscy 
forms, and serves for a time as a vanguard of class-conscious collective 
action, but is eventually split, its fragments coopted or isolated in 
the capitalist counterattack. Foster is equally meticulous in assembling 
and presenting his evidence; it includes close analyses of marriage 
patterns, collective biographies of working-class activists and treatments 
of changes in the labor force. Finally, Foster devotes great attention 
to the opponents and exploiters of the workers: the local bourgeoisie. 
Indeed, one of Foster's most illuminating discussions treats the bourgeois 
adoption of rigorous religious practice as a means of taming and shaming 
the workers. 
It is no accident that solid Marxist analyses abound in European 
historical work and are rare in studies of contemporary America. There 
are two basic reasons. The first is simply thnt Marxism has remained a 
lively, evolving body of thought in Europe while sometimes fossilizing 
and sometimes having to hide underground in America. The second is that 
Marxist ideas are most adequately developed in regard to the experience 
Marx himself treated most fully: the conflicts surrounding the growth 
of capitalism in Europe. The Marxist scholar's task is to adapt to 
other settings a model which is already well fitted to the European 
historical experience. 
Among the determinants of collective action, Marxists have generally 
given grent attention to interests and organization, have sometimes dealt 
wi th  mob i l i za t ion ,  but  have gene ra l ly  neglected oppor tun i ty .  As compared 
wi th  Durkheimian, Mi l l i on  and Weberian ana lyses ,  t h e  Marxian t reatment  
of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  s t r e s s e s  t h e  ub iqu i ty  of c o n f l i c t ,  t h e  importance 
of i n t e r e a t a  rooted i n  t h e  o rgan iza t ion  o r  product ion,  t h e  in f luence  of 
s p e c i f i c  forms of o rgan iza t ion  on t h e  c h a r a c t e r  and i n t e n s i t y  of c o l l e c t i v e  
a c t i o n .  Marxls ta  have not  paid a s  much a t t e n t i o n  a s  Weberians have t o  
t h e  imp l i ca t ions  of p reva len t  b e l i e f  ayatems. o r  t o , t h e  proceaaes  by . 
which movements r i s e  and f a l l .  They have not  matched t h e  M i l l i a n s  i n  
p r e c i s e  modeling of decision-making processes .  There i s ,  however, no 
obvious a n a l y t i c  ground on which t h e  Durkheimians have t h e  advantage 
over  t h e  Marxiana. 
That w i l l  be t h e  gene ra l  a t t i t u d e  of t h e  ana lyses  t o  fol low:  
doggedly anti-Durkheimian, r e s o l u t e l y  pro-Marxian, bu t  sometimes indu lgen t  
t o  Webe: and sometimes r e l i a n t  on M i l l .  Good Durkheimiana w i l l  f i n d  l i t t l e  
comfort i n  my arguments o r  i n  such evidence a s  I p re sen t :  no support  i n  
e i t h e r  regard f o r  uprooted masses a s  makers of r e v o l u t i o n s ,  r a p i d  s o c i a l  
cllange a s  a  gene ra to r  of anomic c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n ,  and s o  on. Orthodox 
Marxis ts  w i l l  f i n d  themaelves aomewhat more a t  home than t h e  Durkheimiana, 
but  w i l l  s t i l l  f i n d  much t o  d i s a g r e e  wi th  -- no tab ly  t h e  cons ide rab le  
importance a t t ached  t o  p o l i t i c a l  proceaaes  and t o  i n t e r e a t a  which a r e  
not  obvioualy and d i r e c t l y  based on c l a s s  c o n f l i c t .  Followers of Weber 
w i l l  d e s p a i r  a t  t h e  v i r t u a l  absence of charisma snd a t  my avoidance of 
t h e  a o c i a l  movement a s  a  u n i t  of a n a l y s i s ;  a t  l e a s t  they w i l l  g l o a t  
over  t h e  conccaalons made t o  shared concept ions  of r i g h t s  and o b l i g a t i o n s  
a s  bases  of c o l l e c t i v e ~ a c t i o n .  Mi l l i ana  w i l l  r e j e c t  much of t h e  d i a -  
cuaaion a s  imprecise  and unparsimonioua, y e t  they should f i n d  f a m i l i a r  
t h e  e f f o r t s  t o  analyze t h e  s t r a t e g i c  problems of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t o r s .  
Our Task 
I f  we t r y  t o  a d j u d i c a t e  among t h e  theo r i ea  of c o l l c c t i v c  a c t i o n  I 
have aomewhat a r b i t r a r i l y  i d e n t i f i e d  wi th  Marx, M i l l ,  nurkheim and Weber, 
we f i n d  ou r se lves  i n  a  f r u s t r a t i n g  s i t u a t i o n .  The s i t u a t i o n ,  n l a a ,  is 
common i n  t h e  a o c i a l  s c i ences .  The t h e o r i e a  a t  hand c l e a r l y  l ead  i n  
d i f f e r e n t  directions. Yet i n  many a r e a s  they a r e  too incomplete o r  t oo  
imprec i se ly  a p e c i f i e d  t o  permit  e i t h e r  c l e a r  con f ron ta t ions  wi th  o t h e r  
t h e o r i e s  o r  d e c i s i v e  t e s t i n g  a g a i n s t  t h e  f a c t s .  Where .they a r e  w e l l  
s p e c i f i e d ,  fur thermore,  i t  o f t e n  tu rna  o u t  t h a t  they a r e  t a l k i n g  about 
d i f f e r e n t  th ings:  t h e o r i e s  of c o l l e c t i v e  choice  apply  t o  s i t u a t i o n s  i n  
which the  a l t e r n a t i v e s  a r e  l i m i t e d  and w e l l  de f ined ,  t h e o r i e s  of c o l l e c t i v e  
behavior  r e f e r  t o  what happens when t h e  s t anda rd  cho ices  a r e  suspended, 
and s o  f o r t h .  
In  Kenneth Boulding'a terms,  t h e o r i e s  i n  t h e  t r a d i t i o n  of M i l l  d e a l  
mainly wi th  exchange ayatems ( thoae i n  which t h e  i n c e n t i v e  f o r  one person 
o r  group t o  a c t  i s  t h e  d e s i r a b l e  r e t u r n  someone e l s e  w i l l  g ive  them i n  
response) .  Durkheimian t h e o r i e s  d e a l  mainly wi th  i n t e g r e t i o n  systems 
( those  i n  which t h e  i n c e n t i v e  is a  sense  of common f a t e  o r  i d e n t i t y ) .  
Weber'a l i n e  emphasizes t h r e a t  systems ( thoae i n  whlch t h e  incen t ive  is  
an undes i r ab le  response ano the r  group w i l l  v i s i t  on t h e  a c t o r  i f  he  f a i l s  . 
t o  a c t  i n  a  c e r t a i n  way). The Marxian l i n e  of t h ink ing  d e a l s  mainly 
wi th  t h r e a t 8  and exchange, a l though i n t e g r a t i o n  w i t h i n  groups -- e s p e c i a l l y  
w i t h i n  c l a s s e s  -- becomea an  important  cond i t i on  f o r  e f f e c t i v e  a c t i o n  by 
thoae groups. 
We can c r i t i c i z e  t h e  a v a i l a b l e  t h e o r i e s  on l o g i c a l  grounds, a p p r a i s e  
t h e i r  f r u i t f u l n e s s  i n  gene ra t ing  hypotheses ,  exp lana t ions  and r e sea rch  
s t r a t e g i e s ,  examine how w e l l  they work i n  t h e i r  ovn f i e l d s  of a p p l i c a t i o n .  
and a s s e s s  t h e  f i d e l i t y  o r  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  w i th  which t h e i r  advocates  employ 
them. In  t h e i r  p re sen t  a tnge  o f  development, however, we cannot dev i se  a  
s e t  of gene ra l  t e s t s  which w i l l  convincingly  e s t a b l i s h  t h e i r  r e l a t i v e  
v a l i d i t y .  
Never theless ,  t h e  accumulating l i t e r a t u r e  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  
o f f e r s  an  i n v i t i n g  t e r r a i n  f o r  t h e o r e t i c a l  exp lo ra t ion .  My plan he re  i s  
t o  draw on i t  i n  proposing gene ra l  concepts ,  hypotheses f o r  t h e  s tudy  -- 
contempornry o r  h i s t o r i c a l  -- of conc re t e  c a s e s  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  
We r e t u r n  t o  some of t h e  problems posed, bu t  no t  r e so lved ,  by Marx' 
ana lyses  of n ineteenth-century p o l i t i c a l  c o n f l i c t s :  how do b ig  s t r u c t u r a l  
changes a f f e c t  t he  p r e v a i l i n g  p a t t e r n s  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n ?  Among the  
b ig  changes. I want e s p e c i a l l y  t o  i n q u i r e  i n t o  t h e  e f f e c t s  of u rban iza t ion .  
i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n ,  state-making and t h e  expansion of cap i t a l i sm.  Among 
p r e v a i l i n g  p a t t e r n s  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n ,  I would p a r t i c u l a r l y  l i k e  t o  
know wl~a t  k inds  of groups ga in  o r  l o s e  t h e  capac i ty  t o  a c t  t oge the r  
e f f e c t i v e l y ,  and how t h e  forms of a c t i o n  themselves change. 
I n  t h i s  n b s t r a c t  formulat ion,  t h e  problems look l i k e  a  d e s e r t :  huge, 
dry and forbidding.  Happily, a l l  r e n l  d e s e r t s  con ta in  oases ;  s o  does 
t h i s  one. Some of tlie s p e c i f i c  ques t ions  which fol low from t h e  ~ b s t r n c t  
problem a r e  engaging nnd important .  Some a r e  even answerable: 1s i t  
t r u e  t h a t  tlie p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  of o rd ina ry  people  g r e a t l y  i n c r e a s e s  
w i th  u rban iza t ion ,  i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n  and t h e  growth of n a t i o n a l  s t a t e s ?  
Is i t  t r u e  t h n t  r ep re s s ion  can on ly  work f o r  a  wh i l e ,  because sooner o r  
l a t e r  people become s o  f r u s t r a t e d  they sna t ch  a t  any chance t o  r ebe l?  
Why has  the  a n t i - t a x  r e b e l l i o n ,  once t h e  most common occasion f o r  large-  
s c a l e  popular  v io l ence  i n  western  c o u n t r i e s ,  almost d isappeared? I n  our 
own t ime,  why l ~ a v e  s t r i k e s  and demonstra t ions  become s o  f r equen t?  Is 
t h e r e  a  tendency f o r  p o l i t i c h  l i f e  t o  become l e s s  and l e s s  t u r b u l e n t ,  
more and more r o u t i n i z e d ,  a s  a  country  g e t s  o l d e r  and r i c h e r ?  To what 
e x t e n t  (and when) a r e  s o c i a l  c l a s s e s  t h e  ch ie f  p o l i t i c a l  a c t o r s ?  Our 
ques t ions  run t h e  whole range of p o l i t i c a l  procesnes  from t h e  mob i l i za t ion  
of groups f o r  a c t i o n  t o  t he  working ou t  of r evo lu t ion .  
The pages t o  fol low w i l l  not  l a y  o u t  f i r m  answers t o  t l ~ c s e  q ~ ~ e s t i o n s .  
The i r  purpose is more l imi t ed .  They l a y  ou t  a  s e t  of concepts  which apply  
a c r o s s  t h i s  wide range of problems; they thereby he lp  i d e n t i f y  t h e  con- 
nec t ions  among t h e  problems. The f o l l o w i t ~ g  chap te r s  s t a t c  some genc rn l  
arguments concerning t h e  p o l i t i c a l  p roces ses  involved,  and i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  
arguments w i th  a  number of d i f f e r e n t  conc re t e  ca ses .  Now and then t l ~ e y  
pause t o  sum up t h e  e x i s t i n g  evidence on some mnjor controversy concerning 
c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  
The i l l u s t r a t i o n s  and t h e  evidence d e a l  mainly wi th  discont lnuoua.  
con ten t ious  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n :  s t r i k e s ,  demonstrntiona and t a x  r e b e l l i o n s  
r a t h e r  than workaday ward p o l i t i c s .  That is  no acc iden t .  The Elnrxian 
t r a d i t i o n  on which I r e l y  has  d e a l t  moat f u l l y  and e f f e c t i v e l y  wi th  
s i t u a t i o n s  of open c o n f l i c t .  ).ly own empi r i ca l  work has  c o n c e t ~ t r a t e d  on 
c o n f l i c t  r a t h e r  than consensus. A t  a  number of p o i n t s  l a t e r  i n  t h e  book 
I argue and i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  g r e a t  c o n t i n u i t y  between open c o n f l i c t  and 
r o u t i n e  con ten t ion  f o r  power. S t i l l ,  t h e  r e l a t i v e  weakness of t h e  
evidence concerning everyday, rou t in i zed ,  peaceful c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  
w i l l  l e a v e  open t h e  possibility t h a t  Weber and Durkheim were r i g h t :  t h n t  
t h e r e  r e a l l y  is a  s e p a r a t e  realm of con ten t ious ,  ex t r ao rd ina ry  c o l l e c t i v e  
a c t i o n  which r e q u i r e s  a  s e p a r a t e  mode of explanat ion.  I do not t h ink  
so .  But t h e  s k e p t i c a l  r eade r  may  refer t o  t r e a t  w l~a t  fo l lows a s  an 
a n a l y s i s  of d i scon t inuous ,  con ten t ious  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n ,  and t o  r e se rve  
judgment about the rest . 
The remainder of this book proposes strategies for the study of 
mobilization, repression, struggles for power and related processes. It 
returns repeatedly to the problems of observing and measuring the political 
processes reliably, because those problems of observation and measurement 
have been handled thoughtlessly in the past. In passing -- but only in 
passing -- the following discussion comments on previous work concerning 
collective action, conflict and revolution. Our main concern is with the 
work that has yet to be done. 
CHAPTER 3: INTERESTS, ORCANIZATLON AND MOBILIZATION 
The Elementaty'Mddels 
To get anywhere at all, we will l~ove to hew out rough models of inter- 
action among groups, and of a single group's collective action. At flrst 
chop, the model of interaction is quite static. Let us call it our pollty 
model. Its elements are a population, a government, one or more contenders. 
a polity and one or more coalitions. We define a population of interest 
to us by any means we please. Within that population we search For one or 
more of the following: 
a government: an organization which controls the prlncipal con- 
centrated means of coercion within the population. 
a contender: any group which, during some specified period, applies 
pooled resources to influence the government. Contenders include 
challengers and members of the polity. A =is any contender 
which has routine, low-cost access to resources controlled by the 
government; a challenger is any other contender. 
a polity consisting of the collective action of the members snd the 
government. 
a coalition: a tendency of a set of contenders andlor governments to 
corrdinate their collective action. 
Figure 3-1 presents these elements schemntically. 




------ c o a l i t i o n  
To apply  t h e  p o l i t y  model t o  an a c t u a l  populot ion,  we hove a  choice  
of s t a r t i n g  po in t s .  We can i d e n t i f y  a  government, thcn i d e n t i f y  t h e  pop- 
u l a t i o n  over  which t h a t  government e x e r c i s e s  (o r  c la ims)  c o n t r o l ;  t h e  g r e a t  
bulk  of p o l i t i c a l  a n a l y s i s  s t a r t s  t h a t  way, and wi th in  p o l l t i c a l  a n n l y s i s  
n a t i o n a l  s t a t e s  a r e  t h e  most comnon p o i n t s  of reference.  We can,  however, 
s t a r t  by i d e n t i f y i n g  a  populat ion,  then i d e n t l f y  a l l  governments e x e r c i s i n g  
c o n t r o l  w i t h i n  t h a t  populat ion and/or  des igna te  one such government a s  t h e  
po in t  of r e f e rence .  
I n  t h e  f i r s t  approach, we might t ake  t h e  U.S.S.R. a s  our po in t  of 
depa r tu re ,  and then i n t e r e s t  ou r se lves  i n  a l l  popu la t ions  over  which 
t h e  U.S.S.R. e x e r c i s e s  j u r i s d i c t i o n .  The c r i t e r i a  we use  f o r  "government" 
and " j u r i s d i c t i o n "  w i l l  c l e a r l y  determine how l a r g e  a  populot ion w i l l  
f a l l  i n t o  ou r  a n a l y s i s :  by a  weak c r i t e r i o n  much of Asia  and Eastern  Europe 
would q u a l i f y ;  by a  s t r o n g  c r i t e r i o n ,  g iven t h e  f e d e r a l  s t r u c t u r e  of t h e  
U.S.S.R., we could end up wi th  nothing but  t h e  c e n t m l  bu reauc rac i e s .  
I n  t h e  second approach, we might t ake  t h e  populat ion r e s i d i n g  with- 
i n  t h e  mapped boundar ies  of a  n o t i o n a l  s t a t e ;  t h a t  would produce a  r e s u l t  
s i m i l a r  t o  t h e  f i r s t  approach, w i th  t h e  main d i f f e r e n c e s  due t o  mlgrot ion 
a c r o s s  t h e  boundary i n  both  d i r e c t i o n s .  However, we might a l s o  t ake  n l l  
n a t i v e  speakers  of Russian,  a l l  e t h n i c  Kurds, a l l  persons  l i v i n g  wi th in  
500 k i lome te r s  of t h e  Black Sea. Those s t a r t i n g  p o i n t s  w i l l  produce very 
d i f f e r e n t  populat ions .  r~nd very d i f f e r e n t  s e t s  of r e l evan t  governments. In  
t h i s  approach, t h e  s t i c k i e s t  problem is  l i k e l y  t o  be  how durab le  t h e  a t tnch -  
! ment of i n d i v i d u a l s  t o  t h e  populat ion must be  be fo re  wc inc lude  them. Do 
. , 
! American t o u r i s t s  i n  Moscow count?  I f  n o t ,  what about  American diplomats  
who spend fou r  o r  f i v e  yea r s  i n  Moscow? Americans whom t h e  Russians put '  i n  
j a i l  f o r  fou r  o r  f i v e  yea r s?  We w i l l  so lve  t h e s e  problems a r b i t r a r i l y  o r  -- 
better -- as a F~rnction of the questions we are asking. The solutions, how- 
ever, will affect the answers to our questions. 
In the primitive, stntic version of this model, all contenders are 
attempting to realize their interests by applying pooled resources to each 
other and to the government. They vary in the success with which they get 
back resources in return; the biggest division in that regard separates the 
high-return members of the polity from the low-return challengers. Among 
other things, all contenders (members and challengers alike) are struggling 
for power. In the model, an increase in power shows up as an increasing 
rate of return on expended resources. All challengers seek, among other 
tlllngs, to enter the polity. A11 members seek, among other things, to 
remain in the polity. Changes in tlie resources controlled by each contender 
nnd by the government, changes in the rates at which the contenders and the 
government give and take resources and changes in the coalition structure 
add up to produce entries into the polity, and exits from it. The model 
conveys a familiar image of interest-group politics. 
The second model describes the behavior of a single contender. Let us 
call it our mobilization model. Four important, variable characteristics 
of contenders are: 
interests: the shared advantages or disadvantages likely to accrue to 
the population in question as a consequence of various possible inter- 
actions with other populations. 
orgnnizotion: tlie extent of common identity and unifying structure 
among the individuals in the population; as a process, an increase in 
common identity and/or unifying structure (we can call a decline in 
common identity and/or unifying structure disorganization). 
mobilization: the extent of resources under the collective control of 
the contender; as a process, an incrense In the reanurces or in tile 
degree of collective control (we can call n decline in either one 
demobilization). 
collective action: the extent of a contender's Joint action in pursuit 
of common ends; as a process, the joint action itself. 
Interest, organization, mobilization and collective action are four of the 
five components we reviewed earlier. The fifth was opportunity. 
Opportunity describes the relationship between the populatloli's Ln- 
terests and the current state of the world around it. In this First rough 
'statement of the model, it has three elements: 
power: the extent to which the outcomes of the population's inter- 
actions with other populations favor its interests over those of 
the others; acquisition of power is an incrense in the fnvorability 
of such outcomes, loss of power a decline in their fnvorabillty; 
political power refers to the outcomes of internctions with govern- 
ments. 
repression: the costs of collective action to the contender reaultin~ 
from interaction with other groups; as a process, any action by a- 
nother group which raises the contender's cost of collective action; 
an action which lowers the contender's cost is a form of facilitntton; 
let us reserve the term politicnl repression and political fncilita- 
tion for the relationships between contender(s) and government(s). 
opportunitylthreat: the extent to which other groups, including govern- 
ments, are either a) vulnernble to new claims which would, if success- 
ful, enhance the contender's realization of its interests or b) thrent- 
ening to make claims which would, if successfu.l. reduce the contender'e 
realization of its interests. 
Repression and power refer to closely related transactions. Repression 
refers to the volume of collective action as a function of the costs of 
producing it, while power refers to the returns from collective action as 
o function of its volume. If by some unlikely chance the volume of collec- 
tive action were to increase while total costs and total returns remained 
constant, by definition both repression and parer would fall. In general, 
however, a group which is subject to heavy repression -- that is, pays a 
high coat per unit of collective action -- also has little power (that is. 
gets R low return per unit of collective action). 
Interests and opportunity/threat are also closely connected. Loosely 
speaking, interest refers to advantages and disadvantages which would 
theoretically result from possible interactions with other groups, oppor- 
tunitylthreat to the Jlkelihood that those interactions will really occur. 
A Simple Account of Collective Action 
Before moving on to the difficulties hidden behind these elementary 
concepts, let us consider the simplest version of an argument linking them. 
Figure 3-2 presents it in schematic form. The diagram declares that the 
mnin determinants of s group's mobilization are its organization, its 
interest in possible interactions with other contenders, the current 
~~portunitylthreat of those interactions and the group's subjection to 
repression. The diagram says that the group's subjection to repression is 
mainly a function of the sort of interest it represents. It treats the 
extent of a contender's collective action as a resultant of its power, 
its mobilization, and the current opportunities and threats confronting its 
interests. And so on. 
It is easy to add hypothetical connections. For instance, it is 
quite possible that the form of s contender's organization, as such, affects 
Figure 3-2: The Mobilization Model 
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the repression to which other contenders and governments subject it; when 
voluntary associations become legal vehicles for one kind of interest, 
they tend to become legal for other kinds of interest. My provisional srgu- 
ment, however, is that such effects are secondary as compared with the 
particular interest embodied in the contender. Repression depends mainly 
on that interest, end especially on the degree to which it conflicts with 
the interests of the government and members of the polity. 
Likewise. a number of these connections are reciprocal over the 
longer run. For example, in the longer run a contender's form, pace and 
extent of mobilization surely affect the repression which other groups 
apply to it. So does power position. A mobilizing group which concentrates 
on building sn arsenal is likely to run afoul of the law, although the more 
powerful the group is in other respects the more likely it is to get away 
with it. Over the longer run a group's form of organization and of mobili- 
zation both affect its interest. Roberto Michele made the classic statement 
of the dilemma: to act on an interest, a group of people have to organize 
and mobilize; but complex and effective forms of organization give their 
managers new interests to advance or defend, and the new interests often 
conflict with the interests around which the group organized and mobilized 
in the first place. This, then, is a short-run model; it deals with the 
determinants of collective action at the moment of action. 
Although these short-run connections are plausible, they are not self- 
evident. Some of them contradict standard arguments concerning political 
processes. For instance, many "pluralistic" analyses of politics in 
parliamentary democracies make two assumptions which compete with those 
of our model: first. that repression is relatively low and spread evenly 
across the whole range of contenders and potential contenders; second, that 
the costs of organizing and mobilizing are also Eeirly low and equal. When 
he comes to consider the drawbacks of pragmatic two-party politics, Robert 
Dahl offers some intriguing reflections: 
Consider the lot of the political dissenter . . . If he enters 
into a third party, he is condemned to political impotence . . . 
It is natural for him to interpret political conflict among 
national leaders as sham battles within a unified power elite . . . 
For the political dissenter, continued political impotence and 
rejection breed frustration. Frustration may produce epothy 
and withdrawal from politics, but frustration may also turn to 
hostility. resentment, vengefulness, and even hatred for national 
leaders in both parties. The political dissenter, then, is 
likely to become alienated from the political system -- from 
its prevailing practices. its institutions, its personnel, and 
their assumptions (Dahl 1966: 65-66). 
Dahl does not claim to be building a general account of collective action. 
The work just quoted deals with the conditions for different patterns of 
political opposition in democracies. Nevertheless it is legitimate and 
useful to generalize Dahl's argument, for it contains the main proposals 
pluralist theory offers for the analysis of collective action in genernl. 
Dahl's reflections place a remarkable emphasis on individual, as 
opposed to group, aspirations end grievances. They assume that an indi- 
vidual defines his interest. then searches for a way to forward that 
interest within the existing poljtical system. They contain an indirect 
observation that the costs and returns of collective action differ from 
one potential actor to another as a result of the particular lineaments . 
of the American political system. Neither repression nor mobilizing costs 
seem to play a significant part in Dahl'a explanation of differentials in 
political participation. 
"Political participation" itself, in this view, consists of voting. 
party work, holding office and communicating with legislators: people 
whose problems these procedures won't solve tend to withdraw or to act 
outside the political system. The extent to which a group's interests 
are facing new threats or new opportunities becomes, in Dahl's argument 
and the plurallst argument in general, the chief determinant of its 
collecti.ve action. Furthermore, the argument draws sharp distinctions 
among normal politics, abnormal politics and collective action outside 
the realm of politics. In all these regards. our collective-action model 
 lead^ in other directions: assuming groups as the political participants, 
attributing major importance to repression and to mobilizing costs, mini- 
mizing the political/nonpolitical distinction and arguing that the main 
difference between "normal" and "abnormal" political action is the power 
position of the groups involved. 
The comparison of our barebones mobilization model with the pluralist 
assumptions also helps display some worrisome gaps in the mobilization 
argument. For one thing, the model does not directly represent the effects 
of beliefs, customs, world views, rights or obligations. Instead, in this 
elementary version, it assumes that beliefs, customs, world views, rights 
and obligations affect collective action indirectly through their influence 
on interest, organization, mobilization and repression. This assumption, 
for the ways a contender's collective action affects its opportunities 
and its power. The model provides no place for strategic interactions and 
no place for the conquest or loss of power. Collective action affects s 
group's parer, but that effect takes time. As we move along, we will have 
to treat time-sequences more explicitly and carefully. 
Finally. the model is essentially quantitative. It concerns the 
amount of collective action. the extent of organization, and so on. 
Unquestionably, the = of organization, of interest, of mobilization 
effects the =of collective action of which a contender is capable: in 
many circumatances it affects the quantity of collective nction an well: 
In Karl Marx' analysis of 1848, which we looked at in the last chapter, 
the social and geographic fragmentation of the peasantry helps explain 
their inaction in the face of assaults on their interests. We will have 
much to do with these qualitative relationships later on. 
If we were to apply the elementary mobilization model to the changing 
collective action of different groups of workers in the course of indust- 
rialization -- which is one of the purposes for which it is intended -- 
we would find ourselves pursuing two somewhat separate bunches of questions: 
first, how the shared interests, general organization and current mobilization 
of a trade affected its members' capacity for acting together; second, how 
its current relationship to the government and to powerful contenders 
effected the costs and returns of each of the available opportunities to act 
and others like it, will need attention later on. 
For another thing, the model has no time in it. Collective action 
does. The most obvious defect of the model is that it makes no allowance 
on common g r i evances  and a s p i r a t i o n s .  Under t h e  f i r s t  heading come.questions 
about  t h e  s p a t i a l  concen t r a t ion  of t h e  indus t ry .  t h e  ex tens iveness  of t h e  
i n t e r n a l  communicat io~~s network, t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of unions ,  and s o  on. 
Under t h e  second a r e  ques t ions  concerning t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of c o a l i t i o n s  wi th  
power-holders, t h e  e x t e n t  of l e g i s l a t i o n  pena l i z ing  l abo r  o rgan iza t ions ,  t h e  
rewards s v l i l n b l e  t o  v i c t o r s  i n  e l e c t i o n s  o r  i n  s t r i k e s ,  e t c .  
Much of t h e  fol lowing d i scuss ion  w i l l  propose arguments concerning 
s u c l ~  s p e c i f i c  ques t ions .  It w i l l  o f f e r  concepts  t o  c l a r i f y  t h e  arguments 
a s  we l l  a s  s t r a t e g i e s  of measurement and a n a l y s i s .  I f ,  equipped only  wi th  
our  elementary model, we pressed our  i nqu i ry  i n t o  working-class c o l l e c t i v e  
a c t i o n ,  we would soon need f c r t h e r  assumptions about r i g h t s ,  b e l i e f s ,  and 
t h e  r u l e s  of t h e  p o l i t i c a l  game. The l a t e r  d i scuss ion  w i l l  o f t e n  t a r r y  
over  such problems. 
For t h e  moment, neve r the l e s s ,  we should s t i c k  wi th  i n t e r e s t s ,  o rgsn i -  
za t ion ,  mobi l iza t ion, .  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n ,  repression-facilitation, power 
and o p p o r t u n i t y l t h r e a t .  Let us  go around ou r  diagram i n  t h a t  o r d e r ,  r e f i n i n g  
a s  we go. Then we can r e s t a t e  t h e  model be fo re  applying i t  t o  t h e  a n a l y s i s  
of d i f f e r e n t  forms of c o n f l i c t .  This  chap te r  w i l l  t ake  us  through i n t e r e s t ,  
organizat . ion,  mob i l i za t ion  and c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  Chapter 4 w i l l  then 
add r e p r e s s i o n - f a c i l i t a t i o n ,  power and o p p o r t u n i t y l t h r e a t  t o  t h e  a n a l y s i s  
be fo re  r econs ide r ing  both our  models and t h e i r  imp l i ca t ions  f o r  r e a l - l i f e  
c o n f l i c t .  
I n t e r e s t s  
Elont ana lyses  of mob i l i za t ion  and ' con ten t ion  f o r  power t ake  t h e  groups 
involved,  and t h e i r  I n t e r e s t s ,  f o r  granted.  Once we n o t i c e  who i s  a c t i n g ,  i t  
r a r e l y  seems d i f f i c u l t  t o  exp la in  why they ,  and no t  o t h e r  groups, a r e  a c t i n g .  
Yet many groups f a i l  t o  mobi l ize ,  some mobilized groups f a l l  t o  a c t  c o l l e c -  
t i v e l y ,  some c o l l e c t i v e  a c t o r s  f a i l  t o  contend f o r  power, nnd many a c t o r s  
come and go: i nd ignan t  women now, angry farmers  then,  temperance ndvocntes 
some o t h e r  time. A v a l i d  theory of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  must exp la in  t h e  
comings and goings. I t  must a l s o  exp la in  why some groups never sl~ow up a t  . 
a l l .  P a r t  of t h e  exp lana t ion  l i e s  i n  t h e  o rgan iza t iona l  problems we wLll 
t ake  up l a t e r .  But p a r t  of i t  s u r e l y  r e s i d e s  i n  t he  f a c t  t h o t  groups have 
va ry ing  i n t e r e s t s  i n  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  
Theor ies  i n  t h e  t r a d i t i o n  of John S t u a r t  lI111 g ive  us  l i t t l e  guidance 
i n  t h e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of a  group 's  i n t e r e s t .  Yet they suggest  t h a t  t h e  
na tu re  of t h e  popu la t ion ' s  c e n t r a l  decision-making s t r u c t u r e s  -- its mnrket. 
its system of vo t ing ,  o r  something e l s e  of t h e  s o r t  -- s t r o n g l y  a i f e c t s  
which people  have an i n t e r e s t  i n  a c t i n g  toge the r ,  and w i l l  t h e r e f o r e  do so .  
Durkheimisn t h e o r i e s  t e l l  us  t o  walch t h e  c r e a t i o n  and d e s t r u c t i o n  
of groups by t h e  changing d i v i s i o n  of l a b o r .  They t e l l  us  t o  expect  g r e a t e r  
a c t i o n  (o r  a t  l e a s t  a  d i f f e r e n t  kind of a c t i o n )  from t h e  groups being most 
completely and r a p i d l y  transformed. For Durkheim, i nd iv idun l  and c o l l e c -  
t i v e  i n t e r e s t s  gene ra l ly  c o n f l i c t  i n  t h e  s h o r t  run. Ind iv idua l  Jmpulses 
and i n d i v i d u a l  i n t e r e s t s  e r e  roughly eqtr ivs lent ;  t h e  c r u c i a l  v a r i a t i o n  from 
one group o r  s o c i e t y  t o  ano the r  is how much those  indJvidua1 impulses and 
i n t e r e s t s  a r e  under s o c i a l  c o n t r o l .  
Weberian t h e o r i e s  a l s o  draw bur a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  d i v i s i o n  of l nbor ,  
but  l ead  us t o  a n t i c i p a t e  g r e a t e r  a c t i v i t y  from groups wl~ich have a t t achbd  
themselves t o  new systems of b e l i e f .  Stlared b e l i e f  i t s e l f  l eads  t o  a  d e f -  
i n i t i o n  of i n t e r e s t ,  and s t i m u l a t e s  a c t i o n  o r i en t ed  t o  t h a t  d e f i n i t i o n .  
The Mnrxian l i n e ,  f i n a l l y ,  is w e l l  known: t h e  changing o rgan iza t ion  
of product ion c r e a t e s  and d e s t r o y s  s o c i a l  c l a s s e s  which a r e  def ined by d i f -  
f e r e n t  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  t o  t h e  b a s i c  means of product ion;  ou t  O F  t h e  o rgan i -  
za t ion  o f  product ion a r i s e  fundamental c l a s s  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  i n t e r e s t .  
A c l a s s  a c t s  t oge the r ,  i n  t h e  Marxian account ,  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  i t  has  
ex tens ive  i n t e r n a l  o rgan iza t ion  and t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  i t s  i n t e r e s t s  a r e  
c u r r e n t l y  being th rea t ened .  
The Mi l l i on ,  Durkheimian. Weberian and Marxian views produce 
competing s t a t emen t s  about  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between i n t e r e s t  and 
o rgan iza t ion .  A major p a r t  of t h e  disagreement concerns  the  proper  way 
t o  i d e n t i f y  a  popu la t ion ' s  i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  f i r s t  p lace .  The b a s i c  
choices  a r e  two. We can: 
1 )  i n f e r  t h e  i n t e r e s t  from t h e  popu la t ion ' s  own u t t e r a n c e s  and 
a c t i o n s ;  
2) i n f e r  i t  from a  gene ra l  a n a l y s i s  of t h e  connect ions  between 
i n t e r e s t  and s o c i a l  p o s i t i o n .  
Mi l l i on  t h e o r i s t s  tend t o  do some ve r s ion  of t h e  f i r s t ;  they t r y  t o  
ground t h e i r  ana lyses  on u t i l i t i e s  o r  p re fe rences  revealed d i r e c t l y  
o r  i n d i r e c t l y  by t h e  a c t o r s .  Elarxists o f t e n  do some ve r s ion  of t h e  
second; they determine o group ' s  i n t e r e s t  a  p r i o r i  from i t s  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
Lo t h e  means of product ion.  There a r e  many e l a b o r a t i o n s  and compromises 
between t h e  two. For example, some a n a l y s t s  i n f e r  t h e  i n t e r e s t  of 
workers a t  one po in t  i n  time r e t r o a c t i v e l y  from an i n t e r e s t  they a r t i c u l a t e  
l a t e r .  Many t r ea tmen t s  of s o c i a l  movements t ake  t h a t  t ack ,  looking back 
t o  t h e  e a r l y  s t a g e s  of t h e  movement f o r  t r a c e s  of awareness of g o a l s  which 
would l o t e r  become c l e a r  and dominant. 
The f i r s t  choice  -- i n f e r r i n g  t h e  i n t e r e s t  from t h e  popu la t ion ' s  
own u t t e r a n c e s  and a c t i o n s  -- is open t o  s e r i o u s  ob jec t ions .  For one 
th ing.  many groups appear  t o  be unaware of t h e i r  own r e a l  i n t e r e s t s .  
E i the r  they have not a r t i c u l a t e d  t h e i r  shared i n t e r e s t s  o r  they have 
a r t i c u l a t e d  them f a l s e l y .  For ano the r ,  t h e  appropr i a t e  evidence is  very 
hard t o  i d e n t i f y ,  assemble.and syn thes i ze :  people o f t e n  say  conflicting 
th ings ,  o r  nothing a t  a l l .  But t h e  second choice  -- i n f e r r i n g  i n t e r e s t s  
from a  gene ra l  a n a l y s i s  of t h e  connect ions  between i n t e r e s t s  and s o c i a l  
p o s i t i o n  -- a l s o  has  s e r i o u s  drawbacks. It t a k e s  conf idence,  even 
arrogance,  t o  o v e r r i d e  a  g roup ' s  own v i s i o n  of i ts i n t e r e s t s  i n  l i f e .  
General i n t e r e s t  schemes commonly r e v e a l  a  c o n f l i c t  between shor t - run 
and long-run i n t e r e s t s .  (Much i n t e r e s t i n g  game theory d e a l s  wi th  
s i t u a t i o n s  i n  which shor t - run i n t e r e s t  l eads  t o  s t r a t e g i e s  con t r a ry  t o  
t h e  long-run i n t e r e s t  of t h e  p a r t i e s . )  In  t h a t  c a s e ,  whicl~ is t h e  "real"  
i n t e r e s t ?  F i n a l l y ,  we a r e  t r y i n g  t o  exp la in  why people behave ns  they 
do; t h e  g o a l s  they have fashioned f o r  themselves appear t o  i n f l u e n c e  
t h e i r  behavior  even when those  g o a l s  a r e  t r i v i a l ,  vague, c ln reo l i s t i c  Or 
se l f -de fea t ing .  My own response t o  t h i s  dilemma con ta ins  two r u l e s :  
1 )  t r e a t  t h e  r e l a t i o n s  of product ion a s  p r e d i c t o r s  of t h e  i n t e r e s t s  
people w i l l  pursue on t h e  average and i n  t h e  long run. but  2) r e l y ,  a s  
much a s  p o s s i b l e ,  on people ' s  own a r t i c u l a t i o n  of t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s  a s  nn 
exp lana t ion  of t h e i r  behavior  i n  t h e  s h o r t  run. 
We escape t h a t  f e roc ious  dilemma, however, only  t o  rush on to  t h e  
horns  of another :  i n d i v i d u a l  i n t e r e s t s  vs .  group i n t e r e s t s .  Even i f  
we i d e n t i f y  both  wi th  conf idence,  they need not  co inc ide ,  ond m y  well. 
c o n f l i c t .  Much t h e o r i z i n g  i n  t h e  ve in  of John S t u a r t  M i l l  h a s  d e a l t  
w i th  p r e c i s e l y  t h a t  dilemma -- sometimes by s t r i v i n g  t o  show t h a t  
i n d i v i d u a l  p u r s u i t  of s e l f - i n t e r e s t  w i l l  s e rve  t h e  common good, some- 
t imes  by a t t empt ing  t o  i d e n t i f y  and exp la in  those  s i ~ u a t i o n s  i n  which 
a  genuine c o n f l i c t  does  emerge. sometimes by looking f o r  dec i s ion  r u l e s  
which w i l l  cumulate i n d i v i d u a l  i n t e r e s t s  t o  t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  advnntnge. 
In  a  famous psaaage of The Wealth of Nations (Chapter 3. Book 4 ) ,  Adam 
Smith s e t  t h e  tone of t h e  f i r s t  a l t e r n a t i v e :  
Every i n d i v i d u a l  is c o n t i n u a l l y  e x e r t i n g  himself t o  f i n d  ou t  t h e  
most advantageous employment f o r  whatever c a p i t a l  he can command. 
It is h i s  own advantage, indeed,  and no t  t h a t  of t h e  s o c i e t y ,  
which he has  i n  view. But t h e  s tudy  of h i s  own advantage n a t u r a l l y ,  
o r  r a t h c r  n e c e s s a r i l y ,  l eads  him' t o  p r e f e r  t h a t  employment which 
is most advantageous t o  t h e  s o c i e t y .  
On t h e  o t h e r  hand, t h e  argument by Mancur Olson which we reviewed 
e a r l i e r  ( d e s p i t e  i t s  deb t  t o  Adam Smith) i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l  
i n t e r e s t  and group i n t e r e s t  u s u a l l y  do c o n f l i c t .  At l e a s t  they c o n f l i c t  
i n  t h i s  sense:  each i n d i v i d u a l  a c t o r  o r d i n a r i l y  has  an i n c e n t i v e  t o  
avoid  c o n t r i b u t i n g  h i s  s h a r e  t o  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n s  which w i l l  b e n e f i t  
everyone. Adnm Smith r e so lves  t h e  dilemma by denying i t ;  by imp l i ca t ion ,  
he den ie s  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  anything s p e c i a l  about  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  which 
the  proper  s tudy of i n d i v i d u a l  a c t i o n  w i l l  no t  exp la in .  Mancur Olson. 
however, makes t h a t  very ' l i n k  problemat ic .  
We a r e  not  d e f e n s e l e s s  s g a i n s t  t h e  dilemma. We should remain c l e a r  
t h a t  c o l l e c t i v e  i n t e r e s t s  e x i s t .  however l a r g e  a  p a r t  t h e  p u r s u i t  of 
i n d i v i d u a l  i n t e r e s t s  may play i n  t h e  accomplishmentof t h o s e c o l l e c t i v e  
i n t e r e s t s .  We should d e l i b e r a t e l y  t r e a t  t h e  degree  of c o r ~ f l i c t  between 
i n d i v i d u a l  end c o l l e c t i v e  i n t e r e s t s  a s  a  v a r i a b l e  a f f e c t i n g  t h e  l i k e -  
l ihood and c h a r a c t e r  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  We should t r e a t  t h a t  degree  
of c o n f l i c t ,  more p r e c i s e l y ,  a s  i n c r e a s i n g  the  c o s t  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  
t o  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l s  and t o  t h e  group a s  a  whole. And we 6ho11ld pursue t h e  
a n a l y s i s  of t h e  ways t h a t  a l t e r n a t i v e   arrangement^ f o r  making d e c i s i o n s  
t r a n s l a t e  i n d i v i d u a l  p re fe rences  i n t o  c o l l e c t i v e  outcomes. In  t h e  annly- 
s ea  t h a t  fo l low,  I w i l l  occas iona l ly  w r e s t l e  w i th  t h e s e  t h e o r e t i c a l  prob- 
lems. Usually. however. I w i l l  t r e a t  them a s  p r n c t i c n l  ma t t e r s :  how t o  de- 
termine,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  t imes  end p l aces ,  which i n t e r e s t s  a r e  lmpprtant and 
how t h e  people involved aggregate  them. 
Organizat ion 
Harr ison White has  made a  powerful d i s t i l l a t e  of t h e  most i n s i p i d  
wines i n  t h e  s o c i o l o g i c a l  c e l l a r  -- group taxonomies. There we f ind on ly  
two e lements .  There a r e  c a t e g o r i e s  of people  who s h a r e  some chnrac t e r i a -  
t i c :  they a r e  a l l  female, a l l  Sunni Muslims, a l l  r e s i d e n t s  of Timbuktu, o r  
something e l s e .  A fu l l - f l edged  category c o n t a i n s  people a l l  of whom recog- 
n i z e  t h e i r  common c h a r a c t e r i s t i c ,  and whom everyone e l s e  recognizes  a s  
having t h a t  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c .  There a r e  a l s o  networks of people who a r e  
l i nked  t o  each o t h e r ,  d i r e c t l y  o r  i n d i r e c t l y ,  by a  s p e c i f i c  kind of i n t e r -  
pe r sona l  bond: a  chain  of people  each of whom owes someone e l s e  i n  t h e  s e t  
a t t endance  a t  h i s  o r  he r  wedding, l e t  us  s ay ,  o r  t h e  s e t  of i n d i v i d u a l s  de- 
f i n e d  by s t a r t i n g  a r b i t r a r i l y  w i th  some person, i d e n t i f y i n g  everyone t h a t  
person t a l k s  w i th  st  l e a s t  once every day, then i d e n t i f y i n g  everyone tlley 
t a l k  w i th  a t  l e a s t  once every day,  and so  on u n t i l  no new persona j o i n  t h e  
list. I f  t h e  common c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of t h e  i n t e r p e r s o n a l  bond I s  o rd inn ry ,  
t h e  c a t e g o r i e s  and networks def ined by them tend t o  be  l a r g e .  C l e a r l y  we 
can s h r i n k  t h e  c a t e g o r i e s  and networks by i n s i s t i n g  on c r i t e r i a  (or  combln- 
a t i o n s  of c r i t e r i a )  which occur r a r e l y :  female Sunni Muslim r e s i d e n t s  of 
Timbuktu, perhaps ,  o r  d a i l y  conve r sa t ion  p l u s  i n v i t a b i l i t y  to n wedd4.ng. 
The more i n t e r e s t i n g  combination is  t h e  one White c n l l n  n  c a t n e t :  
a  s e t  of i n d i v i d u a l s  comprising both a  category and a  network. The c a t n e t  
ca t ches  g r a c e f u l l y  t h e  sense  of "groupness" which more complicated con- 
c e p t s  m i s s .  For t h a t  reason,  I w i l l  s u b s t i t u t e  t h e  word group f o r  t h e  e x o t i c  
c n t n e t .  A s e t  of i n d i v i d u a l s  is s group t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  i t  comprises 
both  s category and a  network. 
The idea  of o rgan iza t ion  fol lows d i r e c t l y .  The more ex tens ive  its 
common i d e n t i t y  and i n t e r n a l  networks, t h e  more organized t h e  group. 
CATNESS X NETNESS ORGANIZATION. Schemat ical ly ,  F igu re  3-3 sums up t h e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  among t h e  concepts .  "All Braz i l i ans"  comprise a  s e t  of peo- 
p l e  on ly  weakly l i nked  by i n t e r p e r s o n a l  networks, but  s t r o n g l y  i d e n t i f i e d  
by themselves and o t h e r s  a s  a  s e p a r a t e  ca t egory  of being:  low on ne tnes s ,  
high on c a t n e s s .  The p r i n t e r s '  union l o c a l s  por t rayed i n  L i p s e t ,  Trow 
and Coleman's Q Democracy have both  d i s t i n c t ,  compelling i d e n t i t i e s  
and ex tens ive ,  absorbing i n t e r p e r s o n a l  networks: l i i g l~  on both  c a t n e s s  and 
ne tnes s ,  t h e r e f o r e  on o rgan iza t ion .  
Figure  3-3: Components of Organizat ion 
s u a l  Crowd Fr i endsh ip  Network ,&n 
* Low > High 
NETNESS 
Th i s  no t ion  o f  o rgan iza t ion  s t r e s s e s  t h e  group 's  i nc lus iveness :  llow 
c l o s e  i t  comes t o  absorbing t h e  members' whole l i v e s .  (For " inclus ivencsa"  
we have our  cho ice  of t h r e e  r e l a t e d  s t anda rds :  t h e  nmount of t ime, t h e  
amount of energy, o r  t h e  p ropor t ion  of a l l  s o c i a l  i n t e r a c t i o n  i n  wlilcll t h e  
members and o t h e r  people  a r e  t ak ing  i n t o  account t h e  f a c t  o f  group mem- 
bership . )  Other  f e a t u r e s  of a  group 's  s t r u c t u r e  one might want t o  cons ide r  
i n  judging l~ow "organized" i t  is a r e  i t s  e f f i c i e n c y  and its e f f c c t i v e n e s s  
-- o r  t h e  s t r u c t u r a l  f e a t u r e s  presumably e f f e c t i n g  e f f i c i e n c y  and e f f e c -  
t i v e n e s s ,  such a s  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n ,  c e n t r a l i t y  and s t r n t l f i c a t i o n .  I s t r e s s  
i nc lus iveness  on two grounds: 1 )  t h e  (unproved) l ~ y p o t h e s l s  t l i s t  i t  is  t h e  
main a s p e c t  of group s t r u c t u r e  which a f f e c t s  t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  mobi l ize ;  2 )  
t h e  i n t r i n s i c  d i f f i c u l t y  of s e p a r a t i n g  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  and e f f i c i e n c y  from 
t h e  mob i l i za t ion  and c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  we a r e  t r y i n g  t o  e x p l a i n .  By t h e  
s t anda rd  of i nc lus iveness ,  an i s o l a t e d  community w i l l  tend t o  be h lgh ly  
o rgan ized ,  but  s o  w i l l  some occupa t iona l  groups ,  some r e l i g i o u s  groups 
and some p o l i t i c a l  groups. 
We need these  d e f i n i t l o n s  i n  o r d e r  t o  t h ink  about  t h e  groups which cou ld ,  
i n  p r i n c i p l e ,  mobilize. We a l s o  need them t o  s p e c i f y  what i t  means t o  soy 
t h a t  o rgnn iza t ion  promotes mob i l i za t ion .  The number of p o t e n t i a l  mobilizers 
is enormous. The t s s k  of enumerating a l l  of them f o r  a  g iven populat ion 
would look something l i k e  t h i s :  
1 )  i d e n t i f y  every s i n g l e  s t a t u s  d i s t i n c t i o n  employed v i t h l n  t h e  
populs t  ion;  
2 )  s e l e c t  t hose  d i s t i n c t i o n s  which imply some d i f f e r e n c e  i n  i n t e r e s t  
between those  i n  one category and t l ~ o s e  i n  another ;  
3) produce t h e  (tremendous) l i s t  c o n s i s t i n g  of a l l  combinntions o f  
t h e  s e l e c t e d  d i s t i n c t i o n s :  
4) e l i m i n a t e  those, wlilch llave no r e a l  persons  wi th in  them (e.g. 
Chinese-.lewish-cowboy-grandmother); 
5)  s e l e c t  those  wi th  some minimum p o s s i b i l i t y  of i d e n t i f y i n g  and 
communicnting wi th  each o t h e r .  
This  f a n t a s t i c  t a s k  is probably o u t  of reach f o r  l a r g e  popu la t ions  organ- 
i zed  i n  complicated ways, a l though Edmonson (1958) d id  analyze appa ren t ly  
exhaus t ive  l i s t s  of s t a t u s  terms f o r  North American Ind ian  groups. But 
one mig l~ t  be a h l e  t o  c a r r y  o u t  s t e p s  1 and 2 a s  sampling o p e r a t i o n s ,  i f  
t h c r e  were an unbiased sou rce  of s t a t u s  d i s t i n c t i o n s ;  then t h e  l i s t  f o r  
s t e p  3  could be  a s  sma l l  a s  one d e s i r e d .  I f  s t e p s  4  and 5 l e f t  no c a t e -  
g o r i e s ,  one could go back t o  1 and 2 over  and ove r .  
Gamson's procedure f o r  i d e n t i f y i n g  "chal lenging groups" i n  American 
p o l l t i c s  bea r s  a  gene ra l  resemblance t o  t h i s  i d e a l  p l an ,  bu t  s t a r t s  much 
f a r t h e r  a long i n  t h e  mob i l i za t ion  process .  ("Challenging groups" a r e  
t hose  whicl~ i n  t he  per iod from 1800 t o  1945 made a  new, con te s t ed  b id  t o  
cllangc tile o rgan iza t ion  o r  behavior  of t h e  n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c a l  system; 
they a r e  a  s p e c i a l  c a s e  of t h e  groups which, not c o i n c i d e n t a l l y ,  I e a r l i e r  
c a l l e d  "chal lengers" . )  Gamson s c a ~ i s  numerous h i s t o r i c a l  sou rces  f o r  any 
mention whatsoever of a  group making new c l a ims ,  and p l aces  a l l  group namea 
i n  a  pool from which he then draws groups st random f o r  c l o s e  s tudy.  A f t e r  
somc e l imina t ions  f o r  d u p l i c a t i o n ,  l a c k  of geographic  scope,  e t c .  and a f -  
t e r  a  l a r g e  scorch f o r  a d d i t i o n a l  informat ion concerning t h e  groups drawn, 
Gamson has  an unbiased, well-documented sample of a l l  cha l l eng ing  groups 
meet ins  h i s  c r i t e r i a  over  t h e  e n t i r e  pe r iod .  Within t h e  sample, he can 
then s tudy  changes i n  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of cha l l eng ing  groups over  time, 
d i f f e r e n c e s  between success fu l  and unsuccessful  c h a l l e n g e r s ,  and a  number 
o f  o t h e r  important  problems. For ou r  purposes ,  t h e  weakness oE Camson's 
procedure  is t h a t  a  group must have ac t ed  toget l ier  somewhow t o  bc  mentioned 
i n  h i s t o r i c a l  accounts .  I t  i s  n o t ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  a  r e l i a b l e  way of determining 
what c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  s e t  o f f  t hose  groups which mobi l ize  from a l l  t l ~ o s c  
o t h e r s  which could ,  i n  theory,  have mobilized. 
We have an a l t e r n a t i v e .  In s t ead  of a t t empt ing  t o  prepare  an unbinaed 
l i s t  of a l l  p o t e n t i a l  mob i l i ze r s ,  we can tnkc one o r  two dimensions o r  
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  which a r e  of t h e o r e t i c a l  i n t e r e s t ,  s e n r c l ~  f o r  evidence oC 
group format ion,  and then of mob i l i za t ion ,  a t  d i f f e r e n t  l o c a t i o n s  a long t h e  
dimension, l e t t i n g  t h e  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  t e s t  more gene rn l  a s s e r t i o n s  con- 
ce rn ing  t h e  determinants  of o rgan iza t ion  and mob i l i za t ion .  Voting a n a l y s t s  
and s t u d e n t s  of i n d u s t r i a l  c o n f l i c t  sometimes do on important  p n r t  of t h e  
necessary  work. I n  vo t ing  s t u d i e s ,  i t  i s  common t o  t ake  t h e  e n t i r e  popu- 
l a t i o n  of p o t e n t i a l  v o t e r s  i n  some t e r r i t o r y ,  d i v i d e  i t  up i n t o  mnjor demo- 
g raph ic  c a t e g o r i e s ,  then examine d i f f e r e n t i a l s  among t h e  c a t e g o r i e s  i n  o r -  
gan iza t ion ,  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t y  and vo t ing  p ropens i t i e s .  In  snn lyses  of 
s t r i k e s ,  i t  i s  common t o  t ake  an e n t i r c  l abo r  f o r c e ,  d i v i d e  i t  i n t o  indus- 
t r i e s  and types  of f i rms ,  t hen  document v a r i a t i o n  i n  t h e  o rgan iza t ion  of 
work, type and i n t e n s i t y  of un ion iza t ion  and p ropens i ty  t o  s t r i k e .  
D i f f e r e n t  ways of d i v i d i n g  up t h e  e l e c t o r a t e  o r  t h e  l a b o r  fo rce  w i l l  
produce d i f f e r e n t  r e s u l t s .  But t h a t  can be an advantage: i t  he lps  us  de- 
c i d e  which d i f f e r e n t i a l s  a r e  du rab le  and gene ra l .  For example, some yea r s  
ago Clark  Kerr and Abraham Siege1 made a  p l a u s i b l e  and widely-accepted 
a n a l y s i s  of i n d u s t r i a l  s t i k e  p r o p e n s i t i e s .  F i r s t ,  they s u m r i z e d  t h e  
o v e r a l l  p a t t e r n  of s t i k e  p r o p e n s i t i e s  i n  A u s t r a l i a ,  Czechoslovakia, Germany, 
I t a l y .  t h e  Nether lands ,  New Zealand. Norway, Sweden. Swi t ze r l and ,  t h e  United 
Kingdom and t h e  United S t a t e s  du r ing  va r ious  pe r iods  from World War I t o  
t h e  l a t e  19401~. The i r  d e s c r i p t i o n  of t h e  ~ e n e r a l  p a t t e r n  appears  411 Tnblc 
3-1. llaving i d e n t i f i e d  t h e  d i f  f e r e n t i a l s ,  they t r i e d  t o  exp la in  them. 
Table  3-1: Kerr C S i e g e l ' s  Summary of S t r i k e  P r o p e n s i t i e s  
Source: Kerr 6 S i e g e l  1.954: 190 
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workforce ,  segregated from o t h e r  workers -- a s  t h e  major cond i t i on  pro- 
ducing high s t r i k e  propensi ty .  They a l s o  suggested t h a t ,  
I f  t h e  job is phys i ca l ly  d i f f i c u l t  and unpleasant ,  u n s k i l l e d  o r  
s emisk i l l ed ,  and casua l  o r  s e s s o n s l ,  and f o s t e r s  an independent s p i r i t  
( a s  i n  t h e  logger  i n  t h e  woods), i t  w i l l  draw tough, i ncons t an t  com- 
b a t i v e ,  and v i r i l e  workers,  and they w t l l  be i n c l i n e d  t o  s t r i k e .  I f  
t h e  job i s  phys i ca l ly  easy and performed i n  p l easan t  surroundings ,  
s k i l l e d  and r e spons ib l e ,  s t eady ,  and s u b j e c t  t o  s e t  r u l c s  and c l o s e  
supe rv i s ion ,  i t  w i l l  a t t r a c t  women o r  t h e  more submiss ive  type of man 
who w i l l  abhor s t r i k e s  (Kerr 6 S i e g e l  1954: 195) .  
But t h i s  was, f o r t u n a t e l y .  a  secondary hypothesis .  
I n  e i t h e r  v e r s i o n ,  t h e  argument has  two l e v e l s :  1 )  t h e  i d e n t i f i c n t i o n  
of some s t anda rd  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  among i n d u s t r i e s  i n  s t r i ke -p ropens i ty ;  2 )  
t h e  exp lana t ion  of whatever d i f f e r e n t i a l s  a c t u a l l y  appear .  Both f a c e t s  of 
t h e  Kerr-Siege1 a n a l y s i s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  t h e  second, appear  t o  be  wrong. For 
t h e  case  o f  France, Table  3-2 p re sen t s  r a t e s  of s t r i k e s  and man-days i n  
s t r i k e s  f o r  major i n d u s t r i e s  from 1890 t o  1960. The da t a  stlow no more 
than a  moderate s t a b i l i t y  i n  r e l a t i v e  s t r i k e  p r o p e n s i t i e s  from one per iod 
t o  tl ie nex t .  They show a  cons ide rab le  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  r c l a t l v e  s t r i k e  pro- 
p e n s i t i e s  as measured by frequency of s t r i k e s  and hy t o t a l  man-days. 
Although a g r i c u l t u r e  does s t i c k  a t  t h e  bottom of t h e  l i s t ,  s o  do t r a n s p o r t  
and t e x t i l e s .  Food is a l s o  c o n s i s t e n t l y  low, con t r a ry  t o  t h e  p r e d i c t i o n .  
There is l e s s  cons i s t ency  a t  t h e  top:  qua r ry ing  t u r n s  o u t  t o  linve m n y  
s t r i k e s ,  bu t  r e l a t i v e l y  s h o r t ,  a m 1 1  ones .  Mining t u r n s  o u t  t o  linve few 
s t r i k e s ,  bu t  b i g ,  long ones. In  any c a s e ,  t h e  o t h e r  French i n d u s t r i e s  
which rank r e l a t i v e l y  high i n  s t r i k e  p ropens i ty  -- chemlcals ,  c o n s t r u c t i o n ,  
bu i ld ing  m a t e r i a l s  and sme l t ing  -- a r e  n e i t h e r  high on a l l  i n d i c e s  nor ob- 
v ious  i l l u s t r a t i o n s  of t l ie g r e a t e r  s t i ke -p ropens i ty  of  i s o l a t e d ,  homogen- 
Table  3-2: French S t r i k e  Rates  by Indus t ry ,  1890-1960 
S t r i k e s  pe r  100,000 Man-Days Lost pe r  100 Mi l l i on  
Labor Force Labor Force. . 
Indus t ry  1890-1914 1915-1935 1915-1932 1950-1960 
Quarrying* 30 2  2  40 Ill* 
Cl~emlcels  24 10 54 62 
Construct ion 24 1 5  50 31 
Uuilding Mate r i a l s  
Ceramics 2  3  
Mining . 19 5 151 * 
P r i n t i n g  6 Paper 1.6 11 37 15 
Smel t ing 14 17  220 70 
Leother 6 ll ides 1 3  14 77 1 3  
Metalworking 12 1 0  4  6  88 
Transpor t  I) 8  14 86 
T e x t i l e s  8  7  72 2  7  
Garments a 2  
Wood Industries 8  9  19 
Food I n d u s t r i e s  5  6 10 
Agr i cu l tu re ,  F i sh ,  
Fo res t  0.4 0.3 n .a .  
T o t a l  Non-Agri- 
c u l t u r e  7  6  37 
*Quarrying and Nining combined i n  1950-1960. 
Source: Shor t e r  6 T i l l y  1974: 201. 
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I n  o rde r  t o  g e t  a t  t h e  '!isolated mass" po r t ion  of  t h e  argument, Fdward 
Shor t e r  and I regrouped t h e  French s t r i k e  d a t e  by sm11 d i s t r i c t  i n t o  
t h r e e  types  of a r eas :  mono-industrial,  po ly - indus t r i a l ,  metropol i tan .  
The Kerr-Siege1 a n a l y s i s  p r e d i c t s  a  s t r o n g  tendency f o r  t h e  mono-industrial 
a r e a s  t o  have h ighe r  s t r i k e  r a t e s ,  g r e a t e r  mi l i t ancy ,  and s o  on. In  f a c t ,  
i t  is t h e  o t h e r  way round: on t h e  whole, metropol i tan  d i s t r i c t s  outshadow 
po ly - indus t r i a l  d i s t r i c t s ,  and t h e  one-industry d i s t r i c t s  come i n  l a s t  
(Shor t e r  6 T i l l y  1974: 287-295). When Muhammnd Fiaz  a r r sycd  French indus- 
t r i e s  by t h e i r  degree  of geographic  s eg rega t ion  over  t h e  country  o s  a  
whole, he discovered no r e l a t i o n s h i p  between i n o l a t i o n  and s t r i k e  proyen- 
s i t y ;  such f a c t o r s  a s  un ion iza t ion  and p l a n t  s i z e ,  on t h e  o t h e r  hand, s i g -  
n i f i c a n t l y  a f f e c t e d  t h e  r e l a t i v e  p ropens i ty  t o  s t r i k e  (Fiaz  1973). Ltke- 
wise ,  t h e  ana lyses  Snyder and Kel ly  have done f o r  I t a l y ,  1878-1903, i n d i c a t e  
t h a t  once obvious o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  f e a t u r e s  such a s  s i z e  and un ion izo t lon  
a r e  allowed f o r ,  i ndus t ry  a s  such has  no s i g n i f i c a n t  e f f e c t  on t h e  broad 
q u a n t i t a t i v e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  s t r i k e s  (Snyder 6 Kelly 1976). 111 t hese  ' 
t r i a l s ,  a t  l e a s t ,  no ve r s ion  of t h e  Kerr-Siege1 argument holds  up. 
These examples o f f e r  an  important  l e s son  t o  u s e r s  of a  group-compari- 
son s t r a t e g y :  t h e  l e s s  compelling your a p r i o r i  reasons  f o r  employing a  
p a r t i c u l a r  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  a s  a  b a s i s  f o r  t h e  s tudy of d i f f e r e n t i n l s  i n  or-  
gan iza t ion ,  mob i l i za t ion  and c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n ,  t h e  more important  i t  is 
t o  compare t h e  e f f e c t s  of u s ing  d i f f e r e n t  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s .  Each app l i ce -  
t i o n  of a  new c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  t o  t h e  d a t a  i s ,  i n  its crude way, t h e  t r i a l  
of a  new theory. The c o r o l l a r y  a p p l i e s  more gene ra l ly :  t h e  b e t t e r - s p e c i f i e d  
your t heo ry ,  t h e  nore l i k e l y  you a r e  t o  f i nd  some a c c e s s i b l e  co rne r  of 
r e a l i t y  i n  which t o  t r y  i t  ou t .  The b e t t e r - s p e c i f i e d  your t heo ry ,  t h e  l e s s  
you w i l l  have t o  worry about  t h e  monumental t n sk  of enumerating a l l  groups 
a t  r i s k  t o  o rgan iza t ion ,  mob i l i za t ion  and c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  An obvious 
sermon,. but  one l i t t l e  heeded. u n i t s ,  t h e  s u p l a u n i t  of which t h e  u n i t  is o  member, o r  e x t e r n o l  u n i t s ,  
The Kerr-Sicgel a n o l y s i s  provides  ano the r  l e s son  a s  we l l .  S t r i k e s  
o r e  s form of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  To exp la in  group d i f f e r e n t i a l s  i n  any kind 
of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n ,  i nc lud ing  s t r i k e s ,  we w i l l  have t o  t ake  i n t o  ac -  
count a l l  our  components: i n t e r e s t s ,  o rgan iza t ion ,  mob i l i za t ion  and oppor- 
t u n i t y .  Kerr and S i e g e l  a t t empt  t o  exp la in  the  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  wi th  i n t e r -  
e s t s  and o rgan iza t ion  a lone.  The reasoning about  i s o l a t e d  masses and 
toughness g ives  s p a r t i c u l a r  (ond inadequate)  account of t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  
s t r u c t u r e  and i n d i v i d u a l  workers '  i n t e r e s t s  c h a r o c t e r i s t i c  of d i f f e r e n t  
i n d u s t r i e s .  Rut i t  s a y s  nothing about  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  i n  mob i l i z s t i on  o r  
oppor tun i ty  t o  s t r i k e .  
To be more e x a c t ,  Kerr and S i e g e l  assume i m p l i c i t l y  e i t h e r  1 )  t h o t  
mobi l lzot ion ond oppor tun i ty  a r e  rougllly equa l  a c r o s s  i n d u s t r i e s  o r  2) 
t h a t  whatever d j f f e r e n c e s  i n  mob i l i za t ion  and oppor tun i ty  do e x i s t  have 
no independent e f f e c t s  on s t r i k e  p ropens i ty ;  they r e s u l t  from t h e  d i f f e r -  
ences  i n  i n t c r e s t  and o rgan iz s t ion .  Those assumptions, t oo ,  a r e  hypotheses  
- dubious ones. Before accep t ing  i n t e r e s t  and o rgan iza t ion  a lone  a s  
f u l l  exp lana t ions  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n ,  we w i l l  have t o  look a t  t h e  ev i -  
dence concerning mob i l i z s t i on  and oppor tun i ty .  
Mobi l iza t ion 
The word "mobi l iza t ion"  convenient ly  i d e n t i f i e s  t h e  process  by which 
a  group goes from be ing  o  pas s ive  c o l l e c t i o n  of i n d i v i d u a l s  t o  an a c t i v e  
p o r t i c i p s n t  i n  pub l i c  l i f e .  Demobilization is t h e  r eve r se  process .  Amitai 
E tz ion i  (1968: 388-389) p u t s  i t  t h i s  way: 
We r e f e r  t o  t h e  p rocess  by which s u n i t  ga ins  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  i n  t h e  
c o n t r o l  of a s s e t s  i t  p rev ious ly  d i d  not  c o n t r o l  a s  mob i l i za t ion  . . . 
By d e f i n i t i o n ,  i t  e n t a i l s  a  d e c l i n e  i n  t he  n s a e t s  c o n t r o l l e d  by aub- 
u n l e s s  tlie n s s e t s  whose c o n t r o l  t h e  u n i t  goined a r e  newly-produced 
ones  . . . A mere i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  a s s e t s  o f  members, of sub-uni ts ,  o r  
even o f  t h e  u n i t  i t s e l f  does not  mean t h a t  mob i l i za t ion  llas occu r red ,  
though i t  i n c r e a s e s  t h e  mob i l i za t ion  p o t e n t i a l .  The change i n  t h e  cap- 
a c i t y  t o  c o n t r o l  and t o  u se  a s s e t s  is  what is s i g n t f i c s n t .  
E t z i o n i  o f f e r s  a  rough c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  of a s s e t s ,  o r  resources :  coe rc ive  
(e .g .  weapons, armed f o r c e s ,  m a n i p u l ~ t i v e  t echno log ie s ) ;  u t i l i t a r i a n  (e.g. 
goods, informat ion s e r v i c e s ,  money); normative (e.8. l o y n l t i e s ,  o b l i g a t l o n s ) .  
A group mobi l izes  i f  i t  ga ins  g r e a t e r  c o l l e c t i v e  c o n t r o l  over  coe rc ive ,  
u t i l i t a r i a n  o r  normative r e sources ,  demobi l izes  i f  i t  l o s e s  t h o t  s o r t  of 
c o n t r o l .  
In p r a c t i c e ,  E t z i o n i ' s  c l s s s i f i c s t i o n  of r e sou rces  is d i f f i c u l t  t o  main- 
t a i n .  I t  r e f e r s  t o  t h e i r  u se  r a t h e r  than t h e i r  i n t r i n s i c  c h a r a c t e r .  The 
s e r v i c e  a  r evo lu t iona ry  c a b a l  draws from i t s  272 l o y a l  memhers is 1.ikcly 
t o  be  st once coe rc ive  and u t i l i t a r i a n .  The r e source  is lobor  power of s 
c e r t a i n  kind. Furthermore, l o y a l t y  and ob l igo t ion  a r e  not s o  much re-  
sou rces  a s  cond i t i ons  s f f ' e c t ing  t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  t h a t  r e sou rces  w i l l  be  de- 
l i v e r e d  when c a l l e d  f o r .  If .we a r e  a c t u a l l y  comparing t h e  c u r r e n t  mobilizo- 
t i o n  l e v e l s  of s e v e r a l  groups, o r  t r y i n g  t o  gouge o  group 's  change over 
t ime,  we w i l l  o r d i n a r i l y  do b e t t e r  t o  f a l l  back on t h e  economist ' s  f o c t o r s  
of product ion:  l and ,  l a b o r ,  c a p i t o l ,  perhaps t e c l ~ n i c o l  e x p c r t i s c  o s  we l l .  
To t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  a l l  of t h e  r e sources  have we l l - e s t ab l i shed  market 
va lues  i n  t h e  populat ion st l a r g e ,  r e l i a n c e  on product ion f o c t o r s  w i l l  h e l p  
US s e t  r a t e s  of r e t u r n  f o r  r e sou rces  expended i n  tlie p o l i t i c a l  oresna.  We 
can then r ep resen t  l o y a l t i e s ,  o b l i g a t i o n s ,  commitments and s o  f o r t h  a s  de- 
t e rminan t s  of t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  eoch r e source  nominally under group con- 
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trol will be available: 
mobilization level = sum 
I Iproduction nominally under group control 
[~~~~!~~j) when called 
Political life mokes the probabilities hard to estimate a priori and un- 
likely to remnin constant from one possible type of action to another: 
the militants who will vote or picket will not always go to the barricades. 
This formulation poses the problem explicitly. We can then ask, as a 
question for research, whether the use of elections as a reference point 
produces the same polnt in time (or for the some group at different points 
in time) than does the use of street demonstrations. 
We can also close in on the old problem of differences between a dis- 
ciplined professional stoff and committed volunteers: it should appear not I 
only as a difference in the morket value of the labor under group control, 
but also as a variation in the probability that the available labor will 
actually do the different things whicl~ might be demnnded of it: stuff 
envelopes, picket, lobby, bribe, kidnap, bomb, write legal briefs. 
The formulotion neatly states an old political dilemma: the choice 
bctween loyalty and effectiveness. Effective employees or members often 
use their effectiveness to serve themselves or to serve others instead of 
the orgnnization to which they are attached, while loyal employees or mem- 
bers are often ineffective; sometimes the solution of the tax farmer (who 
uses his power to enrich himself, but at least has enougli effectiveness to 
produce n surplus for his nominal masters) is the best nvailable. Some- 
times the disloyalty of the professionals is so great as to make loyal amn- 
teurs n more desirable alternative. 
Loyalty refers to the breadth of membera' commitments to deliver 
resources. It has three dimensions: 
-- the amount of resources committed 
-- the range of resources involved 
-- the range of circumstances in which the resources will be delivered. 
A commitment to deliver substantial resources of only one kind in a 
narrowly-specified situation bespeaks relatively little loyalty. A commit- 
ment to deliver many resources of different kinds regardless of the 
situation reveals great loyalty. Real-life organizations lie somewhere 
between the two extremes. 
Albert Hirschman turns this observation inside out; he considers loyolty 
as one of the major alternative modes of demand for on orgnnizntion'e 
services. (We looked at Hirschman's analysis briefly while reviewing the 
Million approach to collective action.) In the context of response to 
decline in the performance of organizations, he distinguished three 
possible reactions of consumers, clients or members of a given organizetion: 
exit, voice end loyalty. Economics, Hlrschman comments, treats exit -- a 
cessation of demand for the commodity or service -- as the normal response 
to declining quality. In the case of schools, governments and other orgoni- 
zations whose performances fluctuate, he argues, two other responses are 
common. The relevant public may voice its dissatisfaction, with implicit 
or explicit threats of exit. Or it may tolerate unsatisfactory performance 
for a while because the costs of exit or voice are greater than the loss 
of quality. That tolerance is a measure of subjective returns from the 
organization, hence of loyalty. 
The economic problem is to work out the trodeoffs among exit, voice 
and loyalty. That specifies the conditions under wl~ich one or anotllcr 
occurs. For our purposes. Iiowever, the value of Hirschman's analysis is 
to help us calculate the probability that resources ostensibly on call will 
actually be delivered. Exit is the analogue of refusal to deliver, while 
voice and loyalty are alternative ways of continuing to yield. At least 
in the short run, voice raises the cost of group access to the resources. 
In general, fl group which puts a large proportion of its membership 
into remunerated positions within its own organization (for example, a 
bureaucratized priesthood) raises the cost of exit, and thereby makes voice 
and loyalty more likely responses to its performance. It does so at the 
cost of committing an important share of its mobilized resources to the 
maintenance of the organization itself. 
The alternative of placing its members elsewhere -- as a victorious 
politics1 party often dispofies of government jobs -- reduces the internal 
drain on the organization. However, it also lowers the cost of exit, unless 
i 
members continue to hold their posts at the pleasure of the organization. I 
i 
Building an all-embracing moral community also raises tlie relative costs 
of exit. Earlier I suggested that tlie most important element of organization. 
so far as impact on mobilization was concerned, was the group's inclusiveness I 
of different aspects of social life. The creation of a moral community is 
therefore on extreme case of organization-building in general. On the whole, 
the higher the level of organization, the greater the likelihood of voice I 
or loyalty. If a group emphasizes coercion, however, it probably shifts the 
likelihood away from voice, toward exit or loyalty. 
I 
The major variables affecting the probability of delivery are therefore 
the extent of competing claims on the resources involved, the nature of the 
action to which the resources are to be committed, and how organized the I 
mobilizing group is. If the resources are free of competing claims, if 
I 
I 
the action clearly defends the interests of every member and if the group 
is an all-embracing moral community, the probability of delivery is close 
to 100 percent. Loyalty is then at its maximum, the probability of depnr- 
ture or contestation -- exit or voice -- is at its minimum. 
Indeed, a significant part of the work of mubilizntion goes into 
changing these three variables: reducing the competing claims on resources 
controlled by members, developing a program which corresponds to the per- 
ceived interests of members, building up a group structure which minimizes 
exit and voice. In her survey of nineteenth- and twentieth-century 
American communes, Rosabeth Moss Kanter identifies a series of "commitment 
mechanisms." "For communes ," she tells us : 
the problem of commitment is crucial. Since the community 
represents an attempt to estahlish an ideal social order within 
the larger society, it must vie with the outside for the members' 
loyalties. It must ensure high member involvement despite 
external competition without sacrificing its distinctiveness or 
ideals. It must often contravene the earlier socialization of 
its members in securing obedience to new demands. It must calm 
internal dissension in order to present a united front to the 
world. The problem of securing total and complete commitment 
is central (Kanter 1972: 65). 
She is describing a mobilization program which concentrates on the lahor- 
power and loyalty of the members themselves. 
What organizational arrangements promote that sort of mobil.ization? 
Ksnter compares nine nineteenth-century comm~~nal movements (including the 
Shakers, Harmony, Jerusalem and Oneida) which lasted 33 yeflrs or more with 
twenty-one (including Modern Times. Oberlin, Brook Farm and the Iowa 
Pioneer Phalanx) which lasted 16 years or less. The commitment mechanisms 
wliicli were substantially more common among the long-lived communes included: 
eexual and material abstinence 
prohibition of nonresident members 
signing over property at admission 
non-reimbursement of defectors for property and labor 
provision of medical services 
insulation mechanisms, such as a special term for the Outside, 
ignoring of' outside newspapers, speaking a foreign language and/or 
a special jargon 
rules for interaction with visitors 
discouragement of pairing: free love or celibacy required 
physical separation of family members 
communal ownership of clothing and personal effects 
no compensation for labor 
no charge for community services 
communal work efforts 
daily meetings, and most time spent with other group members 
mortification procedures such as confession, mutual surveillance 
and denunciation, or distinctions among members on moral grounds 
institutionalization of awe for the group and its leaders through 
the attribution of magical powers, the legitimation of group demands 
through appeals to ultimate values, and the use of special forms 
of address (Kanter 1972: chapter 4). 
Kanter's list begins to give us a feeling for the real-life manifestations 
of the process Max Weber called the routinization of charisma. Faith and 
magic play a part, to be sure. But so do a concrete set of social arrange- 
ments which place the available resources at the disposal of the group, and 
make either voice or exit costly ways to respond to unsatisfactory performance. 
I 
The social arrangements build loyalty. and enliance mobilization. 
Most social groups are unlike communes. They differ in the priorl.ties 
they assign to exit, voice and loyalty. The professionals Concentrate on 
I 
I '  
accumulating resources free of competing claims, the rat'on~lists on 
adapting their program to current group interests, the moralists on building 
an inclusive group which commands assent for its own sake. An exploitative 
group will concentrate on the first while appearing to concentrate on the 
second or the third: actually working to free resources while appearing to 
shape a program to the interests of its members or to build a satisfying 
group. Religious frauds often take this latter form. 
Thus any group's mobilization program breaks down into these components: 
1. accumulating resources 
2. increasing collective claims on the resources 
a. by reducing competing claims 
1 b. by altering the program of collective action 
c. by changing the satisfaction due to participntion in 
the group as such. 
A successful mobilization program does all of them at once. 
Groups do their mobilizing in a number of different ways. We can 
make crude distinctions among defensive, offensive and preparatory mobili- 
zation. In defensive mobilization, a threat from outside induces the members 
of a group to pool their resources to fight off the enemy. Eric Wolf (1969) 
has pointed out how regularly this sort of response to the representatives 
I of capitalism and state power has preceded peasant rebellions. Standard 
i European forms of rural conflict -- food riots, tax rebellions, invasions 
of fields, draft resistance and so on -- typically follow the same sort of 
defensive mobilization. This large class of actions challenges the common 
assumption (made by Etzioni, among others) that mobilization is always a 
top-down phenomenon, organized by leaders and agitators. 
Offensive mobilization &, however, often top-down. In the offensive 
case, a group pools resources in response to opportunities to realize its 
interests. A common form of offensive mobilization consists of the diffusion 
of a new organizational strategy. In the late 18208, for example, the 
success of O'Connell's Catholic Association in forcing the expansion of 
the political rights of British and Irish Catholics inspired the creation 
of political associations aimed at expanding the franchise and gusranteeing 
rights to assemble, organize end act collectively. A coalition of bourgeois 
and substsntinl artisans arose from that strategy, and helped produce the 
great Reform Rill of 1832. In this instance, the top-down organizational 
efforts of such leaders as Francis Place and CJilliam Cobbett were crucial. 
Nevertheless, in pariah after parish the local dissidents decided 
on their own that it was time to organize their own association, or (more 
likely) to convert their existing forms of organization into a political 
association. 
Preparatory mobilization is no doubt the most top-down of all. In this 
variety, the group pools resources in anticipation of future opportunities 
and threats. The nineteenth-century trade union is a classic case. The 
trade union built up s store of money to cushion hardship -- hardship in the 
form of unemployment, the death of a breadwinner or loss of wages during a 
strike. It also pooled knowledge and organizational skills. When it 
escaped the union-busting of employers and governments, the trade union 
greatly increased the capacity of workers to act together: to strike, to 
boycott, to make collective demands. This preparatory mobilization often 
began defensively, in the course of a losing battle with employers or in 
the face of a threat of firings, wage reductions or cutbacks in privileges. 
It normally required risky organizing efforts by local leaders who were 
willing to get hurt. 
The preparatory part of the strategy was always difficult, since it 
required the members to forego present satisfactions in favor of uncertain 
future benefits. As we move from defensive to offensive to preparatory 
mobilization, in fact, we see the increasing force of Hancur Olson's 
statement of the free-rider problem: a rational actor will ride for nothing' 
if someone else will pay the fuel and let him aboard. But if everyone 
tries to ride free the vehicle goes nowhere. Preparatory mobilization, 
especially in the face of high risks, requires strong incentives to overcome 
the reasonable desire to have someone else absorb the costs. 
As we move from defensive to offensive to preparatory mobilization, we 
also see that the distinction between offensive and preparatory is less clear 
than the distinction between offensive and defensive. Both offensive and 
preparatory mobilization require foresight and an active scanning of the 
world outside the group. Both are unlikely in any but the smallest groups 
without active leadership and deliberate organizational effort. One frequent 
pattern is for leaders to employ resources which are already mobilized to 
assure the commitment of other resources to collective ends. That happens, 
for example. when priests play on their congregations, already obliged to 
assemble, for cash contributions. It also happens when landlords send 
bailiffs to claim part of the crop. or when word heelers trade jobs for votes. 
These are concrete examples of the "selective incentives" for participation 
whose importance Mancur Olson has stressed. 
Unlike defensive mobilization, neither offensive nor preparatory 
mobilization occurs very often as a simple extension of the group's everyday 
routines for doing its work: gathering at the market, shaping up for hiring 
at the dock, getting together for a little poaching. Offensive and prepara- 
tory mobilization resemble each other; the main difference is whether the 
opportunities to which the group responds are in the present or the future. 
So the basic distinction runs between defensive hnd offensive modes of 
mobillzntion. 
A population's initinl.wenlth and power significantly affect the proba- 
bility that its mobilization will be defensive or offensive. Common sense 
says that the rich mobilize conservatively, in defense of their threatened 
interests, while the poor mobilize rndically, in search of what they lack. 
Common sense is wrong. It is true that the rich never lash out to smash ! 
the status quo, while the poor sometimes do. But the rich are constantly ! 
mobilizing to take sdvant~ge of new opportunities to maximize their interests. 
The poor can rarely afford to. 
The poor and powerless tend to begin defensively, the rich and powerful 
offensively. The group whose members are rich can mobilize a surplus without 
threatening a member's othcr amusements end obligations. A group with a 
poor constituency has little choice but to compete with daily necessities. 
I 
The group whose members are powerful can use the other organizations they 
control -- including governments -- to do some of their work, whereas the 
powerless must do it on their own. The rich and powerful can forestall claims 
from othcr groups before they become articul'ated claims, and can sfford to 
seize opportunities to make new claims on their own. Tlie poor and the power- 
less often find that the rich, the powerful and the government oppose and 
punish their efforts at mobilization. (The main exception, an important one, 
is the powerless group whlch forms a coalition with a rich, powerful patron; 
European Fascists of the 1920s mobilized rapidly in that fashion.) As a 
result. any mobilization at all is more costly to the poor and powerless; 
only a threat to the little they have is likely to move them to mobilize. 
Tlie rich and powerful are well-defended against such threats: they rnrely 
have the occasion for defensive mobilization. 
If, on the other hand, we hold mobilization constant and consider 
collective action itself, common sense is vindicated. Relatively poor and 
powerless groups which have already mobilized are more likely to act 
collectively by claiming new rights, privileges end advantages. At the 
same level of mobilization the rich and powerful are more likely to act 
collectively in defense of whet they already have. Thus the well-docu- 
mented tendency of strikes to become more frequent and more demnnding in 
times of prosperity, when workers have more slnck resources to devote to 
acting together, and employers have more to lose from the withholding 
of labor. 
Mobilization implies demobilization. Any process by wllich s group 
loses collective control over resources demobilizes the group. Now could 
that happen7 Anything which destroys resources tends to hnve that effect: 
war, neglect, potlatch. But the more common source of demobilization is 
the transfer of control over certain kinds of resources to another group: 
a subunit of the group in question, a large unit of which the group itself 
is a part, a group outside. A lost war, for example, frequently produces 
all three sorts of demobilization in the losing country. Hen and women 
return from military service to the service of their fomilics; the govern- 
ment, for a time, gives up some of its control over its own operations to 
a concert of nations of which it is a part; other countries seize some of 
the loser's territory, population, equipment or wealth. Whether such 
processes produce a negative sum, a positive sum or a zero sum depends 
entirely on the relative rates at which new resources are being created, 
nnd old ones destroyed. 
Often two groups, one containing the other, mobilize st approximately 
the same time. A confusion between the two levels has regularly dogged 
discussions of mobilization, since Karl Deutsch's initial formulation of 
the idens (1953). The most notable examples from our own era involve 
national states and smaller units within them: parties, unions or even 
organized ethnic groups. (Many Africenists, for instance, have noticed 
the strengthening of the ostensibly traditional groups which outsiders 
call "tribes" with the growth of new states). 
Political theorists, both totalitarian and democratic, have often 
considered the mobilization at one level end at the other to be comple- 
mentary. The party, in such an account, sccumulates loyalties which 
transfer to the state. There is actually, however, little guarantee that 
this harmony will prevail. In the usual situation, the smaller and larger 
units compete for the same resources. They may follow well-defined rules 
of combat, and one of them may consistently have the upper hand, but they 
compete nonetheless. Likewise, two or more groups mobilizing simultaneously 
within some larger group which is also mobilizing commonly struggle over 
control of the same resources. The Teamsters and the Transport Workers 
fight for jurisdiction over the same drivers. lJhen union members pay more 
taxes they l~ave less for union dues. Illen all a person's time goes into 
o religious sect, he has none left either for union membership or for 
government service. Military conscription withdrew8 a man from his obli- 
gations to s circle of friends end relatives. 
This lest example underscores the collective character of the process. 
We ere not simply dealing with the fact that people in some categories give 
up resources as people in other categories ncquire them. \hen conscrip- 
tion occurs, a group gives up labor power. In the European feudal period. 
the "group" was charscteristically a fief. The vassal's personal obli- 
gation to the overlord tied his fief to the overlord's fief, to he sure; 
but the fief owed the knight service. As states grew stronger. communities 
typically became the units which owed n certain numher of recruttn. The 
usual mechanism of the draft consisted of the assignment of s quota to s 
commune, with some sort of collective decision (frequently the drawing oE 
lots) determining which of the eligible young men would go. The purchase 
of substitutes by those who could afford it, as shockin8 as it nppesrs to 
egalitarian eyes, expresses precisely this sense of a debt owed by n 
comunity, rather than en individual, to the state: Community X owes six 
conscripts. Under these circumstances, resistance to the draft united s 
community, not just a group of young people, against the ntate. The greot 
counter-revolution of the ~endge against the French revolutionsry state, 
in 1793, began with solidery resistance of commt~nlties to the demnnd for 
conscripts. The cmunity as e whole stood to lose part of its supply 
of labor, love, loyalty end procreative power. 
The spread of the political theory end practice of "possessive jndi- 
vidualism" (as C. 8.  Hscpherson calls it) shifted tlie military obll&stion 
toward the individual, but only incompletely. Within French villnges, the 
classe oE young men coming up for the draft in the same yeor remnins one 
of the principal solidar~ groups, one which symbolizes its Jons through 
rituals, banquets and ceremonial gifts. In most western countries. religious 
groups and some of the professions have, in tlie course of acquiring 
distinct political identities. worked out special compacts with the state 
exempting some of their members -- nt least their priests -- from service, 
and s e t t i n g  cond i t i ons  f o r  t h e  s e r v i c e  of o the r s .  In  t h e  United S t a t e s ,  
t h e  American Medical Associa t ion has  achieved t h a t  s o r t  of gua ran tee  f o r  
i t s  members, wh i l e  t h e  American Ch i rop rac t i c  Associa t ion has  no t .  The 
Rel igious  Soc ie ty  of F r i ends  has ,  t h e  Black Muslims have no t .  This  t y ing  
of r e l i g i o u s  exemptions t o  s p e c i f i c  group memberships caused g r e a t  confusion 
i n  t h e  1960s a s  young Americans opposed t o  t h e  Vietnam war begal; applying 
f o r  c e r t i f i c a t i o n  a s  consc i en t ious  o b j e c t o r s  on gene ra l  moral grounds 
wi thout  c la iming a f f i l i a t i o n  wi th  one of t h e  p r i v i l e g e d  s e c t s .  I 
In  t h e  America of t h e  1960s. something e l s e  was going on a s  w e l l .  1 
In d i f f e r e n t  ways, groups of b l acks  and groups of young people  began t o  
c la im a  c o l l e c t i v e  r i g h t  t o  withhold t h e i r  members from m i l i t a r y  s e r v i c e .  
I do no t  mean they were widely s u c c e s s f u l  e i t h e r  i n  mobi l iz ing t h e i r  own 
I 
populat ions  o r  i n  holding o f f  t h e  s t a t e .  Both groups con ta in  competing 
mob i l i ze r s  pursuing competing ends ,  and have many members who r e f u s e  t o  
commit t h e i r  r e sou rces  t o  any of t h e  mobi l ' izers ,  even though they a r e  w i l l i n g  
t o  y i e ld  them t o  t h e  s t a t e .  Yet t h e  c la im was t h e r e ,  i n  t h e  form of 
organized campaigns t o  r e s i s t  o r  evade t h e  d r a f t .  The demands f o r  t h e  
exc lus ion  of co rpo ra t e  and m i l i t a r y  r e c r u i t e r s  from campuses l i k e w i s e  
mnde c la ims f o r  c o l l e c t i v e  c o n t r o l  of t h e  d i s p o s i t i o n  of manpower. The 
c la im was a  s i g n  t h a t  some mob i l i za t ion  was occu r r ing ;  groups, r a t h e r  than 
i n d i v i d u a l s ,  were s t r u g g l i n g  over t h e  r i g h t  t o  p rec ious  resources :  t h e  I 
l abo r  power of young people. With t h e  end of t h e  d r a f t  and t h e  withdrawal 
of American t roops  from t h e  Vietnam war, t h e  groups involved demobilized. 
I do not  t h i n k  they,  o r  t h e i r  c la ims,  have disappeared.  
Reminder: mob i l i za t ion  r e f e r s  t o  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  of c o l l e c t i v e  
c o n t r o l  over  resources .  r a t h e r  t han  t h e  s imple  a c c r e t i o n  of r e sou rces .  
A group t h a t  grows i n  s i z e  has  more manpower i n  i t .  That does not mean t h e  
a b s o l u t e  o r  p ropor t iona te  monpower committed t o  c o l l e c t i v e  ends inc reases .  
An i n c r e a s e  of r e sou rces  w i th in  a  u n i t  normally f a c i l i t a t e s  i t s  mobi l iznt ion,  
simply by pe rmi t t i ng  subun i t s  t o  keep r ece iv ing  r e sources  wh i l e  t h e  l o r g e r  
u n i t  g a i n s  c o n t r o l  over  more than i t  had be fo re .  But i t  is t h a t  i nc rease  
i n  c o l l e c t i v e  c o n t r o l  i t s e l f  which c o n s t i t u t e s  mob i l i za t ion .  Without some 
mob i l i za t ion ,  a  group may prosper ,  bu t  i t  cannot contend f o r  power; 
contending f o r  power means employing mobilized r e sourcee  t o  i n f luence  o t h e r  
groups. 
I d e a l l y ,  then,  we a r e  looking a t  a  s e t  of groups, and t r y i n g  t o  
e s t i m a t e  f o r  each group and f o r  each r e source  under t h e  c o n t r o l  of any 
of t h e  groups two d i f f e r e n t  e n t i t i e s :  a )  t h e  va lue  of t h e  r e source  nominally 
under group c o n t r o l ,  and b) t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  t h e  r e source  w i l l  be 
d e l i v e r e d  when c a l l e d  f o r ,  g iven some s tandard assumption obout t h e  uses  
t o  which t h e  r e sources  w i l l  be  pu t .  To my knowledge, no one has  eve r  come 
c l o s e  t o  e s t ima t ing  t h e s e  q u a n t i t i e s  f o r  any s e r  of groups. We have only  
rough approximations. 
Measurinu Mobi l i za t ion  
How t o  do i t ?  I f  t h e  mob i l i za t ion  of d i v e r s e  r e sources  f e l l  i n t o  a  
s tandard sequence w i t h i n  any p a r t i c u l a r  populot ion,  one could produce a  
s c a l e  of mob i l i za t ion  wi thout  having d i r e c t  meosures of each of t he  component 
resources .  We might t ake  a s  a  methodolop.ica1 model t h e  s c a l e s  f o r  
" c e n t r a l i t y "  of v i l l a g e s  which Frank Young has  cons t ruc t ed  ( see  Young 1966). 
Such a  s c a l e  would resemble t h e  fol lowing s e t :  
1 )  No one wi th in  t h i s  ca tegory eve r  i d e n t i f i e s  i t  a s  a  group, s o  
f a r  a s  can be determined from some s t anda rd  s e t  of sou rces .  
2 )  Members of t h i s  ca tegory sometimes i d e n t i f y  themselves a s  a  group. 
3) The group has a standard name known to members and nonmembers 
alike. 
4) Members of the group sometimes appear in public as a group. 
identified by name. 
5 )  The group has standard symbols, slogans, songs, styles of dress 
and/or other identifying marks. 
6) The group contains one or more organizations which some members 
of the group recognize as having the authority to speak for the 
group as a whole on some matters. 
7) The group contains one or more organizations controlling well- 
defined buildings and spaces which are at least nominally open to 
members of the group as a whole. 
8) Thc group has at lenst one common store of major resources -- 
money, labor, weapons, information or something else -- held in 
the name of the group as a whole. 
9) At lenst one organization run by group members exercises extensive 
control over group members' allocation of time and energy in the 
name of the group as a whole. 
10) At lenst one organization run by group members exercises 
extensive control over the personal relations of members of the group. 
The first four items on the list clearly belong under the heading "organi- 
zation" rather than "mobilization." The fifth bal.ances uncertainly between 
the two. Thus the lower end of the scale rests on the assumption of a 
close association between organization and mobilization. Obviously such 
a scale could not be used to establish the existence of that relationship. 
In my own research group's work on collective action in Europe and 
America, we have approached the measurement of mobilization in two 
simple ways. They fall short of the comprehensive accounts and internally 
consistent scales we would like to have; the real world is hard. 
The first and more obvious way is to take one or two widely-available 
indicators of mobilization, such as union membership, and prepare comparable 
series of those indicators for the set of groups under study. In this case, 
we make no a priori effort to combine available indicators. On the contrary, 
we hope to learn something about their relationships from the analysis. 
In our studies of French strike activity from 1830 to 1968. Edward Shorter 
and I recurrently use number of union members andlor years of continuous 
existence of a local general labor organization (a bourse de travail) as 
indicators of a local labor force's mobilization level (Shorter and Tilly 
1974). David Snyder (1974) uses union membership in his time-series analyses 
of strikes in Italy, France and the U.S. from various points in the nine- 
teenth century to 1970. Joan Lind, studying strikes and labor-related 
street demonstrations in Sweden and Great Britain from 1900 to 1950, 
measures mobilization via union membership and union income. With interesting 
exceptions to be discussed later on, alternative indicators of mobilization 
turn out to be strongly correlated with each other, and to have a signi- 
ficant positive effect on the level of strike activity. 
The second and riskier way we have indexed mobilization is to build 
different versions of the sort of ordinal scale I have just sketched from 
descriptions -- statistical or otherwise -- of the groups in question. 
Ronald Aminzade's study of Marseillaise workers illustrates this tack. 
Aminznde was trying to assess the influence of organizational charac- 
teristics, prior experience with collective action and mobilization level 
on the involvement of different groups of workers in Marseille from 1830 
to 1871. Drawing on evidence from French archives and from published 
works, he found that he could assemble more or less continuous descriptions 
for each of twenty-one occupational categories concerning a) the presence 
or absence and b) the general pattern of activity of guilds (more exactly, 
compagnonnages), cooperatives, trade unions, mutual benefit societies, and 
resistance societies. For 1848, he was also able to ascertain whether the 
occupational group had its own representation to the Republican Central 
Committee. its own political club, and any collective privileges formally 
recognized by government regulations. (Informtion on membership and on 
funds controlled was also ovailable, but not regularly enough for the 
construction of continuous series.) 
Aminzade then combined this information into three indicators: 
1) total number of occupational organizations 
2) total years of prior existence of different organizational 
forms 
3) total number of collective actions previously carried out 
by these organizations 
the third being the most debatable as an index of mobilization. Aminzade 
essentially ranked each occupational group as high or low on each of the 
three items (2 = high; 1 - low) and summed them into a six-point scale 
(6 - three highs; 1 - three lows). Using the scores for the periods just 
preceding the events in question, he analyzed occupational differentials in 
arrests during Marseille's insurrection of June, 1848 and in the course of 
Louis Napoleon's 1851 coup d16tat: for the insurrections of August 1870 
and March 1871 in Marseille, he reconstructed a list of 429 portlcipnnts 
from police dossiers on persons involved in the revolutionary International, 
from conviction records for the 1870 ins~~rrection and Erom arrest records 
for the 1871 insurrection. Individual indicators of mobilization correlate 
with involvement in one or another of these events from 0 to +.8. The 
correlations of participation with the combined mobilization index are: 
1848 : +. 333 
1851: +.571 
1870-71: +.473 
There is a substantial relationship between mobilization level -- as 
crudely measured by Aminzade -- and involvement in Marseille's major 
revolutionary movements from 1848 to 1871. 
General Conditions for Mobilization 
According to our mobilization model, the broad factors witl~in a popu- 
lation affecting its degree of mobilization are the extent of Its shared 
interest in interactions with other popu.lntions. and the extent to which 
it forms a distinct category and a dense network: its interest end its 
organization. Outside the group, its power, Its subjection to repression and 
the current constellation of opportunities and threats most strongly affect 
its mobilization level. Power, repression and opportunitylthreat will 
come in for detailed discussion in the next chapter. Interest and organi- 
zation have already hod their share of attention. Yet it would be good to 
review their impact on mobilization before rushing on to examine collective 
action itself. 
Anthony Oberschall has provided a neat synthesis of a good deal of 
recent thinking about these relationships. Oberschnll deliberately counters 
hrkl~eimlan thinking -- especially its "mass society" variety -- by insisting 
on the importance of some forms of prior group coherence to the mobilization 
of conflict groups. Among other things, he points out that newly mobilizing 
conflict groups usually reduce their organizing costs by building, inten- 
tionally or unintentionally, on existing group structure. Instead of 
starting from a shared interest but no organization, existing groups coalesce 
and reorganize. Thua the conflict group escapes, to some extent, from the 
great cost of starting at zero mobilization. 
Considering that prior organization, Oberschall cnlls particular 
attention to two dimensions: the character of links within the population 
(communal orgonizatlon, associational organization, or little organization 
of any kind) and to the ties between the population and other groups (inte- 
grated with other groups vs. segregated from them). In combination, the two 
dimenslons produce a sixfold classification of populations: 
internal links 
comunal weak associationol 
ties to integrated 
other 
groups segregated 
We will use a related classification later on, when we try to distinguish 
the major varieties of collective action. 
Oberschnll's analysis directly confronts mass-society theory. The 
mass-socjety argument says that populations in the central column, especially 
those which are segregated from the'rest of society, ore the great breeders 
of protest movements. One of the best-known statements of the theory runs: 
Groups which are particularly vulnerable to mass movements manifest 
mnjor discontinuities in their structure during periods of change. 
Thus, comunism and fascism have gained strength in social systems 
undergoing sudden and extensive changes in the structure of suthor- 
ity and community. Sharp tears in the social fabric caused by 
widespread unemployment or by major military defeat are higl~ly 
favorable to mass politics. Social classes which provide dispro- 
portionate support for mass movements are those that possess the 
fewest social ties among their members. This means above all the 
lower social classes. However, since there are sections of all 
social classes which tend to be sociolly atomized, members of 
all social classes are to be found among the participants in mans 
politics: unattached (especially free-lance) intellectuals, morginol 
(especially small) businessmen and farmers, and isolated workers 
have engaged in mass politics in times of crisis (Kornhauser 1959: 229). 
We have already encountered the same line of argument in our review of 
Durkheimian analyses of collective action. 
Oberschall counters with the argument that populations with weak internal 
structure rarely act at all. He also argues that each combination of 
internal structure and external ties produces a different variety of 
mobilization and collective action. In general, he sees ties to other 
groups (especially elite groups) as constraints on the formation of conflict 
groups; in that one regard, he tends to agree wlth the moss-society theorists. 
But in his analysis, segmented populations with either extensive comunnl 
or extensive associational structure are especially likely to produce -- , 
or become -- conflict groups. To put it in mass-society terms, they are 
more, not less, "available" for social movements. 
Oberschall then proposes a useful series of hypotheses about the 
mobilization of conflict groups: 
1. In a segmented context, the greeter the number end variety of 
organizations in a collectivity, and the higher the participation of 
members in this network, the more rapidly and enduringly does 
mobilization into conflict groups occur, and the more likely it is 
thst bloc recruitment, rather than individual recruitment, will 
take place (Oberschall 1973: 125). 
2. The more segmented s collectivity is from the rest of the 
society, and the more viable end extensive the communal ties within 
it, the more rapid and easier it is to mobilize members of the 
collectivity into en opposition movement (p. 129). 
3. If a collectivity is disorganized or unorganized along trsdi- 
tional comunsl lines and not yet organized along associations1 lines, 
collective protest is possible when members share c o m o n  sentiments 
of opression and targets for hostility. These sentiments are more 
likely to develop if the collectivity is segmented rather then 
vertically integrated with other collectivities of the society. 
Such protest will, however, tend to be more short-lived and more 
violent than movements based on comunal or sseociational orgsni- 
zstion (p. 133). 
4 .  Participants in populnr disturbances and activitiat in oppo- 
sition organizations will be recruited primarily from previously 
active end relatively well-integrated individuals within the 
collectivity, whereas socially isolated, atomized, end uprooted 
individuals will be underrepresented, at least until the movement 
has become substantial (p. 135). 
Although the third hypothesis provides en escape clause, the mnin srgumcnt 
strongly emphasizes the influence of prior organization. So does the 
varied evidence which Oberschall reviews. Perhaps too strongly, or rather 
too exclusively: the argument I have been building up here gives greater 
weight to interests, mobilization strategy, repression end power position. 
Nevertheless, the two lines of argument agree in denying thst unattached 
individuals and homogenized masses have any special propensity to form 
or join social movements. 
Oberschall's hypotheses focus on just that issue: joining or not 
joining. For that reason, the comunsl end of his classification remains 
more mysterious than the asaociationnl end. It is valuable to point out. 
as Oberschall does, thst events such as great peasant revolts do not 
ordinarily sweep up society's rootless, disorganized, leftover people, but 
draw in coherent but aggrieved eroups of people who remain attached to 
each other and to their socisl settings. But to speak of "recruitment" 
compromises the insight. 
The implicit model has modern contours. It applies easily to such 
membership organizations as labor unions, political parties and religiocts 
organizations. It does not apply so easily to the eighteenth-century . 
countrymen who tore down poorhouses and then went back to work in their 
shops and fields. It distorts the experience of nineteenth-century artisans 
who built barricades in the streets near their shops during the revolutions 
of 1848. The eighteenth-century people of Nacton and the nineteenth- 
century people of Paris mobilized end acted collectively. all right. Btlt 
they did not form or join a "socisl movement" or even s "conflict group" 
in the sense ,required by Oberschall's model. 
To cover the whole range from anti-poorhouse crowds to revolutionary 
artisans to political parties to religious cults, we need a very broad 
view of mobilization. It must accommodate a great variety of resources. 
and not be tied to any particular organizational form or type of interest. 
In that spirit, the three major principles we have laid down so far are 
brond indeed; schematically: 
1. (quantity of resources (probability 
x = mobilization 
collectively controlled) of delivery) 
2. mobilization = f(organization) 
3. organization - catness x netness 
The first and third are, obviously, definitions. The second is a proposition. 
but one which needs a good deal more specification before it has much value. 
The specification will drive us back toward the same problems Oberachall 
emphasizes: the differences between segmented and integrated populations, 
the contrasting mobilization patterns of communal and associational 
groups, the conditions for organizational effectiveness. In short, we are 
on the right path, but not very far along. Let us try to stride on by 
dealing with collective action itself. 
From Mobilization to Collective Action 
Collective action is joint action in pursuit of common ends. Up to 
this point, I have argued that the extent of a group's collective action 
is a function of 1) the extent of its shared interests (advantages and 
disadvantages likely to result from interactions with other groups). 
2) the intensity of its organization (the extent of common identity and 
unifying structure among its members) and 3) its mobilization (the amount 
of resources under its collective control). Soon I will add repression, 
power, and opportunity/threat to those determinants of a group's collective 
action. In this general statement, the argument is not very controversial. 
It rejects Durkheimian theories which trace routine co11,ective action 
back to society's integration and which trace non-routine collective action 
back to society's disintegration. Still a grent many Weberian, Marxinn and 
Millian analyses will fit, with a bit of shoving, into the boxea defined 
by interests, organization and mobilization. 
At thia level of argument, the main differences among the Weberian, 
Marxian and Millian analyses are in the weighta they assign to the various 
determinants of collective action. On the whole, Weberian arguments -- 
especially as they appear in analyses of social movements and their 
routinization -- assign different weighta to interests in routine and 
non-routine collective action. In a full-fledged social movement. runs 
the argument, interests have a leas immediate effect because the group's 
beliefs override or redefine them. The Weberian approach tends to treat 
the costs and effects of organization as great, but then to consider the 
group's interests and organization a sufficient explanation of ita actions. 
Implicitly, that is, it treats the coats of mobilization and collecttve 
action as slight. 
Marxian analyses likewise give high weights to interests and organi- 
zation. low weighta to the costa of mobilization and collective action as 
such. The difference from the Weberian line. in thia regard. is in the 
strong Marxian emphasis on material interests -- more precisely, on interests 
.defined by relationship to the predominant means of production -- and in 
the argument that the organization of production underliea and dominates 
other forms70r organization. 
Milliana are the only one of our four clusters who commonly assign 
major importance to the costa of coll,ective action itself. The standard 
Millian analysis jumps from defined interests to collective action with 
scant attention to organization and mohilization. Starting from the 
challenge laid down by Msncur Olson, Millians have sharpened the analysis 
/ 
of collective action by connecting it to the production of collective goods. 
The ideal col.lective good is inclusive and indivisible. If any member 
of the group receives it, all receive it. There is no way of breaking 
it up into shares. The draining of a swamp to prevent malaria is s fairly 
pure example. Real goods vary considerably in how much they approximate 
that ideal. Police protection, for example, is ideally a pure collective 
good; ideally, it is inclusive and indivisible. In practice, some people 
get little or no police protection, and others buy up extra shares for 
themselves. We therefore have to say that action is collective to the 
extent that it produces inclusive, indivisible gooda. --
The definition I have proposed is more relaxed in some regards and 
more restrictive in others. Joint action in pursuit of c m o n  ends often 
fails to produce any goods at all, but so long as it &?& to produce 
collective goods I propose to include it. On the other hand, some collec- 
tive gooda (and many collective bads) are produced unintentionally, as 
by-products of Individual efforts. I propose to exclude them from the 
definition of collective action. That choice has its disadvantages; it 
requires us to think about what an unsuccessful action might have produced 
and to be sure that people really did act jointly, instead of simply 
searching around for the appearance of collective goods. Yet it has 
the advantage of focusing the analysis more clearly on the explanation 
of the action itself, instead of aiming at its outcomes. 
Let us borrow the basic Millian insight: collective actors are 
attempting to produce collective goods that have a specific value in 
relation to their interests, and are expcnding valuable resources In the 
effort. If we can imagine assigning relative values to the collective 
goods produced and the resources expended, we can think of a contender 






O RESOURCES EXPENDED 
111 t h e  shaded a r e a  above t h e  d l agona l ,  t h e  va lue  of t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  goods 
obtnined is  g r e a t e r  than t h e  value  of t h e  r e sources  expended; t h a t  i s  
o  ga in .  Below t h e  d i agona l  we have l o s s e s ,  and t h e  d i agona l  i t s e l f  is a  ' 
brca k-even 1 i ne .  
In  any r e a l  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n ,  t h e r e  a r e  r e a l  l i m i t s  on how much of 
t h e  space i n  t h e  diagram is a v a i l a b l e  t o  t h e  a c t o r .  We have t a lked  about 






0 RESOURCES EXPENDED 
The group cannot expend more r e sources  than i t  has  c u r r e n t l y  mobi l ized;  
t h n t  s e t s  an unbreakable l i m i t  i n  one d i r e c t i o n .  The o p p o r t u n i t i e s  f o r  
g a i n  n r e  f i n i t e ;  t h a t  s e t s  a  l i m i t  i n  t h e  o t h e r  d i r e c t i o n .  La te r  on we 
w i l l  look c o r e f u l l y  a t  l i m i t s  on oppor tun i ty .  For t h e  moment i t  i s  enough 
t o  s e e  t h a t  both mob i l i za t ion  and oppor tun i ty  l i m i t  t h e  p o s s i b l e  g a i n s  Erom 
c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  I t  fo l lows,  c l e a r l y ,  t h a t  a  change i n  mob i l i za t ion  o r  
oppor tun i ty  w i l l  produce a  change i n  t h e  s e t  of ga ins  and l o s s e s  a v a i l a b l e  
t o  a  group. Zero mobi l iznt ion - ze ro  g a i n s  o r  l o s s e s .  A group can inc rease  
t h c  range of ga ins  and l o s s e s  a v a i l a b l e  by mobi l iz ing o r  by manipula t ing 
o p p o r t u n i t i e s  -- t h a t  is, by inc reas ing  i t s  power o r  reducing Lta s l rbjcct ion 
t o  r ep res s ion .  
I f  t h ings  were t h i s  s imple ,  we would expect  every group t o  mobl l ize  
t o  i ts utmost capac i ty  t o  manipula te  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  a s  much a s  p o s s i b l c  
and t o  maneuver i t s e l f  i n t o  t h e  h ighes t  a v a i l a b l e  p o s i t i o n  above t h e  d l a -  
gonal.  To some e x t e n t ,  t h a t  i s  a  reasonable  simplification of whnt goes 
on i n  power s t r u g g l e s .  But i t  ignores  important r e a l i t i e s :  mob l l l za t ion  
i t s e l f  is c o s t l y .  The group 's  o rgan iza t ion  i t s e l f  s e t s  important  l i m i t s  
on t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n s ,  mob i l i za t ion  s t r a t e g i e s  and manipula t ions  of 
oppor tun i ty  i t  can o r  w i l l  undertake. And i t s  i n t e r e s t s  d e f i n e  whicl~ s o r t s  
of g a i n s  and l o s s e s  a r e  accep tab le  o r  unacceptable .  
To put  i t  ano the r  way, groups d i f f e r  considerably  i n  t h e  r e l o t l v e  
v a l u e s  they a s s i g n  t o  c o l l e c t i v e  goods and t o  t h e  r e sources  which must bc 
expended t o  a c q u i r e  them. Many, perhaps most, groups behave l i k e  peasan t s  
who a r e  s e e k i n g . t o  draw a  t a r g e t  income from t h e i r  land;  i n s t ead  of lo- 
c a t i n g  themselves a t  t h e  po in t  of maximum p r o f i t ,  they aim f o r  a  c e r t a i n  
r e t u r n .  I f  they can ,  they expend t h e  minimum resources  r cqu i r cd  f o r  t l ~ s t  
reason.  Thus a  group of workers f i r s t  dec ide  they want an elght-hour day. 
then c a l c u l a t e  what e f h r t  they w i l l  have t o  expend i n  o rde r  t o  win t h a t  
p a r t i c u l a r  o b j e c t i v e .  
Some groups va lue  a  g iven c o l l e c t i v e  good s o  highly  t h a t  they a r e  
w i l l i n g  t o  i ncu r  what o t h e r  groups regard a s  n e t  l o s s e s  i n  o r d e r  t o  achieve 
t h e i r  che r i shed  o b j e c t i v e s .  From t h e  viewpoint of t h e  average group, they 
a r e  s a t i s f i e d  wi th  a  p o s i t i o n  below t h e  break-even l l n e .  We can mnke a  
d i s t i n c t i o n  among fou r  group s t r a t e g i e s :  1 )  t h e  z e a l o t s  who, compared t o  
o t h e r  groups, s e t  an  extremely high va lue  on some c o l l e c t i v e  good i n  terms 
of t h e  r e sources  r equ i r ed  t o  achieve t h a t  good: w l l l i n g  t o  expend l i f e  and 
lLmb, f o r  i n s t ance ,  i n  o rde r  t o  a c q u i r e  self-government; 2)  t h e  mise r s .  who 
value t h e  r e sources  t hey  a l r e a d y  hold s o  h igh ly  t h a t  ha rd ly  any a v a i l a b l e  
c o l l e c t i v e  good can draw them i n t o  expending t h e i r  mobilized r e sources  on 
c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n ;  we should expect  mi se r s  t o  a c t  t oge the r  de fens ive ly  
when they a c t  a t  a l l ;  3 )  t h e  run-of-the-mill cpntenders  who aim f o r  a  
l i m i t e d  s e t  of c o l l e c t i v e  goods, making t h e  minimum expendi ture  of re-  
sou rces  necessary  f o r  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  of t h e s e  gooda, and remaining in-  
a c t i v e  when t h e  c u r r e n t  combination of mob i l i za t ion  and oppor tun i ty  makes 
a  n e t  l o s s  on t h e  exchange l i k e l y ;  4 )  t h e  o p p o r t u n i s t s  who s t r i v e  t o  
maximize t h e i r  n e t  r e t u r n  -- t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  value  between r e sources  
expended and c o l l e c t i v e  gooda obta ined -- r e g a r d l e s s  of which c o l l e c t i v e  
goods they acquire .  
. Figure  3-4 presen t s  t h e  tou r  i d e a l  t ypes  schemat i ca l ly .  I n  t h i s  
s i m p l i f i e d  p i c t u r e .  oppor tun i ty  and mob i l i za t ion  a r e  t h e  same f o r  a l l  
types .  The diagrams va lue  t h e  r e sources  expended and t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  
goods acquired st  averages  over  a l l  groups i n s t e a d  of showing t h e  r e l a t i v e  
va lues  u sua l ly  ass igned t o  mobilized r e sources  and c o l l e c t i v e  goods by 
each type of group. According t o  t h e  diagram, z e a l o t s  f i nd  accep tab le  
on ly  a  narrow range of c o l l e c t i v e  goods; t h e  goods a r e  no t  n e c e s s a r i l y  
those  t h ~ t  o t h e r  groups va lue  most h igh ly .  They a r e  w i l l i n g  t o  spend up 
t o  t h e  l i m i t  of t h e i r  mobilized r e sources  t o  a c q u i r e  t hose  c o l l e c t i v e  
goods, even i f  by t h e  s t anda rds  of o t h e r  contenders  they a r e  t ak ing  l o s s e s .  
Misers w i l l  only  spend a  s h a r e  of t h e i r  mobilized r e sources  f o r  a  ve ry  
va luab le  r e t u r n  i n  c o l l e c t i v e  goods. They w i l l  never  spend up t o  t h e  
l i m i t  s e t  by t h e i r  mob i l i za t ion .  Run-of-the-mill contenders  resemble 
z e a l o t s .  except  t h a t  they a r e  w i l l i n g  t o  s e t t l e  f o r  a  wider  range of co l -  
l e c t i v e  goods. and unwil l ing t o  s e t t l e  f o r  a  l o s s .  F i n a l l y ,  o p p o r t u n i s t s  
w i l l  t ake  any c o l l e c t i v e  goods they  can g e t .  They wi l l .  spend up t o  t h e i r  
l i m i t  t o  g e t  i t ,  j u s t  s o  long a s  they make a  p r o f i t .  
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ACCEPTABLE 
I 
The diagram invites further theorizing. For example, it is reasonable 
to suppose that zealots tend to maintainhigher levels of mobilization than i I
other klnds of actors. They therefore have more chances to acquire their I 
desired collective goods, but they also run a greater risk of heavy losses. 
Opportunists, on the other hand, probably work more effectively at moving 
up the opportunity line by aucll tactics as forming coalitions with other 
powerful contenders. Some of these strategic questions will become impor- 
1 .  
tant in our later discussions of power. 
Every political system sorts its contenders among zealots, misers, op- 
portunists and run-of-the-mill contenders. No doubt every political sys- 
tem rewards the opportunists more than the run-of-the-mill, and the run-of- i 
the-mill contenders more than the zealots or the misers. That is even 
true. I fear, after zealots seize power. They. too, reward opportunists 
and punieh zealots. 
Oddly enough, the opportunist is the least likely of the four extremes. 
Regardless of group stmtegy, the return the group seeks is rarely or never 
i 
I 
o simple profit on collective action. Groups care about the character of 
the collective goods. Labor unions usually don't want papal dispensations. 
clans usually don't want recognition as bargaining agents. In fact, both 
the supply and the demand are "lumpy", clumped, discontinuous. For that 
! 
reason, we cannot simply graft the analysis of collective action on the existing 
microeconomics of private goods. The existing economics of collective 
goods comes closer. But it, too, has yet to solve the problems of interest, 
organization and mobilizstion we have encountered. 
The Detection and Measurement of Collective Action 
When trying to study joint action in pursuit of common ends, we face 
the practical problems of detecting the action, and then determining how 
joint it is and how common its ends. If we confine our attention to clesr- 
cut examples, such as strikes, elections, petitions and attacks on poor- 
houses we still face the practical problems of gauging their mngnitudes -- 
especially if we want to any "how much" collective action one group or 
another engaged in over some period of time. As with the meosurcmcnt of 
mobilization, we commonly have the choice between a) indicators of collective 
action which come to us in a more or lees qunntitatlve form, but are too 
narrow or too remote to repreaent adequately the range of action we have 
in mind, or b) indicators derived from qualitative descriptions, which 
are usually discontinuous, which often vary in coverage from one group or 
period to another, and which are always hard to convert reliably into 
meaningful numbers. 
David Snyder's time-series analyses of Italian. French and American 
strikes provide a case in point. Snyder uses number and proportion of 
labor union members in the civilian labor force as a mobilization measure. 
Data for long periods are difficult to locate and hard to make comparable. 
but when they are available at all they are usunlly in quantitative form 
from the start. On the side of collective action, Snyder uses two sets of 
variables. First come the strike-activity measures: number of strikes. 
number of participants in atrikes, mean duration of strikes, days lost. 
proportion ending in success or failure, proportion making offensive or de- 
fensive demands, and so on. Ultimately, all of these come from official 
sources, where they appear as summary statistics or as uniform descriptions 
of all the strikes reported for some period, area and definition of the 
relevant labor force. As in the case of union membershfp, it tokes some 
ingenuity and effort to wrest comparable measures from the sources, but 
the quantification itself is not very difficult. 
That is certainly not true of Snyder's second set of measures. Tliey 
concern other forms of collective action by workers. Snyder's list (from 
Snyder 1974: 114) runs :  
Economic and D i r e c t l y  Job Rela ted Act ions  
1) employment informat ion and placement 
2) l o c a l  c o n t r o l  of working cond i t i ons ,  i nc lud ing  gr ievance 
procedures. l o c a l  adjus tments  of n a t i o n a l  c o n t r a c t s ,  e t c .  
3) n e g o t i a t i o n  of e x t r a l o c a l  c o n t r a c t s  (u sua l ly  n a t i o n a l )  
4) disbursement of s t r i k e  funds 
Economic, But Not Job Rela ted Act ions  
1 )  a i d  t o  members f o r  a c c i d e n t ,  s i c k n e s s ,  unemployment, b u r i a l  
2) p rov i s ion  of social/recreationalleducational f a c i l i t i e s  
3) finencjpg coope ra t ive  e f f o r t a  (both  product ion and consumption) 
P o l i t i c a l .  Act ions  
1 )  lobbying a c t i v i t i e s  
2) d i s t r i b u t i o n  of p r i n t e d  m a t e r i a l  
3) support  of cand ida t e s  f o r  e l e c t i o n  
4) c o a l i t i o n  wi th  p o l i t i c a l  pa r ty  
Snyder read through a  l a r g e  number of economic, l a b o r ,  s o c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  
h i s t o r i e s  f o r  each of h i s  t h r e e  c o u n t r i e s ,  a b s t r a c t i n g  any mention of any 
of t hese  a c t i v i t i e s ,  regrouping t h e  a b s t r a c t s  i n t o  organizat ion-year  sum- 
maries .  then coding cnch of t h e  e l even  i tems i n  a  s t anda rd  way. For 
example, t h e  code f o r  suppor t  of cand ida t e s  appears  i n  Figure  3-4. Snyder 
summed the  s c o r e s  f o r  each o rgan iza t ion  i n t o  fou r  gene ra l  s c o r e s  -- one each 
f o r  h i s  Job Rela ted,  Economic-Not-Job-Related and P o l i t i c a l  c a t e g o r i e s ,  
and o  summary C o l l e c t i v e  Action sco re .  F i n a l l y ,  he weighted each organiza-  
t i o n  f o r  t h e  propor t ion o f  t h e  l abo r  f o r c e  i t  contnined,  and summed each 
weighted s c o r e  over a l l  o rgan iza t ions  f o r  a country-year t o t a l .  Snyder ' s  
F igu re  3-5: Snyder ' s  Code f o r  
Labor Support of Candidates  
The coder is e v a l u a t i n g  a  a ingle-year  sununary of a b s t r a c t s  from h i s t o r i c a l  
sou rces  concerning a  p a r t i c u l a r  o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s  suppor t  of cand ida t e s  f o r  




none a t  a l l  
sma l l  amount 
moderate 
good d e a l  
g r e a t  d e a l  
Source: Snyder 1974: 302 
C r i t e r i a  
no support  o f  cand ida t e s  
endorsement of candidntee  i n  
p r i n t e d  m a t e r i a l  of t h e  orgnni- 
za t ior!  
speechmaking, e t c . .  by l abo r  
leaderslrnembers i n  support  of 
cand ida t e s  and endorsement i n  
p r i n t e d  m a t e r i a l  
a c t i v e  compaigning by members 
f o r  cand ida t e s  (pnss ing o u t  l e a f -  
l e t s ,  going door t o  door ,  c t c . )  
and i tems l i s t e d  nbove -
f i n a n c i a l  suppor t  oE cand ida t e s  
and i tems l i s t e d  above -
ana lyses  of t h e  un ion iza t ion  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  and s t r i k e  v a r i a b l e s  f o r  
France and I t a l y  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h e  b e s t  summary of t h e l r  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  
runs ,  s chemat i ca l ly :  
~ d w b r d  Shor t e r  end I had i m p l i c i t l y  adopted a  d i f f e r e n t  mbdel: 
U N ~ N Z A T ~ ~  f; 
THER COLLECTIVE ACTION 
Rut we n e i t h e r  formulated t h a t  model c l e a r l y  nor (except  f o r  some a n a l y s e s  
o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  between s t r i k e  a c t i v i t y  and c o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence )  
made much of on e f f o r t  t o  e s t i m a t e  i t .  Thus Snyder's work i n  d e s c r i p t i o n  
and measurement l eads  us  t o  r econs ide r  t h e  processes  we a r e  analyzing.  
Aside from s t r i k e s ,  our  r e sea rch  group's most ex t ens ive  fo rays  i n t o  
t h e  meosuremellt of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  have d e a l t  wi th  v i o l e n t  even t s .  (For 
gene ra l  d e s c r i p t i o n s  end p re l imina ry  r e s u l t s ,  s e e  T i l l y ,  T i l l y  and T i l l y  
1975.)  For reasons  which w i l l  become c l e a r e r  i n  t h e  course  of my l a t e r  
d i scuss ions  of v io l ence  a s  such,  c o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence  s e r v e s  a s  a  u s e f u l  
" t m c e r "  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  i n  gene ra l .  Although c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n s  
which produce damage t o  persons  o r  o b j e c t s  a r e  by no means a  random sample 
of a l l  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n s ,  t h e  presence of v io l ence  g r e a t l y  i n c r e a s e s  t h e  
l i k e l i h o o d  ' t h a t  t h e  event  w i l l  be  no t i ced  and recorded.  With prudent 
a n a l y s i s ,  t h e  p a t t e r n  o f  c o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence  w i l l  y i e l d  va luab le  i n fo ron t ion  
about  t h e  p a t t e r n  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  a s  a  whole. My c o l l o b o r a t o r e  and I 
hove done d e t a i l e d  enumerations and d e s c r i p t i o n s  of c o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence  
i n  I t a l y ,  Germany, France and England over s u b s t a n t i a l  b locks  of t ime wi th  
e x a c t l y  t h a t  purpose i n  mind. 
Le t  us  concen t r a t e  on c o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence  wi th in  a  populat ion under t h e  
c o n t r o l  of a  s i n g l e  government. Let  us  ag rce  t o  pay l i t t l e  a t t e n t i o n  t o  
war, t o  fu l l - f l edged  games, t o  i nd iv idua l  v io l ence  and t o  highly  d i scon t inu -  
ous  i n t e r a c t i o n s .  We a r e  t hen  s t i l l  f r e e  t o  exnmine even t s  i n  wl~ich t h e  
damage was only  i n c i d e n t a l  t o  t h e  aims o f  most of those  involved.  In  ou r  
own i n v e s t i g a t i o n s ,  my r e sea rch  group has  discovered t h a t  w c  con, wittiout 
huge unce r t a in ty ,  s i n g l e  ou t  eventa  occu r r ing  w i t h i n  a  p o r t l c u l a r  n a t i o n a l  
s t a t e  i n  which a t  l e a s t  one group above some minimum s i z e  (commonly 
twenty o r  f i f t y  persons)  s e i z e s  o r  dsmoges someone o r  something from 
ano the r  group. We use  newspapers,  a r c h i v a l  sou rces  and h i s t o r i c n l  works 
f o r  t h e  purpose. As t h e  minimum s i z e  goes down, c o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence  be- 
g i n s  t o  fade i n t o  band i t ry .  brawling,  vandalism, t e r r o r i s m  and s wlde 
v a r i e t y  of t h rea t en ing  nonviolent  even t s ,  so  f a r  a s  our  a b i l i t y  t o  d i s -  
t i n g u i s h  them on t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  record is concerned. 
We use  t h e  community-population-day a s  an  elementnry u n i t .  On o 
p a r t i c u l a r  day,  d i d  t h i s  segment of t h e  populat ion of t h i s  community 
engage i n  c o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence ,  a s  j u s t  def ined7 Is s o ,  we hove t h e  elemen- 
t a r y  u n i t  of a  v i o l e n t  event .  Did an ove r l app ing  s e t  of people  c a r r y  on t h e  
a c t i o n  i n  ad j acen t  community? I f  s o ,  both  communities were involved jn 
t h e  same even t .  Did an  over lapping s e t  of people con t inue  t h e  a c t i o n  t h e  
fol lowing day? I f  so .  t h e  i n c i d e n t  l a s t e d  a t  l e a s t  two days. In t roduce 
a  break i n  time. space o r  personnel ,  and we a r e  dea l ing  wi th  two o r  more 
distinct events. The result of this modular reasoning is both to greatly 
simplify the problem of bounding the "same" incident and to fragment into 
many separate incidents series of interactions (such as the Spanish Civil 
War as a whole) which many analysts have been willing to treat as s single 
unit. More details on definitions and procedures are in the appendix. 
For some purposes, like the comparative study of revolutions, a 
broader criterion may serve better. Still other investigations will re- 
quire more stringent standards: more participants, a certain duration, some- 
one killed, a particular minimum of property damage. But the general 
reasoning of such choices would be the same: identify the events above 
a certain magnitude, or at least a representative sample of them, before 
trying to sort them out in terms of legitimacy or in terms of the aims 
of the participants. 
Let us consider some alternative ways of handling the enumeration 
of events. Reacting to what he regards as the weakness of our concentra- 
tion on violent events. Heinrich Volkmann has delineated a class of events 
called "social protests". In general, he thinks of a social protest as 
"any collective disturbance of public order on behalf of common objectives" 
(Volkmann 1975: 33). Events qualify when at least twenty persons take ..' 
part. Looking at Germany (as defined by the frontiers of 1937) during 
the revolutionary years f r y  1830 through 1832, he finds 165 events . :;..,, - .  
meeting the criteria in the of the Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung. 
Just as in the case of Prance we use certain key words ("multitude", 
"rassemblement", "reunion", "f oule". "attroupement", etc . ) to establish 
the presence of at least fifty people when our reports contain no numeri- 
cal estimate, Volkmann establishes rough numerical equivalents for certain 
terms. He does so by taking the 22 accounts which contain both a numerical 
estimate and a verbal description of'magnitude. The claaaificstion runs: 
3-65 
20-100 persons: eine Anzahl. ein Trupp. Schwsrm. Ilac~femeist mit 
spezifizierenden ~ u A t z e n  wie "ein Haufe Arbeiter", "ein Haufe Volks". 
100-1000 persons: Rotte, Zusamenrottierung, Haufen, grsssere Haufen, 
zshlreiche oder gr5ssere Menge, einige Hundert. 
1000-2000 pe'rsons: Menge, grosse Menge, grosser Volksaufl.nuf. Hsssen, 
unzthlige Menschenmasse (Volkmann 1975: 89). 
He 1s thus able to estimate sizes for another 60 events. leaving almost 
exactly half without either a numerical statement or a codable verbal 
description. Presumably Volkmann judged whether at least 20 persons took 
part from the nature of the action itself. 
In s study of "mass disturbances" in Japan from 1952 to mid-1960, 
I, ' 
done independently of our research group, Yoshio Sugimoto adopted some of 
our definitions and procedures. Ile used a Gmber of Japanese newspapers 
to identify all events involving st least fifty people in which the police 
intervened and there was some detectable violence. Ile identified 945 
such events in his 8.5-year period. Sugimoto's measurement of magnitudes 
followed the same pattern: number of events, size, duration. But, follow- 
ing Sorokin and Gurr, he added a fourth dimension: intensity. The inten- 
sity measurement is unusual.. Instead of simply scoring the injuries, 
property damage and arrests that occurred in any particular event, Sugimoto 
attempted to estimate their probability as function of the various kinds 
of action that made up the event. llaving broken down every event into 
phases consisting of only one kind of action. he then sorted all action 
phases from all events in his sample by type of action. Items 31 to 40 on 
the 70-item list (with numbers of action phases sham in parenthesis) 
were, f o r  example: 
p r o t e c t i o n  of i n d i v i d u a l s  from a t t a c k  (109) 
p i c k e t  a g a i n s t  c a r s  (105) 
a t t empt  t o  break p i c k e t  l i n e  (312) 
ski rmish (1133) 
a t t empt  t o  throw someone i n t o  t h e  sea  (3) 
f o r c e f u l  removal of o b j e c t s  (10) 
a t tempt  t o  t rample  down f i e l d s  (1) 
a t tempt  t o  d i g  a  we l l  (1) 
a t tempt  t o  dam water  i n  a  r i v e r  (5) 
a t t empt  t o  hammer p ikes  i n t o  ground (1) 
For each of t h e  seventy  types  of a c t i o n  d i s t i n g u i s h e d ,  he summed i n j u r i e s ,  
p rope r ty  damnge and a r r e s t s .  The "p robab i l i t y "  of i n j u r y  ass igned t o  each 
a c t i o n  is  t h e  p ropor t ion  of a l l  a c t i o n s  i n  t h e  c l a s s  which produced in-  
j u r i e s .  Sugimoto then combined t h e  t h r e e  i n d i v i d u a l  s c o r e s  f o r  each 
action-phase by means of t h e  weighta de r ived  from a  f a c t o r  a n a l y s i s  of t h e  
t h r e e ,  computed t h e  magnitude of t h e  act ion-phase  by mul t ip ly ing  
i n t e n s i t y  x  s i z e  x  d u r a t i o n  
and then computed t h e  magnitude of t h e  event  a s  a  whole by summing t h e  
magnitudes of a l l  its act ion-phases .  The r e s u l t  was probably t h e  most 
r e f ined  measure of magnitude eve r  computed f o r  a  l a r g e  sample of v i o l e n t  
even t a .  
What is more, Sugtmoto made good use  of h i s  r e f ined  measures. He 
shows t h a t  t h e  magnitude of a g r a r i a n  d i s tu rbances  was g r e a t e r  i n  regions  
where landholding was r e l a t i v e l y  equa l  be fo re  t h e  land reforms,  and where 
t h e  pace of t h e  reform was more r a p i d ,  t h a t  t h e  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  of labor  
uniona s t r o n g l y  promoted d i s tu rbances  involving workers ,  and many o t h e r  
f i n d i n g s  of equa l  i n t e r e s t .  
Let u s  t ake  a  l a s t  example which is e n t i r e l y  independent of my group 's  
work. Drawing on t h e  Annual Reg i s t e r  from 1815 t o  1848, Char les  Taylor  
(1966) prepared an index of " p o l i t i c a l  a r t i c u l a t i o n "  by Engl ish  workingmen. 
It s ing led  ou t  e f f o r t s  t o  i n f luence  t h e  n a t i o n a l  government, i nc lud ing  
"meetings t o  demand a  reform of t h e  f r anch i se .  r i o t s  t o  p r o t e s t  t h e  i n t r o -  
duc t ion  of new poor law and demonstra t ions  t o  support  aome p a r t i c u l a r  group 
cause" (Taylor 1966: 15) .  The con tex t  makes i t  appear  t h a t  Taylor a l s o  
scored p e t i t i o n s ,  group v io l ence ,  t h e  format ion of a s s o c i a t i o n s  and t h e  
founding of p u b l i c a t i o n s ,  j u s t  s o  long a s  they bore  e x p l i c i t l y  on t h e  
p o l i t i c a l  system. He weighed each in s t ance  from 1 t o  5  depending on i t s  
du ra t ion  and t h e  number of p a r t i c i p a n t s .  He then used t h e  index t o  demon- 
s t r a t e  s t r o n g  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  between a  county 's  l e v e l  of p o l i t i c a l  a r t t c -  
u l a t i o n  over t he  e n t i r e  per iod and t h e  coun ty ' s  urban populat ion,  d e n s i t y ,  
growth r a t e  and non-ag r i cu l tu ra l  l abo r  fo rce .  
I n  my own group 's  e f f o r t  t o  index R r t t l s l ~ c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  du r ing  
t h e  same span of time, we have avoided r e l y i n g  on a  p o l i t i c a l  c r i t e r i o n  
a t  t h e  s t a r t ,  i n  hopes of cap tu r ing  a  wide range of a c t i o n ;  then we have 
some chance t o  determine whether c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  o r i en t ed  t o  n a t i o n a l  
p o l i t i c s  and c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  i n  gene ra l  r i s e  and f a l l  t oge the r .  o r  
whether t h e  r i s e  of n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c s  r e p r e s e n t s  a  ne t  s h i f t  w i th in  t h e  
body of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  (For d e t a i l s ,  s e e  t h e  Appendjx.) That impor- 
t a n t  except ion a s i d e ,  t h e  two approaches t o  t h e  measurement of c o l l e c t i v e  
a c t i o n  have much i n  common. 
In  l i n e  wi th  t h e  hope of assembling evidence on t h e  p a t t e r n  o f  col- 
lective sction as a wliol.e, we have coded many features of the violent 
events: chsracteristica of tlie setting, types of participants, forms of 
action, outcomes. In thinking of the magnitude of collective action 
involved, we hsve followed the model of strike analysis. We have at- 
tempted to estimate the total person-days absorbed by the action, and to 
disaggreeate that estimate into its components: number of participants, 
duration. For the total amount of collective action produced by e given 
population in a certain period of time, we then hsve a three-dimensional 
figure which can assume quite different proportions: 
Croup A produces a few long events of medium size, while Group B produces 
many large, short events; the volume of collective action as measured by 
person-days, however, is about the-same in the two hypothetical cases. 
This simple sort of representation brings out the fact that in France 
from the nineteenth to the twentieth century both strikes and collective 
violence shifted from a pattern of small size and long duration to large 
size and short duration; the number of strikes and the person-days in 
strikes expanded greatly, whlle the number of violent events and person- 
days in violence did not rise significantly faster than the French popu- 
lation. 
Some of the reasons for these changes are obvious, and some require 
reElection and research. rile twentieth-century rise of the big demun- 
strstion and the one-day protest strike as modes of collective action 
and as contexts for collective violence played s large part in the net 
shift toward large, short, violent events. To ask why they rose, however. 
is to ask about the expanding importance of special-purpose nssociotlons, 
the changing relations between organized labor and the notional govern- 
ment, the movement of protests toward large cities and big plants. In 
short, the alterations an the forms of collective sction result from 
changes in its determinants. 
Interest, organization and mobilization, however. are not tlie only 
determinants of the intensity and character of collective actlon. Op- 
portunity matters. too. We must look st the three major components of 
opportunity -- power, repression/facilitstion and opportunitylthreot -- 
before we have a rounded picture of collective action. 
CHAPTER 4:  THE OPPORTUNITY TO ACT TOGETHER 
From Mobi l iza t ion t o  Opportuni ty  
We began t h e  l a s t  chap te r  w i th  two models. The "mobi l iza t ion model" 
d e s c r i b e s  t h e  behavior  of a  s i n g l e  contender  i n  terms of i n t e r e s t ,  organi-  
zn t ion ,  power and o t h e r  v a r i a b l e s .  That model we have kept  much i n  view. 
We I~ove ,  however, looked mainly a t  one s i d e  of i t :  t h e  s i d e  dea l ing  wi th  
t h e  con tende r ' s  i n t e r n a l  s t r u c t u r e .  Schemat ical ly ,  we have concentra ted 
on t h e  fol lowing r e l a t i o n s h i p s :  
By i t s e l f ,  t h i s  po r t ion  of t h e  model i s  inadequate .  It d e a l s  only  wi th  
t h e  capac i ty  t o  a c t ,  no t  w i th  t h e  immediate i n c e n t i v e  o r  oppor tun i ty  t o  
a c t .  Those i n c e n t i v e s  and o p p o r t u n i t i e s  f i n d  t h e i r  p l aces  i n  t h e  o t h e r  
h a l f  of t h e  mob i l i za t ion  model, and i n  t h e  p o l i t y  model. 
The " p o l i t y  model" r e l a t e s  contenders  t o  a  government and t o  o t h e r  
contenders  -- both cha l l enge r s  and members of t h e  p o l i t y  -- v i a  c o a l i t i o n s  
and s t r u g g l e s  f o r  pa re r .  So long a s  we were examining t h e  i n t e r n a l  s t r u c -  
t u r e  of a  contender ,  we could t a k e  its e x t e r n a l  r e l a t i o n s  f o r  g ran ted .  As 
we move i n t o  t h e  world of oppor tun i ty ,  we must pay sus t a ined  a t t e n t i o n  t o  
o t h e r  a c t o r s .  The i r  s t r e n g t h s  and weaknesses comprise t h e  contender ' s  
o p p o r t u n i t i e s  t o  a c t  on i t s  i n t e r e s t s .  
In  Durkheimian th ink ing ,  t h e  main word f o r  t h i s  s e t  of r e l a t i o n s  be- 
tween t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t o r  and i ts environment is  s o c i a l  c o n t r o l .  S o c i a l  
c o n t r o l  c o n s i s t s  of t h e  e f f o r t s  of a u t h o r i t i e s ,  o r  of s o c i e t y  a s  n  whole, 
t o  b r i n g  dev ian t s  back i n t o  l i n e .  Thia i dea  of s o c i a l  c o n t r o l  a s s i g n s  a  
pas s ive ,  unc rea t ive  r o l e  t o  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t o r s .  I t  f i t s  t h e  r e a l i t y  of 
c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  too poor ly  t o  he lp  u s  he re .  
Real contenders  a r e  more a c t i v e  than Durkheim's p o r t r a i t  impl ies .  
They pursue t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s .  They s t r u g g l e  f o r  pa re r .  On t h e  wny, they 
maneuver, form and break c o a l i t i o n s ,  t r y  a l t e r n a t i v e  s t r a t e g i e s ,  win and 
l o s e .  Our p r i m i t i v e  models a impl i fy  a l l  t h i s  con ten t ion  by deac r ih ing  i t  
a s  a  s e r i e s  of responses  t o  changing e s t i m a t e s  of t h e  c o s t s  and h e n e f i t s  
l i k e l y  t o  r e s u l t  from va r ious  p o s s i b l e  i n t e r a c t i o n s  wi th  governments and 
wi th  o t h e r  contenders .  The c e n t r a l  assumptions run: 
1. C o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  costs something. 
2. A l l  contenders  count  c o s t s .  
3. C o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  b r i n g s  b e n e f i t s ,  i n  t h e  form of c o l l e c t i v e  
goods. 
4 .  Contenders cont inuously  weigh expected c o a t s  ngn lns t  expected 
b e n e f i t s .  
5. Both c o s t s  and b e n e f i t s  a r e  unce r t a in  because a )  contenders  have 
imperfect  informat ion about  t h e  c u r r e n t  s t a t e  of t h c  p o l i t y ;  
b)  a l l  p a r t i e s  engage i n  s t r a t e g i c  i n t e r a c t i o n .  
We sum up t h e  r e l evan t  c o s t s  and b e n e f i t s  under t h e  headings  r ep reas ion /  
f a c i l i t a t i o n ,  power and o p p o r t u n i t y l t h r e a t .  On t h e  oppor tun i ty  s i d e ,  t h e  
main r e l a t i o n a h i p a  i n  t h e  model run:  
COLLECTIVE ACTION 
OPPORTUNITY/THREAT 
Remember t h a t  t h e s e  r e l a t i o n s h i p a  r e f e r  t o  t h e  moment of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  
Over t h e  long run ,  t h e  e x t e n t  and form of a  contender ' s  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  
a f f e c t  its power. t h e  r e p r e s s i o n  t o  which i t  i s  auhJected,  and t h e  f u r t h e r  
o p p o r t u n i t i e s  and t h r e a t s  i t  f a c e s .  Thia ve r s ion  of t h e  model i gnores  time. 
Let us consider each component of the timeless model in turn. 
Repression and Facilitation 
Contention for power always involves at least two parties. The be- 
havior of the second party runs along a range from repression to facili- 
tation. Let us recall the definitions: repression is any action by another 
group which raises the contender's cost of collective action. An action 
which lowers the group's cost of collective action is a form of facilita- 
tion. (We cell repression or facilitation political if the other party is -
s government.) A group bent on repressing or facilitating another group's 
action has tlie choice of working on the target group's mobilization or 
directly on its collective action. For example, a government can raise a 
group's mobilization costs (and thereby raise its costs of collective ac- 
tion) by disrupting its organization, by making comunicstions difficult 
or inaccessible, by freezing necessary resources such as guns and manpower. 
Standard repressive measures such as suspending newspapers, drafting 
strikers, forbidding assemblies and arresting leaders illustrate the anti- 
mobilization avenue. Or a government can operate directly on the costs of 
collective action by raising the penalties, making the targets of the ac- 
tion inaccessible or inducing a waste of the mobilized resources; the 
egentprovocatex, the barricades around the city hall, the establishment 
of military tribunals for insurgents fall familiarly into the strategy of 
moving directly against collective action. Facilitation likewise has two 
faces, both familiar: pro-mobilization activities such as giving a group 
publicity, legalizing membership in it and simply paying it off; activities 
directly reducing the group's costs of collective action, such as lending 
information or strategic expertise, keeping the group's enemies out of the 
action, or simply sending forces to help the action along. 
Despite the two faces of repression/facilitation, the elementary mo- 
bilization model shows no direct connection between repressionlEacilitation 
and collective action. Instead, it portrays repression/facilitstion as 
acting on power, which in turn influences collective action. That is be- 
cause the elementary model refers to the moment of action alone. At that 
moment, the prior effects of repression translate into power: into tlie cx- 
tent to which the outcomes of the contender's various possible interactions 
with other contenders favor its interests over those of the others. 
Governmental repression is the best-known case. For example, the 
United States government's outlawing of the Communist Party during the Cold 
War essentially guarsnteed that the party would lose lenders to jail when 
it acted together in sny visible way. That is a high cost to pay for col- 
lective action. The law also raised the party's cost of mobilization by 
penalizing individuals who dared to contribute time, money or moral support 
to its work. From a government's point of view, raising the costs of mobi- 
lization is a more reliable repressive strategy than raising the costs of 
collective action alone. The anti-mobilization strategy neutralizes tlie 
actor as well as the action, and makes it less likely that the actor will 
be able to act rapidly when the government suddenly becomes vulnerable, a 
new coalition partner arises, or something else quickly shifts the probable 
costs and benefits of collective action. Raising the costs of collective 
action alters the pattern of effective demand from mobilized groups, while 
raising the costs of mobilization reduces demand across the board. 
Governmental repression is uniquely important because governments 
specialize in the control of mobilization and collective action: police 
for crowd control, troops to back them, spies and informers for infiltra- 
tion, licensing to keep potential actors visible and tame. Yet groups 
o u t s i d e  government a l s o  r e p r e s s  each o t h e r ,  i n  t h e  sense  of manipula t ing 
each o t h e r ' s  c o s t  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  That is obvious i n  t h e  case  of 
quasi-governments such a s  l a r g e  f i rms :  simply cons ide r  how much t h e  s t r u c -  
t u r e  and po l i cy  of t h e  f i rm  a f f e c t  t h e  chances f o r  un ion iza t ion  and there-  
f o r e  f o r  s t r i k e  a c t i v i t y .  It is l e s s  obvious i n  t h e  c a s e  of r o u t i n e  compe- 
t i t i o n  among o t h e r  groups: t h e  vo lun tee r  f i r e  companies which burned each 
o t h e r ' s  premises and he ld  deadly  shoo tou t s  i n  tlie s t r e e t s  of n ineteenth-  
century Ph i l ade lph ia  ended up r e s e t t i n g  t h e  r e l a t i v e  a b i l i t y  of each f i r e  
company t o  wield  p o l i t i c a l  i n f l u e n c e  (Laur i e  1972). The f i g h t s  between 
groups of young b l acks  nnd I r i s h  f o r  c o n t r o l  of l o c a l  t u r f s  i n  Boston s i g n i -  
f i c a n t l y  a f f e c t  t h e  g roup ' s  f u t u r e  c o s t s  of assembling and a c t i n g  toge the r .  
In  p r i n c i p l e ,  then,  r ep re s s ion  sums t h e  e f f e c t s  of t h e  a c t i o n s  of a l l  o t h e r  
groups, i nc lud ing  governments, on a  p a r t i c u l a r  g roup ' s  c o s t  of c o l l e c t i v e  
a c t i o n .  
If d i f f e r e n t  forms o f  r ep res s ion  and f a c i l i t a t i o n  sometimes concen- 
t r a t e  on mob i l i za t ion  and sometimes on c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  i t s e l f ,  they a l s o  
I 
s e l e c t  i n  two o t h e r  important  r egn rds :  t h e  t a r g e t  groups and t h e  v a r i e t i e s  
of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  encouraged o r  d e t e r r e d .  S e l e c t i v i t y  by group is t h e  
more obvious. I n  r ecen t  y e a r s ,  agenc ie s  of t h e  U.S. government have 
worked t o  impede t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  of groups a s  d i v e r s e  a s  t h e  Symbion- 
e s e  L ibe ra t ion  Army, t h e  Vietnam Veterans  Against  t h e  War, and t h e  Demo- 
c r a t i c  Pa r ty .  Agencies of t h e  government have a l s o  worked t o  f a c i l i t a t e  I 
t he  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  of t h e  Blackstone Rangers,  tlie American Medical Asso- 
c i a t i o n  and t h e  A.P.L.-C.I.O. P o l i t i c s  ss usua l  i nvo lves  a  g r e a t  d e a l  of 
conlition-making among and a g a i n s t  d i f f e r e n t  contenders  f o r  power. Divi- 
s i o n s  of t he  government p lay important  p o r t s  on both  s i d e s .  
S e l e c t i v i t y  by type of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  shows up i n  t h e  very r u l e s  
of t h e  game, and i n  t h e i r  changes; a t  a  given time, i t  may be l e g n l  t o  pet -  
i t i o n ,  a s s o c i a t e ,  v o t e  a s  a  b loc ,  a c q u i r e  n  pa t ron  i n  t h e  l e ~ i s l s t i ~ r e  and 
assemble a s  a  fo rma l ly -cons t i t u t ed  community, bu t  no t  t o  demonstra te ,  
s t r i k e ,  boyco t t ,  form m i l i t a s  o r  invade t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e .  The r e p r e s s i o n  
and f a c i l i t a t i o n  r e s i d e  i n  t h e  government's a c t i o n  t o  a l t e r  t h e  r e l a t i v e  
c o s t s  of d i f f e r e n t  forms o f  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  L e g a l i t y  m a t t e r s  because 
laws s t a t e  t h e  c o s t a  and b e n e f i t s  which governments a r e  prepared (o r  a t  
l e a s t  empowered) t o  app ly  t o  one form of a c t i o n  o r  ano the r .  
Impressed by t h a t  f a c t .  I once thought we should index f l u c t u a t i o n s  
i n  a  government's r ep re s s iveness  by watching c a r e f u l l y  its flow o f  l e g i s -  
l a t i o n .  A c l o s e r  l ook  a t  t h e  way t h e  mag i s t r a t e s  o f  e ighteenth-  and nine- 
teenth-century B r i t a i n  d i d  t h e i r  work of r e p r e s s i o n  and f a c i l i t a t i o n ,  
however, diminishedmy conf idence.  Eighteenth-century l e g i s l a t i o n  mul t ip-  
l i e d  t h e  number of c a p i t o l  o f f enses .  P e n a l t i e s  f o r  o f f e n s e s  a g a i n s t  
p rope r ty  l e d  t h e  way: p lunder ing shipwrecks, food r i o t i n g ,  m n y  forms o f  
f o r c i b l e  e n t r y  and t h e f t  became punishable  by hanging. Moreover, t h e  b l l l s  
which extended t h e  dea th  p e n a l i t y  were c h o r o c t e r i s t i c a l l y  s p e c i a l - i n t e r e s t  
l e g i s l a t i o n ;  i n  f a c t ,  t h e  c a p i t a l  o f f e n s e s  o f t e n  appeared a s  i n c i d e n t a l  
f e a t u r e s  of complex b l l l s  designed t o  advance t h e  c u r r e n t  i n t e r e s t s  o f  
shipowners, merchnnts,  l a n d l o r d s  o r  o t h e r  proper ty-holders  (Hoy 1975). 
This  much seems q u i t e  c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  t h e  e ighteenth-century r i s e  
of "possess ive  individual ism."  But one f a c t  is inconvenient :  t h e  appl ico-  
t i o n  of t h e  dea th  pena l ty  became l e s s  f r equen t  du r ing  t h e  eigliteentli  cen- 
t u ry  ( B e a t t i e  1974). What a r e  we t o  make of t h a t 7  Perhaps t h e  d e t e r r m t  
worked s o  we l l  t h a t  fewer c a p i t a l  o f f e n s e s  were committed. Perhaps j u r i e s  
tempered t h e   law'^ s e v e r i t y  by r e fus ing  t o  conv ic t .  Perhaps, a s  Douglna 
Hay sugges t s ,  t h e  combination of widespread t h r e a t s  and d e c l i n i n g  execu- 
t i o n s  r e s u l t e d  Erom a  system of g e n e r a l  t e r r o r <  s e l e c t i v e  r e ~ r e s s i o n  and 
ex tens ive  patronage. I n  any of t h e s e  e v e n t u a l i t i e s ,  t h e  r ead ing  o f  r ep res -  
s iveness  from l e g i s l a t i o n  a lone  is f a u l t y .  
E.P. Thompson's a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  background o f  t h e  Black Act of 1723 
is a  c a s e  i n  po in t .  The Black Act s e t  t h e  d e a t h  pena l ty  f o r  no fewer 
than f i f t y  o f f e n s e s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  armed and d i sgu i sed  hunt ing,  poaching, 
rick-burning and o t h e r  a t t a c k s  on r u r a l  proper ty .  Thompson shows t h a t  i t  
was e s sen t i aL ly  c l a s s  l e g i s l a t i o n ;  i t  was engineered by S i r  Robert Walpole 
and h i s  f r i e n d s  t o  c o n s o l i d a t e  t h e i r  exc lus ive  enjoyment o f  t h e i r  e s t a t e s  
over  t h e  r e s i s t a n c e  of t h e  smal l  farmers  nearby. At a  s u p e r f i c i a l  reading.  
one might e a s i l y  t ake  t h e  Black Act a s  an i l l u s t r a t i o n  of t h e  manner i n  
which l e g i s l a t i o n  makes t h e  r i s e a n d  f a l l  of r ep re s s ion  v i s i b l e  . . . and 
thus ,  perhaps, makes i t  q u a n t i f i a b l e .  
Thompson, however, p o i n t s  o u t  t h e  d i f f i c u l t y :  
On t h e  one hand, i t . i s  t r u e  t h a t  t h e  law d i d  mediate  e x i s t e n t  c l a s s  
r e l a t i o n s  t o  t h e  advantage of t h e  r u l e r s ;  not  on ly  is t h i s  so ,  bu t  
a s  t h e  cen tu ry  advanced t h e  law became a  superb ins t rument  by which 
t h e s e  r u l e r s  were a b l e  t o  impose new d e f i n i t i o n s  o f  proper ty  t o  
t h e i r  even g r e a t e r  advantage, a s  i n  t h e  e x t i n c t i o n  by law of i nde f in -  
i t e  a g r a r i a n  use - r igh t s  and i n  t h e  f u r t h e r a n c e  of enclosure .  On t h e  
o t h e r  hand, t h e  law mediated t h e s e  c l a s s  r e l a t i o n s  through l e g a l  
forms, which imposed, aga in  and again ,  i n h i b i t i o n s  upon t h e  a c t i o n s  
of t h e  r u l e r s  (Thompson 1975: 264).  
We have t o  d e a l  wl th  not  one element -- l e g i s l a t i o n  a l o n e  -- b u t  w i th  th ree :  
t h e  l e g i s l a t i o n  a s  such; t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  and a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  l e g i s -  
l a t i o n ;  t h e  l i m i t s  s e t  on t h a t  l e g i s l a t i o n ' s  e f f k c t  by o t h e r . e x i s t i n g  law. 
The f i r s t  and t h i r d  e lements  a r c  both  m a t t e r s  of t h e  law a s  m i t t e n  
by judges ,  l e g i s l a t o r s  and lawyers .  One m i g l ~ t  hope t o  ~ e t  a t  them by 
s tudy ing  c u r r e n t  l e g i s l a t i o n  and jur isprudence.  But t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  
and a p p l i c a t i o n  of e x i s t i n g  l e g i s l a t i o n  a r e  s u b t l e ,  va r i ed  and s c a t t c r c d .  
I n  B r i t a i n ,  t h e  J u s t i c e s  o f  t h e  Peace had g r e a t  d i s c r e t i o n .  They used i t .  
On t h e  one hand, they never exe rc i sed  t h e i r  l e g a l  powers t o  tl ie f u l l e s t  
p o s s i b l e  ex t en t ;  t h e r e  were groups on which t h e  f u l l  r i g o r  o f  t l ic law d i d  
no t  descend, laws which remained unused, numerous i n s t a n c e s  i n  whlcl~ one 
person was punished a s  an  example wh i l e  t h e  o the r  o f f ende r s  were l e f t  t o  
a c q u i r e  c o n t r i t i o n  and f e a r  by proxy. I n  t h e  c a s e  o I  t h e  p r o v i n c i a l  hvn- 
ge r  r i o t s  of 1766: 
. . . t h e  m a g i s t r a t e s  no t  on ly  r e f r a i n e d  from e f f e c t i v e  measures t o  
c rush  t h e  i n t i t i a l  d i s o r d e r s ,  they a c t u a l l y  a b e t t e d  o t h e r  members of 
t h e  landed and i n d u s t r i a l  i n t e r e s t s  i n  t h e i r  encouragement o f  t l ic 
people  t o  r e g u l a t e  mnrkets and reduce t h e  p r i c e s  of p rov i s ions  by 
fo rce .  . . By t h i s  means, they d i v e r t e d  t h e  r i o t e r s  towards middle- 
men .and l a r g e  farmers ,  and away Erom t h e  landed and indus t r i a l .  in-  
t e r e s t s .  Unl ike  o t h e r  a g r a r i a n  d i s o r d e r s  of t l ie century,  t h e  r i o t s  
of 1766 d i d  no t  i nvo lve  d i r e c t  a t t a c k s  on londowneru o r  mnnufacturcrs.  
Thus wtiile not  a c t u a l l y  i n c i t i n g  t h e  r i o t s ,  t h e  a c t i o n s  o f  t h e  magis- 
t r a t e s  c e r t a i n l y  gave them d i r e c t i o n .  Only b e l a t e d l y ,  when t h e  s c a l e  
of d i s o r d e r  f r i gh tened  them, dLd t h e  gentry-mngis t ra tes  c l o s e  ranks  
wi th  t h e  a r i s t o c r a c y  and o t h e r  r u r a l  l e a d e r s  t o  c r u s l ~  what they had 
come t o  f e a r  was t h e  s t a r t  of s o c i a l  r evo lu t ion  (Shel ton 1973: 95-96). 
When i t  s u l t e d  them, on t h e  o t h e r  hand. t h e  J u s t i c e s  of t h e  Pence o f t e n  
used portmanteau laws concerning pub l i c  o rde r .  They a r r e s t e d  people for  
vagrancy, t r e spass ing ,  breach of t h e  peace, unlawful assembly o r  h indrance 
of an o f f i c e r  i n  t he  p u r s u i t  of h i s  duty .  Sometimes they r e i n t e r p r e t e d  
an e x i s t i n g  law, such a s  t h e  law of t r ea son ,  t o  cover t h e  form of co l l ec -  
t i v e  a c t i o n  a t  hand. 
B r i t i s h  m a g i s t r a t e s  of t h e  e igh teen th  and n ine t een th  c e n t u r i e s  pro- 
bably had unusual freedom of a c t i o n ,  a s  compared wi th  t h e i r  coun te rpa r t s  
Jn o the r  western  c o u n t r i e s .  Never theless ,  t h e  P russ i an  Junker who judged 
h i s  own t e n a n t s  a s  Landrat and t h e  humbler French n o t a b l e  who held  c o u r t  
over  h l s  neighhors  a s  j u g e  d e  pa ix  a l s o  chose t h e i r  weapons from a  l a r g e  
l e g a l  a r s e n a l .  
The e x e r c i s e  of d i s c r e t i o n  w i t h i n  t h e  system does  not  mean t h a t  t h e  
d i s t i n c t i o n  between l e g a l  and i l l e g a l  means of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  i s  i n s i g -  
n i f i c a n t .  T t  means we must d e r i v e  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  from l e g a l  p r a c t i c e  i n -  
s t e a d  of r e l y i n g  na ive ly  on t h e  s t a t u t e  books. Cr iminal  s t a t i s t i c s  t hus  
r ece ive  a  new l e a s e  on l i f e .  
Criminnl s t a t i s t i c s  a r e  p rope r ly  suspec t  a s  a  comprehensive (or  even 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e )  record of a c t u a l  v i o l a t i o n s  of t h e  law. Yet they do un- 
ques t ionab ly  r e f l e c t  t h e  a c t i o n  p f  t h e  j u d i c i a l  apparatus .  and t h e r e f o r e  
provide evidence on changes i n  t h a t  a c t i o n .  George Rude no te s  t h e  marked 
d e c l i n e  i n  t h e  B r i t i s h  use  of t h e  dea th  pena l ty  a g a i n s t  p r o t e s t  a f t e r  1800: 
Once a r son ,  r i o t  and a t t a c k s  on p rope r ty  had v i r t u a l l y  ceased t o  
be  c a p i t a l  o f f ences ,  t h e  wors t  he would have t o  f a c e  -- and t h i s  
was t e r r i f y i n g  enough -- was a  term of t r a n s p o r t a t i o n .  I t  is not  
s u r p r i s i n g ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h a t  t h e  t y p i c a l  cr imes f o r  which pro- 
t e s t e r s  were t r anspor t ed  i n  t h e  1840 's  -- t h e  C h a r t i s t s  and Re- 
hecca 's  Daughters,  f o r  example -- were f o r  former c a p i t a l  o f f e n ~ e s  l i k e  
demolishing tu rnp ikes ,  p u l l i n g  down houses. s e d i t i o n ,  " c u t t i n g  and 
maiming", "mobbing and r i o t i n g "  and "attempted murder". And t h e  l a s t  
batch o f  t r anspor t ed  p r o t e s t e r s  t o  bc s e n t  t o  A u s t r a l l a  from England 
were 21 a r s o n i s t s  who a r r i v e d  t h e r e  i n  half-a-dozen s h l p s  i n  1852. 
A f t e r  t h i s ,  t m n s p o r t a t i o n  ceased i n  Tasmania nu i t  had t en  yea r s  
e a r l i e r  i n  Sydney; and when i t  revived b r i e f l y  i n  Western Aue t rn l i a  
between 1860 and 1868, t h e r e  was no t  a  s i n g l e  Englisli ,  Welull o r  
S c o t t i s h  p r o t e s t e r  among t h e  9,000 c o n v i c t s  t h a t  went o u t .  Ilcnce- 
for th ,  such p r o t e s t e r s  a s  remained t o  be  sentenced were conf ined t o  
j a i l s  a t  home; and, a s  we noted e n r l l c r ,  i nd ic tmen t s  f o r  such o f f e n s e s  
were, by t h e  1860's.  i n  f a i r l y  s t eady  d e c l i n e  (Rudk 1973: 22-23): 
A s  Rude p o i n t s  o u t ,  t h i s  u s e  of t h e  c r imina l  record s h i f t s  t h e  a n a l y t i c  
s l ~ o e  t o  t h e  o t h e r  foo t .  In s t ead  of assuming a  cons t an t  p a t t e r n  of repres-  
s i o n  and r ead ing  t h e  r epor t ed  conv ic t ions  a s  a  h i s t o r y  o f  c r imina l  n c t i J i t y .  
wewant t o  "hold constant"  t h e  c r imina l  a c t i v i t y  and fo rce  t h e  record t o  
t e l l  u s  about r ep res s ion .  Not easy,  bu t  a t  l e a s t  we can ana lyze  t h e  punish- 
ment meted o u t  f o r  s i m i l a r  o f f e n s e s  i n  d i f f e r e n t  t lmes  and p l aces ,  watch 
tl ie waxing and waning involvement o f  d i f f e r e n t  t ypes  of r e p r e s s i v e  f o r c e s  
( f o r  example, t h e  inc rens ing  r o l e  of p ro fe s s iona l  p o l l c c  i n  ninetecnt l i  
and twen t i e th  c e n t u r i e s ) ,  a tudying t h e  changing l i f e  h i s t o r i e s  of t y p i c a l  
complaints .  
I n  looking a t  much t h e  same m a t e r i a l  a s  Rudg, E.P. ll~ompson n o t e s  
t h e  f r equen t  e ighteenth-century use  o f  exemplary punlshment -- e s p e c i a l l y  
t h e  publ ic  hanging -- i n s t e a d  of widespread prosecut ion a s  a  d e t e r r e n t  t o  
t h e  rambunctious e ighteenth-century Engl ish  popular c l a s s e s ,  and i ts 
l a t e r  d e c l i n e  i n  favor  o f  a  tendency t o  prosecute  a l l  ofCenders,  t o  Jncnr- 
c e r a t e  them i n s t e a d  o f  s u b j e c t i n g  them t o  banishment o r  b r i e f  agony, t o  
remove punishment from t h e  pub l i c  view, t o  dream of reforming t h e  ind iv id -  
u a l .  Thompson is t h e r e f o r e  p rope r ly  s k e p t i c a l  t h a t  anyone could e s t i m a t e  
e i t h e r  t h e  amount o f  p r o t e s t  o r  t h e  degree  o f  r e p r e s s i o n  by fol lowing such 
s t a t i s t i c s  a s  a r r e s t s ,  imprisonments and execut ions .  Yet h i s  very  o b j e c t i o n  
he lps  s p e c i f y  what has  t o  be  measured. C l e a r l y  we have t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  
between t h e  volume and type of r e p r e s s i v e  a c t i v i t y ,  on t h e  one hand, and 
its symbolic s i g n i f i c a n c e ,  on t h e  o t h e r .  
Since  groups va ry  so  much i n  t h e i r  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  u se  of one s o r t  
of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  o r  ano the r ,  t h e  s e l e c t i v i t y  of r ep re s s ion  and f a c i l i -  
t a t i o n  with r e spec t  t o  t ypes  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  u s u a l l y  e n t a i l s  a  s e l ec -  
t i o n  by kind of a c t o r  a s  we l l .  No doubt ab r idg ing  t h e  r i g h t  of assembly 
i s  l e s s  s e l e c t i v e  than out lawing t h e  Communist Pa r ty .  Even when t h e  as-  
sembly laws a r e  e q u i t a b l y  enforced,  however, they f a l l  w i th  s p e c i a l  f o r c e  
on those  groups which can on ly  make c o n t a c t  by ga the r ing  i n  pub l i c  spaces .  
In  t h e  n ine t een th  century.  t h e  workers who cus tomar i ly  go t  t oge the r  i n  pubs 
o r  on t h e  s t r e e t  found themselves more g r e a t l y  hampered by r i o t  a c t s  than 
d i d  t h e  r i c h .  The r i c h  could escape t o  t h e i r  s a l o n s  and p r i v a t e  c lubs .  
The n ine t een th  cen tu ry  c a s e  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n t e r e s t i n g  because of 
t h e  g r e a t  p r o f e s s i o n a l i z a t i o n  of p o l i c i n g  which occurred i n  most western  
c o u n t r i e s  a s  t h e  cen tu ry  moved on. Some of t h e  appa ren t ly  huge expansion 
of po l i ce  f o r c e s  i n  t h e  n ine t een th  cen tu ry  r e s u l t e d  from t h e  bu reauc ra t i za -  
t i o n  o f  vo lun tee r  and par t - t ime po l i c ing .  I n  France, t h e  r e g u l a r  n a t i o n a l  
f o r c e s  r o s e  from about  5,000 policemen and 16,000 gendarmes ( f o r  a  combined 
r a t e  of 57 p o l i c e  per  100,000 populat ion)  i n  1848 t o  about  16,000 pol ice-  
men and 21,000 gendarmes ( f o r  a  combined r a t e  of 97 per  100,000 populat ion)  
I 
i n  1897. But a  s i g n i f i c a n t  p a r t  of t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  policemen cons i s t ed  
of t h e  inco rpora t ion  o f  i r r e g u l a r  l o c a l  f o r c e s  i n t o  t h e  n o t i o n a l  p o l i c e  
( s e e  T i l l y .  Leve t t ,  Lodhi and Munger 1975). i n  t h e  United S t a t e s ,  no 
n a t i o n a l  p o l i c e  emerged, b u t  p a r a l l e l  changes i n  p o l i c i n g  accurred.  There 
we s e e  t h e  s h i f t  from "en t r ep reneur i a l "  t o  "bureaucrat ic"  p o l i c e  f o r c e s  
(Leve t t  1974). I n  t h e  e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l  s t a g e ,  t h r e e  k inds  of f o r c e s  shared 
t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y :  1 )  c i t i z e n  fo rces ;  they were c a l l e d  such t h i n g s  a s  
posse  and d e p u t i e s  when t h e  government d i d  not  a u t h o r i z e  them; 2) r egu ln r  
t roops ;  3) c o n s t a b l e s  and s i m i l a r  o f f i c e r s ,  o f t e n  shor t - term o r  par t - t ime,  
o f t e n  given l i t t l e  o r  no r egu ln r  remuneration, o f t e n  drawing most of t h e i r  
p o l i c e  income from fees :  f i n e s ,  a  s h a r e  of recovered proper ty ,  rewords 
posted f o r  t h e  apprehension of major c r imina l s ,  and s o  on. Thesc f o r c e s  
had l i t t l e  i n c e n t i v e  t o  c a r r y  on comprehensive p a t r o l s ,  t o  d e a l  wi th  
~ o u t i n e  pub l i c  o rde r  o f f enses ,  o r  t o  p r o t e c t  t h e  poor. The t h i r d  group 
were "en t r ep reneur i a l "  i n  t h a t  they made t h e i r  l i v i n g s  by competing f o r  
t h e  a v a i l a b l e  f e e s .  With a  growing, i nc reas ing ly  segregated and inc reas -  
i n g l y  foreign-born working c l a s s  g a t h e r i n g i n n l n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y  c i t i e s ,  
however, American p o l i t i c a l  o f f i c i a l s  became i n c r e a s i n g l y  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  
forming r egu la r  p o l i c e  f o r c e s  which would p a t r o l  t h e  e n t i r e  c i t y .  d e a l  wi th  
v i c t i m l e s s  o f f e n s e s  such a s  pub l i c  drunkenness, and con to in  rnaJor t h r e a t s  
of h o s t i l e  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  Thus they organized bu reauc ra t i zed ,  s o l a r i e d .  
uniformed fu l l - t ime  fo rces .  
The same gene ra l  change took p l ace  i n  England. Robert Storcli  p o i n t s  
o u t  t h a t  a s  t h e  middle and working c l a s s e s  drew a p a r t ,  n ineteenth-century 
middle c l a s s  l e a d e r s  i n c r e a s i n g l y  f e l t  t h e  need f o r  a  f o r c e  which would 
con ta in  and c i v i l i z e  t h e  workers: 
The d i s i n t e g r a t i o n  o f  a  common sphe re  of enjoyment was of cou r se  
p a r a l l e l e d  by a  phys i ca l  s e p a r a t i o n  of t h e  c l a s s e s  -- c l a s s i c a l l y  
desc r ibed  by Engela -- unprecedented i n  western  h i s t o r y .  The Victor-  
i an 'bour&oi s i e  wliicl~ s e t  t h e  moral t one  of c i t i e s  l i k e  Manchester . , 
and Leeds were n o t  l i k e l y  t o  p a t r o n i z e  t h e  cockp i t  a s  t he  P res ton  
gen t ry  of t h e  l a t e  e igh teen th  century.  had done, nor to-shower c o i n s  
on s Guy Fawkes crowd a s  Wakefield T o r i e s  stil l  f e l t  a t  l i b e r t y  t o  
do  a t  mid-century. Such gentlemen were much more i n c l i n e d  t o  e i t h e r  
mind t h e i r  own bus ines s  and bus ines ses  o r  e l s e  t o  p a r t o n i z e  temperance 
o r  r a t i o n a l  r e c r c a t i o n  s o c i e t i e s  o r  mechanics' i n s t i t u t e s .  I t  was 
a l s o  they who supported the  moral-reform miss ion ass igned t o  t h e  po- 
l i c e  and added t o  i t  i n  t h e  language o f  numerous l o c a l  improvement 
a c t s .  The ncw demands f o r  c i v i l  o rde r  i n  rdneteenth-century England 
produced a  novel type o f  s u r r o g a t e  t o  r e p l a c e  o l d e r  and perhaps more 
personal  l i n e s  of a u t h o r i t y  and ,de fe rence  which were now conceived 
t o  be moribund. The po l i ce ,  a  "bureaucracy o f  o f f i c i a l  moral i ty ."  were 
produced t o  tiy t o  f i l l  t h i s  vacuum and to  a c t  a s  a  l e v e r  of moral 
reform on t h e  myster ious  t e r r a i n  of t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  c i t y ' s  i nne r  c o r e  
(Storch 1976: 496) .  
What is more, t h e  poor of Engl ish  c i t i e s  r e s i s t e d  t h e  growth of r e g u l a r  
p o l i c e  fo rces .  They sow t h e  p o l i c e ,  i u i t e  r i g h t l y ,  a s  s p e c i a l i s t s  i n  in-  
t rud ing  on t h e i r  l i f e  space,  keeping them under s u r v e i l l a n c e ,  i n t e r f e r i n g  
i n  t h e i r  o rgan iza t ion  and enter ta inment .  They a s sau l t ed  p o l i c e  who c losed  
pubs du r ing  church s e r v i c e s  o r  t r i e d  t o  break up crowds of i d l e r s  on tlie 
s t r e e t .  The r e s i s t a n c e  was, t o  be  sure .  s e l f -de fea t ing :  i t  on ly  gave t h e  
f e a r f u l  middlc c l a s s e s  s t r o n g e r  i n c e n t i v e s  t o  expand and r e g u l a r i z e  t h e  
p o l i c e  fo rces .  Thus an o s t e n s i b l y  gene ra l  p r o t e c t i v e  measure increased 
t h e  r ep res s ion  d i r e c t e d  a t  urban workers.  
Repress ive  and To le ran t  Governments 
Let  u s  s e t  t h e s e  i d e a s  down more sys t ema t i ca l ly .  The r ep rcs s ivcness  
of a  government is never a  s imple  ma t t e r  o f  more o r  l e s s .  It is aLways 
s e l e c t i v e ,  and always c o n s i s t s  of some combination of r ep res s ion ,  t o l e rn -  
t i o n  and f a c i l i t a t i o n .  Governments respond s e l e c t i v e l y  t o  different s o r t s  
of groups, and t o  d i f f e r e n t  s o r t s  of a c t i o n s .  Sometimes t h e  discriminations 
a r e  f i n e  indeed: t h e  same government which smi l e s  on c l ~ u r c h  s e r v i c e s  br ing-  
i ng  toge the r  a  thousand people  assembled t o  pray f o r  s a l v a t i o n  s l ~ o o t s  
wi thout  h e s i t a t i o n  i n t o  a  crowd of a  thousand workers assembled to  pray 
f o r  j u s t i c e .  
Governments which r e p r e s s  a l s o  f a c i l i t a t e .  While r a i s i n g  t h e  c o s t a  
o f  some kinds  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  t o  some k inds  of groups. they lower 
t h e  c o s t s  of o t h e r  k inds  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  t o  o t h e r  k inds  of groups. 
They do s o  i n  two d i f f e r e n t  ways: a )  by 's imply diminishing t h e  d i f f i c u l t y  
o f  s p e c i f i c  v a r i e t i e s  of mob i l i za t ion  and lo r  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n ,  and b) 
by providing p o s i t i v e  i n c e n t i v e s  f o r  s p e c i f i c  v a r i e t i e s  o f  mobill .zation 
and lo r  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  At t h e  extreme, f a c i l i t a t i o n  t h e r e f o r e  t u r n s  
i n t o  compulnion: punishing non-performnce i n s t e a d  o f  simply rewarding 
performance. For p re sen t  purposes, however. we can t r e o t  f a c i l i t a t i o n  
and compulsion a s  a  seamless  continuum. 
To le ra t ion  is t h e  space  between r ep res s ion  and f a c i l i t a t i o n .  For 
some combinations o f  groups and c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n s ,  a  g iven government 
does  no t  r e a c t  a t  a l l :  t h e  r e s i d e n t s  of an urban neighborhood g e t  to- 
ge the r  t o  w r i t e  a  l e t t e r  t o  t h e  e d i t o r  about  l o c a l  houslng f o r  t h e  e l d e r l y ,  
and t h e  government n e i t h e r  impedes them nor he lps  them; s t r i k i n g  s t u d e n t s  
s t a y  away from c l a s s e s ,  and t h e  p o l i c e  s tud ious ly  ignore  them. 
To t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  t l ie a c c e p t a b i l l t y  of nc t ions  and o f  groups t o  a  
given government each f a l l  i n t o  a  s i n g l e  rank o r d e r ,  we have a  s imple  way 
of r ep resen t ing  both t h e  l i m i t s  o f  t o l e r a b l e  behavior  and t h e  gene ra l  
l e v e l  of governmental r ep re s s iveness .  F igu re  4-1 o f f e r s  a  s imple  desc r ip -  
t i o n  of r ep res s ion ,  t o l e r a t i o n  and f a c i l i t a t l o n .  I n  t h i s  i d e a l i z e d  dia-  
gram, any group l e s s  accep tab le  then D g e t s  r ep res sed  no ma t t e r  what i t  
docs .  Any a c t i o n  l e s s  accep tab le  than B g e t s  repressed no ma t t e r  which 
group does  i t .  AC t h e r e f o r e  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  amount o f  r ep re s s ion .  Any 
group more accep tab le  than E and any a c t i o n  more accep tab le  than F re- 
c e i v e  governmental suppor t .  EG r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  gene ra l  e x t e n t  of govern- 
mental f a c i l i t a t i o n ,  CG t h e  gene ra l  e x t e n t  of governmental t o l e rance .  
With t h e s e  t o o l s ,  we can manufacture t h e  two i d e a l  types  of regimes 
shown i n  Figure  4-2: E g a l i t a r i a n  and Ol iga rch ic .  I n  t h e  extreme case  of 
e g a l i t n r i a n i s m ,  tl ie a c c e p t a b i l i t y  of t h e  group makes no d i f f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  
l i k e l i h o o d  t h a t  t l ie government w i l l  r e p r e s s  o r  f a c i l i t a t e  a  gtven s o r t  o f  
a c t i o n  by t h a t  group. In t h e  extreme c a s e  of o l iga rchy ,  t h e  s o r t  of ac- 
t i o n  undertaken makes no d i f f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  t h a t  t h e  government 
w i l l  r e p r e s s  t h e  a c t i o n  of a group wi th  a  given amount of power. 
I n  t h a t  never-never world where evidence is f r e e ,  c l e a r  and r e l i a b l e ,  
we c sn  compare r e a l  regimes i n  t h e s e  r ega rds ,  and thus  be  on ou r  way t o  
t e s t i n g  arguments concerning such th ings  a s  t h e  tempering e f f e c t s  of par- 
l iamentary  systems on t h e  r ep res s ion  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  Real evidence 
would a l s o  g ive  u s  tllemeans of judging t h e  u t i l i t y  o f  t h e  p o l i t y  model 
presented e a r l i e r :  t h e  c l e a r e r  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  between members and chal-  
l enge r s .  
F igu re  4-1: Repress ion,  To le ra t ion ,  F a c i l i t a t i o n  and Cocrcion 
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F igu re  4-2: Repression i n  E g a l i t a r i a n  and Ol iga rch ic  Governments 
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Accep tab i l i t y  of Croup 
t h e  sha rpe r  tand more n e a r l y  v e r t i c a l  should be  t h e  l i n e  between r ep res -  
s i o n  and t o l e r a t i o n .  To t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  governments a r e  t r u l y  e g a l i t a r i a n  
and t h a t  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  from t o l e r a t i o n  t o  r ep res s ton  is g radua l  insLend 
of ab rup t ,  t h e  d i v i s i o n  of contenders  i n t o  manhers and c lml l cnge ra  i s  m i s -  
l e ad ing .  
The r e c t i l i n e a r  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  we have been us ing  s o  f a r  is  not very  
r e a l i s t i c .  Let  u s  neg lec t  t h e  u n r e a l i t y  in t roduced by having no gray a r e a s ,  
no governmental wavering and no t a c t i c a l  maneuvering. Even wi th  g r e a t  
certainty a s  t o  when t h e  government w i l l  and w i l l  not r e p r e s s ,  t o l e r a t e  o r  
f a c i l i t a t e ,  F igu re  4-3 is more l i k e  everyday r e a l i t y .  In  both  c n s e s  shown 
i n  t h e  diagrams, even h igh ly  unacceptable  groups have a few innocuous cour ses  
of a c t i o n  open t o  them. Even h igh ly  accep tab le  groups have some a c t i o n s  
barred t o  them. Rut t h e  a c c e p t a b i l i t y  of t h e  a c t i o n  v a r J e s  w i th  t h e  accept-  
a b i l i t y  of t h e  group. 
I n  t h e  diagrams, a l though governments X and Y do about  t h e  same 
amount of f a c i l i t a t i n g  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n ,  Y i s  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  more repres-  
s i v e  than X .  Y i s  a l s o  l e s s  t o l e r a n t  than X. We can  r ep resen t  t l ie d i e -  
f e r e n c e  i n  r ep res s iveness  between t h e  governments a s  AC - A'C'. The same 
d e v i c e  w i l l  s e r v e  t o  po r t r ay  t h e  change i n  t h e  r ep res s iveness  of a s i n g l e  
government over time: t h e  ques t ion  is how f a r  C moves up and down tlie d J a -  
gonal  . 
The diagram has  an  i n t e r e s t i n g  by-product: i t  he lps  s p e c i f y  some s tnn -  
dard i n t u i t i o n s  of t h e  r e p r e s s i v e  p a t t e r n s  i n  d i f f e r c n t  s o r t s  of regimes. 
F igu re  4-4 l a y s  o u t  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  among r e p r e s s i v e ,  t o t a l i t a r i a n .  t o l e r -  
a n t  and weak regimes. I n  t h i s  cho rnc te r i ea t ion .  a r e p r e s s i v e  regime 
r e p r e s s e s  many groups and a c t i o n s ,  wh i l e  f a c i l i t a t l n g  few o f  e i t h e r .  A 
t o t a l i t a r i a n  regime may r e p r e s s  l e s s ,  but  i t  f a c i l i t a t e s  a wide range of 
Figure 4 - 3 :  Tolernnce v s .  Rcpression 
Government X Government Y 
A '- 
Figure 4 - 4 :  Repressive Patterns i n  Different  Typcs o f  Rcgtmc 
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8 .  TOTALITARIAN 
a c t i o n s ,  even t o  t h e  po in t  of making them compulsory. As a  consequence, 
t h e  bnnd of mere1.y t o l e r a t e d  a c t i o n s  narrows. The t o l e r a n t  regime widens 
t h a t  middle bnnd: diagram C sneaks  i n  t h e  suppos i t i on  t h a t  t o  do s o  i t  
must ba r  some a c t i o n s  t o  t h e  most powerful groups w i t h i n  i t .  F i n a l l y ,  
t h e  week regime a l s o  has  a  wide band of t o l e r a t e d  behavior ,  b u t , i t  f o c i l i -  I I 
t a t e s  l e s s ,  and t i p s  its r e p r e s s i o n  toward t h e  weaker groups wh i l e  doing ! 
p r a c t i c a l l y  nothing about  t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  of t h e  s t rong .  
So f a r  we have simply been exp lo r ing  a  two-dimensional d e f i n i t i o n  . 
of r ep res s iveness .  We con edge a  b i t  f a r t h e r  i n t o  t h e  world of t e s t a b l e  
p ropos i t i ons  by a sk ing  what f e a t u r e s  of a c t i o n s  make them accep tab le ,  i 
and what f e a t u r e s  of groups make them accep tab le .  Those a r e  empi r i ca l  
quest ions .  tough ones .  Their  d e t a i l e d  answers vary according t o  t h e  kind 
of people and t h e  kind of government we a r e  t a l k i n g  about .  . Whatever e l s e  
a f f e c t s  t h e  a c c e p t a b i l i t y  of an  a c t i o n ,  however, its sheer  s c a l e  c e r t a i n l y  
does .  The l a r g e r  t h e  s c a l e  of a  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n ,  on t h e  whole. t h e  more 
r ep res s ion  a  government is l i k e l y  t o  throw a t  i t . .  By "scale"  we may mean 
number of p a r t i c i p a n t s ,  d u r a t i o n ,  geographic range,  e i t e n t  of o rgan iza t ion ,  
I 
degree  of f o r c e  mobi l ized,  o r  some weighted combination of them. 
On t h e  s i d e  of g r o u p ~ o c c e p t a b i l i t y ,  t h e  group 's  c u r r e n t  .power i s  
t h e  most promising s i n g l e  f a c t o r .  That . for  two reasons:  because might 
o f t e n  makes right, . .and because cu r ren t .power  sums up many o t h e r  k inds  of 
a c c e p t a b i l i t y .  The more powerful t h e  group, on t h e  average. t h e  l e s s  r ep res -  
s i o n  i t  r ece ives .  Although a t  f i r s t  hea r ing  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  sounds obvious, 
i t  is n e i t h e r  s e l f - ev iden t  nor t r u e  by d e f i n i t i o n .  Indeed, a  government I 
a t  t h e  edge oE a  revolutionary s i t u a t i o n  o f t e n  c o n c e n t r a t e s  whatever r ep res -  
I 
s i v e  s t r e n g t h  i t  has  on i ts most powerful r i v a l s ,  and l e t s  t h e  weak run  f r e e .  
Never theless ,  i n  gene ra l  an  i n v e r s e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between power and repres-  
s i o n  probably does hold. 
This  e f f e c t  of power on r ep res s ion  and E o c i l i t o t i o n  r eve r ses  ~ l i c  main 
r e l a t i o n s h i p  proposed by our  e lementary  mob i l i za t ion  model. 'Illere, t l ie 
con tende r ' s  c u r r e n t  s u b j e c t i o n  t o  r e p r e s s i o n l f a c i l i t o t i o n  a f f e c t s  its pw-  
e r ,  b u t  no t  v i c e  ve r sa .  Again t h e  d i fFe rence  i s  due t o  a  s l ~ i f t  i n  perspec- 
t i v e .  The elementary model d e a l s  w i th  t h e  moment of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n ,  
and aims a t  t h e  a c t i o n  of t h e  contender .  This  supplcmentory model of 
repression/facilitation. however, d e a l s  w i th  a  government's dec i s ion  t o  
r e p r e s s  -- e i t h e r  i n  response t o  some s i n g l e  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n ,  o r  a s  a  
p a t t e r n  of responses  over  a  l onge r  per iod.  
Our e a r l i e r  diagrams now t r a n s l a t e  i n t o  F igu re  4-5. I n  t h i s  idealized 
map, a  g roupweake r than  A  w i l l  be r ep res sed  no ma t t e r  how smal l  t l ie s c a l e  
of i ts a c t i o n .  Even t h e  s t r o n g e s t  group w l l l  be  r ep res sed  i f  i t  under tokes  
an  a c t i o n  l a r g e r  than E. A group s t ronge r  than B  w i l l  r e c e i v e  n c t i v e  sup- 
p o r t  f o r  i ts sma l l e r - sca l e  a c t i o n s .  and t h e  s t r o n g e s t  groups w i l l  r e c e i v e  
f a c i l i t a t i o n  from t h e  government f o r  t h e  f u l l  range o f  a c t i o n s  from C t o  
D. The odd i ty  of some o f  t h e s e  imp l i ca t ions  makes i t  c l e a r  t h a t  o  v a l i d  
map would show more bumps and dep res s ions .  For example. i n  any p a r t i c u l a r  
p o l i t i c a l  system t h e r e  i s  no doubt a  threshold  below which groups a r e  too 
weak t o  bother  wi th;  s i n c e  they  pose no t h r e a t ,  t h e i r  smnl l -scale  co l l ec -  
t i v e  a c t i o n s  a r e  ignored.  Making t h e  map more r e a l i s t i c  i n  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  
t h e o r e t i d a l  and empi r i ca l  problem. 
The l a s t  f i g u r e  i n  t h i s  s e r i e s ,  o f f e r s  some s p e c u l a t i o n s  about  t h e  
s tandard d i s t r i b u t i o n s  of r ep res s ion  and f a c i l i t a t i o n  i n  popu la t ions  wi th  
r e l a t i v e l y  s t r o n g  governments. I mean them t o  apply  t o  major western  
s t a t e s  over  t h e  l a s t  two o r  t h r e e  c e n t u r i e s .  The r ep res s ion  cu rve  now 
r e g i s t e r s  t h e  idea  t h a t  groups wi th  a  l i t t l e  power pose a  g r e a t e r  t h r e a t  
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t o  t h e  government and its main suppor t e r s  than do powerless groups. Tlie 
hypo the t i ca l  government r e p r e s s e s  a l l  bu t  t h e  s m a l l e s t  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n s  
of s l i g h t l y  powerful groups, wh i l e  a l lowing more l a t i t u d e  t o  t h e  genuinely  
powerless.  It a l s o  c o n t a i n s  t h e  idea  t h a t  a s  t h e  power of a  p a r t i c u l a r  
group r i s e s  -- a s ,  f o r  example, i t  a c t u a l l y  becomes i d e n t i c a l  wi th  t h e  
government -- t h e  range o f  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n s  denied t o  i t  even tua l ly  
dwindles t o  nothingness .  The f a c i l i t a t i o n  c u r v e  t e l l s  u s  t h a t  even r e l a -  
t i v e l y  ppwerless groups r e c e i v e  i n c e n t i v e s  t o  c a r r y  o u t  c e r t a i n  h igh ly  ac- 
c e p t a b l e  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n s ;  t h e  r e s u l t  of t h a t  c i rcumstance i s  to  squeeze 
t h e  range of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  on t h e  p a r t  of s l i g h t l y  powerful groups 
which i s  simply t o l e r a t e d :  e i t h e r  they c a n ' t  do i t  o r  they must do it. 
A s  s r e s u l t ,  r e l a t i v e l y  powerless groups f i n d  t h e i r  world more t o t a l i t a r i a n  
than do t h e  powerful o r  t h e  complete ly  powerless.  
At t h e  o t h e r  end of t h e  power range,  t h e  extremely powerful enjoy 
governmental suppor t  i n  a lmost  any c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  they c a r r y  on. 
At t h e  extreme, where t h e  government and t h e  most powerful group merge 
ind i s so lub ly ,  government suppor t s  eve ry th ing  t h e  group does. This  bas i c  
p a t t e r n  i s  p o s s i b l e  wi th  a  sma l l e r  o r  l a r g e r  a r e a  of t o l e r a t i o n ,  smal ler  
o r  l a r g e r  zones of r e p r e s s i o n  and f a c i l i t a t i o n .  
I f  t h i s  argument is c o r r e c t ,  r ep re s s ion  and f a c i l i t a t i o n  should work. 
I t  should not  be  t r u e ,  f o r  example, t h a t  a  people l ong  held  under a  r e  
p r e s s i v e  regime w i l l  g radua l ly  bu i ld  up s o  much resentment t h a t  i t  b u r s t s  
o u t  a g a i n s t  t h e  regime. I t  should be t r u e ,  on t h e  o t h e r  hand, t h a t  v i s i b l e  
changes In  a  government's r e p r e s s i v e  po l i cy  -- c rack ing  down on v i o l a t o r s  
of a  c e r t a i n  law, o r  ea s ing  up on them -- w i l l  r a p i d l y  encourage o r  d i s -  
courage tl ie c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  of mnny groups bes ides  t hose  most d i r e c t l y  
a f f e c t e d ;  t h e  news of t h e  change should qu ick ly  a f f e c t  t h e i r  e s t i m a t e s  o f  
t h e  c o s t s  of p a r t i c u l a r  k inds  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n ,  and perhaps of co l l cc -  
t i v e  a c t i o ~ i ,  i n  gene ra l .  To be  more exac t ,  a l i lEts  I n  t h e  p a t t e r n  of repres-  
s i o n  and f a c i l i t a t i o n  should have two r e l a t e d  e f f e c t s :  dep res s ing  o r  
r a i s i n g  t h e  o v e r a l l  l e v e l  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n ,  a l t e r i n g  t h e  r e l n t i v e  
a t t r a c t i v e n e s s  of d i f f e r e n t  forms o f  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  
The h i s t o r i c a l  evidence f o r  t h e  impact of r ep re s s ion  on t h e  gene rn l  
l e v e l  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  is. I th lnk ,  q u l t e  s t rong .  A t  t h e  extreme, t h e  
Europe of our  own t ime provides  tl ie examples of Spain under Prifno d e  Rivera 
and Franco, Po r tuga l  under Sa l aza r ,  Germany under H i t l e r ,  and Sov ie t  Unton 
under S t a l i n  and h i s  succes so r s ,  I t a l y  under Mussolini.  France under 
Vichy and t h e  Nazis -- a l l  t imes  of enormously reduced c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  
i n  t hbse  c o u n t r i e s ,  except  f o r  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  d i r e c t l y  i n i t i n t c d  by tlie 
s t a t e .  I n  gene ra l ,  when a  European s t a t e  temporar i ly  t r a ined  i ts f u l l  
r e p r e s s i v e  power on its i n t e r n a l  enemies ( a s  when t h e  I t a l l n n  s t a t c  a t -  
tacked t h e  S i c i l i a n  Fasc i  o f  1893-94), t h e  enemies subsided.  
The a l t e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  r e l a t i v e  a t t r a c t i v e n e s s  of d i f f e r e n t  forms of 
c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  by r ep res s ion  end f a c i l i t a t i o n  is  easy t o  i l l u s t r o t c  
and hard t o  e s t a b l i s h  a s  a  gene ra l  r u l e .  T l ~ e  "channeling" of c o l l e c t i v e  
a c t i o n  by governments shows up i n  t h e  nineteenth-century p re fe rence  f o r  
mutual-aid s o c i e t i e s  over  t r a d e  unions. Western governments g e n e r a l l y  
discouraged t h e  banding togethet '  of workers who sought  t o  c o n t r o l  produc- 
t i on .  They d ive r t ed  workers i n t o  presumably s a f e r  o rgan izn t ions  o r i e n t e d  
t o  consumption. The t a c t i c  worked i n  t h e  s h o r t  run; u n t i l  they bccame 
l e g a l ,  t r a d e  unions a t t r a c t e d  few members. A t  l i r s t ,  Fr iendly  S o c i e t i e s  
and s o c i b t 6 s  d e  secour s  mutuels busied themselves wi th  problcms O F  we l f a re  
away from work. In  t h e  longe r  run,  however, they became t h e  n u c l e i  of ac- 
t i o n  a g a i n s t  employers and a g a i n s t  t h e  s t a t e .  T l ~ e  lower c o s t  a l t e r n a t i v e  
e v e n t u a l l y  bccame a  very e f f e c t i v e  one. That r ep re s s ion  makes a  d i f f e r e n c e  
does not  mean t h a t  i t  slwnys sccompl.ishes what t h e  r e p r e s s o r s  had i n  mind. 
Power 
The p r o v i s i o n a l  hypothesis  of t h i s  lsst d i s c u s s i o n ,  then,  runs  a s  
fol lows:  t h e  e x t e n t  t o  which a  g iven  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  by s given group 
is s u b j e c t  t o  r ep res s ion ,  t o l e r a t i o n  o r  f a c i l i t a t i o n  i s  mainly a  func t ion  
of two f a c t o r s :  1 )  t h e  s c a l e  of t h e  a c t i o n ,  2) t h e  power of t h e  group. 
The l a r g e r  t h e  s c a l e  of t h e  a c t i o n ,  t h e  more l i k e l y  i t s  r ep res s ion ;  t h e  
more powerful t he  group, t h e  l e s s  l i k e l y  i t s  r ep res s ion .  The l a t e r  d i a -  
grams r e f i n e d  t h n t  crude hypo thes i s  by spec i fy ing  i n t e r a c t i o n s  between 
the  s c a l e  of t h e  a c t i o n  and t h e  power of t h e  group. But t h e  co re  of t h e  
hypothesis  remains. 
Sca l e  of a c t i o n  i s  s f a i r l y  c l e a r  i d e s .  Power i s  no t .  Unfortu- 
nn te ly  f o r  c l a r i t y ,  t h e  word has  many tones  and over tones .  Enough, I 
th ink ,  t o  make t h e  sea rch  f o r  one e s s e n t i a l  meaning o r  one comprehensive 
d e f i n i t i o n  of power a  wi ld  goose chase .  The meaning I have i n  mind h e r e  
is s imple  and commonsense. Suppose we have two o r  more i n t e r a c t i n g  psr-  
t i e s .  Suppose each p a r t y  has  an i n t e r e s t  i n  an  outcome of t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n .  
Suppose a t  l e a s t  one such i n t e r e s t  of one p a r t y  t o  t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n  con- 
f l i c t s  w i th  t h e  i n t e r e s t  of ano the r  p a r t y  t o  t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n .  The power 
of t h s t  pa r ty  is t h e  e x t e n t  t o  which i ts i n t e r e s t s  p r e v a i l  over  t h e  o t h e r s  
wi th  which i t  i s  i n  c o n f l i c t .  
The o t h e r  a c t o r s  may range from s s i n g l e  person t o  t h e  sum of a l l  
o t h e r  persons  and groups. The power of a  g iven p a r t y  i s  t h e r e f o r e  always 
r e l a t i v e  t o  a  s p e c i f i c  1 )  o t h e r  p a r t y  o r  s e t  of p a r t i e s ;  2)  i n t e r e s t  o r  s e t  
of i n t e r e s t s ;  3) i n t e r a c t i o n  o r  s e t  of i n t e r a c t i o n s .  A farmer who t ramples  
t h e  i n t e r e s t s  of o t h e r  members of h i s  household sometimes makes no headway 
i n  t h e  v i l l a g e  counc i l ;  he has  extenhive power a t  home. but  not  abroad. 
An indus t ry  which g e t s  ex t ens ive  governmental p r o t e c t i o n  from un ion iza t ion  
sometimes f a i l s  u t t e r l y  t o  a r r ange  p r o t e c t i v e  t a r i f f s ;  i ts  power is high 
wi th  r e s p e c t  t o  l a b o r ,  low with  r e s p e c t  t o  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r ade .  A group 
of r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s  who were i n e f f e c t u o l  lsst year  sometimes reorgonjze  and 
s t a r t  making a  r evo lu t ion  t h i s  year: i n  lsst y e a r ' s  i n t e r a c t i o n s  they 
were powerless,  wh i l e  i n  t h i s  y e a r ' s  t hey  a r e  powerful. When we a rgue  
about  whether a  g iven group is powerful,  we a r e  occns iona l ly  d i sng ree ing  
about  t h e  f a c t s .  But u s u a l l y  we a r e  contending ove r  which p n r t i e s .  i n t e r -  
e s t s  and i n t e r a c t i o n s  dese rve  t o  be  tnken i n t o  cons ide ra t ion ,  and how t o  
weigh then. 
Now and then someone in t roduces  p o t e n t i n l  power i n t o  the  d i scuss ion .  
P o t e n t i a l  power d e s c r i b e s  t h e  e x t e n t  . to  which t h e  p a r t y ' s  i n t e r e s t s  would 
p r e v a i l  i f  i t  used a l l  t h e  means a t  i t s  d i sposa l :  i f  a l l  women used a l l  
t h e  weal th ,  t o o l s ,  knowledge, e t c .  they d i s p o s e  of now t o  enforce  t h e i r  
r i g h t s  t o  employment, f o r  example. The t r o u b l e  w i th  no t ions  o f  p o t e n t i o l  
powe; is t h a t  by d e f i n i t i o n  they  r e f e r  t o  s i t u a t i o n s  we c a n ' t  observe,  
t h a t  they f o r c e  u s  t o  d e c i d e  between assuming t h a t  t h e  o t h e r  p a r t i e s  t o  
t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n  con t inue  t o  behave a s  be fo re  (e .g .  t h a t  men d o n ' t  respond 
by p i l i n g  up a l l  t h e  weal th ,  t o o l s ,  knowledge e t c .  thev c o n t r o l )  and 
t h e o r i z i n g  about  t h e  whole sequence o f  i n t e r a c t i o n  l i k e l y  to' follow: war 
games. Yet we c a n ' t  simply brush a s i d e  p o t e n t i o l  power n s  an  inconvenient  
i dea ,  f o r  t h e  i m p l i c i t  t h r e a t  t h n t  s pa r ty  w i l l  u se  t h e  means i t  hns i n  
r e s e r v e  o f t e n  (perhaps  always) m u l t i p l i e s  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  t h e  means a c t u n l l y  
used. 
A r e l a t e d  d i s t i n c t i o n  s e p a r a t e s  power-as-effectiveness from powcr-ns- 
e f f i c i e n c y .  (An e x a c t l y  p a r a l l e l  d i s t i n c t i o n  appears  i n  d i s c u s s i o n s  of 
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  ou tpu t s ;  s ee ,  e.g. Yuchtman and Seashore  1967.) A group 
which accomplishes what i t  s e t s  ou t  t o  do is e f f e c t i v e ,  r e g a r d l e s s  of t h e  
c o s t s  i t  incu r s .  To t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  t h e  group 's  i n t e r e s t s  thereby pre- 
v a i l  over  o the r  i n t e r e s t s  w i th  which they a r e  i n  c o n f l i c t ,  t h e  group i s  
e x e r c j s i n g  e f f e c t i v e  power. On t h e  o t h e r  hand, a  group which g e t s  a  l a r g e  
r e t u r n  r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  means a t  i t s  d i s p o s a l  i s  e f f i c i e n t ,  r e g a r d l e s s  of 
t h e  s p e c i f i c  c h a r a c t e r  of t h a t  r e t u r n .  To t h e  degree  t h a t  t h e  r e t u r n  f avor s  
t he  group 's  i n t e r e s t s  and coun te r s  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  of o t h e r  groups, t h e  
group i a  e x e r c i s i n g  e f f i c i e n t  power. 
Both e f f e c t i v e n e s s  and e f f i c i e n c y  a r e  r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  g roup ' s  de- 
f i ned  i n t e r e s t s .  But an e f f e c t i v e  group may be r a t h e r  i n e f f i c i e n t ;  by 
v i r t u e  of t h e i r  w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  s a c r i f i c e  almost sny th ing  f o r  t h e i r  objec- 
t i v e s ,  our  "zea lo t s "  o f t e n  f a l l  i n t o  t h a t  ca tegory.  Likewise, an e f f i -  
c i e n t  group may be r e l a t i v e l y  i n e f f e c t i v e ;  our  "misers" f r e q u e n t l y  end up 
the re .  A very  i n e f f e c t i v e  group t ends  t o  demobi l ize  through t h e  p rocess  
t h a t  A lbe r t  Hirschman analyzes:  a  succes s ion  from some combination of 
l o y s l t y  + vo ice  t o  e x i t .  A very i n e f f i c i e n t  group wastes  i t s  mobi l ized 
r e sources  and then  tends  e i t h e r  a )  t o  become i n e f f e c t i v e  ss a  r e s u l t  o r  
b) t o  l o s e  i t s  suppor t  t o  o t h e r  groups pursuing t h e  same i n t e r e s t s  more 
e f f i c i e n t l y .  In  o rde r  t o  su rv ive  and p rospe r ,  r e a l  groups must mainta in  
themselves above some minimum of power-efficiency and some minimum of 
pa re r - e f f ec t iveness .  The s n a l y s i s  which fol lows provides  a  means f o r  
t lea l lng wi th  both  a s p e c t s  of power. 
P a r t i e s  
Let u s  go back t o  our t h r e e  p o i n t s  of r e f e rence :  p a r t i e s ,  i n -  
t e r e s t s  and i n t e r a c t i o n s .  Many s t u d e n t s  of power l i k e  t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  be- 
tween "governments" o r  " au tho r i t i e s " ,  on t h e  one hand, and a l l  p a r t i e s  out-  
s i d e  t h e  government, on t h e  o t h e r .  William Camson, f o r  example, u s e s  
power t o  r e f e r  t o  t h e  e f f e c t  of a u t h o r i t i e s  on o t h e r  p a r t i e s ,  and i n f l u e n c e  
t o  r e f e r  t o  t h e  e f f e c t s  of o t h e r  p a r t i e s  on a u t h o r i t i e s  (Camson 1968). TO 
my way o f  t h ink ing ,  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n s  among par ty .  a u t h o r i t y  and govern- 
ment a r e  pu re ly  r e l a t i v e :  on a u t h o r i t y  i s  simply a  pa r ty  which c o n t r o l s  
some concen t r a t ed  means o f  coercion;  a  government i s  simply t h e  pa r ty  
which c o n t r o l s  t he  moat important  concen t r a t ed  means o f  coercion wi th in  
some de f ined  populat ion.  
P o l i t i c a l  power, then,  is power over  governments. Our e s t i m a t e  of a  
group 's  p o l i t i c a l  power w i l l  depend on which o t h e r  p a r t i e s  we t ake  i n t o  
cons ide ra t ion .  At one extreme, we can look a t  t h e  group and t h e  govern- 
ment a lone.  Then t h e  group 's  p o l i t i c a l  power is t h e  e x t e n t  t o  wliicl~ f t s  
i n t e r e s t s  p r e v a i l  over  those  of t h e  government when t h e  two s e t s  of i n t e r -  
e s t s  a r e  i n  c o n f l i c t .  That r e s u l t  is  vaguely u n s e t t l i n g ,  p r e c i s e l y  because 
we u s u a l l y  have some o t h e r  contenders  f o r  t h e  government's favor  i n  mind, 
and v i s u a l i z e  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  of a  p e r f e c t  coincidence of i n t e r e s t s  between 
a  given pa r ty  and t h e  government: s u r e l y  we wouldn't  want t o  soy t h a t  
such a  p a r t y  had no p o l i t i c a l  power! 
An extreme answer t o  t h a t  d i f f i c u l t y  is  to  inc lude  a l l  o t h e r  contenders .  
The answer is extreme because i t  e n t a i l s  a )  enumernting a l l  those  o t h e r  
contenders ,  b) prepar ing t h e  huge ba l ance  s h e e t  o f  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s  vs.  
t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  t h e  group whose power we a r e  t r y i n g  t o  a s say .  The in-  
t e rmed ia t e  answer is t o  l i m i t  t h e  s e t  o f  contenders  taken i n t o  considera-  
t i on :  one compe t i to r ,  a  l i m i t e d  s e t  o f  powerful compe t i to r s ,  a l l  t hose  
which have made themselves known wltli r e s p e c t  t o  some p a r t i c u l a r  i s s u e  
and lo r  some p a r t i c u l a r  phase of governmental a c t i v i t y ,  and s o  on. 
The not ion of a  "pol i ty"  t okes  a  s t e p  i n  t h a t  direction by s i n g l i n g  
o u t  a l l  contenders  which have r o u t i n e  acces s  t o  t h e  government. For t h i s  
 articular n o t i o n o f p o l i t y  t o  be  u s e f u l ,  t h e r e  must be  a  break In  t h e  d i s -  
t r i b u t i o n  of power. The break must s e p a r a t e  t h e  r e l a t i v e l y  g r e n t  power 
of  a l l  contenders  ("members o f  t h e  pol i ty")  who have r o u t i n e  acces s  t o  t h e  
government from t h e  r e l a t i v e l y  sma l l  power of a l l  o t h e r  contenders  
("chal lengers")  who l ack  t h a t  r o u t i n e  acces s .  It a l s o  imp l i e s  a  break i n  
t h e  l i f e  h i s t o r y  of a  group which moves from cha l l enge  t o  membership o r  
membersl~ip to  cha l l enge .  To tlie e x t e n t  t h a t  t h e s e  p rocesses  a r e  cont inuous  
and g radua l ,  t h e  concept of p o l i t y  l o s e s  i ts va lue .  
I n t e r e s t s  
We f a c e  t h e  trilemma which Steven Lukes l a y s  ou t .  Lukes d i s t i n g u i s h e s  
among " p l u r a l i s t , "  " reformis t"  and " r ad ica l "  concept ions  of power. The 
e s s e n t i a l  d i s t i n c t i o n  r e s t s  on t h e  means used t o  i d e n t i f y  t h e  r e l e v a n t  
i n t e r e s t s  of each a c t o r .  A " p l u r a l i s t "  view, i n  Lukes' terminology, on ly  
t akes  i n t o  account  t hose  i n t e r e s t s  which groups a r t i c u l a t e  and p re s s  i n  t h e  
p o l i t i c a l  a r ena .  A "reformis t"  concept ion of power adds o t h e r  i n t e r e s t s  
which a  group a r t i c u l a t e s ,  bu t  ,has no oppor tun i ty  t o  a c t  upon. I n  a  r e -  
fo rmis t  a n a l y s i s ,  a  t r u l y  powerful group no t  on ly  s e e s  t o  i t  t h a t  its in- 
t e r e s t s  p r e v a i l  i n  t h e  event  of an  open c o n f l i c t  w i th in  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  
a r ena ,  bu t  a l s o  manages t o  keep o t h e r  group 's  cha l l enges  t o  i t s  i n t e r e s t s  
o f f  t h e  pub l i c  agenda. Both t h e  p l u r a l i s t  and t h e  r e f o r m i s t  ana lyses  
l i m i t  t h e  l i s t  of r e l e v a n t  i n t e r e s t s  t o  t hose  which t h e  groups themselves 
a r t i c u l a t e .  
The " r ad ica l "  analysis, according t o  Lukes, cons ide r s  a  group 's  r e a l  
i n t e r e s t s  r e g a r d l e s s  of whether t h e  group has  a r t i c u l a t e d  them. We looked 
a t  t h i s  cho ice  i n  tlie previous  chap te r :  1 )  i n f e r  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  from t h e  
g roup ' s  own u t t e r a n c e s  and a c t i o n s  -- u t t e r s n c e s  and a c t i o n s  i n  t h e  publ ic  
arena fo r  t h e  p l u r a l i s t s ,  u t t e r a n c e s  and a c t i o n s  i n  any arena f o r  t h e  
r e fo rmis t s ;  2) d e r i v e  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  from a  gene ra l  scheme which r e l a t e s  
i n t e r e s t  t o  s o c i a l  pos i t i on .  I n  t h e  Marxist . t r a d i t i o n ,  t h e  " s o c i a l  p s i -  
t ion"  which coun t s  i s  t h e  group 's  r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  t h e  means of product ion.  
It is easy  t o  accep t  t h e  r e fo rmis t  concept ion of power a s  a  s u b s t i t u t e  
f o r  t h e  p l u r a l i s t  concept ion.  The r e f o r m i s t  appeoach simply adds  new in- 
t e r e s t s  t o  those  a l r e a d y  considered r e l e v a n t  by t h e  p l u r n l i s t .  The cho ice  
between t h e  r a d i c a l  approach and t h e  o t h e r  two is  more d r a s t i c .  I t  l c n d s  
t o  t h e  conclus ion t h a t  some appa ren t  i n t e r e s t s  which groups a r t i c u l a t e  and 
pursue a r e  no t  r e a l l y  i n t e r e s t s .  They a r e  chimeras, products  of f a l s e  ' 
consciousness ,  t r i v i a l i t i e s .  The r a d i c a l  approach a l s o  l e a d s  t o  t h e  iden- 
t i f i c a t i o n  of i n t e r e s t s  which t h e  a c t o r s  themselves do n o t  -- and, somc- 
t imes ,  would not  -- r ecogn ize  a s  t h e i r  own i n t e r e s t s .  I t  second-guesses 
t h e  a c t o r s '  o m  percept ion of t h e  world. 
S u b s t i t u t i n g  one ' s  own assessment  o f  t he  r e l e v a n t  i n t e r e s t s  f o r  t h a t  
of t h e  a c t o r s  on t h e  scene t a k e s  conf idence,  sometimes even condescension 
and arrogance.  Those i n t e r e s t s  which groups a r t i c u l a t e  and pursue, whether 
an  o u t s i d e  a n a l y s t  r a t e s  them a s  "real"  o r  not.. s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a f f e c t  r e a l  
s t r u g g l e s  f o r  power. I n  prudence and humi l i t y ,  then, we should g i v e  them 
p r i o r i t y .  Nothing p reven t s  u s ,  however, from posing t h e  fol lowing crnpfri- 
c a l  problem: 
IMPUTED INTERESTS --% ARTICULATED INTERESTS 
CONTENTION FOR POWER 
We may a sk ,  t h a t  is, how a c c u r a t e l y  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  we Impute t o  o  group on 
gene ra l  grounds p r e d i c t  t o  a )  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  t h e  group n r t i c u l a t e o  and pur- 
sues ,  and/or  b) t h e  power s t r u g g l e s  i t 1  which t h e  group engages. The 
Marxis t  a n a l y s i s  s ays  t h a t  both w i l l  have p r e d l c t i v e  power. Over tl ie long 
run ,  a  group 's  r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  t h e  p r e v a i l i n g  means of production de t c r -  
mlnes t h e  i n t e r e s t s  which t h e  group a r t i c u l a t e s  and pursues. The group 's  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  t h e  means o f  product ion a l s o  nf f ec  ts i t s  con ten t ion  f o r  
p w c r  d l r e c t l y ,  by determining i ts l i k e l y  enemies and a l l i e s ,  and by 
shaping i t s  i n t e r n a l  o rgan iza t ion .  Marxis ts  d i f f e r  among themselves when 
i t  comes t o  dec id ing  how much importance to  a t t r i b u t e  t o  t hese  d i r e c t  ef -  
f e c t s  of c l a s s  p o s i t i o n  on con ten t ion  f o r  power, and how much t o  i n s i s t  
on c l a s s  consciousness  a s  a  p r e r e q u i s i t e  f o r  sus t a ined  o r  e f f e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  
T C  we can rind a  reasonable  way of gauging c l a s s  consciousness ,  t h i s ,  too,  
can become an empi r i ca l  ques t ion .  
I n t e r a c t i o n s  
Ilaving s e t t l e d  on a  p a r t i c u l a r  s e t  of p a r t i e s  and a  p a r t i c u l a r  s e t  of 
i n t e r e s t s ,  we s t i l l  have t o  s e t t l e  on a  p a r t i c u l a r  s e t  of i n t e r a c t i o n s .  
The most obvious l i m i t  i s  time: power today, power t h i s  yea r ,  power ove r  
t h e  l a s t  decade, power a t  some time i n  t h e  Euture? DifEerent s e t s  o f  
i n t e r a c t i o n s  a r e  r e l e v a n t :  I f  we want t o  s i n g l e  o u t  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  power, 
we a r e  a lmost  c e r t a i n l y  going to  a t t empt  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  between power 
today and power tomorrow, on t h e  assumption t h a t  today 's  e x e r c i s e  of power 
w i l l ,  d i r e c t l y  o r  i n d i r e c t l y ,  a f f e c t  tomorrow's power d i s t r i b u t i o n .  I n  
a d d i t i o n  t o  f i x i n g  t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n s  i n  time, we have t o  d e c i d e  whether t o  
cons ide r  a l l  i n t e r a c t i o n s ,  o r  on ly  some c r u c i a l  subse t  -- every comunica-  
t i on ,  d i r e c t  o r  i n d i r e c t ,  between Standard O i l  and t h e  U.S. Government, 
o r  j u s t  formal r e q u e s t s  fo r  r a t e  adjus tments?  
We sometimes s i d e s t e p  t h i s  d i f f i c u l t y  by look ing  simply a t  t h e  r e t u r n s  
a  g iven group g e t s  from o t h e r  p a r t i e s  over  some per iod of i n t e r a c t i o n ,  
wl thout  t r y i n g  t o  d e t e c t  t h e  impact oE every s i n g l e  i n t e r a c t i n n .  Log ica l ly  
speaking, t h a t  is a  g r o s s  s i m p l i f i c a t i o n .  We a l s o  tend t o  assume t h a t  t h e  
power which shows up i n  a  v l s i b l e  s e t  of i n t e r a c t i o n s  is s t r o n g l y  cor-  
r e l a t e d  wi th  t h e  power which would show up i n  t h e  interactions 
sh ie lded  from our  eyes: i f  J .P.  Morgan could do t h a t  much i n  pub l i c ,  then 
how much he  could do i n  p r iva t e1  . The c o r r e l a t i o n  is neve r the l e s s  a  mnt ter  
o f  f a c t ,  a  s u b j e c t  of p o s s i b l e  d i s p u t e ,  and an assumption we cannot  con- 
t i n u e  t o  make i n d e f i n i t e l y .  
The Measurement o f  Power 
Le t  us  suppose, mi rnb i l e  d i c t u ,  t h a t  we have s e t t l e d  on n  s p e c i f i c  
s e t  o f  p a r t i e s ,  i n t e r e s t s  and i n t e r a c t i o n s .  Wo can now use  t h e  s i m p l t f i e d  
model of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  a s  t h e  p u r s u i t  of c o l l e c t i v e  goods t o  d e s c r i b e  
a  s i n g l e  group 's  power pos i t i on .  F igu re  4-7 r e f i n e s  t h e  e a r l i e r  co l l ec -  
t i v e  goods model i n  two r ega rds .  The r e t u r n s  now inc lude  t h e  p o s a i b t l i t y  
of c o l l e c t i v e  bads: nega t ive  r e t u r n s  from c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  -1 might 
r e p r e s e n t  t h e  group 's  complete  e x t i n c t i o n .  The diagram a l s o  r e p r e s e n t s  
t h e  i n t e r e s t s  of t h e  s o r t  of contender  we e a r l i e r  c a l l e d  an oppor tun i s t :  
a  group which w i l l  accep t  any s o r t  o f  c o l l e c t i v e  goods, s o  long  a s  they 
r e p r e s e n t  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  ga in  over  t h e  r e sources  expended t o  g e t  them. 
With t h e  a d d i t i o n a l  p o s s i b i l i t y  of c o l l e c t i v e  bnds, t h e  diogrnm n i s o  
shows t h a t  t h e  con tende r ' s  i n t e r e s t  extends  to  de fense  a g a i n s t  t h e s e  nega- 
t i v e  outcomes. Even I n  t h e  c a s e  of t h e  omnivorous oppor tun i s t .  t h e  co l -  
l e c t i v e  goods we now t ake  i n t o  cons ide ra t ion  a r e  t hose  which r e s u l t  from 
a  s p e c i f i e d  s e t  of i n t e r a c t i o n s  wi th  a  p a r t i c u l a r  s e t  of p a r t i e s  by r e f e r -  
ence t o  which we want t o  gauge t h e  con tende r ' s  power. 
For s i m p l i c i t y ' s  sake,  l e t  u s  narrow our  a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n  
of two p a r t i e s .  The narrowing is no t  q u i t e  so  d r a s t i c  a s  i t  may seem, 
s i n c e  one o f  t h e  "pa r t i e s "  t o  t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n  may be a  sum of a l l  o t h e r  
p a r t i e s .  We can e a s i l y  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  a c t i o n s  o f  t h i r d  p a r t i e s  a s  i n f luences  
on t h e  outcomes i n  ques t ion .  Then, a s  before ,  t h e  diagram represfmts  
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s e v e r a l  c r u c i a l  f a c t s :  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  r e q u i r e s  on expendi ture  of re- 
sources ;  t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  goods obta ined a r e  v o r t h  something; t o  t h e  ex- 
t e n t  t h a t  t h e  r e sources  expended and c o l l e c t i v e  goods obta ined have com- 
pa rab le  v a l u e s  t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n  can r e s u l t  i n  a  gain ,  a  l o s s  o r  a  s tond-  
o f f .  Above t h e  d i agona l ,  Pa r ty  A  g e t s  back more than i t  expends; i t  
thus  ga ins .  Below t h e  diagonal ,  Pa r ty  A g e t s  back l e s s  than i t  expends; 
t hus  i t  l o s e s .  The d i agona l  i s  a  break-wen l i n e .  
In  any r e a l  i n t e r a c t i o n ,  a  number of t h ings  c o n s t r a i n  0 ' s  response 
t o  A's a c t i o n :  t h e  r e sources  under 0 ' s  c o n t r o l ,  0 ' s  own d e s j r e  and cnpa- 
c i t y  t o  r e s i s t  o r  cooperate ,  t h e  i n t e r e s t  of t h i r d  p o r t l e s  i n  t h e  re-  
sou rces  under B's c o n t r o l ,  and so  on. For a  number of r ea sons  i t  i s  
r easonab le  t o  suppose t h e  fol lowing th ings:  
1. a  contender  which does  n o t  a c t  a t  a l l  w i l l  r e c e i v e  c o l l e c t i v e  
bads; 
2. a  contender  which a c t s  on a  ve ry  smal l  s c a l e  v i l l  r e c e i v e  even 
more c o l l e c t i v e  bsds ,  a s  t h e  o t h e r  pa r ty  responds nega t ive ly  t o  
i t s  e f f o r t s ;  
3. beyond t h a t  po in t ,  t h e  contender  w i l l  r e c e i v e  on inc reas ing  re- 
t u rn  f o r  i nc reas ing  o u t p u t s  of c o l l e c t i v e  s c t l o n ,  bu t  on ly  up 
t o  a  l i m i t ;  
4. t h e  marginal r a t e  of r e t u r n  f o r  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  even tua l ly  bc- 
comes negat ive .  
The cu rve  i n  F igu re  4-8 d e s c r i b e s  t hose  hypo the t i ca l  e f f e c t s .  The r a t e  
o f  r e t u r n  e v e n t u a l l y  d e c l i n e s  because  B ' s  r e sou rces  a r e  not  i nexhaus t ib l e .  
because B  w i l l  defend i t s e l f  a g a i n s t  t h r e a t s  t o  i ts own s u r v i v a l ,  and be- 
cause  t h i r d  p a r t i e s  w i l l  i n t e r v e n e  when A ' s  g a i n s  v i s i b l y  t h r e a t e n  t h e i r  
own i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  r e sources  under B'S c o n t r o l .  Under t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  of 
4-37 
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F igu re  4-8, an unconstra ined,  c o o l l y  c a l c u l a t i n g  Pa r ty  A -- an  oppor tun i s t  
-- would mnximlze by expending Z r e sources ,  landing a t  Y on t h e  r e t u r n s  
curve and g e t t i n g  back X i n  c o l l e c t i v e  goods, f o r  a  ga in  of X-Z. The 1 
r e t u r n s  cu rve  g i v e s  a  s imple  desc r ' i p t ion  of A ' s  power over  B.  I 
P u t t i n g  t h e  diagonal  back i n  makes i t  c l e a r e r  t h a t  some groups might I 
always be  i n  a  l o s i n g  p o s i t i o n  because t h e i r  e n t i r e  r e t u r n s  curve l i e s  be- I 
low t h e  break-even l i n e .  F igu re  4-9 s t a t e s  t h a t  p o s s i b i l i t y .  There, Pa r ty  I 
A 2  has  l i t t l e  hope; i t s  cu rve  l i e s  too low. Pa r ty  A1 i s  b e t t e r  o f f ;  a  ! 
por t ion  of i ts curve l i e s  above t h e  break-even l i n e .  With r e spec t  t o  I 
t h i s  s e t  of p a r t i e s ,  i n t e r e s t s  and i n t e r a c t i o n s ,  P a r t y  A1 ha s  more power 
than Pa r ty  A 2 .  An o p p o r t u n i s t  Pa r ty  A  would conf ine  i t s  a c t i o n  t o  t h e  1 
rnngc producing r e t u r n s  nbove t h e  d i agona l :  Z  t o  Z2. An oppor tun i s t  1 
Par ty  A2 wou1.d a c t  on ly  enough t o  f o r e s t a l l  c o l l e c t i v e  bods -- and work 
t o  improve its schedule  of r e t u r n s .  i i 
We have fo rgo t t en ,  however, t h a t  n e i t h e r  A nor A2 tias unl imited re-  1 
sources  t o  expend. The amount of r e sou rces  P a r t y  A  c u r r e n t l y  has  under I I 
i ts  c o n t r o l  ( t h a t  is, mobilized r e sources )  l i m i t s  how Par o u t  on t h e  
S-curve of r e t u r n s  A can move. F igu re  4-10 i d e n t i f i e s  t h a t  l i m i t .  W i t 1 1  
i 
! 
M i n  mobi l ized r e sources ,  Pa r ty  A can on ly  l o s e ,  d e s p i t e  i t s  t h e o r e t i c a l l y  
1 
favorab le  pos i t i on .  I f  A can a r r ange  tomob i l i zemore  r e sources ,  then a c t ,  
t h a t  l ooks  l i k e  a  good s t r a t e g y .  With M2,  expending a lmost  e v e r y t l ~ i n g  on 
hand w l l l  make sense .  With M, i t  would sti l l  be smart t o  expend some- 
th ing  around M 2 ,  and keep t h e  r e s t  i n  r e s e r v e  f o r  another  time. 
Th i s  l a s t  diagram permits  two ref inements  t o  t h e  a n a l y s i s  of power. 
F i r s t ,  t h e  i n t e r s e c t i o n  of t h e  S-curve wl th  t h e  mob i l i za t ion  1.ine is  a  
F igu re  4-10: How Mobi l i za t ion  Limits  C o l l e c t i v e  Action 
f a i r l y  good approximation of p o t e n t i a l  power. It t e l l s  u s  what e f f e c t  
Par ty  A could have i f  i t  expended n l l  t h e  r e sources  under its c o n t r o l .  
(You may p re fe r  t o  s ea rch  f o r  t h e  h ighes t  po in t  on tl ie S-curve which f a l l s  
t o  t h e  l e f t  of t h e  mob i l i za t ion  l i n e ,  and c a l l  that A ' s  p o t e n t i a l  power.) 
Second, t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  between power-effect iveness  and power-efficiency 
nppenrs c l e a r l y .  Power-effect iveness  r e f e r s  t o  how f a r  up t h e  v e r t i c a l  
a x i s  Pa r ty  A can r each ,  o r  does reach.  Power-efficiency r e f e r s  t o  t h e  
s l o p e  of t h e  r e t u r n  cu rve  a t  t h e  po in t  Pa r ty  A can o r  does  reach.  I n  
e i t h e r  ca se ,  tlie diagram t e l l s  u s  t h a t  t h e  c u r r e n t  mob i l i za t ion  l e v e l  of 
Par ty  A s e t s  a  f i rm  l i m i t  on Pa r ty  A ' s  power. 
A prudent d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  A ' s  power i n  t h e  r e a l  world d i s r e g a r d s  
t h e  po r t ion  of t h e  S-curve t o  t h e  r i g h t  of t h e  mob i l i za t ion  b a r r i e r .  For 
t h i s  s t a t e  of t h e  world, t l ~ i s  s e t  of p a r t i e s ,  t h i s  s e t  of i n t e r e s t s  and 
t h i s  s e t  of i n t e r a c t i o n s ,  t h e  segment of t h e  curve t o  t h e  l e f t  of t h e  mo- 
b i l i z a t i o n  l i n e  d e s c r i b e s  t h e  power of Pa r ty  A.  
Power and P o l i t y  Membership 
Content ion fo r  power l i n k s  t h e  mob i l i za t ion  model t o  t h e  p o l i t y  model. 
Contention f o r  power c o n s i s t s  of t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  of r e sou rces  t o  i n f luence  
o t h e r  groups, and power i t s e l f  c o n s i s t s  of a  g roup ' s  making i t s  i n t e r e s t s  
p r e v a i l  over  o t h e r s  wi th  which they a r e  i n  c o n f l i c t .  Contention f o r  politi- 
c a l  power invo lves  applying r e sources  t o  a  p a r t i c u l a r  kind o f  o rgan iza t ion :  -
a  government. A government is simply t h e  o rgan iza t ion ,  i f  any, which con- 
t r o l s  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  concentra ted means of coe rc ion  wi th in  some populat ion.  
The contenders  f o r  power wi th in  a  g iven populat ion inc lude  a l l  groups which 
n r e  c o l l e c t i v e l y  applying r e sources  t o  i n f luence  t h e  government. In r e a l  
l i f e ,  we usua l ly  want t o  s e t  some th re sho ld  For con ten t ion ,  i n  o rde r  t o  elim- 
i n a t e  t i n y ,  evanescent ,  i n t e r m i t t e n t  a p p l i c a t i o n s  of r e sou rces  t o  t h e  govern- 
ment. I n  theory,  we can generously  inc lude  a l l  of them. 
At any po in t  i n  time, some (and on ly  some) of t h e  contenders  hove 
achieved r ecogn i t i on  of t h e i r  c o l l e c t i v e  r i g h t s  t o  wield power over  t h e  
government, and have developed r o u t i n e  ways of e x e r c i s i n g  those  r i g h t s .  
They a r e  members of t h e  p o l i t y .  A 1 1  o t h e r  con tende r s  o r e  cha l l enge r s .  
They contend wi thout  r o u t i n e  o r  r ecogn i t i on .  Memhership i n  t h e  p o l i t y  
g i v e s  important  advantages  t o  a  group. In t h e  most general senee,  i t s  
power r i s e s :  i n  terms of t h e  diagrams of t h e  previous  s e c t i o n ,  p o l i t y  
membership produces a  r i s e  i n  t h e  cu rve  of r e t u r n s  from c o l l e c t i v e  a c t l o n .  
Depar ture  from t h e  p o l i t y  produces a  drop i n  t h e  curve.  Concrete ly ,  recog- 
n i t i o n  pays o f f  i n  c o l l e c t i v e  acces s  t o  jobs ,  exemptions from t axa t ion .  
0 a v a i l a b i l i t y  of p r iv i l eged  informat ion,  and s o  on. 
Every p o l i t y  e s t a b l i s h e s  t e s t s  of membecshlp. A l l  p o l i t i e s  i nc lude  
among such t e s t s  t l ie a b i l i t y  t o  mob i l i ze  o r  coe rce  s i g n i f i c a n t  numbers of 
people. Furthermore, w i t h i n  t h e  p o l i t y  members c o n t i n u a l l y  t e s t  one anoth- 
e r ;  r ep rea t ed  f a i l u r e s  of p a r t i a l  t e s t s  l ead  t o  f u l l e r  t e s t s .  The f u l l e r  
t e s t s  l end ,  i n  extremis ,  t o  exclus ion from t h e  p o l i t y .  Each new e n t r y  o r  
e x i t  r e d e f i n e s  t h e  c r i t e r i a  of membership i n  a  d i r e c t i o n  f avorab le  t o  t h e  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of t h e  p re sen t  s e t  of members. In  t h e  process ,  t h e  members 
tend to  become a t t ached  t o  t hose  c r i t e r i a  a s  s ma t t e r  o r  principle. 
In  theory,  a  group can mob i l i ze  wi thout  contending f o r  power: i L  can 
apply  i t s  c o l l e c t i v e  r e sources  e n t i r e l y  to  r e c r e a t i o n ,  t h e  sea rch  f o r  
enlightenment o r  some o t h e r  non-po l i t i ca l  end. A commune o r  r e l i g i o u s  cnm- 
munity r e t i r i n g  from t h e  world moves i n  t h a t  d i r e c t i o n .  Within tl ie modern 
world, however, governments a r e  so  l i k e l y  t o  c la im tlie r i g h t  t o  r e g u l a t e  and 
t o  e x t r a c t  r e sou rces  from any mobi l iz ing group t h a t  mob i l i za t ion  usua l ly  
p rope l s  a  group i n t o  con ten t ion  f o r  power over  one government o r  another  -- 
a t  l e a s t  i n t o  an  e f f o r t  t o  s ecu re  gua ran tees  of i ts bas i c  r i g h t s  t o  e x i s t ,  
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assemble, nccumu.Late r e sources ,  and c a r r y  on i ts valued a c t i v i t i e s .  E r i c  
Wolf 's a n a l y s i s  of t h e  involvement of peasant  communities i n  r evo lu t ions ,  
f o r  i n s t ance ,  shows how r e g u l a r l y  they mob i l i ze , and  then contend f o r  power 
no t  because they i n i t i a l l y  want a  change i n  government, b u t  i n  se l f -denfense .  
Wolf ' s  a n a l y s i s  a l s o  t e l l s  u s  how c r u c i a l  t o  t h e  success  of t h a t  conten- 
t i o n  f o r  power a r e  t h e  c o a l i t i o n s  peasant  communities make wi th  o t h e r  groups 
ou t s ide .  No c o a l i t i o n  = l o s t  r evo lu t ion .  I n  a  g r e a t  many s i t u a t i o n s ,  a  
s i n g l e  contender  does  not  have enough r e sources  -- enough committed people, 
enough guns, enough t r a i n e d  lawyers,  enough cash  -- t o  i n f luence  t h e  gov- 
ernment by i t s e l f .  A c o a l i t i o n  wi th  ano the r  contender  which has  over lapping 
o r  complementary des igns  on t h e  government w i l l  then i n c r e a s e  t h e  j o i n t  
power o f  t he  contenders  t o  accomplish t h o s e  des igns .  
C o a l i t i o n s  most commonly occur  between members of t h e  p o l i t y  o r  be- 
tween nonmembers of t h e  p o l i t y .  Never theless ,  c o a l i t i o n s  between members 
and nonmembers o f t e n  occur when t h e  members a r e  seeking ends f o r  which t h e r e  
a r e  no t  enough c o a l i t i o n  p a r t n e r s  w i t h i n  t h e  po l i t y .  and f o r  which t h e  re-  
sou rces  being mobilized by t h e  nonmembers would be use fu l .  Th i s  happens 
when a  pa r ty  wins an e l e c t i o n  by buying o f f  t h e  support  of a  t r i b e  through 
promises of jobs  and in f luence .  I t  a l s o  happens when a  d i s s i d e n t  b u t  
e s t a b l i s h e d  group o f  i n t c l l e c t u a l s  forms an  a l l i a n c e  wi th  n  new worker ' s  
movement. These c o a l i t i o n s  t ake  on s p e c i a l  importance because they o f t e n  
open tlie way t o  t h e  new n c q u i s i t i o n  of membership i n  t he  p o l i t y ,  o r  t h e  way 
t o  a  r evo lu t iona ry  a l l i a n c e .  
Member-nonmember c o a l i t i o n s  a l s o  ma t t e r  because they a f f e c t  t h e  
amount of v io l ence  which grows o u t  of con ten t ion  f o r  power. Under most 
c o n d i t i o n s  a  c o a l i t i o n  with a  member reduces  t h e  v io l ence  which a t t e n d s  a  
c l l a l l cnge r ' s  a c q u i s i t i o n  of membership. The c o a l i t i o n s  of t h e  women's s t ~ f -  
f r a g e  and temperance movements i n  England and t h e  United S t a t e s  w i th  
o t h e r  e s t a b l i s h e d  segments of t h e  middle c l a s s e s ,  f o r  example, a lmost  
c e r t a i n l y  r e s t r a i n e d  t h e  use  o f  f o r c e  a g a i n s t  them. Where t h e  e f f e c t  of 
c o a l i t i o n  i s  t o  s p l i t  t h e  p o l i t y  i n t o  f a c t i o n s  m k i n g  exc lus ive  and incom- 
p a t i b l e  c l a ims  on t h e  government, Ilowever, a  high degree  of c o l l e c t i v e  
v io l ence  is l i k e l y  t o  fol low.  That is, i n  f a c t ,  a  re*olut ionary s i t u n -  
t i o n .  
Detect ing Changes inPo l i t yMembersh ip  
P o l i t i c a l  power is a  characteristic of t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n s  between con- 
t ende r s  and governments. I n  seeking t o  d e t e c t  major changes i n  p o l i t i c a l  
power, we have t h e  c h o i c e  of s t a r t i n g  w i t h ' t h e  contenders  o r  oE s t a r t i n g  
wi th  t h e  government. What should we look f o r ?  A  s imple ,  i f  s l i g h t l y  
r i s k y ,  approach would be  t o  t a k e  running accoun t s  of p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  a s  
t hey  appear i n  p o l i t ' i c a l  h i s t o r i e s ,  yearbooks, memoirs and so  on, t o  dc- 
termine whether informed obse rve r s  r e p o r t  changes i n  t h e  m J o r  a c t o r s  on 
t h e  scene.  Jean Laponce (1969) has  invented a  r e f i n e d  ve r s ion  of t h i s  
s t r a t e g y :  h e  watches t h e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  of pa r ty  l a b e l s  i n  Conadion pol i -  
t i c s  an  an  i n d i c a t i o n  of t h e  conso l ida t ion  of v a r i o u s  b l o c s  o f  vo te r s .  
A success fu l  pa r ty  such a s  t h e  L i b e r a l s  tends ,  a t  i t  succeeds ,  t o  drop 
t h e  q u a l i f i e r s  from i ts l a b e l  and t o  r e t a i n  a  shor tened ve r s ion  of i ts 
o r i g i n a l  t i t l e .  A par ty  a t i l l  ga the r ing  i t s  f o r c e s  (and perhaps one on 
t h e  way o u t ,  a s  we l l )  t ends  t o  accumulate changes and q u a l i f i e r s  a s  i t  
makes new, p rov i s iona l  c o a l i t i o n s .  
That approach has  promise. Another p o s s i b i l i t y  is t o  examine tlie 
expend i tu re  p a t t e r n s  of t h e  government. I f  a  new b u d g e t ' l i n e  r ep resen t ing  
s e r v i c e s  t o  l i n g u i s t i c  m i n o r i t i e s  appears ,  t h a t  may be a  s i g n  t h a t  a  l l n -  
gu i s t i ca l ly -based  cha l l enge r  is breaking i n t o  t h e  p o l i t y .  I f  an  o l d  pro- 
gram d i sappea r s  ( a s  when s p e c i a l  b e n e f i t s  f o r  Spanish-American War v e t e r a n s  
me l t  i n t o  t h e  gene ra l  v e t e r a n s '  program), t h a t  probably t e l l s  u s  t h e  b loc  
i t s e l f  i s  d i s so lv ing .  Major changes i n  t h e  amounts spen t  on war, edu- 
cn t ion  o r  we l f a re  might po in t  i n  t h e  same d i r e c t i o n ,  a l t hough  ( a s  Fenno 
1966 makes c l e a r )  some such changes  a r e  m y s t i f i c a t i o n s ,  and o t h e r s  depend 
mainly on t h e  i n t e r n a l  dynamics of t h e  government i t s e l f .  
Perhaps t h e  a c t u a l  s t r u c t u r e  of agenc ie s  -- a  Department of l a b o r  t o  
match t h e  a r r i v a l  of organized l a b o r ,  a  Department of Ve te ran ' s  A f f a i r s  
t o  match t h e  a r r l v s l  of v e t e r a n s  -- provides  evidence of t h e  same kind. 
But i n  a  par l iamentary  system, t h e  behavior  of t h e  par l iament  i t s e l f  prob- 
ab ly  r e f l e c t s  t h e  va-et -vient  of contenders  more a c c u r a t e l y  than anything 
e l s e .  I)o d i s c u s s l o n s  o f  i s s u e s  c l e a r l y  l i nked  wi th  one contender  o r  ano the r  
(whether r ep resen ted  i n  tlie par l iament  o r  no t )  wax and wane i n  time wi th  
t h e  p o l i t i c a l  f o r t u n e s  of those  contenders7 Does t h e  appearance of a  re- 
l i a b l e  s p l i t  of t h e  v o t e  on such i s s u e s  s i g n a l  t h e  a r r i v a l  of a  member7 
Is t h e r e  a  s o r t  of s c a l e  going: 
-- a  d i s c u s s i o n  of an  i s s u e  c l e a r l y  l i nked  wi th  a  contender  (e.g. 
p u t t i n g  down unruly  workers o r  r a c i a l  m i n o r i t i e s )  
-- i n t roduc t ion  of b i l l s  o r  r e s o l u t i o n s  
-- br ing ing  such b i l l s  o r  r e s o l u t i o n s  t o  a  v o t e  
-- nppearances  wi th in  t h e  par l iament  of s b loc ,  o r  s t anda rd  a l i g n -  
ment, wi th  r e spec t  t o  i s s u e s  c l e a r l y  i i nked  wi th  t h e  contender .  
-- appearance wi th in  t h e  par l iament  of a  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  p u b l i c l y  
i d c n t i f i e d  wi th  a  s p e c i f i c  contender  
-- appearance wi th in  t h e  par l iament  of a  p a r t y  p u b l i c l y  i d e n t i f i e d  
wi th  a  s p e c i f i c  contender7 
With t h e  idea  t h a t  some such process  might be going on. J e f f  Pearson 
analyzed r o l l - c a l l  v o t e s  i n  t h e  Ninth L e g i s l a t u r e  of t h e  French Chamber 
of Deput ies ,  which met i n  1906-1907. Those were tu rbu len t  yea r s  i n  
France. S o c i a l i s t s  had withdrawn t h e i r  suppor t  from t h e  government i n  t h e  
f a l l  of 1905 over  t h e  i s s u e  of s choo l t eache r s '  r i g h t  t o  un ion ize  and t o  
s t r i k e .  The e l e c t i o n s  of January 1906 renewed t h e  Senate  and brought  
i n  a  new Pres iden t ,  Armand ~ a l l i 2 r e s .  A s t r i k e  wave concen t r a t ed  i n  t h e  
mines bu t  involving many workers i n  chemicals  nnd smel t ing a s  we l l  began 
t o  r o l l  i n  March and reached a  c r e s t  i n  Mny. During t h e  l e g i s l a t l v e  
e l e c t i o n s  of May, t h e  P a r t i  S o c i s l i s t e  ~ n i f i 6  conducted a  n a t i o n a l  cam- 
paign f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t ime; quest lcms of n a t i o n a l i z a t l o n  of r a i l r o a d  l i n e s ,  
r e t i r emen t  p l a n s  and b e n e f i t s  i n  gene ra l  f i gu red  widely i n  tl ie campalgn 
deba te s .  1907 f e a t u r e d  a  massive p r o t e s t  of southern winegrowers r e su l -  
t i n g  from an  overproduct ion c r i s i s .  And throughout t h e  per lod t h e  gov- 
ernment was implementing t h e  d i se s t ab l i shmen t  of t h e  Ca tho l i c  Church which 
had been decided two y e a r s  before ,  and l i q u i d a t i n g  t h e  Dreyfus A f f a i r  
which had hung over  France f o r  a  decade. Judging from tlie gene ra l  p o l i t -  
c a l  h i s t o r i e s  of t h e  time, one could reasonably  a s s e r t  t h a t  two mojor 
changes i n  p o l i t y  membership were occu r r ing :  organized l a b o r  was a c q u i r i n g  
an  e s t a b l i s h e d  p l a c e  i n  t h e  n a t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e  of power, and t h e  Ca tho l i c  
Church was l o s i n g  an  important  s h a r e  of power. 
Pea r son ' s  a n a l y s i s  j i b e s  n i c e l y  wi th  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  h i s t o r y  of t h e  
time. He examined 228 of t h e  324 r o l l - c a l l  v o t e s  which occurred i n  t h e  
par l iamentary  s e s s i o n .  (The i s s u e s  of t h e  Jou rna l  O f f i c i e l  r e p o r t i n g  t h e  
o t h e r  96 r o l l - c a l l s  were unava i l ab l e  t o  Pearson a t  t h e  time.) They f e l l  
i n t o  t h r e e  c a t e g o r i e s :  l e g i s l a t i v e  r o l l  c a l l s  dec id ing  tlie f a t e  of laws 
proposed f o r  enactment; sanctioning r o l l  c a l l s  approving o r  d iapproving 
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an a c t i o n  of t h e  government; o t h e r s  which cover a  v a r i e t y  of procedural  
ma t t e r s ,  r e s o l u t i o n s  and o t h e r  a c t i o n s  none of which can l ead  t o  t h e  
psssnge of a  law o r  t h e  Cal l  o f  a  government. Using t h e  con ten t  of t h e  de- 
b a t e s  and suclt secondary sou rces  a s  Bonnefous' H i s t o i r e  p o l i t i q u e  && 
~ r o i s i h n e  Rzpubl iqt~e a s  a  guide .  Pearson coded ench vo te  f o r  t h e  groups 
o u t s i d e  t h e  Chnmber, i f  any, t o  whicl~ the  a c t i o n  was supposed t o  apply .  
The r e s u l t s  of t h e  coding appear i n  Table  4-1. 
Pearson was a b l e  t o  i d e n t i f y  about  h a l f  t h e  r o l l  c a l l s  he  examined 
wi th  some f a i r l y  well-defined group. Some of t h e  e n t r i e s  r a i s e  doubts: 
l e g i s l a t i v e  d i s t r i c t s ,  f o r  example, o r  t h e  Army i n  gene ra l ;  t hose  doubts  
i nvo lve  important ques t ions  concerning both  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  of contenders  
f o r  power i n  gene ra l  and t h e  s t r u c t u r e  of con ten t ion  wi th in  t h e  French 
p o l i t i c a l  system. Ln gene ra l ,  however, t h e  list ca t ches  e x a c t l y  t h e  a c t o r s  
one would hope f o r :  winegrowers, p o s t a l  workers,  t h e  Ca tho l i c  Church, and s o  
on. The i s s u e s  involved i n  t h e  r o l l  c a l l s  a r e  t h e  i s s u e s  which r e n t  France 
a s  a whole i n  1906 and 1907. And t h e  t a l l y  of outcomes i s  sugges t ive .  
"Fcvornble" r o l l  c a l l s  a r e  simply those  i n  which t h e  proposal  voted on ap- 
proves o r  promotes t he  i n t e r e s t s  of t h e  group i n  quest ion.  To be the  sub- 
j e c t  o f  r o l l  c a l l s  which a c t u a l l y  pass  i s  evidence of power, a t  l e a s t  power 
i n  t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e .  Although t h e  numbers of r o l l  c a l l s  a r e  too sma l l  t o  in-  
s p i r e  confidence. Pearson 's  t a b u l a t i o n  sugges t s  t h a t  i n  1906-07 the  power 
p o s i t i o n  of miners and r a i l r o a d  workers was s u p e r i o r  t o  t h a t  of s c l ~ o o l t e a -  
chc r s  and p o s t a l  workers.  That remains t o  be  v e r i f i e d  wi th  o t h e r  evidence.  
nu t  t h i s  pre l iminary i n v e s t i g a t i o n  m k e s  i t  seem p o s s i b l e  t o  draw sys t ema t i c  
informat ion abou t . con ten t ion  f o r  power a t  t h e  n a t i o n a l  l e v e l  from t h e  ample 
proceedings  o f  I  e g i s l a t u r e s .  
The use  of r o l l  c a l l s  and deba te s  has  some obvious l i m i t a t i o n s .  I t  is 
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b e s t  s u i t e d  t o  t h e  d e t e c t i o n  of groups whose p o s i t i o n  is c l i n n ~ i n g ,  ro t l tcr  
than calmly enjoying long-es tabl ished b e n e f i t s .  It assumes t h n t  a  
s i g n i f i c a n t  p a r t  o f  pub l i c  bus ines s  i s  a c t u a l l y  being done i n  t h e  
l e g i s l a t u r e .  I f  some contenders  (bankers ,  say. o r  t h e  m i l i t a r y )  t y p i c a l l y  
do t h e i r  work through o t h e r  branches of government, t h e  procedure w i l l  
no t  work s o  we l l .  One might have t o  t u rn  t o  t h e  s o r t  of a n a l y s i s  Tudesq 
has  undertaken f o r  g rands  no tab le s  and f o r  c o n a c i l l e r s  Rgn&rsux, o r  t h n t  
many o t h e r s  have undertaken f o r  c a b i n e t  members, government o f f l c i n l s  
o r  l e g i s l a t o r s :  person-by-person c o l l e c t i v e  biography aggregated i n t o  
a c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  of t h e  e n t i r e  category of persons .  At t he  edges of 
t h e  government, i t  might be  p r o f i t a b l e  t o  s ea rch  f o r  t h e  r i s e  nnd fn1.l 
of p re s su re  groups, p r o f e s s i o n a l  l o b b y i s t s  and t h e  1.ike. By t h i s  po in t ,  
Itowever, we a r e  beginning t o  edge back i n t o  t h e  s tudy  of mob i l i za t ion  nnd 
of c o l l e c t i v e  ac t ion .  away from t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  and l o s s  of power a s  such.  
I n  dea l ing  wi th  r e l a t i o n s  between major i n d u s t r i e s  and t h e  U.S. 
government from 1886 t o  1906, William Roy has  invented some procedures  
which n e a t l y  l i n k  t h e  mob i l i za t ion  processes  and t h e  power p rocesses ,  
wi thout  confounding them. Roy's work focuses  on t h e  in f luence  exe r t ed  
by d i f f e r e n t  i n d u s t r i e s  over i n t e r a c t i o n s  between t h e  U.S. government 
and o t h e r  coun t r i e s .  IIe indexes  t h a t  i n f luence  v i a  t h e  frequency and, 
t ypes  of e x p l i c i t  mention which t h e  i n d u s t r i e s  i n  ques t ion  r ece ive  i n  
correspondence between t h e  S t a t e  Department and ombassndorisl  o f C i c i n l s  
overseas .  The index is imperfect ;  some important  k inds  of i n f luence  m y  
n o t  appear i n  t h e  correspondence because they a r e  e i t h e r  too r i s k y  o r  
too r o u t i n e  t o  commit t o  p r i n t .  Neverthel.ess,  t he  b a s i c  not ion -- t l l s t  
t o  hold power is  t o  be  taken account of i n  your a r e a s  of i n t e r e s t  -- is 
v a l i d ,  and t h e  method of implementing i t  ingenious. 
Roy a t t empt s  t o  account f o r  v a r i a t i o n s  i n  power among i n d u s t r i e s  
Table 4-1: Groups Figuring i n  1906-07 Roll  C a l l s  of French Chamber of Deputies 
Group - I s sue  
Number of Roll  Cal ls :  Percent 
Percent Favorable 
L e g i s l a t i v e  Sanctioning Other To ta l  Favorable and Passed 
schoolteachers  r i g h t  of s t a t e  emplyees t o  
s t r i k e  f o r  vages v i thou t  0 
government sanct ions 
p o s t a l  workers same 6 0 3 9 89 11 
r a i l r o a d  workers f r e e  from compulsory dependence 
on employer-run economats 
0 0 2 100 50 
miners introduce maximum 8-hour day 1 0 0 1 100 100 
spinners  emergency funds f o r  unemployed 0 0 1 1 100 0 
winegrowers stemming the  overproduction 
c r i s i s  of 1907 and safeguards 22 
f o r  f u t u r e  
winegrowers punishment f o r  June 1907 
demonstrations i n  South 0 
wine merchants safeguards and con t ro l s  on 
and middlemen them t o  prevent watering wine 
1 
Second Amy d i s c i p l i n e  regiment which re- 
fused t o  q u e l l  demonstrations 
Second Amy provide e a r l i e r  r e lease  of 
d r a f t e e s  t o  a i d  ha rves t  
3 
Amy i n  general  v ind ica te  Dreyfus and P iquar t  4 
Amy i n  general  inc rease  appropriat ions 3 
Amy i n  genera l  reduce compulsory s e r v i c e  5 
by one year 
Group 
Table 4-1: Groups Figuring i n  1960-07 Rol l  C a l l s  of French Chamber of Deputies (continued) 
I s sue  
Number of Rol l  Ca l l s :  Percent 
Percent  Favorable 
L e g i s l a t i v e  Sanct ioning Other To ta l  Favorable and Passed 
small  grocers  impose t ax  on, t o  regu la te  s a l e  
of sugar t o  l o c a l  wine makers 2 
workers i n  general  c r e a t e  N n i s t r y  of Labor 1 0 1 2 100 100 
workers i n  general  l e g a l i z e  na t iona l  Sunday 
hol iday f o r  3 0 0 3 67 33 
workers i n  genera l  abo l i sh  p r i v a t e  property 
in behalf of 0 2 0 2 50 0 
l e f t - l ean ing  l eg i s -  i n s t i t u t e  p ropor t iona l  repre- 
l a t i v e  d i s t r i c t s  sen ta t ion  in a l l  e l e c t i o n s  0 0 2 2 50 0 
lower c l a s s e s  r e l a t i v e  t ax  burden on 1 4 0 5 20 0 
a g r i c u l t u r e  emergency appropriat ions f o r  1 0 0 1 100 100 
p r i v a t e  r a i l r o a d  s t a t e  takeover of 
company (Chemin de 
Fer de l ' o u e s t )  
Roman Ca tho l ic  
Church 
Tota l  c l a s s i f i a b l e  
Unclassif i a b l e  
r i g h t  t o  r e t a i n  tax-free 
property 
To ta l  Rol l  Ca l l s  
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and over  time t l~ rough  Lhree d i f f e r e n t  s e t s  of i n d u s t r i a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s :  
1 )  t he  network p o s i t i o n  of f i rms i n  t h e  indus t ry ,  a s  measured e s p e c i a l l y  
by i n t e r l o c k i n g  d i r e c t o r a t e s  and by r e l a t i o n s  of i ndus t ry  personnel  t o  
government and s o c i a l  o rgan iza t ions ;  2) "object ive"  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of 
t h e  indus t ry  such a s  s i z e ,  number of f i rms  and revenue from fo re ign  
t rnde ;  3) mob i l i za t ion  and c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  w i t h i n  t h e  i n d u s t r y ,  a s  
represented by the  i n t e n s i t y  of economic cooperat ion and concen t r a t ion  
among f i rms,  tlie c h a r a c t e r  of t r a d e  a s s o c i a t i o n s  and t r a d e  p u b l i c a t i o n s ,  
t h e  e x t e n t  of lobbying, p o l i t i c a l  involvement of execu t ives ,  and s o  on. 
Roy's r e sea rch  design does n o t  q u i t e  b r ing  us  t o  t he  po in t  o f  
mcnsuring t h e  r e t u r n s  d i f f e r e n t  i n d u s t r i e s  r ece ive  f o r  t h e  resources  
they apply  t o  t h e  government; i t  t h e r e f o r e  f a l l s  s h o r t  of t h e  i d e a l  
measure of power proposed e a r l i e r .  I t  t akes  important  s t e p s  i n  t h a t  
d i r e c t i o n .  Furthermore, i t  makes p o s s i b l e  a  va luab le  p a r t i a l  t e s t  of 
t he  proposed d i s t i n c t i o n  between cha l l enge r s  end members of t h e  p o l i t y .  
I f  a  "pol i ty"  e x i s t s  i n  a  s t r o n g  sense  of t h e  term, t h e r e  should be a  
d i s t i n c t  break i n  t h e  continuum o f  inf luence-wielding;  t h e  break should 
correspond t o  t he  threshold  below which an indus t ry  is  simply no t  a  
p o l i t y  member t o  be taken account o f .  
I f ,  on t h e  o t h e r  hand, tlie continuum runs smoothly from 0 t o  i n f i n i t e  
power, t he  motion of a  bounded p o l i t y  i s  misleading. Likewise t h e  no t ion  
1 
r e q u i r e s  a  break i n  t he  r e l a t i o n s h i e  between l e v e l  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  
and amount of inf luence.  corresponding t o  t h e  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  h ighe r  r e t u r n  
p o l i t y  members should r ece ive  f o r  t h e i r  investments .  I n  any case ,  i f  
t h e r e  is no s i g n i f i c a n t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between the  i n d u s t r y ' s  mob i l i za t ion  
and i t s  p o l i t i c a l  i n f luence ,  t h e  model of t he  p o l i t y  l a i d  o u t  h e r e  w i l l  
l o s e  p l a u s i b i l i t y .  
So f a r ,  my account makes the  process  of e n t r y  and e x i t  too calm and 
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.order ly:  s t o l i d ' ~ r i t o n 8  wa i t ing  i n  l i n e ,  r a t l o n  books i n  hand. t n  
r e a l i t y ,  i t  is t h e  occasion f o r  some of t h e  g r e a t e s t  s t r u g g l e s  i n  which 
people  engage. I f  every p o l i t y  has  tes t ' s  o f  membership. t h a t  does no t  
mean every cha l l enge r  has  equa l  chances of meeting those  t e s t s ,  o r  t h a t  
t h e  l e a d e r s  o f  every contender  a r e  equa l ly  w i l l i n g  t o  make t h e  e f f o r t .  
The l i k e l i h o o d  t h a t  a  new contender  w i l l  accep t  and employ t h e  means 
of a c q u i s i t i o n  of power t h e  members of t h e  p o l i t y  p r e s c r i b e  (e.8. ga the r ing  
enough v o t e s  t o  e l e c t  a  pa r ty ,  s a c r i f i c i n g  enough people i n  war, b r ing ing  
i n  enough food from t h e  hunt ,  buying enough government o f f i c i a l s )  depends 
on t h e  congruence of t h e  concept ions  of j u s t i c e  which p r e v a i l  w i t h i n  i t  
t o  t hose  b u i l t  i n t o  t h e  ope ra t ion  of t h e  p o l i t y .  Where the'y d ive rge  
widely ,  t h e  cha l l enge r  i s  l i k e l y  t o  employ i r r e g u l a r  means -- wl~icli means 
applying r e sources  t o  t h e  government and t o  members of t l ie p o l i t y  which 
a r e  r a r e l y  used i n  t hose  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  A  conc re t e  example: Guatemalan 
r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s  kidnap government o f f i c i a l s  and American e m i s s a r i e s  i n  
o r d e r  t o  s e c u r e  t h e  r e l e a s e  of t h e i r  own members from pr iaon.  Another 
L a t i n  American case:  Peruvian t r a d e  unions d e l i b e r a t e l y  s t a e e  v i o l e n t  
demonstra t ions  a s  a  way of p re s s ing  t h e i r  demands on' t h e  c e n t r a l  govern- 
ment (Payne 1965). 
The i d e a  of a  p o l i t y ,  then,  sums up the  major r e l a t i o n s h i p s  among 
r ep res s ion ,  power, and c o l l e c t i v e  ac t ion .  . Members of tlie poll . ty have 
more power and f ace  l e s s  r ep res s ion  than cha l l enge r s  do. Chal lengers  
become members through c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n ,  and members defend themselves 
a g a i n s t  l o s s  of power t h r o u g h ~ c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  This  much is  a  u s e f u l  
s i m p l i f i c a t i o n .  But t h e  p o l i t y  model l a c k s  an important  element: i n t e r e s t s .  
It provides  no guide  t o  t he  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  and t h r e a t s  a f f e c t i n g  nny por- 
t i c u l a r  group 's  i n t e r e s t s .  Without some i d e a  of t h e  a r t i c u l a t i o n  of 
i n t e r e s t  and power p o s i t i o n ,  we can have no c l e a r  i d e a  how t h e  e x t e n t  and 
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c h a r a c t e r  of cha l l enge r s '  and members' c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  d i f f e r  from 
one another .  
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F igu re  4-11. C o l l e c t i v e  Action a s  a  Function of Threata ,ond Opport l ln i t ies .  
responsiveness .  La te r  on we w i l l  have t o  cons ide r  a  contender ' s  obse rva t ion  
~ p ~ o r t u n i t ~ l ~ h r e a t  
I 
Opportuni ty  has  two s i d e s .  On t h e  oppor tun i ty  s i d e ,  we have t h e  ! 
. i 
e x t e n t  t o  which o t h e r  groups, i nc lud ing  governments, a r e  vu lne rab le  t o  
of i n t e r a c t i o n s  among o t h e r j p a r t i e s  -- no t ing ,  f o r  example, t h a t  when a  I 
new cla ims which would, i f  s u c c e s s f u l ,  enhance t h e  contender ' s  r e a l i z a t i o n  
of i t s  i n t e r e s t s .  On t h e  t h r e a t  a ide .  we have the  e x t e n t  t o  which o t h e r  
groups a r e  t h rea t en ing  t o  mike c la ims which would, i f  s u c c e s s f u l ,  reduce 
the  con tende r ' s  r e a l i z a t i o n  of i t s  i n t e r e s t s .  The a n a l y s i s  of oppor tun i ty l  
t h r e a t  para1le l . s  t h e  a n a l y s i s  of power: i n  p r i n c i p l e ,  i t  embraces every- 
t h ing  about t he  surrounding world which i s  l i k e l y  t o  a f f e c t  t h e  a c t o r ' s  
well-being. In p r a c t i c e ,  we can only  d e a l  wi th  i t  by r e f e r r i n g  t o  some 
s p e c i f i c  s e t  o f  i n t e r e s t s ,  p a r t i e s  and i n t e r a c t i o n s .  
One important  d i f f e r e n c e  between t h e  ana lyses  of power and of 
o p p o r t u n i t y l t h r e a t  concerns pe rcep t ions  and expec ta t ions .  I n  t he  a n a l y s i s  
of power we can choose t o  neg lec t  them: power then r e f e r s  t o  t h e  
obscrvable  t r a n s a c t i o n s  amon8 t h e  p a r t i e s .  In  t h e  case  o f  oppor tun i ty l  
t h r e a t  we have no cho ice  b u t  t o  c o n s t r u c t  some model of t h e  way t h a t  
informat ion about  t h e  environment comes t o  t h e  a c t o r ' s  a t t e n t i o n .  For 






C o l l e c t i v e  
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i n t e r a c t i o n s  wi th  o t h e r  groups, simply responds t o  t h e  t r end  of those  I 
i n t e r a c t i o n s .  The contender  responds i n d i v i d u a l l y  t o  t h e  t r end  of i t s  \ 
i n t e r a c t i o n s  wi th  each s p e c i f i c  group, and c o l l e c t i v e l y  t o  t h e  t r end  i n  i .  0-1 Threat  0  Opportunity +1 
a l l .  i n t e r a c t i o n s .  A contender  which is encounter ing inc reas ing  a t t a c k s  I 
Extent of Change i n  
on i t s  i n t c r e s t s  a n t i c i p a t e s  more a t t a c k s ;  a . con tende r  which f i n d s  t h e  
Realization of I n t e r e s t s  
government i nc reas ing ly  responsive  t o  its o v e r t u r e s  a n t i c i p a t e s  f u r t h e r  
government shows s i g n s  of weakness i n  dea l ing  wi th  any p a r t i c u l a r  con- 
tender  most o t h e r  contenders  read t l ~ o s e  s i g n s  a s  t h r e a t s  o r  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  
wi th  regard t o  t h e i r  own i n t e r e s t s .  We w i l l  a l s o  have t o  recognize  t h a t  
s t r a t e g i c  i n t e r a c t i o n  u s u a l l y  i nvo lves  f e i n t s  and misunders tandings .  
Let  us i gnore  t h e s e  i n t e r e s t i n g  complicat ions  f o r  t h e  time being. 
Figure  4-11 breaks  o p p o r t u n i t y / t h r e a t  i n t o  two dimensions: 1 )  t he  
e x t e n t  of a n t i c i p a t e d  change i n  t he  con tende r ' s  r e a l i z a t i o n  of its 
i n t e r e s t s ;  i t  runs from -1. (comp1.ete o b l i t e r a t i o n  of i t s  i n t e r e s t s )  t o  
0 (no change) t o  +I. (complete r e a l i z a t i o n  o f  its i n t e r e s t s ) ;  2) t h e  
p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  t h e  change w i l l  occur  a )  i f  t he  contender  does no t  n c t ,  
i n  t h e  case  of t h r e a t s .  b) i f  t he  group a c t s .  i n  t h e  case  of o p p o r t u n i t i e s .  
The diagram says  t h e t  t he  g r e a t e r  t he  a b s o l u t e  va lue  of t h e  q u a n t i t y  
(probably  of occurrence x  e x t e n t  o f  change).  t he  more ex tens ive  t h e  
con tende r ' s  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  In  t h i s  s imple  ve r s ion ,  the  con tende r ' s  
responses  t o  t h r e a t  and t o  oppor tun i ty  a r e  e x a c t l y  symmetrical:  t he  
more of e i t h e r ,  t he  more c o l l e c t i v e  ac t ion .  The two curves  a r e  gen t ly  
concave t o  r ep resen t  s mild tendency f o r  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  t o  a c c e l e r a t e  
more r ap id ly  wi th  h i ehe r  l e v e l s  of t h r e a t  o r  oppor tuni ty .  
An asymmetr ics l  response to  t l ~ r e s t  and oppor tun i ty  i s  more p l a u s i b l e  
than a  symmetrical response. Assuming equa l  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  of occurrence,  
a  given amount o f  t h r e a t  tends  t o  gene ra t e  more c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  than 
the  "same" amount of oppor tuni ty .  On the  whole, response t o  oppor tun i ty  
is  l i k e l y  t o  r e q u i r e  more a l t e r a t i o n  of t he  group!s o rgan iza t ion  and 
mob i l i za t ion  p a t t e r n  than i s  response t o  t h r e a t ;  t h e  group can respond 
t o  t h r e a t  v i a  i ts  e s t a b l i s h e d  rou t ines .  European peasant  communities 
r e l i e d  on t h e i r  l oca l  communication networks end shared unders tandings  
i n  g e t t i n g  toge the r  t o  chase o u t  t h e  unwanted t ax  c o l l e c t o r .  They had 
much more t r o u b l e  sending a  de l ega t ion  t o  t h e  c a p i t a l  t o  demand an 
F igu re  4-12. Asymmetrical E f f e c t  of Threat  and Opportuni ty  on 
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a l t e r a t i o n  of t he  t ax  burden. Furthermore, groups gene ra l ly  i n f l a t e  t he  
value  of those  th ings  they a l r eady  possess ,  when someone e l s e  is seeking 
t o  take them ahay. For equa l  p r o b a b i l i t i e s ,  t h e  l o s s  of t h e  e x i s t i n g  
v i l l a g e  common l and  counts  more than the  ga in  of t h e  same amount of 
common land.  F ina l ly ,  t h r e a t s  g e n e r a l i z e  more r e a d i l y  than o p p o r t u n i t i e s  
do. A group is more l i k e l y  to  s e e  a  t h r e a t  t o  a  p a r t i c u l a r  i n t e r e s t  a s  
a  s i g n  of t l ~ r e a t s  t o  a  wide range of i t s  i n t e r e s t s  than i t  i s  t o  s e e  
an oppor tun i ty  f o r  enhancement o f  one of its i n t e r e s t s  a s  a  s i g n  of 
opportrrnity f o r  a  wide range of i ts i n t e r e s t s .  
These a r e ,  of course .  n o t  e s t a b l i s h e d  v e r i t i e s ,  b u t  hypotheses. 
Figure  4-12 sums them up: t h e  e x t e n t  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n ,  i t  says ,  
mounts more r ap id ly  a s  a  [unction of t h r e a t  than a s  a  func t ion  of 
oppor tuni ty .  On the  t h r e a t  s i d e ,  i t  says ,  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  r i s e s  t o  
t h e  maximum permit ted by t h e  group's mob i l i za t ion  l e v e l  considerably  
be fo re  the  po in t  a t  which t h e  t h r e a t  means a n n i h i l a t i o n .  The longe r  t h e  
time l a g  considered,  t h e  g r e a t e r  tlie asymmetry. Over a  l onge r  per iod 
de fens ive  mob i l i za t ion  i n  response t o  t h r e a t  tends  t o  add i t s  e f f e c t  
more r a p i d l y  than o f f e n s i v e  o r  p repa ra to ry  mob i l i za t ion  i n  response t o  
oppor tun i ty .  
The asymmetry. T be l i eve ,  produces a  deep conservat ism i n  every 
p o l i t y .  Members of t h e  p o l i t y  r e s i s t  changes which would th rea t en  t h e i r  
c u r r e n t  r e a l i z a t i o n  of t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s  even more than they seek  changes 
which would enhance t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s .  They f i g h t  t e n a c i o r ~ s l y  a g a i n s t  
l o s s  of power, and e s p e c i a l l y  a g a i n s t  expuls ion from t h e  p o l i t y .  They 
work a g a i n s t  admission t o  t h e  p o l i t y  of groups whose i n t e r e s t s  c o n f l i c t  
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  w i th  t h e i r  own. 
Ex i s t ing  members tend t o  be more exac t ing  i n  t h e i r  demands of 
contenders  whose very admission would cha l l enge  t h e  system i n  some 
s e r i o u s  way. Max He i r i ch  p o i n t s  ou t  t he  s t n r k  c o n t r a s t  i n  t he  rcsponse 
of Un ive r s i ty  of C a l i f o r n i a  o f f i c i a l s  t o  two equa l ly  obscene even t s  wl~ich 
occurred about t h e  same time i n  1965: tlie campus Ugly Man c o n t e s t  (won 
by Alpha Epsi lon P i  f r a t e r n i t y ,  whose cand ida t e  was Miss Pussy Galore)  
and t h e  l a t e  s t a g e s  of t he  F ree  Speech Movement. now redubbed tllc F i l t h y  
Speech Movement. At t h a t  p o i n t ,  t h e  Movement's qu in t e s sence  was the  
pos t ing  and parading of s i g n s  saying,  simply. Fuck. H e i r i c l ~  r e p o r t s  a  
conversat ion wi th  a  f a c u l t y  member who a c t i v e l y  opposed the  F6M nnd was 
incensed about  a  r ecen t  "obsceni ty  r a l l y "  a  ~ r o u p  of f r e e  speech advocates  
had organized:  
When I asked him why he was angry about  t h i s  bu t  n o t  about  t he  
obscene remarks by t h e  f r a t e r n i t y  boys, he  r ep l i ed :  That was 
d i f f e r e n t .  That was a  bunch of f r a t e r n i t y  boys blowing o f f  stenm. 
You know t h a t  when i t ' s  a l l  over  t hey ' r e  going t o  r e t u r n  t o  t h e i r  
p l ace  a s  r e s p e c t a b l e  members of s o c i e t y .  Br~t  t hese  people n re  o u t  
t o  d e l i b e r a t e l y  break every r u l e  they can,  t o  t r y  t o  t e a r  down 
s o c i e t y  (He i r i ch  1971: 363). 
Throughout 1964 and 1965 t h e  va r i co lo red  Movement was. indeed. r ap id ly  
mob i l i z ing  and demobilizing; i t  made r ecu r ren t ,  spasmodic b i d s  f o r  power 
wi th in  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  of t h e  u n i v e r s i t y ,  o r d i n a r i l y  by t e s t i n g  Lhe Berkeley 
r u l e s  of assembly, speech, o r  advocacy s t  t l ~ e i r  most vu lne rab le  l i m i t ,  
and then c la iming some a l t e r n a t i v e  l eg i t imacy  f o r  i ts a c t i o n .  The 
u n i v e r s i t y ' s  r ecogn i t i on  of t he  claimed r i g h t  would tend t o  ndmit t h e  
group making t h e  c la im t o  membership i n  its p o l i t y .  and thereby t o  s h i f t  
t h e  c r i t e r i a  of membership i n  general.. Something s e r i o u s  is a t  s t a k e  
i n  every such change. 
A s  a  consequence, people a r e  excep t iona l ly  ready t o  f i g h t  over  
e n t r i e s  i n t o  a  p o l i t y ,  and e x i t s  from i t .  A s  Arthur  Stinchcombe (1965) 
says ,  l e a d e r s  of o rgan iza t ions  a r e  e s p e c i a l l y  l i k e l y  t o  employ, a u t h o r i z e  
o r  t o l e r a t e  unl imited means of combat when they sense  a  d iscrepancy 
between what t h e i r  o rgan iza t ion  i s  g e t t i n g  ond what i t  i s  due. That  
enraging disagreement t y p i c a l l y  has  t o  do, p r e c i s e l y ,  w i th  what t he  
o rgan iza t ion  is due. It is  a  ma t t e r  o f  p r i n c i p l e ,  of r i g h t s ,  o f  j u s t i c e .  
This  s t a t e  of a f f a i r s  has  s t r o n g  imp l i ca t ions  f o r  t h e  locus ,  t iming 
and personnel  of major s t r u g g l e s  f o r  power. 
The r ecen t  work of William Gamson (1975) d e a l s  e f f e c t i v e l y  wi th  
some a s p e c t s  of the  power s t r u g g l e .  Gamson and h i s  a s s o c i a t e s  s t u d i e d  
53 "clial.lenging groups" i n  t he  U.S. from 1800 t o  1945. (The list makes 
neighbors  of t he  Anarcho-Communists and t h e  Nat ional  Urban League, of 
tlie United Sons of Vulcan. t h e  Tobacco Night Riders  and t h e  S t e e l  Workers' 
Organiz ing Committee.) The r e sea rch  examines two main s o r t s  of outcomes 
of t he  chal lenges:  
-- acceptance o r  non-acceptance of t h e  group by a t  l e a s t  one o f  
i t s  a n t a g o n i s t s  a s  a  l e g i t i m a t e  spokesman f o r  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  i t  
c la ims t o  r ep resen t  
-- a c q u i s i t i o n  o r  non-acquis i t ion of new advantages  f o r  i t s  members. 
The acceptance of t he  group, a s  de f ined  by Gamson, ove r l aps  t o  some 
e x t e n t  wi th  en t r ance  i n t o  a  p o l i t y ,  a s  desc r ibed  e a r l i e r .  As one might 
expec t ,  acceptance and the  a c q u i s i t i o n  of new advantages  a r e  connected: 
80  pe rcen t  of t h e  groups which gained some acceptance a l s o  acqu i r ed  new 
advantages ,  whi le  only  21 pe rcen t  o f  t hose  which f a i l e d  t o  ga in  any 
acceptance acquired any new advantages. - 
More important.  t h e  groups which gained acceptance tended t o  d i f f e r  
i n  form and s t r a t e g y  from t h e  o t h e r s :  on t h e  whole, they were groups 
which d i d  n o t  demand t o  d i s p l a c e  o t h e r  groups, organized around a  s i n g l e  
i s s u e ,  were r e l a t i v e l y  l a r g e ,  provided s e l e c t i v e  i n c e n t i v e s  f o r  
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  t o  t h e i r  members i n s t e a d  of r e l y i n g  on d i f f u s e  nppeals  t o  
s o l i d a r i t y .  and were bu reauc ra t i c ,  Thus f a r ,  t h e  r e s u l t s  sound l i k e  
an argument f o r  cool ly-organized p re s su re  groups. But t h e  s u c c e s s f u l  
cha l l enge r s  were a l s o  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  more l i k e l y  t o  ha;e used v io l ence  
and o t h e r  c o n s t r a i n t s  i n  t h e i r  ques t  f o r  power. The pas s ive  r e c i p i c n t a  
of v io l ence  had very low r a t e s  o f  success .  I f  i t  is  t r u e  t h a t  o rgan iza t ion  
pays, i t  is n o t  s o  t r u e  t h a t  pa t i ence  and moderation pay. Gomson's r e s u l t s  
a r e  congruent w i th  tlie 'general aGument .  which is unfolding here .  
Gamson's world i s  keenly  an t i -~u rk l i e imian :  '1t opposes the  Durklteimian 
p o r t r a y a l  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  i n  two main ways: 1 )  i t s  a c t o r s  spproscli  
de f ined  o b j e c t i v e s  wi th  s t r a t e g y  and t a c t i c s  -- which does no t  mean they 
always choose t h e  b e s t  s t r a t e g y  o r  t h a t  t h e i r  o b j e c t i v e s  o r e  oluays  
c o n s i s t e n t  and a t t a i n a b l e ;  2) t h e i r  a c t i o n s  and the  outcomes oE those  
a c t i o n s  cannot be expla ined by looking a t  t h e  cha l l eng ing  groups a lone;  
they r e s u l t  from an i n t e r a c t i o n  between cha l l enge r s  and o t h e r  groups. 
I n  t h e  terms we have been us ing  here ,  they r e s u l t  from t h e  i n t e r p l a y  
of i n t e r e s t s ,  o rgan iza t ion ,  and mob i l i za t ion ,  on the  one s i d e .  and of 
r ep res s ion  / f a c i l i t a t i o n ,  power, and o p p o r t u n i t y l t h r e s t .  on t h e  o t h e r .  
The I n t e r p l a y  of Mobi l iza t ion and Opportuni ty  
Le t  us cont inue t o  concen t r a t e  on the  mob i l i za t ion  model. We can 
c r y s t a l l i z e  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  teachings  of t h e  l a s t  two chap te r s  i n  a  p a i r  
of diagrams. Remember t h e  e a r l i e r  d i s t i n c t i o n s  among fou r  types  o f  
contenders :  z e a l o t s ,  run-of-the-mill  contenders .  misers.  and oppor tun i s t s .  
The run-of-the-mill  contenders  d e f i n e  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t  i n  terms of a  l i m i t e d  
range of c o l l e c t i v e  goods, and a r e  unwil l ing to  a c t  i f  t he  a c t i o n  is 
l i k e l y  t o  b r ing  a  l o s s .  In  f i g u r e s  4-13 and 4-14 ue  s e e  an i d e a l i z e d  
run-of-the-mill  contender  i n  two con t r a s t inp ,  s i t u a t i o n s .  I n  t h e  f i r s t ,  
t h e  preceding arguments s ay  t h a t  t h e  contender  is l i k e l y  t o  produce somc 
I Figure  4-13: Idea l i zed  Sketch of Condi t tons  f o r  Act ion of s run-of-the-mill 
Contender.  




c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  In t he  second, i f  t h e  arguments a r c  c o r r e c t ,  t he  
contender  should n o t  a c t .  
I n  Figure  4-13, t h e  run-of-the-mill contender  hne s i g n i f i c a n t  
c u r r e n t  i n c e n t i v e s  f o r  c o l l e c t i v e  ac t ion .  Current  oppor tun i ty  i nc ludes  
t h e  group 's  narrow a r e a  of i n t e r e s t ,  whi le  c u r r e n t  t h r e a t  includes  the  
p o s s i b i l i t y  of s i g n i f i c a n t  l o s s ,  nlthough n o t  t h e  -1 of t o t a l  e x t i n c t i o n .  
I f  t hose  were the  on ly  c o n s t r a i n t s  i n  ope ra t ion .  we would expec t  t h e  
contender  t o  a c t  both  t o  c a p i t a l i z e  on i t s  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  and t o  defend 
i t s e l f  a g a i n s t  t h r e a t s  o f  l o s s .  
There i s ,  however, one o t h e r  c o n s t r a i n t :  mob i l i za t ion .  In  t h i s  
ske t ch ,  t he  con tende r ' s  mob i l i za t ion  l e v e l  is high enougl~ LO permit  
a c t i o n  throughout t h e  range of i ts c u r r e n t  i n t e r e s t  and oppor tun i ty .  
Never theless ,  t he  group's power p o s i t i o n  would permit  i t  t o  a c q u i r e  
s t i l l  more c o l l e c t i v e  goods i f  i t  mobilized f u r t h e r ;  t h e  do t t ed  curve 
t o  t h e  r i g h t  of t h e  mob i l i za t ion  l i n e  d e s c r i b e s  those  t h e o r e t i c n l  
p o s s i b i l i t i e s ;  i t  a l s o  shows t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l  d e c l i n e  i n  t h e  group'n 
r e t u r n  i f  i t  pushes c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  too  f a r .  Beyond a  c e r t a i n  po in t .  
we expect  r ep re s s ion  t o  s t a r t  d iminishing t h e  group 's  r e t u r n  from 
c o l l e c t i v e  ac t ion .  
Repression does no t  appear  i n  t h e  diagram. bu t  its e f f e c t  is  the re .  
F a i t h f u l  t o  t h e  mob i l i za t ion  model. we r ep resen t  i t  a s  one of t he  f a c t o r s  
producing the  c u r r e n t  shape and l o c a t i o n  o f  t h e  probable-re turn  curve. 
a s  we l l  a s  t h e  c u r r e n t  l o c a t i o n  o f  t h e  mob i l i za t ion  l i n e .  Organizat ion 
l i k e w i s e  remains hidden from view, a s  a  v n r i a b l e  whicl~ works through 
i n t e r e s t  and mob i l i za t ion .  Power is p resen t ,  however. The crlrve o f  
probable  r e t u r n s  g ives  us a  s i m p l i f i e d  summary of t he  contender ' s  c u r r e n t  
power pos i t i on .  Indeed. s e v e r a l  d i f f e r e n t  a s p e c t s  o f  t h e  con tende r ' s  
power a r e  t he re :  power-efficiency i n  t h e  r a t e s  of r e t u r n  of c o l l e c t i v e  
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goods f o r  r e sou rces  expended i n  t he  two zones of most l i k e l y  a c t i o n ;  
power-effect iveness  i n  tlie po r t ion  of i t s  i n t e r e s t  -- i n  t h i s  case  100 
pe rcen t  -- t h a t  t h e  contender  can r e a l i z e ;  p o t e n t i a l  power i s  t h e  h igh  
po in t  of t h e  probable-re turn  l i n e .  
In  our  f i r s t  dlagram, then. the  c u r r e n t  combination of i n t e r e s t ,  
mob i l i za t ion ,  power and oppor tun i ty - th rea t  l e a d s  us  t o  expect  t h e  
contender  t o  engage i n  two kinds  and l e v e l s  o f  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n :  a  
low i n t e n s i t y  of a c t i o n  t o  counter  t h r e a t s  of l o s s ,  a  h ighe r  i n t e n s i t y  
of nc t ion  t o  t ake  advantage of o p p o r t u n i t i e s  f o r  ga in  i n  t he  a rea  of t he  
group 's  i n t e r e s t .  F igu re  4-14 shows us  tlie same s o r t  of contender  i n  
a  very d i f f e r e n t  s i t u a t i o n .  The s i t u a t i o n  i s  a  p r e s c r i p t i o n  f o r  i nac t ion .  
'Eniy? Because a l l  fou r  major v n r i a b l e s  a r e  now i n  d i f f e r e n t  p o s i t i o n s .  
Take oppor tun i ty - th rea t :  t he  con tende r ' s  range of des i r ed  c o l l e c t i v e  
goods l i e s  above the  l i m i t  s e t  by c u r r e n t  o p p o r t u n i t i e s ,  and t h e  c u r r e n t  
t h r e a t  of l o s s  is very s l i g h t .  I n  o t h e r  words, no o t h e r  contenders  a r e  
c u r r e n t l y  vu lne rab le  t o  c la ims which would enhance t h i s  run-of-the-mill  
con tende r ' s  r e a l i z a t i o n  o f  i t s  de f ined  i n t e r e s t s ;  ha rd ly  any o t h e r  
contender  is making p l a u s i b l e  t h r e a t s  a g a i n s t  i t s  c u r r e n t  r e a l i z a t i o n  
of i t s  i n t e r e s t s .  
Mobi l iza t ion l l kewise  i n h i b i t s  t h i s  run-of-the-mill  con tende r ' s  
capnc i ty  f o r  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  The c u r r e n t  mob i l i za t ion  l e v e l  r e s t r i c t s  
t h e  con tende r j s  p o s s i b l e  a c t i o n  t o  t he  range i n  which a  n e t  l o s s  i s  
almost c e r t a i n .  
The contender ' s  curve of probable  re tur t is  from c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  
i s  unfavorable  a s  wel l .  I t  ba re ly  c ros ses  t h e  break-even l i n e  -- and 
t h a t  only  i n  a  region which a )  is  c u r r e n t l y  i n a c c e s s i b l e  because of t h e  
mob i l i za t ion  c e i l i n g ,  b) does n o t  q u i t e  reach t o  t he  con tende r ' s  a r e a  
of p a r t i c u l a r  i n t e r e s t .  Another way o f  s t a t i n g  these  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  is 
F igu re  4-14: Idea l i zed  ske t ch  of c o n d i t i o n s  t o r  i n a c t i o n  of a run-of-the-mill  
contender .  




t h i s :  t h e  group 's  aims n r e  " too high" f o r  its c u r r e n t  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  of 
a c t i o n .  A change i n  any of t he  f o u r  v a r i a b l e s  could inc rease  the  
l i k l i h o o d  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  An o rgan ize r  who wanted t o  put  t h i s  
hap le s s  run-of-the-mill  contender  i n t o  a  b e t t e r  p o s i t i o n  would a t t empt  
t o  i n c r e a s e  i L s  mob i l i za t ion  and t r y  t o  augment i ts power by such t a c t i c s  
ns  forming c o a l i t i o n s .  IIe might a l s o  t r y  t o  f o s t e r  a  r e d e f i n i t i o n  of 
t h e  contender ' s  i n t e r e s t s ,  i n  o r d e r  t o  b r i n g  them wi th in  t h e  range o f  
p o s s i b i l i t y .  A powerful c o a l i t i o n  pa r tne r  might t r y  maneuvering t o  mnke 
o t h e r  contenders  o r  t he  government more vu lne rab le  t o  t h i s  con tende r ' s  
c la ims -- t o  r a j s e  t h e  l i m i t  s e t  by oppor tuni ty .  Any of t hese  e f f o r t s ,  
i f  s u c c c s s f u l ,  would inc rease  the  l i k e l i h o o d  of t h e  con tende r ' s  c o l l e c t i v e  
a c t i o n .  
Tn the  s l ~ o r t  run we have been cons ide r ing ,  t he  e x t e n t  of c o l l e c t i v e  
a c t i o n  depends g r e a t l y  on the  degree  t o  which t h e  group involved has  
p rev ious ly  acquired c o l l e c t i v e  c o n t r o l  of resources .  Most a l t e r n a t i v e  
t h e o r i e s  e i t h e r  make mob i l i za t ion  such an immediate func t ion  of changing 
i n t e r e s t s  t h a t  mobiliznLion ceases  t o  a c t  a s  an independent v a r i a b l e ,  
o r  mninta in  t h a t  under many c i rcumstances  unmohilized groups tend t o  
mobi l ize  s o  r a p i d l y  and e f f e c t i v e l y  a s  t o  wipe ou t  any gene ra l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
between p r i o r  mob i l i za t ion  and p re sen t  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  
Simple c l a s s -vo t ing  schemes fol low t h e  f i r s t  l i n e ;  b loc  vo te s  r i s e  
nnd f a l l  ns an immediate e f f e c t  of changing t h r e a t s  t o  c l a s s  i n t e r e s t s .  
James Davies'  J-curve exp lana t ion  of r e b e l l i o n s  fol lows t h e  second l i n e ;  
a  populat ion which exper iences  n l ong  pe r iod  of r i s i n g  s a t f s f a c t i o n  of 
i t s  i n t e r e s t s  nnd then exper iences  a  r a p i d  dec l ine  i n  t h a t  s a t i s f a c t i o n ,  
Davles argues ,  Lends t o  mobi l ize  and t o  s t r i k e  o u t  a t  once. The argument 
o f r e r e d  h e r e  nnswers the  f i r s t  l i n e  by saying t h n t  t he  e f f e c t  of changing 
t h r e a t s  e x i s t s ,  but  is  no t  immediate becnuse t h e  speed and i n t e n s i t y  o f  
t he  c l a s s '  response depends on i t s  p r i o r  mob i l i za t ion .  The argument 
answers t h e  Davies l i n e  by say ing  t h n t  t h e  quick response t o  d e c l i n e  is 
only  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of highly-mobilized groups ,  and t h a t  i n  any case  t h e  
groups which r e b e l  do no t  respond t o  t h e  gene ra l  f a c t  of dcp r ivn t lon ;  they 
respond t o  t h e  s p e c i f i c  f a c t  of a n o t l ~ e r  group 's  making c l a ims  which would. 
i f  r e a l i z e d ,  v i o l a t e  t h e i r  e s t a b l i s h e d  r j g h t s  and p r i v i l e g e s .  The a l t c r -  
n a t i v e  arguments underes t imate  o r  e l i m i n a t e  t h e  c o s t s  of c o l l e c t i v e  
a c t  ion. 
I f  t h e  mob i l i za t ion  model is an improvement over  previous  ana lyses  
of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n ,  i t  s t i l l  has  some s i g n i f i c a n t  weaknesses. I t  ha s  
no time i n  i t .  Concentra t ing on t h e  immediate s i t u a t i o n  of c o l l e c t i v e  
a c t o r s  g r e a t l y  s i m p l i f i e s  t h e  a n a l y s i s .  But i t  a l s o  mnkes i t  d i f f i c u l t  t o  
d e a l  wi th  r e c i p r o c a l  i n f l u e n c e s  such a s  t hose  which l i n k  power nnd co l -  
l e c t i v e  ac t ion :  c u r r e n t  power p o s i t i o n  c e r t a i n l y  a f f e c t s  t h e  l i ke l ihood  
of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n ,  a s  t h e  model s ays ;  c u r r e n t  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  a l s o  
a f f e c t s  f u t u r e  power p o s i t i o n ,  a s  t h e  model does not  say.  The nbsence of 
t ime, fur thermore,  e l imina te s  t h e  f e i n t s  and h e s i t a t i o n s  of s t r a t e g i c  in-  
t e r a c t i o n .  The most t h e  mode1,can do f o r  u s  i n  t hese  r ega rds  is t o  he lp  
us reduce t h e  b l u r  of t h e  newsreel i n t o  many d i s t i n c t  succes s ive  frames. 
each wi th  i ts own l o g i c .  
The mob i l i za t ion  model is e s s e n t i a l l y  q u a n t i t a t i v e .  I t  d e a l s  wi th  
amounts of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n s ,  r e sou rces  and c o l l e c t i v e  gooda r n t h e r  than 
wi th  t h e i r  q u a l i t i e s .  Unless we can f i n d  some way of e s t e b l i s h i n g  t h e  
q u a n t i t a t i v e  equivalences  among d i f f e r e n t  s o r t s  of c o l l e c t i v e  nc t ions .  
r e sou rces  and c o l l e c t i v e  goods, fur thermore,  t h e  model w i l l  only  apply  t o  
t h e  s imp les t  s i t u a t i o n s .  With t h e  d i scuss ion  of r ep res s ion  and f n c i 1 l . t ~ -  
t i o n ,  we wandered i n t o  t h e  comparison of d i f f e r e n t  k inds  of contender  nnd 
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d i f f e r e n t  s o r t s  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  But by end l a r g e  we no t i ced  qua l i -  
t a t i v e  v a r i a t i o n s  wi thout  b u i l d i n g  them i n t o  t h e  mob i l i za t ion  model. 
We f a c e  an  i r rpor tant  choice .  1Je can con t inue  t h e  step-by-step 
exp lo ra t ion  snd e l a b o r a t i o n  of t h e  mob i l i za t ion  and p o l i t y  models. Or 
we can jump headlong i n t o  t h e  world of t ime and q u a l i t a t i v e  v a r i a t i o n .  
I hope many of my r eade r s  w i l l  fo l low t h e  f i r s t  course:  r e v i s i n g  t h e  mo- 
b i l i z a t i o n  and p o l i t y  models t o  d e a l  e f f e c t i v e l y  wi th  time, q u a l i t y  and 
s t r a t e g i c  i n t e r a c t i o n ,  then s c r u t i n i z i n g  t h e  evidence t o  s e e  i f  t h e  
models work r i g h t .  I plan t o  keep st t h a t  work myself.  bu t  e lsewhere .  
The next  t h r e e  chap te r s  w i l l  fo l low t h e  second course .  They w i l l  make 
loose  a p p l i c a t i o n s  of t h e  models t o  major h i s t o r i c a l  problems i n  t h e  
s tudy of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  Chapter f i v e  t r e a t s  changes i n  t h e  p reva len t  
forms of con ten t ious  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  which occurred i n  western  c o u n t r i e s  
a s  l a rge - sca l e  i ndus t ry  developed, c i t i e s  grew, powerful n a t i o n a l  s t a t e s  
formed, and c a p i t a l i s m  expanded. Chapter s i x  d e a l s  w i th  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
between c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  and c o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence .  Chapter seven d i s -  
cus ses  r e b e l l i o n  and r evo lu t ion .  Then, s t  t h e  end, we t ake  one more look 
a t  t h e  g e n e r a l  l o g i c  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  . 
The Forms of Content ion 
Real people  do no t  g e t  t oge the r  and Act Co l l ec t ive ly .  They meet t o  
p e t i t i o n  Par l iament ,  o rgan ize  te lephone champaigns, demogstrate o u t s i d e  
of c i t y  h a l l ,  a t t a c k  powerlooms, go on s t r i k e .  The a b s t r a c t  mobilization 
model we have been us ing has  many v i r t u e s ,  bu t  i t  tends  t o  obscure  two 
fundamental f a c t s .  F i r s t ,  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  gene ra l ly  i nvo lves  i n t e r -  
a c t i o n  wi th  s p e c i f i c  o t h e r  groups, i nc lud ing  governments. C o l l e c t i v e  
a c t i o n  r a r e l y  c o n s i s t s  of s o l i t a r y  performances. People  do not  o r d i n a r i l y  
a c t  t o  i n f l u e n c e  a b s t r a c t  s t r u c t u r e s  such a s  p o l i t i e s  and mnrkets; they 
t r y  t o  g e t  p a r t i c u l a r  o t h e r  p e o p l e . t o  do p a r t i c u l a r  t h ings .  A s  a  consc- 
quence, exp lana t ions  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  which Concentra te  on t h e  cnpn- 
c i t i e s  and i n c l i n a t i o n s  of one p a r t i c i p a n t  a t  o  time -- o r  t h e  average 
c a p a c i t i e s  and i n c l i n a t i o n s  of a l l  p a r t i c i p a n t s  w i l l  l c s v e  us disoppointcd.  
Second, c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  usua l ly  t akes  well-defined forms e l rendy 
f a m i l i a r  t o  the .par t ic ipants .  i n  t h e  some sense  t h a t  most of an e r a ' s  
a r t  t akes  on of e  sma l l  number of ea tobl ish$d forms. Because o f  t h a t ,  
n e i t h e r  t h e  sea rch  f o r  u n i v e r s a l  forms (such a s  t hose  nometimes proposed 
f o r  crowds o r  r evo lu t ions )  nor  t h e  assumption of on i n f i n i t y  of means t o  
group ends w i l l  t ake  us very f a r .  Because o f  t h a t ,  t h e  s tudy  of t h e  con- 
c r e t e  forms of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  immediately draws u s  i n t o  th ink ing  about  
\ 
t h e  c u l t u r a l  s e t t i n g s  i n  which more forms appear .  Much of tl ie p l easu re  
and adventure  i n  t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  s tudy of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  comes from t h e  
r i c h  complexity of t h e  m a t e r i a l :  having t o  l e a r n  how and why t h e  P a r i s i a n s  
of 1793 paraded severed hends on pikes .  how and why t h e  young people  of 
Berkeley, C a l i f o r n i a  occupied a  makeshif t  pa rk  i n  1.969. 
P u t t i n g  t h e  two themes toge the r  opens t h e  way t o  a  f i r s t  rough 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  of forms of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  The c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  s t r e s s e s  
t he  n a t u r e  of t h e  i n t c r o c t i o n  between o t h e r  groups and t h e  group whose 
a c t i o n  we a r e  c l a s s i f y i n g .  More p r e c i s e l y ,  i t  depends on t h e  c la ims t h e  
c o l l e c t i v e  a c t o r s  a r e  a s s e r t i n g  i n  t h e i r  ac t ion :  compet i t ive  c la ims,  
r e a c t i v e  c la ims o r  p r o a c t i v e  c la ims.  The c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  l eaves  o u t  pur- --
s u i t  of common ends which invo lve  no c la ims on o t h e r  groups: pure  recrea-  
t i o n ,  contemplation, escape. I n  f a c t .  i t  a p p l i e s  most e a s i l y  where the' 
c la ims express  a  c o n f l i c t  of i n t e r e s t  among t h e  p a r t i e s .  I have worked 
o u t  t he  c a t e g o r i e s  i n  s tudy ing  t h e  evo lu t ion  of forms of c o n f l i c t  i n  
western  Europe, and w i l l  i l l u s t r a t e  them from European exper ience.  
Competitive a c t i o n s  l a y  c la im t o  r e sources  a l s o  claimed by o t h e r  
groups which t h e  a c t o r  d e f i n e s  a s  r i v a l s ,  compet i tors ,  o r  a t  l e a s t  a s  
p n r t i c i p n n t s  i n  t h e  same c o n t e s t .  Take t h e  c h a r i v a r i  -- t h e  American 
"shivaree" -- f o r  an  example. Only r e c e n t l y  have European h i s t o r i a n s  be- 
gun t o  uncover t h e  l a r g e  base  of compet i t ion and c o n t r o l  on which t h i s  
o s t e n s i b l y  f r ivo loun  custom r e s t e d .  John G i l l i s  (1974: 30-31) desc r ibes  
one s t anda rd  vers ion:  
I n  a  t y p i c a l  r u r a l  c h a r i v a r i ,  s r e c e n t l y  remarried widower might 
f i n d  himself awakened by t h e  clamor of t h e  crowd, on e f f i g y  of 
h i s  dead wi fe  t h r u s t  up t o  h i s  window and a  l i k e n e s s  of h imse l f ,  
placed backwarddon an a s s ,  drawn through t h e  s t r e e t s  f o r  h i s  
neighbors  t o  s ee .  Paying o f  a  "contr ibut ion"  t o  t h e  Lord of Mis- 
r u l e  might q u i e t  h i s  you th fu l  tormentors ,  bu t  by t h a t  t ime t h e  
vo ices  of v i l l a g e  conscience had made t h e i r  po in t .  Second marr iages  
i n v a r i a b l y  drew t h e  g r e a t e s t  wrath and. by c o n t r a s t ,  endogamous 
marr iages  of young people of roughly t h e  same age were t h e  occasion 
of t h e  youth group 's  r e j o i c i n g .  I n  t h a t  ca se ,  t h e  [unct ions  of 
c h a r i v a r i  were reversed and t h e  couple  were accompanied by n  noisy  
crowd t o  t h e i r  wedding bed, t h e  r i t u a l  send-off of its former mem- 
be r s  by t h e  peer  group. The marr iage f e a a t .  end the  Abbcy's p a r t l c i -  
po t ion  i n  i t ,  symbolized t h e  c e n t r a l  purpose of t h e  y o u t l ~  group, 
which was t o  provide o  prolonged r i t e  o f  passage from ro t~gh ly  t h e  
o n s e t  of puberty t o  t h e  po in t  of marr iage.  
The Englisli  o f t e n  c a l l e d  t h e i r  s i m i l a r  custom Rough Music. Host of t h e .  
t ime, i t  was a conta ined b u t  raucous a f f a i r ,  accompanied by t h e  tllumping 
of pans and blowing of horns. The c h a r i v a r i  became a  "disorder"  t o  t h e  
eyes  (and, no doubt ,  t h e  e a r s )  of t he  a u t h o r i t i e s  when i t  p e r s i s t e d  more 
than a  n i g h t  o r  two, o r  when dozens of young people  jo ined t h e  fun. 
The p r e c i s e  form of t h e  c h a r i v n r i  d i f f e r e d  considerably  from one 
region o f  Europe t o  ano the r .  Within Great  Br i t a in .  E.P. Thompson d i s t t n -  
gu i shes  fou r  mnin v a r i a n t s :  
a )  c e f f y l  pren (Welsh f o r  "wooden horse"). which is  a s soc ia t ed  wi th  
t h e  Rebecca Riota  i n  many p a r t s  of I,lales; 
b) "Riding t h e  stang". commonly p m c t i c e d  i n  t h e  S c o t t i s h  Lowlands 
and the  no r th  of England; 
C)  t h e  Skimmington o r  Skimmety parade, which s t i l l  survived i n  t h e  
n ine t een th  century i n  t he  West, a s  w e l l  a s  i n  some r eg ions  of t h e  
South; and f i n a l l y  
d )  Rough Music i t s e l f ,  wi thout  a  parade, but  i n  t h e  cour se  of which 
people  o f t e n  burned e f f i g i e s  o f  t h e  v i c t ims ;  a  widespread custom. 
but  found e s p e c i a l l y  i n  t h e  I t id lands  and t h e  South (Thompson 1972: 
287-288). 
In  a d d i t i o n  t o  t he  sh lva rce ,  v a r i a n t s  of t hese  o t h e r  forms of a c t i o n  re-  
m i n  embedded i n  American f o l k l o r e ,  even i f  they have come unstuck from 
d a i l y  p r a c t i c e :  r i d i n g  someone o u t  of town on a  r a i l ,  parading and 
burning e f f i g i e s ,  and s o  on. 
V i l l a g e  sue-groups were t h e  t y p i c a l  i n i t i a t o r s  of c h a r i v a r i n .  The 
o rgnn iza t ion  and func t ions  oE age-groups va r i ed  considerably  from one 
p a r t  of Europe t o  ano the r .  (For r eg iona l  p a t t e r n s  i n  France, e .g . ,  s e e  
Varagnnc 1947). They o f t e n  had r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  Lenten b o n f i r e s  and 
o t h e r  c e l e b r a t i o n s .  They sometimes c o n t r o l l e d  t h e  p a i r i n g  up of young 
couples  f o r  bundling and cour t ing .  V i l l age  age-groups a l s o  fought  tl ie 
youth of neighbor ing v i l l a g e s ,  sometimes t o  tlie death .  They o f t e n  as-  
sembled a s  a  b loc  a t  p u b l i c  ceremonies, sometimes mounting e l e a b o r a t e  
charades  t o  mock and warn those  who had t r ansg res sed  t h e i r  r u l e s .  A l l  
t hese  a c t i v i t i e s  afctrmed t h e i r  p r i o r i t y  ove r  t h e  e l i g i h l e  females and 
over  t h e  r i t u a l s  of cou r t sh ip  wi th in  t h e i r  own v i l l a g e s .  Within t h e i r  
l imi t ed  sphe re ,  t h e  activities were deadly s e r i o u s .  
The c h a r i v a r i ,  t h e  v i l l a g e  f i g h t  and t h e  youth group's mocking cere-  
mony had many k in .  There were brawls  between s t u d e n t  groups, between 
d l f f e r e n t  detachments of s o l d i e r s ,  between s o l d i e r s  and c i v i l i a n s ,  between 
e t l ~ n i c  and r e l i g i o u s  groups. There were t h e  more h igh ly  r o u t i n i z e d  s t r u g -  
g l e s  of ~ i v a l  groups of a r t i s a n s  t o  dishonor  each o t h e r ' s  symbols, impede 
each o t h e r ' s  ceremonies and cha l l enge  each o t h e r ' s  p r i o r i t y  i n  p roces s ions  
and o t h e r  pub l i c  assemblies .  Somehow t h e s e  forms of a c t i o n  seem t r i v i a l  
and q u a i n t  t o  twent ie th-century people. Me of t h i s  century have seen 
g l a n t  wars and mass murder, and have come t o  t h i n k  of "ser ious"  p o l i t i c s  
on having a  nadonnl o r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  scope. The even t s  i n  ques t ion  were. 
indeed,  u sua l ly  sma l l ,  s l lor t - l ived,  l o c a l i z e d .  They r a r e l y  l inked wi th  
r e v o l r ~ t i o n a r y  movements o r  g r e a t  r e b e l l i o n s .  Yet they l e f t  t h e i r  t o l l  
of dead and in ju red .  In  times of c r i s i s ,  they blended i n t o  mnjor c o n f l i c t s .  
They were important  forms of c o l l e c t i v e  ac t ion .  
Some f e a t u r e s  of c o l l e c t i v e  compet i t ion such a s  t h e  r i t u a l i z e d  mockery, 
c a r r i e d  ove r  i n t o  t h e  second major category:  r e a c t i v e  c o l l e c t i v e  ac t ions .  
(We can a l s o  c a l l  them c o l l e c t i v e  r eac t ions . )  They c o n s i s t  of group e f f o r t s  
t o  r e a s s e r t  e s t a b l i s h e d  c la ims when someone e l s e  cha l l enges  o r  v i o l a t e s  
them. Speaking of peasant  l and  invas ions  i n  contemporary Peru. E.J. 
Hobsbawm p o i n t s  o u t  t h a t  they t ake  t h r e e  forms: sq r~aLt ing  on land t o  
which no one ( o r  only  t h e  go~ernmen t )  has  a  c l e a r  t i t l e ,  exp ropr in t ing  land 
t o  which t h e  invade r s  have n o t  p rev ious ly  enjoyed a  c l a im and t o  which 
someone e l s e  has ,  r eposses s ing  l and  from which t h e  invade r s  have them- 
s e l v e s  been expropr i a t ed  (Hobsbawm 1974: 120-121). 
The t h i r d  v a r i a n t  is  the  c l e a r  r e a c t i v e  case:  t h e  dispossessed r e a c t .  
Thar s o r t  of land re-occupation cha rac t e r i zed  t h e  f i r s t  s t a g e s  of Zopato's 
r e b c l l i o n  du r ing  t h e  Mexican Revolution, recurred through much of sou the rn  
I t a l y  du r ing  t h e  massive n ine  teenth-century concen t r a t ion  of land i n  bour- 
g e o i s  and noble  hands, and marked t h e  conso l ida t ion  of bourgeois  landowner- 
s h i p  wherever i t  developed i n  tlie presence of s o l i d a r y  peasant  communlLies. 
I n  a  s t anda rd  Europeanscenario, a  ~ r o u p  of v i l l a g e r s  who had long pastured 
t h e i r  c a t t l e ,  gathered firewood and gleaned i n  common f i e l d s .  found a 
l and lo rd  o r  a  l o c a l  o f f i c i a l  ( o r ,  more l i k e l y ,  t h e  two i n  co l l abo ra t ion )  
f enc ing  tlie f i e l d s  by newly-acquired o r  newly-ssscrted r i g h t  of proper ty .  
The v i l l a g e r s  commonly warned a g a i n s t  tile fencing.  I f  t he  warning Went un- 
heeded, they a t t acked  t h e  f ences  and the  fencers .  They ac t ed  i n  t h e  name o f  
r i g h t s  they s t i l l  considered v a l i d .  
The ove r l ap  wi th  c o l l e c t i v e  compet i t ion appeared c l e a r l y  when costumed 
avengers  t o r e  down t h e  fences  o r  occupied the  f i e l d s ,  a s  i n  t h e  Demoiselles 
movement of t h e  1830's i n  t h e  Pyrenees ( s e e  Merriman 1975). In  o t h e r  col-  
l e c t i v e  r e a c t i o n s ,  t h e  ove r l ap  was a t  l e a s t  a s  notable .  f o r  i n  both  
canes  the  a c t o r s  commonly assumed. more o r  l e s s  s e l f - consc ious ly ,  t h e  
r o l e  of t h e  auLhor i t i e s  who were being d e r e l i c t  i n  t h e i r  du ty ,  and t h e  
groups which r eac t ed  were o f t e n  t h e  same l o c a l  s o l i d a r i t i e s :  t h e  youth 
groups, g i l d s ,  and s o  on. 
T l~c  bns i c  o u t l i n e  of t h e  l and  occupat ion app l i ed  t o  t h e  bulk  o f  
E u r ~ p e a n  food r i o t s ,  machine-breaking, t a x  r e b e l l i o n s  and l o c a l  a c t i o n s  
ngn ins t  m i l i t a r y  consc r ip t ion :  a l l  moved d i r e c t l y  a g a i n s t  someone who 
had u n j u s t l y  depr ived,  o r  t r i e d  t o  dep r ive ,  a  l o c a l  populat ion of a  pre- 
c i o u s  resource .  Yves-Marie 8erc6. expanding on h i s  comprehensive a n a l y s i s  
of t h e  seventeenth-century r e b e l l i o n  of t h e  Croquants i n  southwestern  
Frnnce, has  proposed t h a t  t h e  ke rne l  of European peasant  r e b e l l i o n s  be fo re  
t h e  n ine t een th -cen tu ry  was t h e  r e s i s t a n c e  of c lo sed ,  s o l i d o r y  peasant  
communities t o  o u t s i d e  a t t empt s  t o  i n f r i n g e  upon t h e i r  e s t a b l i s h e d  r i g h t s  
and rou t ines .  In  t h e  case  of seventeenth-century France, he  d i s t i ngu i shen  
fou r  major occasions  f o r  r e h e l l i o n s :  high food p r i c e s ,  b i l l e t i n g  of 
t roops .  t a x  c o l l e c t i o n  and t h e  imposi t ion of e x c i s e  t axes  by t a x  farmers .  
Tn a l l  theoe c a s e s ,  s ays  Berc'e, "Revolt is t h e  s t r a t e g y  OF t h e  l i t t l e  
people ,  a n  ex t r ao rd ina ry  o rgan iza t ion  f o r  defense  a g a i n s t  f i s c a l  aggress ion"  
(Berci? 1974: 11, 680-681). 
A s  community s o l i d n r i t y  dec l ined ,  according t o  8erc6,  t he  concer ted 
peasant  r e b e l l i o n  disnppenred. Only much l a t e r  d id  farmers  and a g r i c u l t u r a l  
workers reappear  i n  a c t i o n ;  now they were organized around forward-looking 
s p e c l a l - i n t e r e s t  groups. Al t l~ough ( a s  8e rc6  himself concedes) t he  scheme 
homogenizes unduly the  p a r t i c i p a n t s  and motivcs i n  t h e  o l d e r  forms of con- 
f l i c t ,  i t  cap tu re s  an e n s e n t i n l  c o n t r a s t .  I t  is t h e  c o n t r a s t  between re- 
a c t i v e  and p roac t ive  forma of c o l l e c t i v e  ac t lons .  
P r o a c t i v e  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n s  a s s e r t  group clntms which have no t  -- 
prev ious ly  been exe rc i sed .  (We may a l s o  c a l l  them i n s t a n c e s  of c o l l e c t i v e  
p roac t ion . )  The s t r i k e  f o r  h ighe r  wages o r  b e t t e r  working cond i t i ons  pro- 
v ides  an everyday i l l u s t r a t i o n .  De l ibc ra t e  work s toppaees  t o  ~ n l n  a  
po in t  have probably e x i s t e d  s i n c e  people f i r s t  worked fo r  one a n o t l ~ e r .  
N a t a l i e  Davjs (1975: 1-16) d e s c r i b e s  well-organized s t r i k e s  i n  s l x i e e n t t ~  
century Lyons. But t h e  s t r i k e  only  became a  common way of doing pub l i c  
bus ines s  i n  t h e  nineteenth-century.  A s  wage-work i n  o rgan lz s t tons  
l a r g e r  than households expanded, t h e  number and s c a l e  of s t r i k c s  expondcd. 
I n  most western  c o u n t r i e s ,  f i f t y  t o  a  hundred yea r s  went by i n  wl~ich 
s t r i k e s  were inc reas ing ly  f r equen t  bu t  remained i l l e g a l  -- sometimes pro- 
s ecu ted ,  sometimes broken up by armed fo rce ,  sometimes t o l e r a t e d ,  alwnys 
disapproved. Under p re s su re  from organized workers and t h e i r  par l inmcntary  
a l l i e s .  most western  governments l e g a l i z e d  t h e  s t r i k e  between 1860 nnd 1900. 
S ince  then,  s t a t e s  t h a t  have ~ t e p p e d  up r ep res s ion  ( s t a t e s  o f  emergency, 
wartimes governments. F a s c i s t  regimes) have normnlly rescinded t h e  r i g h t  
t o  s t r i k e ,  and a l l  regimes have nego t i a t ed  c o n t i n u a l l y  wiLh workers nnd 
employers over  who had t h e  r i g h t  t o  s t r i k e .  and how. But ill gene ra l  t h e  
s t r i k e  has  been widely a v a i l a b l e  a s  a  means of a c t i o n  s i n c e  t h e  beginning 
of t h e  twen t l e th  century.  
Government s anc t ion  of t h e  s t r i k e  shows up i n  s t r i k e  s t a t i s t i c s ;  they 
d a t e  from t h e  18808.or 1890s i n  most western coun t r i e s .  The i r  sppenronce 
r e f l e c t s  t h e  working ou t  o f  a  s tandard pub l i c  d e f i n i t i o n  of t h e  word 
" s t r ike" .  and t h e  formation o f  a  bureaucracy t o  monitor nnd r e g u l a t e  t h e  
s t r i k e ' s  use. In  France, M i c l ~ e l l e  P e r r o t  (1974) argues  t h a t  1l1e s t r i k e  
l o s t  much of its expres s ive  funct ion.  its f e s t i v a l  a i r ,  i t s  r evo lu t iona ry  
potential, as the bureaucratization of the 1890s set in. By way of corn 
pensation, it became a more widely accessible, less risky way of making 
demands. 
Several other forms of collective proaction came into their own 
during the nineteenth century. The demonstration, the sponsored public 
meeting and the petition drive began to thrive with the arrival of mass 
electoral politics. The seizure of premises by an insurrectionary comit- 
tee also generalized during the nineteenth century, although the ties to 
electoral politics are more distant. The military pronunciamento is of 
the same vintage. On the other hand, the general strike, the sit-in, and 
the farmers' dumping of surplus crops in protest are essentially twentieth- 
century creations. Proactive forms of collective action have proliferated 
over the last two centtrries. 
This labeling of forms has two catches. First, although we are 
dealing with situations in which contenders interact. we are not classi- 
fying the interactions themselves. On the whole, if one group is engaging 
in collective proaction, then at least one of its partners is engaging 
in collective reaction: a group of dissident colonels attempts a coup, the 
I 
junta defends itself against the coup. Landlords band together to raise 
rents, peasants band together to resist the raising of rents. Only the 
collective competition is usually symmetrical: when one party jockeys for 
a visible position in a public ceremony, so does another. 
Second catch. Strictly speaking, a public meeting or a general 
strike could fit any of the three types: competitive. reactive or pro- 
active. Just as the charivari could mock a wrongdoer or celebrate a right- 
doer. people can demonstrate for something, against something, or both for 
one thing and against another thing at the.same time. The classification 
as competitive, reactive or proactive depends on the claims being nsserted. 
not on the form of the action. The squatting and expropriating land occu- 
pations described by Hobabawm have a far more proactive flavor than the 
re-occupations of lost land. Workers have often struck in defense of 
threatened job rights. Those strikes were reactive. 
Yet the general correletion persists. In general, the demonstro- 
tion and the strike have been privileged vehicles for new claims, have 
risen in periods and places in which ordinary people were articulating new 
demands, and are peculiarly suitable to the effort to m k e  gains rother 
than to forestall losses. In general, the tax rebellion, tlle food riots 
and similar events have cascaded when ordinary people were defending their 
righta against attack, and make little sense as means of stating new claims. 
On the average, the demonstration and the strike are proactive, the food 
riot and tax rebellion reactive. 
In Europe of the last few hundred years, tlle three forms of col- 
lective action have waxed and waned in sequence. In the fifteenth and six- 
teenth centuries, competitive actions seem to have predominated. From the 
seventeenth into the nineteenth century, the reactive forms became much 
more widespread, while the competitive forms remained steady or perhaps 
declined. With the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, collective pro- 
action began to predominate, the reactive forms dwindled, while new forms 
of competition came into existence. If I read the record nright, seven- 
teenth- and eighteenth-century Europeans took collective oction in de- 
fense of threatened rights much more than their predecessors had, while 
twentieth-century Europeans became exceptionally prone to act in support 
of claims they had not previously exercised. 
The reasons for the successive changes are, I think. twofold: ' 
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1) during the period from 1600 to 1850, more so than before and after, the 
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I Figure 5-1: Hypothetical Effects of Lowered Costs of Collective Action on a Zealot. 
agents of international markets and of national states were pressing their I 
new (and proactive) claims on resources which had up to then been under the 
control of innumerable households, comunities, brotherhoods and other Mobilization 
I 
small-scale organizations. The small-scale organizations reacted repeatedly, 
fighting against taxation, conscription, the consolidation of landed pro- 
perty and numerous other threats to their organizational well-being. Even- 
tually the big structures won, the battle died darn, the reactive forms di- 
minished. 2) Increasingly, the pools of resources necessary to group sur- 
vival came under the control of large organizations, especially governments, 
which only redistributed them under the pressure of new claims. 
There may be a third factor: 3) a general decline in the costa of 
mobilization and co1,lective action during the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuriea. Such a decline might have resulted from the massing of popu- 
lation in large settlements and big organizations, from the elaboration of 
comunicntiona and from the expansion of elections as a way of doing public 
business. This is roughly the same set of changes which Karl Deutsch calls 
Social Mobilization, end which Amitsi Etzioni regards as making possible 
the self-directed Active Society. If the analysis of the previous chapter 
is correct, however, we could only expect such changes to elevate the level 
of collective action if the relationship between contenders and their in- , 
terests altered. For a fixed set of interests and a given level of oppor- 
tunity/threat, a general decline in the costs of mobilization and collective 
action could well depress the level of colJ.ective action. 
Figure 5-1 shows liar that could happen. (It illustrates the prob- 





goods and is prepared to take what others would regard as a loss in order 
t o  achieve those  goods -- bu t  a p p l i e s  equa l ly  t o  mi se r s  and run-of-the- 
m i l l  contenders .  Oppor tun i s t s  p r e s e n t ,  a s  we s h a l l  s ee ,  ano the r  problem.) 
Under high c o s t s  (curve A f o r  expected r e t u r n s  from c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n ) .  
our  contender  would be  unable  t o  a t t a i n  i t s  i n t e r e s t ,  r e g a r d l e s s  of i ts 
m_obilizstion l e v e l  o r  t h e  c u r r e n t  c o n s t e l l a t i o n  of o p p o r t u n i t i e s ;  a l l  we 
could reasonably  a n t i c i p a t e  i n  t h a t  ca se  would be de fens ive  a c t i o n  t o  
f o r e s t a l l  t h r e a t s :  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  of amount A on t h e  resources-expen- 
ded a x i s .  Under medium c o s t s  (curve B), t h e  contender  can ach ieve  i t s  
e n t i r e  i n t e r e s t  i n  new c o l l e c t i v e  goods and f o r e s t a l l  t h r e a t s  a t  t h e  same 
time by p l ac ing  i t s  a c t i o n  i n  t h e  range from B1 t o  B2. (Being a  z e a l o t ,  
t h e  contender  has  no i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  h ighe r  r e t u r n s  ob ta inab le  by pushing 
a  b i t  beyond B2 -- bu t  not  too f a r  -- on t h e  resources-expended s c a l e . )  
But no te  what happens i f  c o s t s  become very low: curve C a p p l i e s .  In  t h i s  
c a s e ,  t h e  p re sen t  l e v e l s  of oppor tun i ty  and mob i l i za t ion  permit  our  con- 
tender  a  very  high r e t u r n  indeed. Because t h e  con tende r ' s  def ined i n t e r e s t  
remains t h e  same, however, i t  can achieve t h e  name o b j e c t i v e s  w i th  a  
sma l l e r  amount of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  than when c o s t s  a r e  medium. Now t h e  
i d e a l  range of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  runs  from C1 t o  C2. Lowering c o s t s  lowers 
t h e  expected l e v e l  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  
To be s u r e ,  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between contenders  and t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s  
may a l t e r  i n  some r e g u l a r  f a sh ion  a s  c o s t s  d e c l i n e .  Tlie most obvious a l -  
t e r n a t i v e  is  t h e  one proposed long ago by Robert Michels.  "The revolu- 
t i ona ry  p o l i t i c a l  pa r ty , "  s a i d  Micliels. 
i s  a  s t a t e  w i th in  a  s t a t e ,  pursuing t h e  avowed aim of des t roy ing  
t h e  e x i s t i n g  s t a t e  i n  o rde r  t o  s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  i t  a  s o c i a l  o rde r  
of a  fundamentally d i f f e r e n t  c h a r a c t e r .  To a t t a i n  t h i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  
p o l i t i c a l  end, t h e  pa r ty  a v a i l s  i t s e l f  of t h e  s o c i a l i s t  organiza-  
t i o n ,  whose s o l e  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  i s  found p r e c i s e l y  i n  i t s  p n t i e n t  
bu t  sys t ema t i c  p repa ra t ion  f o r  t h e  d e s t r u c t i o n  of t h e  orgnniza- 
t i o n  of t h e  s t a t e  i n  i ts e x i s t i n g  form. Tlie subve r s ive  pn r ty  or- 
gan izes  t h e  framework o f  t h e  s o c i a l  r evo lu t ion .  For t h l s  reason 
i t  c o n t i n u a l l y  endesvors  t o  s t r eng then  i ts p o s i t i o n s ,  t o  extend 
i t s  bu reauc ra t i c  mechanism, t o  s t o r e  up i t s  ene rg ie s  and i ts 
funds  (Michels 1949: 384-385) .  
The I ron  Law of Ol igarchy -- t h s t  every success fu l  s t r u g g l e  ends wi th  t h e  
es tabl ishment  of a  governing e l i t e  -- t hus  a p p l i e s ,  nccording t o  Michela, 
t o  democrat ic  r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s  a s  we l l  a s  t o  a l l  o t h e r s .  
T rans l a t ed  i n t o  t h e  code we have been us ing ,  t h e  I ron  Lnw t a k e s  two 
forms. F i r s t ,  t h e  process  of mob l l i z s t i on  i n  i t s e l f  t ransforms t h e  group 's  
def ined i n t e r e s t s ;  t hose  who l ead  t h e  con tende r ' s  mob i l i za t ion  a c q u i r e  t h e  
d e s i r e  and t h e  means t o  mainta in  t h e  o rgan iza t ion  they have b u i l t  and t o  
i d e n t i f y  t h e i r  s p e c i a l  i n t e r e s t s  w i th  those  of t h e  group a s  a  whole. 
Second, t h e  lowering of c o s t s  i n c r e a s e s  t h e  gap between t h e  group 's  mo- 
b i l i z a t i o n  l e v e l  and t h e  r e sources  i t  must expend t o  achieve i t s  ends. 
That produces a  s u r p l u s .  Tlie a c c r e t i o n  of a  su rp lua  might l o g i c a l l y  lend 
t o  demobi l iza t ion.  But according t o  Mlchels i t  encourages t h e  ol ignrcl is  
t o  d i v e r t  t h e  a v a i l a b l e  r e sources  t o  ends which they themselves d e f i n e  an 
! 
d e s i r a b l e .  I n  t h e  extreme case ,  t h e  new i n t e r e s t s  which emerge do no t  
even inc lude  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  which o r i g i n a l l y  brought t h e  contender  i n t o  ex- 
i s t e n c e .  In  t h e  extreme case ,  a  z e a l o t  becomes an  oppor tun i s t ,  ready t o  
a c t  f o r  a wide v a r i e t y  of c o l l e c t i v e  goods, prepared t o  s t r i k e  f o r  t h e  
b e s t  r e t u r n  a v a i l a b l e ,  b u t  unwi l l fng  t o  a c t  i n  t h e  f ace  of a  probable  
l o s s .  The " s o c i a l  movement o rgan iza t ions"  i n  contemporary America analyzed 
by Zald and ElcCarthy come c l o s e  t o  t h i s  c a r i c a t u r e .  
We must a l s o  weigh something e l s e  a g a i n s t  t h e  presumed cos t - cu t t i ng  
e f f e c t s  of communications improvements, t h e  i n s t a l l a t i o n  of f r e e  e l e c t i o n s ,  
and t h e  l i k e :  t h e  increased r e p r e s s i v e  a c t i v i t y  and r e p r e s s i v e  e f f i c i e n c y  
of governments and o t l ~ e r  l a r g e  o rgan iza t ions .  I n t r i n s i c  c o s t s  a r e  down. 
But t h e  c o s t s  imposed by o t h e r s  a r e  up. I guess  t h a t  t h e  i n t r i n s i c  c o s t s  
hove dec l ined  more than t h e  Imposed c o s t s  have r i s e n .  I n  t h e  p re sen t  
s t a t e  of our knowledge, however, t h a t  judgment i s  both  r i s k y  and u n v e r i f i a b l e .  
Repe r to i r e s  of C o l l e c t i v e  Act ion 
At any po in t  i n  t ime,  t h e  r e p e r t o i r e  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n s  a v a i l a b l e  
t o  a  populat ion is s u r p r i s i n g l y  l imi t ed .  S u r p r i s i n g l y ,  g iven t h e  innumerable 
ways i n  which people could ,  i n  p r i n c i p l e ,  deploy t h e i r  r e sou rces  i n  p u r s u i t  
of common ends. Su rp r i s ing ly ,  g iven t h e  many ways r e a l  groups have pursued 
t h e i r  own common ends st one time o r  ano the r .  
Most twent ie th-century Americans, f o r  example, know how t o  demonstrate.  
They know t h a t  s group wi th  a  c l a im t o  make assembles i n  a  pub l i c  p l ace ,  
i d e n t i f i e s  i t s e l f  and i t s  demands o r  complaints  i n  a  v i s i b l e  way, o r i e n t s  
i ts common a c t i o n  t o  t h e  persons ,  p r o p e r t i e s  o r  symbols of some o the r  group 
i t  i s  seeking t o  i n f luence .  Within those  gene ra l  r u l e s ,  most Americans 
know how t o  c a r r y  on s e v e r a l  d i f f e r e n t  forms of demonstrs t ion:  t h e  massed 
mnrch, t h e  assembly wi th  speechmaking, t h e  temporary occupat ion of premises. 
Moreover, t he re  a r e  some s p e c i f i a b l e  c i rcumstances  i n  which most Americans 
would a c t u a l l y  app ly  t h e i r  knowledge by j o i n i n g  a  r e a l  demonstra t ion.  
Americans who have no t  l ea rned  t h i s  complicated s e t  of a c t i o n s  through 
pe r sona l  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  have none the l e s s  wi tnessed demonstra t ions  d i r e c t l y ,  
read about them. watched them on t e l e v i s i o n .  Various forms of demonstra t ion 
belong t o  tl ie r e p e r t o i r e  of twent ie th-century Americans -- not  t o  mention 
twent ie th-century Canadians, Japanese. Greeks. B r a z i l i a n s  and many o t h e r s . '  
The r e p e r t o i r e  a l s o  inc ludes  s e v e r a l  v n r j e t i e s  of s t r i k e s ,  p e t i t i o n i n g .  
t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  of p r e s s u r e  groups, and s few o t h e r  ways of a r t i c u l a t i n g  
g r i evances  and demands. 
Pew Americans, on t h e  o t h e r  hand, know how t o  o rgan ize  t h e  h i j ack ing  
of an  a i r p l a n e ,  d e s p i t e  t h e  p u b l i c i t y  h t j a c k i n g s  have received t n  r ecen t  
years ;  even fewer would s e r f o u s l y  cons ide r  h i j ack ing  a s  a  way of accomplishing 
t h e i r  c o l l e c t i v e  o b j e c t i v e s .  Hi jacking belongs  t o  t h e  r e p e r t o i r e  of on ly  
a  few groups anywhere. Uachine-breaking, once s f r equen t  occurrence,  hnn 
dropped o u t  of t h e  r e p e r t o i r e .  So have tlie c l ~ s r i v a r i  and t h e  serenade.  So 
has  t h e  r e g u l a r  i n t e r - v i l l a g e  f i g h t ;  only  f o o t b a l l  remains t o  remind u s  of 
t h a t  o l d  form of b l o o d l e t t i n g .  
Almost no one anywhere i s  now f a m i l i a r  w i th  a  Eorm of a c t i o n  which 
was once canmon i r ?  Europe: t h e  r e b e l l i o n  i n  which an e x i s t i n g ,  func t ion ing  
group such a s  an  army o r  a  conmnrnity assembles ,  c a s t s  o f f  its c o n s t i t u t e d  
a u t h o r i t i e s ,  commissions t h a t  succes so r  (who knows f u l l  w e l l  t h a t  once 
t h e  a c t i o n  is completed he is l i k e l y  t o  be  hanged, o r  worse, f o r  I l l s  pa ins )  
t o  p re sen t  a  s e t  of g r i evances  and demands t o  s higher  a u t h o r i t y ,  r c s j n t s  
w i th  de t e rmina t ion  u n t i l  t hose  demands have been met o r  u n t i l  i t  hns been 
u t t e r l y  des t royed ,  then r e t u r n s  t o  its previous  s t a t e  of submission t o  t h e  
c o n s t i t u t e d  a u t h o r i t i e s .  Remember t h e  r e c u r r e n t  r e v o l t s  of t h e  v i c t o r i o u s  
but  unpaid Spanish armies  i n  t h e  Nether lands  toward t h e  end of t h e  s i x t e e n t h  
century:  they r e g u l a r l y  e l e c t e d  t h e i r  own c h i e f ,  t h e  e l e c t o ;  they dec l s r cd  
they would fo l low no one e l s e ' s  o r d e r s  u n t i l  t h e i r  demands f o r  hack pay 
and o t h e r  b e n e f i t s  were s a t i s f i e d .  They sometimes cont inued t o  f i g h t ,  
even t o  f i g h t  h e r o i c a l l y .  bu t  under t h e i r  own d i r e c t t o n .  'Chey sometimes 
p i l l a g e d  when i t  appeared t h e i r  demands would no t  be met. They always 
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demanded amnesty f o r  a l l  a c t i o n s  committed du r ing  t h e  r e b e l l i o n  -- and they 
usua l ly  won. Armies mat tered t o  t h e  Spanish king (Parker  1973). 
Or r e c a l l  t h e  Pi lgr image of Grace, t h e  g r e a t  Yorkshire  r i s i n g  of 1536 
a g a i n s t  Henry V I I I ' s  d i sposses s ion  of t h e  monaster ies  and a g a i n s t  o t h e r  
measures des igned t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  r o y a l  revenues. The "commons" r o s e  by 
t ens  of thousands, took gentlemen f o r  t h e i r  c a p t a i n s  and London lawyer 
Robert Aske n s  t h e i r  ch i e f  c a p t a i n .  They even tua l ly  c o n t r o l l e d  much of 
t he  North. But t h e  Duke of Norfolk 's  vague, l y i n g  promises t o  t ake  t h e i r  
ca se  t o  t h e  King d i spe r sed  them. By J u l y  of 1537 Robert Aske had d i ed  on 
a  s c a f f o l d  a t  t h e  c a s t l e  of York, and two hundred o t h e r  r e b e l s  had per ished 
a t  t h e  execu t ione r ' s  hand (Dodds and Dodds 1915). The word "mutiny" sti l l  
conveys s sense  of t h a t  o ld  form of a c t i o n .  But now we use  t h e  term almost 
exc lus ive ly  i n  a  m i l i t a r y  con tex t .  We f a i l  t o  recognize  t h a t  i t  was once 
an e s t a b l i s h e d ,  i f  r i s k y ,  path  o u t  of an i n t o l e r a b l e  s i t u a t i o n .  
Hi jacking,  mutiny, machine-breaking, c h a r i v a r i s ,  v i l l a g e  f i g h t s ,  t ax  
r e b e l l i o n s ,  food r i o t s ,  c o l l e c t i v e  se l f - immolat ion,  lynching,  vende t t a  
have a l l  belonged t o  t h e  s t anda rd  c o l l e c t i v e - s c t i o n  r e p e r t o i r e  of aome 
group a t  aome time. In  one s e t t i n g  o r  ano the r ,  people  have known r o u t i n e l y  
how t o  i n i t i a t e  every one of them. People have a t  sometime recognized 
every one of them a s  a  l e g i t i m a t e ,  f e a s i b l e  way of a c t i n g  on an u n s a t i s f i e d  
g r i evance  o r  a a p i r n t i o n .  Most of t h e s e  forms of a c t i o n  a r e  t e c h n i c a l l y  
f e a s i b l e  i n  contemporary America. Yet they occur r a r e l y ,  o r  not  a t  a l l .  
More important ,  no s u b s t a n t i a l  American group wi th  a  p re s s ing  gr ievance i 
o r  a s p i r a t i o n  cons ide r s  any of them t o  be  a  genuine a l t e r n a t i v e  t o  
demonstra t ing,  s t r i k i n g ,  p e t i t i o n i n g  o r  forming a  p re s su re  group. They 
do  not belong t o  t h e  contemporary American r e p e r t o i r e  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  
To s p e c i f y  t h e  menning of r e p e r t o i r e ,  i t  he lps  t o  aak t h i n  ques t ton :  
t o  what degree  does  t h e  group p r e f e r  t h e  means i t  has  used be fo re  over  
t hose  which a r e  t h e o r e t i c a l l y  a v a i l a h l e  f o r  t h e  same purpose? That i s  a  
d i f f i c u l t  ques t ion  t o  answer inxthe  r e a l  world. I t  is hard t o  knov two 
th ings :  1 )  what o t h e r  forms of a c t i o n  a r e  r e a l l y  "ava l l ab l e"  t o  a  group, 
2) t h e  r e l a t i v e  appropr i a t eness  and e f f i c i e n c y  of t h e  means t h e  group 
a c t u a l l y  u s e s  and t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  meana which a r e  t h e o r e t i c a l l y  nva i lnh le .  
However, two a o r t a  of n a t u r a l  exper iments  occur o f t e n  enough t o  provide 
informat ion on t h e  s u b j e c t .  F i r s t ,  s i m i l a r  groups i n  s i m i l a r  s e t t i n g s  
sometimes use  q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  means of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  I n  tl ie 1950s. 
f o r  example, we f i n d  Swedish t r a n s p o r t  workers t ak ing  t h e i r  g r i evances  t o  
government agenc ie s  wh i l e  t h e i r  B r i t i s h  coun te rpa r t s  go  o u t  on s t r i k e .  
Second, t h e  meana of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  a l t e r  and spread from one group t o  
another .  For i n s t ance ,  i n  t h e  I t a l y  of 1919 sit-down s t r i k e s  were r a t h e r  
a  novel ty .  But by August, 1920 ha l f  a  m i l l i o n  workers were occupying 
t h e i r  f a c t o r i e s .  Given such even t s ,  we cangauge t h e  importance of reper-  
t o i r e s  by comparing t h e  success ive  cho ices  of s i m i l a r  groups and by ob- 
s e r v i n g  innovat ion and d i f f u s i o n  i n  t h e  means o f  a c t i o n .  
F igu re  5-2 p r e s e n t s  fou r  p o s s i b l e  r e s u l t s  of such comparisons. In  
each case ,  we a r e  d e a l i n g  wi th  a  group which is p repa r ing  t o  a c t  co l l ec -  
t i v e l y  i n  c i rcumstances  s i m i l a r  t o  o t h e r  c i rcumstances  i t  has  fnced be- 
f o r e .  We i d e n t i f y  a l l  t h e  means which a r e  t h e o r e t i c a l l y  o r  p r a c t i c a l l y  
"avai lable"  t o  t h e  group, and then a r r a y  them i n  terms of t h e i r  s i m i l a r i t y  
t o  t h e  means t h e  group has  p rev ious ly  employed. I n  t h e  shee r - e f f i c i ency  
model, s i m i l a r i t y  t o  f a m i l i a r  means makes no d i f f e r e n c e ;  t h e  only  ques t ion  
is t h e  appropr i a t eness  of t h e  means t o  t h e  end. That model is extreme; i t  
may, i n  f a c t ,  be more e f f i c i e n t  t o  u se  f a m i l i a r  means because f a m i l i a r i t y  
i t s e l f  l e a d s  t o  b e t t e r  execut ion.  The advantage-of-famil ieci ty  model 
Figure  5-2: Four Models of Group Readiness t o  Adopt New Meana of 
C o l l e c t i v e  Action. 
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t akes  t h a t  l i k e l i h o o d  i n t o  account ;  i t  p o s t u l a t e s  a  smooth g rad ien t  i n  t h e  
p r o b a b i l i t y  of adopt ion from moat f a m i l i a r  t o  l e a s t  f a m i l i a r .  The model im- 
p l i e s  t h a t  f a m i l i a r i t y  is simply one of s e v e r a l  f a c t o r s  a f f e c t i n g  t h e  
I cho ice  of a  p a r t i c u l a r  means from among a l l  those  which a r e  t h e o r e t i c a l l y  
a v a i l a b l e .  The t h i r d  model desc r ibea  a  f l e x i b l e  r e p e r t o i r e .  Tn t h i s  
caae ,  t h e  group has  a  heavy b i a s  toward meana i t  has  previounly used. bu t  
is not  complete ly  c losed  t o  innovat ion.  F i n o l l y ,  t h e  r i g i d - r e p e r t o i r e  
model desc r ibea  a  group which chooses f a m i l i a r  meana u n f a i l i n g l y .  To t h e  
e x t e n t  t h a t  t h i s  model app l i ea .  we would expect  innovat ion t o  be  r a r e ,  and 
t o  occur through breaks  and c r i s e s .  
I f  t h e  shee r - e f f i c i ency  o r  advantage-of-famil iar i ty  model a p p l i e a ,  
i t  is  mis leading t o  speak of r e p e r t o i r e s  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  Only i n  
t h e  t h i r d  and f o u r t h  c a s e s  is t h e  word a  u s e f u l  summary of t h e  r e a l i t y .  
Thus we have an  empi r i ca l  t e a t  f o r  t h e  u t i l i t y  of t h e  concept: how c l o s e  
t h e  observable  behavior  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t o r s  comes t o  one o r  another  of 
t h e  fou r  modela. My own hypo thes i s  is t h a t  t h e  f l e x i b l e  r e p e r t o i r e  i a  
t h e  moat gene ra l  caae  f o r  organized groups. The l e a s  organized t h e  group. 
t h e  more l i k e l y  t h a t  t h e  advantage-of-familiority model w i l l  d e s c r i b e  i ts 
behavior .  We might reasonably  suppose t h a t  a  contender  -- e s p e c i a l l y  a  




long time t ends  t o  move from a  f l e x i b l e  t o  a  r i g i d  r e p e r t o i r e .  Rout ini -  
za t ion  s e t s  i n .  I t  is hard,  on t h e  o t h e r  hand, t o  imagine any contender  
mainta ining t h e  shee r - e f f i c i ency  p a t t e r n  f o r  a  a i g n i f i c o n t  span of time. 
A f l e x i b l e  r e p e r t o i r e  pe rmi t s  cont inuous .  gradual  change i n  t h e  
group 's  meana. The change may occur  through i m i t a t i o n  of o t h e r  groups o r  
through innovat ion.  The i m i t a t i o n  of o t h e r  groupa is moat l i k f l y  when t h e  
members of one contender  observe t h a t  another  contender  i s  us ing  a  new 
-- 
Low High 
D i s s i m i l a r i t y  from 
Ex i s t ing  Meana 
means s u c c e s s f t ~ l l y ,  o r  new1.y us ing  an o ld  means s u c c e s s f u l l y .  That i s  no 
doubt one of t h e  main reasons  "waves" of s t r i k e s  o r  demonstra t ions  occur: 
t h e  f a c t  t h a t  a  g iven  s o r t  of group g e t s  somewhere wi th  t h e  t a c t i c  sp reads  
t h e  expec ta t ion  t h a t  employers o r  governments w i l l  be  vu lne rab le  t o  t h e  
snme t a c t i c  i n  t h e  hands of o t h e r  s i m i l a r  groups. 
Innovat ion is r a r e r ,  and ha rde r  t o  exp la in .  One of t h e  main pro- 
ceases  i s  s u r e l y  t h e  s t r e t c h i n g  of t h e  boundar ies  of forms of a c t i o n  which 
a l r eady  belong t o  t h e  r e p e r t o i r e .  I n  t h e  e a r l y  n ine t een th  cen tu ry ,  f o r  
i n s t ance ,  we begin  t o  s e e  t h e  French c h a r i v a r i  i n  a  new gu i se .  It no 
longer aimed e x c l l ~ s i v e l y  s t  cuckolds .  May-September marr iages  and couples  
who f a i l e d  t o  t r e a t  t h e  l o c a l  bache lo r s  t o  t he  customary n u p t i a l  ce l e -  
b r a t i o n .  Many c h a r i v a r i s  began t o  dramat ize  t h e  oppos i t i on  of l o c a l  people  
t o  a  p a r t i c u l a r  p u b 1 . i ~  o f f i c i a l  o r  po l . i t i ca1  cand ida t e .  Likewise. t h e  
complimentnry serenade extended t o  p o l i t i c a l  f i g u r e s  who had e n t h u s i a s t i c  
popular suppor t .  I n  France, t h e  f i r s t  ha l f  of t h e  n ine t een th  cen tu ry  was 
the  heyday of t h e  p o l l t i c a l  c h a r i v a r i l s e r e n a d e .  Then t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n  gave 
way t o  t h e  demonstra t ion,  t h e  r a l l y ,  t h e  pub l i c  banquet and t h e  formal  
meeting 
In  a  p a r a l l e l  f a sh ion ,  t h e  American p a t r i o t s  who mobilized from t h e  
Stamp Act c r i s i s  onward adapted o ld  Engl ish  customs such a s  t a r r i n g  and 
f e a t h e r i n g  o r  r i d i n g  t h e  s t a n g  ( r i d i n g  a  r ep roba te  ou t  of t a r n  on a  r a i l ) .  
N a r  t he se  shaming a c t i o n s  coupled wi th  mock pub l i c  t r i a l s ,  and app l i ed  t o  
1 ,oyal is ts  and o the r  presumed enemies of t he  c o l o n i s t s .  I n  t h e  French 
and American c a s e s ,  both  t h e  form of t h e  a c t i o n  and i ts o h j e c t  changed. 
But i n  both  c a s e s  t h e  b a s i c  a c t i o n  was a l r e a d y  p a r t  of t h e  popular  reper-  
t o i r e .  
I\ popu ln t lon ' s  r e p e r t o i r e  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  gene ra l ly  i nc ludes  
on ly  a  handful  of a l t e r n a t i v e s .  I t  gene ra l ly  changes slowly. seems obvious  
and n a t u r a l  t o  t h e  people  involved.  I t  resembles an elementary lnngunge: 
f a m i l i a r  a s  t h e  day t o  i t s  u s e r s ,  f o r  a l l  i ts p o s s i b l e  qua in tnes s  o r  incom- 
p r e h e n s i b i l i t y  t o  an o u t s i d e r .  Ilow. then,  does  such a  r e p e r t o i r e  come 
i n t o  being? How does i t  change? The answer s u r e l y  inc ludes  a t  l e a s t  
t h e s e  e lements :  
1. t h e  s t anda rds  of r i g h t s  and j u s t i c e  p r e v n i l t n g  i n  t h e  populat ion;  
2. t h e  d a i l y  r o u t i n e s  of t h e  populat ion:  
3. t h e  popu la t ion ' s  i n t e r n a l  o rgan iza t ion ;  
4.  i t s  accumulated exper ience wi th  p r i o r  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n ;  
5. t h e  p a t t e r n  of r e p r e s s i o n  i n  t h e  world t o  which t h e  populat ion 
belongs .  
Let u s  t h ink  b r i e f l y  about  each of t hese  e lements .  
The p r e v a i l i n g  s t anda rds  o f  r i g h t s  and j u s t i c e  govern t h e  accep- 
t a b i l i t y  of t h e  components of v a r i o u s  p o s s i b l e  types  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  
They do not  n e c e s s a r i l y  govern t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  Corm of a c t i o n .  Por exnmple. 
a  group which cons ide r s  t h a t  t h e  s e t  of persons  d i r e c t l y  producing an  ob- 
j e c t  o r  a  s e r v i c e  has  a  p r i o r  r j g h t  t o  i ts consumption is l i k e l y  t o  condone 
some kinds  of f o r c i b l e  r e s i s t a n c e  t o  exp ropr i a t ion  of o b j e c t s  and s e r v i c e s .  
That is t h e  i m p l i c i t  r a t i o n a l e  of t h e  modern European food r i o t  and t a x  re- 
b e l l i o n .  A s  important  r i g h t s  came t o  be  inves t ed  i n ,  end sometimes gtlar- 
anteed by, t h e  n a t i o n a l  s t a t e ,  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  i t s e l f  na t ionn l i zed .  
The popu la t ion ' s  d a i l y  r o u t i n e s  ma t t e r  becnuse they a f f e c t  t h e  e a s e  
wi th  which one o r  ano the r  of t h e  p o s s i b l e  forms of a c t i o n  can n c t r ~ a l l y  
be c a r r i e d  on. The s t r i k e  becomes f e n s i b l e  when cons ide rab le  numbers of 
people  assemble t o  work i n  t h e  same l o c a t i o n .  The no tab le  s h i f t  of col-  
l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  sway from r o u t i n e  assemblies  such a s  markets and f e s t i v n l s  
toword d e l i b e r a t e l y - c a l l e d  g a t h e r i n g s  a s  i n  demonstra t ions  and s t r i k e s  re-  
s u l t e d  i n  p n r t  from t h e  r e s i d e n t i a l  d i s p e r s i o n  of occupa t iona l  groups nnd 
of o t h e r s  who shared a  common i n t e r e s t .  They no longer  came toge the r  
caaua l ly  nnd d i scussed  t h e i r  comon  g r i evances  o r  a n p i r o t i o n s  i n c i d e n t a l l y .  
In  t h a t  p roces s ,  t he  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  of European women i n  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  
dec l ined  no t i ceab ly ;  t h e  segregated worlds  of p o l i t i c s  and l abo r  orgoni- 
za t ion  became mole p re se rves .  
I n  European and American c i t i e s ,  t h a t  p roces s  of s eg rega t ion  passed 
t l~ rough  t h r e e  rough a toges .  I n  t h e  f i r s t ,  t h e r e  was l i t t l e  d i e t i n c t i o n  
between home and work. For example, craf tsmen l i v e d  and gathered i n  t h e i r  
shops and i n  t11e nearby s t r e e t s .  The growth of l a r g e r  f i rms  and workplaces 
produced a  s e p a r a t i o n  of home and work. The t y p i c a l  arrangement,  however, 
was f o r  workers t o  crowd i n t o  dwe l l ings  w i t h i n  walking d i s t a n c e  of t h e i r  
ellops, o f f i c e s  and h i r i n g  s i t e s .  Thus d i s t i n c t i v e  working-class neighbor- 
hoods formed. They tended t o  b e  sma l l  i n  s c a l e  and segregated by c r a f t .  
Between t h e  workplace and t h e  home grew up ga the r ing  p l aces  f requented by 
s i n g l e  groups of workers: pubs, cn fe s .  union h e l l s ,  s o c i a l  c lubs .  With 
t h e  f u r t h e r  growth i n  t h e  s i z e  and seg rega t ion  of workplaces, journeys  t o  
work became longer  and working-clnsa neighborhoods l a r g e r  bu t  more hetero-  
geneous w i ~ l i  r e spec t  t o  c r a f t s .  Gather ing witli your fellow-workers near  
t h e  workplace became i e s s  and l e a s  f e a s i b l e .  
Thew chnnges i n  workers '  d a i l y  r o u t i n e s  g e n e r a l l y  r a i s e d  t h e  mobili-  
z a t i o n  c o s t a  of p a r t i c u l a r  t r a d e s .  They t h e r e f o r e  tended t o  reduce t h e  
l e v e l  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  by t r ade .  A t  t h e  same time, t h e  changes may 
hove lowered t h e  c o s t s  of mob i l i za t ion  f o r  t h e  urban working c l a s s  a s  a  
whole. Thot p o s s i b i l i t y  dese rves  f u r t h e r  i n v e s t i g a t i o n .  For t he  p re sen t  
d i scuss ion ,  however, t h e  important  t h ing  t o  n o t i c e  i s  t h a t  t h e  form of 
working-class c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  changed i n  conjunct ion witli tlie a l t e r a t i o n  
of urban form. To t h e  f i r s t  of our  rough s t a g e s  ( t h e  per iod of l i t t l e  o r  
no home-work sepa ra t ion )  correspond a  r e p e r t o i r e  of smal l -scale  a c t i o n a  
which b u i l t  d i r e c t l y  on t h e  s t r u c t u r e  of t h e  t r a d e :  t h e  p e t i t i o n  from 
t h e  l e a d e r s  of t h e  c r a f t ,  t h e  p u b l i c  process ion,  t h e  s taged baL t l e  he- 
tween r i v a l  groups of a r t i s a n s ,  and s o  on. In  t h e  in t e rmed ia t e  s t n g e  OF 
l a r g e r  workplaces and ad jacen t  homogeneous dwel l ing a r e a s  we s e e  t h e  r i s e  
of t h e  s t r i k e ,  t h e  b l a c k l i s t  of uncooperat ive  employers, t l ie o s t r n c i m  o r  
punishment of non-conforming workers,  and s o  f o r t h .  At t h e  s t a g e  of l n r g e  
f i rms  and ex tens ive  home-work s e p a r a t i o n ,  t h e  d e l i b e r n t e l y - c a l l e d  meeting. 
r a l l y .  demonstra t ion and s t r i k e  took over .  
I n  t h i s  s e t  of changes. i t  is hard t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  t h e  e f f e c t s  of 
a l t e r a t i o n s  i n  d a i l y  r o u t i n e s  from t h e  e f f e c t s  of our next  f a c t o r :  changes 
i n  t h e  r e l e v a n t  groups '  i n t e r n a l  o rgnn izn t ion .  Dai ly  r o u t i n e s  ond in- 
t e r n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n  ove r l ap .  The t h r e e  s t a g e s  correspond approximately 
t o  pure  c r a f t  o rgan iza t ion ,  t h e  organization of p r o l e t a r i a n i z l n g  t r ade0  
and t h e  fu l l - f l edged  p r o l e t a r i a n  s t r u c t u r e .  The r e l i g i o u s  c o n f r a t e r n i t y  is 
a  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  exp res s ion  of s o l i d a r i t y  a t  t h e  f i r s t  s t a g e ,  t h e  mutual- 
b e n e f i t  s o c i e t y  a t  t h e  second, t h e  b u r e a u c r a t i c  t r a d e  union a t  t h e  t h i r d .  
These s h i f t s  i n  o rgan iza t ion  i n t e r a c t  wi th  changing d a i l y  r o u t i n e s  t o  
make d i f f e r e n t  forms of c o l l e c t i v e  nc t ion  f e a s i b l e  nnd ndvantap,eo~~a.  
P r i o r  exper ience a l s o  counts .  The r e l evan t  exper ience i n c l u d e s  both  
t h e  contender ' s  own successes  o r  f n i l u r e a  and t h e  contender's obse rvn t ions  
of o the r  s i m i l a r  groups. We nee Lliat blend of previoun p r a c t i c e  and ob- 
s e r v a t i o n  i n  t h e  r i c h  s t r e e t  t h e a t e r  which grew up i n  t h e  American co lon ie s  
from t h e  Stamp Act c r i s i s  of 1765 Lo the  Revolut ion.  Mock t r i a l s ,  pn- 
r ad ing  of e f f i g i e s ,  r i t u a l i z e d  a t t a c k s  on t h e  homes nnd o f f i c e p  of r o y n l  
o f f i c i a l s ,  t a r r i n g  and f e a t h e r i n g  of L o y a l i s t s  accompanied p e t i t i o n s ,  de- 
c l a r a t i o n s  and solemn assemblies .  Within weeks of Boston 's  f i r s t  d i s p l a y  
of a  boot con ta in ing  a  d e v i l  a s  a  symbol of Stamp Act promoter Lord Bute. 
t he  boot  and d e v i l  had become s t anda rd  p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  urban ga the r ings  t o  
oppose t h e  Stamp Act up and down t h e  American c o a s t .  The p a r t i c u l a r  form 
and con ten t  of t hese  g a t h e r i n g s  were new. But a l l  t h e i r  p r i n c i p a l  e l e -  
ments were a l r e a d y  we l l - e s t ab l i shed  ways of d e a l i n g  wi th  dec l a red  enemies 
of t h e  people .  The p r i o r  expe r i ence  of urban s a i l o r s ,  a r t i s a n s  and mer- 
chan t s  shaped t h e  r evo lu t iona ry  r e p e r t o i r e  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  
Repression l i kewise  a f f e c t s  t h e  r e p e r t o i r e .  Repression makes a  
l a r g e  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  t h e  s h o r t  run because o t h e r  powerful groups a f f e c t  
t h e  r e l a t i v e  c o s t s  and probable  r e t u r n s  of d i f f e r e n t  forms of a c t i o n  
t h e o r e t i c a l l y  o v s i l ~ b l e  t o  a  p a r t i c u l a r  group. I t  a l s o  ma t t e r s  i n  t h e  
long run hecause t h a t  s o r t  of c o s t - s e t t i n g  t ends  t o  e l i m i n a t e  some forms I 
of a c t i o n  a s  i t  channels  behavior  i n t o  o t h e r s .  The widespread l e g a l i z a -  
t i o n  of t h e  s t r i k e  i n  t h e  1860s and 1870s s o  inc reased  i ts a t t r a c t i v e n e s s  i 
r e l a t i v e  t o  d i r e c t  a t t a c k s  on employers end on i n d u s t r i a l  p rope r ty  t h a t  
t h e  l a t t e r  v i r t u a l l y  disappeared from t h e  workers '  r e p e r t o i r e .  A l l  t h e s e  
changes, however, occur w i th  a  l a g .  The forms of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  which 
worked du r ing  t h e  l a s t  c r i s i s  have a  s p e c i a l  appea l  du r ing  t h i s  one a s  
w e l l .  Thus t h e  successes  and f a i l u r e s  of con ten t ion  f o r  power produce 
changes i n  t h e  r e p e r t o i r e  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n ,  but  only  wi th in  t h e  l i m i t s  
s e t  by t h e  a c t o r s '  own d a i l y  r o u t i n c s  and concept ions  of j u s t i c e .  
The idea  of a  s tandard r e p e r t o i r e  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n s .  i f  cor-  
r e c t ,  s i m p l i f i e s  t h e  s tudy  of v a r i a t i o n s  i n  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  from one 
p l ace ,  t ime and populat ion t o  ano the r .  It s i m p l i f i e s  by breaking t h e  
problem i n t o  two p a r t s :  how t h e  populat ion i n  ques t ion  came t o  have i ts 
p a r t i c u l a r  r e p e r t o i r e ,  how t h e  populat ion s e l e c t e d  a  p a r t i c u l a r  form of 
a c t i o n  (or  no a c t i o n  a t  a l l )  from t h a t  r e p e r t o i r e .  The a n a l y s i s  of inno- 
v a t i o n  i n  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  -- f o r  example, t h e  inven t ion  and d l f f u s i o n  
of t h e  s i t - i n  a s  a  way of p re s s ing  f o r  equa l  r i g h t s  i n  pub l i c  nccomoda- 
t i o n s  -- breaks  n e a t l y  i n t o  t h e  same two p a r t s .  
The idea  of a  s t anda rd  r e p e r t o i r e  a l s o  provides  i n s i g h t  i n t o  "con- 
tagion"  and "spontaneity" i n  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  It r a i s e s  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  
t h a t  when a  p a r t i c u l a r  form o f  r i o t  o r  demonstra t ion sp reads  r a p i d l y ,  what 
d i f f u s e s  i s  no t  t h e  model of t h e  behavior  i t s e l f ,  bu t  t h e  informat ion -- 
c o r r e c t  o r  not  -- t h a t  t i e  c o s t a  and b e n e f i t s  a s soc i a t ed  wi th  t h e  a c t i o n  
have suddenly changed. The news t h a t  t h e  a u t h o r i t i e s  o r e  (or  a r e  no t )  
c r ack ing  down on demonstra tors  i n  c i t y  A f i l t e r s  r a p i d l y  t o  c i t y  B. and 
in f luences  t h e  e s t i m a t e s  of p o t e n t i a l  demonstra tors  i n  c i t y  B a s  t o  t h e  
probable  consequences of demonstra t ing.  I n  t h a t  regard t h e  grouches  
who argue t h a t  governmental "permisiveness" w i l l  encourage more a g i t a t i o n  
a r e  o f t e n  r i g h t .  It is c l e a r .  l i kewise ,  t h a t  an  a c t i o n  can be "spon- 
taneous" i n  t h e  sense  of no t  having been planned i n  advance by any of t h e  
p a r t i c i p a n t s ,  and y e t  be  h igh ly  organized,  even r i t u a l i z e d .  There t h e  
grouches a r e  u s u a l l y  wrong; t h e  grouchy i n c l i n a t i o n  is t o  a t t r i b u t e  sus-  
t a i n e d ,  concer ted a c t i o n  t o  some s o r t  of conspiracy.  
A Case i n  Point :  The S t r i k e  
Over t h e  l a s t  century o r  s o ,  Gie most v i s i b l e  a l t e r a t i o n  of t h e  
working-class  r e p e r t o i r e  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  i n  v e s t e r n  c o u n t r i e s  has  
been t h e  r i s e  of t h e  s t r i k e .  Some form of concer ted work s toppage goes 
f a r  back i n  time. What i s  more, t h e  i d e a  muat have been invented inde- 
pendent ly  many t imes;  t h e  d i s p a r a t e  words f o r  t h e  s t r i k e  which emerged 
i n  v a r i o u s  European languages suggest  m u l t i p l e  o r i g i n s :  s c iope ro ,  t u rnou t ,  
Streik, grsve, zabastovka, huelga. f evert he less, strikes were rare 
events at the beginning of the nineteenth century. By 1900, they were 
routine facts of working-class life. They were generally illegal, and 
frequently prosecuted, in 1800. . A century later, they were generally 
legal, and rarely prosecuted. What is more, in most western countries 
the intensity of strike activity continued to rise past the middle of the 
twentieth century (see Hibbs 1976). 'In the process, atrikes routinized: 
settled down to a few standard formats, acquired their own jurisprudence, 
became objects of official statistics. By "routinized," I do not mean 
 calmed down." Despite the complex, standard rules according to which 
they are played, p r o f e s s i ~ n a l h o c k e ~ m a t c h e s  are often angry, bone-crun- 
ching affairs. The same is true of atrikes. 
llow and why did strikes enter the repertoire? In multiple ways, 
proletarianization created the strike. By definition, proletarianization 
created the worker who exercised little or no discretionnry control over 
the means of production and who was dependent for survival on the sale of 
his or her labor power. That proletarian and the worker threatened with 
becoming that proletarian have long been the chief participants in strikes. 
(The word "proletarian" has, alas, recently lost some of the precision 
Marx gave it in Dns Kapital. In Marx's analysis the central elements were 
sepnration from the means of production + wage-labor. Agricultural workers 
were. in fact, the chief historical case Marx discussed. He certainly 
did not concentrate on unskilled factory workers.) Of all workers, the 
proletarian moat clearly had interests opposing him directly to his em- 
ployer. The proletarinn had the moat to gain through the'withh~ldin~ 
of labor power, and the least to gain by other means. 
N o w ,  the pace of proletarianization increased greatly during the 
nineteenth century. My own minimum guess is that in Europe as a whole from 
1800 to 1900, while the total population rose from about 190 million to 500 
million, the proletarian population increased from about 90 million to 300 
I 
million. If that is true, the very kinds of workers who were the prime 
candidates for strike activity were multiplying. Furthermore. many strikes 
were about proletarianization. Whether the immediate iasue was wages. 
hours or working conditions. the underlying struggle c m o n l y  turned about 
the employer's effort to exercise greater and greater control over the dia- 
position of the means of production, and therefore over the worker's own 
use of his labor. . 
In his lucid analysis of "remuneration systems," Bernard Mottee dis- 
cusses the broad nineteenth-century movement from various forms of task 
compensation to various forms of time-effort compensation. A clear exnmple 
of task compensation is the set of contracting systems (marchandage) in 
which a family or work team undertook to produce a certain number of Fin- 
ished objects meeting certain standards at an agreed-upon price. Nuch 
mining, woodworking and textile production once took place under contracting 
arrangements. Indeed, early quasi-factories often consisted of assemblages 
of more or less autonomous artisans who brought their own tools and ma- 
terials into a c m o n  workplace. (Michael llanagan gives the example of the 
artisanal filemakers of nineteenth-century Le Chambon-Feugerolles, near 
St. Etienne, who sometimes worked at home and sometimes in omall shops, de- 
pending on inclination and the current level of activity in the 
trade. ) 
Time-effort compensation takes many forms. but the two most obviolle 
are the hourly wage and piecework. Piecework differo greatly from taskwork: 
the employer characteristically owns the materials, tools and workplace. 
and controls the basic location, timing and routines of the work; in ad- 
dition, the "piece" in question is not normally a finished product, but one 
small portion of it. Most contemporary forms of production incentives fall 
into the same category. They assume a proletarian labor force, while task- 
work and contracting assume workers who have substantial control over the 
means and conditions of production. 
As Mottez points out, a nineteenth-century entrepreneur who wanted 
to assemble a group of relatively skilled workers into a good-sized pro- 
ductive unit had no choice but to adopt some form of task compensation. 
But when capital accumulated, when the scale of production rose, and when 
innovations in technology and work-discipline made it possible to routinize. 
subdivide and demystify the basic productive tasks, employers pushed toward 
greater and greater pre-planning and surveillance of the entire process. 
That included pushing toward time-effort compensation. 
In general, workers resisted the entire process when they could. Not 
that they were simple conservatives; although on the average they did prefer 
work arran~ements they knew and could somehow manage to those they did not 
know, their resistance sometimes took the form of demands for radical reor- 
ganization of work and social life: the word "socialism" itself originally 
represented the vision of a social order in whicli producers would control 
their own fates. The strike grew up as one of the primary means by which 
artisans threatened with proletarianization and semi-proletarians threatened 
with complete loss of control over the disposition of their labor fought 
back. 
If my analysis is correct, the strike entered the collective-action 
repertoires of European workers as a reactive means, but later became a 
primary meana of collective proaction. In the process, the strike routinized. 
One sign is its legalization. Moat western countries legalized some form 
of strike activity during the latter half of the njneteenth century: Creat 
Britain led the way in 1824. Saxony followed in 1861, France in 1864. Bel- 
gium in 1866. Prusaia in 1869. Austria in 1870. Another sign js the advent 
of regular statistical reporting: there, the 1880s and 1890s saw tlie 
launching of annual strike statistics in many western countries. including 
the United States. A third sign is the growth of professional bureaucracies 
devoted to monitoring, regulating, reporting and, on occasion. settling 
strikes. These officials, employers and organized workers hammered out 
standard definitions of strikes and lockouts. They worked out rules con- 
cerning the proper behavior of the parties to a strike. They developed 
meana of registering and publicizing a strike's end and outcome. They, the 
courts, police and other public officials were fixing the precise place 
of the strike in the day's repertoire of collect~ve action. To he sure. 
the rules remained uncertain in important regards, the rules changed na 
the balance of power changed, and most of tlie rule-making occurred as a 
by-product of bitter struggle. That is the way repertoires of collcctive 
action usually change. - 
Michelle Perrot's collective biography of the roughly 3,000 strikes 
which occurred in France from 1870 to 1890 catches an important period in 
the routinization of the strike. The book is a feast: rich with the folk- 
lore, rhetoric and tactics of strike activity, jammed with telling obser- 
vation on the context of the issues about which workers struck. The 
largest theme of the book, however, is that the 18908 tamed and drilled 
the strike, which had previously displayed great spontaneity, and had ex- 
pressed the immediate concerns of workers quite directly. The growth of 
large, centralized labor unions, in Perrot's view, helped smother the strike's 
creativity, its spontaneity, perhaps its revolutionary potential. On the 
last point some doubt remnins: the 18900 brought a great swelling of strike 
activity, an outpouring of revolutionary displays on the occasion of May 
Day and the great strlken, and the heyday of anarcho-syndicelism. Further- 
more, smaller-scale workers' organizations had been crucial to the develop- 
ment of local strike activity before 1890. Nevertheless, the main obser- 
vation stands: through an interplny of unions, workers, government and em- 
ployers, the strike was indeed standardizing. 
In terms of the checklist of factors in the production of collective- 
action repertoires which we looked at earlier, the nineteenth century 
crystallization of the strike looks something like this: , 
1. prevailing standards of rights and justice: artisanal view that 
the contribution of labor gives n right to control the dinposition 
of its product and the conditions of.its use. confronting bourgeois 
view that the ownership of capital bestows a right to its untrammeled 
disposition; 
2. daily routines of the population: increasing concentration of 
workcra in large shops and the equivalent; 
3. population's internal organization: combination of residues of 
croft organization, e'mployer pressure toward proletarianization, 
increasing residential segregation of workers; 
4. accumulated experience with collective action: demonstrated suc- 
cess of artisanal strikes, failure of appeals to officials and 
patrons; 
5. pattern oE repression: increasing readiness of governmentn LO 
tolerate limited forms of strike activity. 
None of these explains the invention of the strike, which goes bock well be- 
fore the nineteenth century. But they are a convenient inventory of the 
major factors in the nineteenth-century emergence of the strike as a 
standard workers' performance in western countries. 
The strike continued to change in the twentieth century. Figure 5-3 
shows neveral aspects of that alteration for France From 1890 to 1954. 
The three-dimensionnl graphs represent the median duration, the n~~mber of 
strikers per strike and the strike rnte in terms of strikes per year per 
100.000 workers in the labor force. The volume of the solid gives an ap- 
proximation of striker-days per year. The shape of the aolid then sums 
up the combination of length, size and frequency of strj.kes. In the 18900, 
French strikes were relatively small and infrequent, but they tended to last 
a long time. In the,1950s. French strikes averaged large and frequent, but 
short. That general change in shape was very common in western countries 
(Shorter and Tilly 1974: chapter 12). It reflected. among other things, 
the shift from small shops. artisnnsl organization and local unjons toward 
large plants, fully proletarian workers and large-scale unione. 
While these changes were quite general, nntionsl patterns of strike 
activity diverged considerably. The general withering away of the strike 
which many theorists expected to come with "mature" industrialization fniled 
to materialize; strike frequencies, sizes and volumes genernlly rose after 
World War I and remained high or cltmbed even higher after World War 11. 
Yet important contrasts upened up. 
One of the most dramatic contrasts separated the Scandinavian 
countries from the rest of the West. While strike levels were reaching new 
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Figure 5-3: The Alteration of French Strike Shapes, 1890-1954. 
Median Daya = 6 
StrikerslStrike = 250.5 
Strikes/100.000 - 2.2 
8 Median DayslStrike 0 %a 
Median Daya = 7 
StrikerslStrike - 477.2 
Strikes/100,000 - 4.9 
Median Days - 1 
StrikeraIStrike = 747.2 
Strikea1100.000 = 9.2 
heights elsewhere, they were declining in Scandinavia. Joan Lind'a com- 
parison of industrial conflict in twentieth-century Britain and Sweden. 
brings out an important element of that contrast. At fjrst inspection, 
her findings fall into the pattern we have already discussed at length. 
Time-series analyses of strike activity in both countries reveal strong re- 
lationships between the level of induatrial conflict and the extent of 
worker mobilization, as measured either by union membership or by union 
income. But the finding is less straightforward than it sounds. In Bri- 
tain the relationship is positive: the higher the mobilization level. the 
more strikes. In Sweden. it is negative. Swedish strikes declined stea- 
dily as union membership mounted. 
That is not all. In Britain, a monthly time-series analysis in- 
dicates that the repressive measures of World War I had a small dcpres- 
sant effect on the overall level of strike activity (allowing for the ef- 
fect of such other variables as prices and unemployment) and a larger ten- 
dency to promote government-aided voluntary negotiations and binding arbi- 
tration as an alternative to strike activity. But a similar analysia of 
World War I1 produces no such results. There, strikes rose greatly during 
the later months of the war, despite the outlawing of strikes and the es- 
tablishment of compulsory arbitration in June, 1940. They roae despite 
the rise of prosecutions for strikes and lockouts from fifty in 1941 to 
582 in 1942 to 1,279 in 1943 (Lind 1973: 156). 
The contradictions are troubling. Some of the things going on are 
clear enough. In Britain, organized labor. despite the Labor Party, never 
developed the continuous, intimate and reliable tie to the government that 
the long incumbency of the Social Democrats nfforded to Swedish labor; in 
Sweden, the stronger labor became the easier it was to settle disputes 
through o t h e r  means than t h e  s t r i k e :  n e g o t i a t i o n ,  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  gov&rnmen- 
t a l  p re s su re  on t h e  employers. As l a b o r  en t e red  t h e  B r i t i s h  p o l i t y ,  mul- 
t i p l e  t r a d e  unions  r e t a i n e d  a  good d e a l  of autonomy; no c e n t r a l  l abo r  or- 
gan iza t ion  acquired t h e  power t o  n e g o t i a t e  f o r  a l l  its members o r  t o  f o r c e  
those  members t o  ab ide  by t h e  terms of t h e i r  c o n t r a c t s .  I n  Sweden, a  high- 
l y -cen t r a l i zed  f e d e r a t i o n  acquired g r e a t  p a r e r  both  a s  a  n e g o t i a t o r  and 
a s  an en fo rce r .  Under t h e s e  c i rcumstances ,  p o l i t y  membership encouraged 
s t r i k e s  i n  B r i t a i n  and made r o u t i n e  p o l i t i c a l  p re s su re  a  more a t t r a c t i v e  
' a l t e r n a t i v e  t o  s t r i k e s  i n  Sweden. 
David Snyder's ana lyses  of i n d u s t r i a l  c o n f l i c t  i n  I t a l y ,  France 
and t h e  United S t n t e s  l i k e w i s e  p o i n t  t w a r d  a  more complex model of power- 
holding.  When Snyder t e s t s  s t anda rd  economic models on annual  s t r i k e  
s e r i e s  running from t h e  l a t e  n ine t een th  cen tu ry  t o  around 1970, he f i n d s  
they have u n s a t i s f s c t o r y  (a l though not  n e g l i g i b l e )  p r e d i c t i v e  power i n  a l l  
t h r e e  c o u n t r i e s  be fo re  World War I1 and i n  France and I t a l y  s i n c e  then;  f o r  
t h e  United S t a t e s ,  t h e  p r e d i c t i v e  power of a  pure  economic model g r e a t l y  
improves a f t e r  World War 11. A pure  p o l i t i c a l  model ( i n  which union mem- 
be r sh ip ,  Democrats i n  Congress,  p a r t y  of P re s iden t  and t h e  presence of 
n a t i o n a l  e l e c t i o n s  f i g u r e )  provides  a  b e t t e r  f i t  t o  t h e  obse rva t ions  i n  
a l l  c a s e s  bu t  t h e  U.S. a f t e r  World War 11. 
As one might expect .  s s y n t h e s i s  of t h e  economic and p o l i t i c a l  
models provides  t h e  most a c c u r a t e  p r e d i c t i o n s ;  even t h e r e ,  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  
v a r i a b l e s  c a r r y  a  major p a r t  of t h e  exp lana to ry  weight except  i n  t h e  r ecen t  
U.S. exper ience.  Snyder ' s  p roposa l  i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  t h a t  t h e  New Deal and 
t h e  accommodations of World War I1 s t rengthened and s t a b i l i z e d  t h e  t i e s  of 
organized American l abo r  t o  t h e  government. I t  s t a b i l i z e d  those  t i e s  s o  
much t h a t  previous  e f f o r t s  t o  i n f l u e n c e  t h e  government i t s e l f  by s t r i k e  
a c t i v i t y .  o r  t o  t a k e  advar)tage of i ts momentary favor .  subsided i n  favor  
of a  fundamentally economic c o n t e s t  between employers and organized 
workers.  The c o n t e s t  was fought  o u t  w i t h i n  l i m i t s  s e t  and guaranteed by 
t h e  government. The r o l e  of t h e  government remained much more con t ingen t ,  
t h e  power of organized l abo r  much weaker and more v a r i a b l e ,  i n  I t a l y  
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and France. 
Snyder ' s  b e s t - f i t t i n g  composite models resemble t h e  ones which 
Edward Shor t e r  end I found t o  be  most e f f i c i e n t  i n  account ing f o r  yenr-to- 
year  f l u c t u a t i o n s  i n  French s t r i k e  a c t i v i t y  between 1885 and 1965 (Shor ter  
I and T i l l y  1974, esp. chap te r  4) .  Snyder improves on our  foumulation by 
c l a r i f y i n g  t h e  e f f e c t  of l a b o r ' s  r e l a t i o n  t o  aovernment. H i s  account  of 
changes i n  t h a t  regard resembles Lind 's  comparison of B r i t a i n  and Sweden. 
Douglas Hibbs has  brought  a  s i m i l a r  pe r spec t ive  t o  bea r  on twen- 
! t i e th -cen tu ry  s t r i k e  t r e n d s  i n  Belgium. Canada, Denmark. Finland,  Prance, 
I t a l y .  Japan. Nether lands ,  Norway. Sweden, United Kingdom and United 
I S t a t e s  (Hibbs 1976). His  g e n e r a l  conclus ions  run a s  f o l l w s :  . . . s t r i k e  a c t i v i t y  is one man i fe s t a t ion  f~ ongoin8 s t r u g g l e  
f o r  power between s o c i a l  c l a s s e s  over  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of r e sou rces ,  -
p r i n c i p a l l y  a l though not exc lus ive ly  n a t i o n a l  income. The main 
t h e s i s  of t h e  s tudy  is t h a t  long-run changes i n  t h e  volume of in-  
d u s t r i a l  c o n f l i c t  a r e  l a r g e l y  expla ined by changes i n  t h e  l o c u s  of 
t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n a l  s t r u g g l e .  S t r i k e  a c t i v i t y  has  dec l ined  dmma- -
t i c a l l y  i n  n a t i o n s  where S o c i a l  Democratic o r  Labor p a r t i e s  assumed 
power i n  t h e  1930s -- o r  j u s t  a f t e r  t h e  second World War -- and 
c rea t ed  t h e  modern "welfare  s t a t e " .  I n  t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s  an enor- 
mous f r a c t i o n  of t h e  n a t i o n a l  income n w  passes  through t h e  p u b l i c  
s e c t o r  and is a l l o c a t e d  by t h e  p o l i t i c a l  process .  P o l i t i c a l  con- 
f l i c t  between l e f t -  and right-wing p a r t i e s  i n  t h e  e l e c t o r a l  
a r ena  . . . has  replaced i n d u s t r i a l  c o n f l i c t  between l a b o r  and ca- 
p i t o l  i n  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  . . . a s  t h e  u l t i m a t e  mechanism f o r  t h e  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  of n a t i o n a l  income. By comparison, i n  c o u n t r i e s  go- 
verned more o r  l e s s  cont inuously  by bourgeois  p a r t i e s  of t h e  c e n t e r  
and r i g h t .  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  con t inues  t o  dominate t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  
a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  p roduc t ion  of r e sou rces .  The economic marketplace  
remains t h e  primary locus  of d i s t r i b u t i o n a l  c o n f l i c t  i n  t h e s e  na- 
t i o n s ,  and, consequent ly ,  t h e  average l e v e l  of s t r i k e  a c t i v i t y  has  
been r e l a t i v e l y  cons t an t  f o r  t h ree -qua r t e r s  of a  cen tu ry  o r  more 
(Ilibbs 1976: 26-27; i t a l i c s  i n  o r i g i n a l ) .  
Syn thes i z ing  tlce f i n d i n g s  of Lind, Snyder and Hibbs, we a r r i v e  a t  a  tri- 
p a r t i t e  d i v i s i o n :  1 )  c o u n t r i e s  i n  which t h e  market is t h e  locus  of d i s t r i -  
b u t i o n a l  c o n f l i c t  and t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  of l abo r  and management t o  govern- 
ment r e l a t i v e l y  s t a b l e ;  t h e r e ,  market v a r i a t i o n s  s t r o n g l y  a f f e c t  t h e  l e v e l  
of s t r i k e  a c t i v i t y ;  2) c o u n t r i e s  i n  which a l l o c a t i o n  d e c i s i o n s  a r e  b a s i c a l l y  
under p o l i t i c o 1  c o n t r o l ;  t h e r e ,  s t r i k e  a c t i v i t y  is low o r  non-exis tent ,  and 
t h e  r e a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n a l  c o n f l i c t s  occur  i n  t h e  cour se  of e l e c t i o n s  and 
o the r  p o l i t i c a l  c o n t e s t s ;  3) c o u n t r i e s  i n  which t h e  l o c u s  of a l l o c a t i o n  de- 
c i s i o n s  i s  i t s e l f  a t  i s s u e ;  t h e r e ,  shor t - run p o l i t i c a l  f l ~ r c t u a t i o n s  s t rong-  
l y  a f f e c t  s t r i k e  a c t i v i t y .  The form of s t r i k e  a c t i v i t y  -- f o r  example, 
t h e  prevalence of t h e  one-day p r o t e s t  s t r i k e  -- undoubtedly v a r i e s  i n  a  
p a r a l l e l  way. 
A l l  t he se  ana lyses  b r i n g  o u t  t h e  g r e a t  importance of mob i l i za t ion ,  
a t  l e a s t  a s  r ep resen ted  by un ion iza t ion  of t h e  workforce. A l l  of them in-  
d i c a t e  t h a t  t h e  most d i r e c t  wny i n  which shor t - run economic f l u c t u a t i o n s  
promote s t r i k e  o c t i v i t y  is no t  through t h e  imposi t ion of hardslcips bu t  
through t h e  p rov i s ion  of o p p o r t u n i t i e s  t o  a c t  on g r i evances  o r  o sp i r a -  
t i o n s  long nu r tu red .  As a  r e s u l t  of t h e s e  and o t h e r  r ecen t  s t u d i e s ,  tlcere 
i s  l i t t l e  remaining doubt concerning a  g e n e r a l  tendency of s t r i k e  a c t i -  
v i t y  t o  r i s e  w i th  economic expansion and f a l l  w i th  contract loci  (e.8. Knovlcs 
1952. Weintraub 1966. Ashenfe l t e r  and Johnson 1969. Vonderkamp 1970. Skee l s  
1971, Kaelble  and Volkmann 1972). None of t h e s e  ana lyses  attnclcen much i m -  
por tance t o  i t s  complement, f a c i l i t a t i o n ,  i n  t h e  nense of government ac- 
t i o n s  lowering t h e  c o s t  of s t r i k e  a c t i v i t y  t o  workers.  
The comparison of d i f f e r e n t  n a t i o n a l  p a t t e r n s  b r i n g s  o u t  two in-  
t e r e s t i n g  d i f f i c u l t i e s .  F i r s t ,  t h e  s t r i k e  is on ly  one of s e v e r a l  means of 
a c t i o n  open t o  workers.  At d i f f e r e n t  t imes ,  p o l i t i c a l  p re s su re ,  sabotnge,  
demonstra t ions  and occtcpation of t h e  workplace a l l  become n t t r n c t i v e  s1- 
t e r n a t i v e s  t o  s t r i k i n g .  The workers '  r e p e r t o i r e  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n s  n l -  
ways inc ludes  more i t ems  than t h e  s t r i k e .  Furthermore, whether a  p a r t i -  
c u l a r  s t r u g g l e  a c t u a l l y  produces a  work s toppage depend0 on t h e  belcavlor 
of t h e  o t h e r  p a r t i e s :  management f i r s t  of a l l ,  unions  and government i n  
many cases .  The l e v e l  of s t r i k e  a c t i v i t y  is t h e r e f o r e  a t  bent  nn imper- 
f e c t  i n d i c a t o r  of working-class c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  a s  a  whole. A proper  
exp lana t ion  of s t r i k e  a c t i v i t y  must i nc lude  en account  hoth  of tlce choice  
among a l t e r n a t i v e  forms of c o l l e c t i v e  o c t i o n  and of t h e  p rocess  of nego- 
t i a t i o n .  
The second d i f f i c u l t y  is t h a t  t h e  of t h e  t i e s  between organized 
l abo r  and government a f f e c t s  s t r i k e  a c t i v i t y  q u i t e  s t r o n g l y .  To t h e  e x t e n t  
t h a t  l abo r  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  become powerful w i t h i n  t h e  government ond a c q u i r e  
c o n t r o l  over  t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  o c t i o n  of workers i n  gene ra l ,  s t r i k i n g  becomes 
a  r e l a t i v e l y  expensive  way of doing l a b o r ' s  business .  To t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  
t h e  t h r e a t  o r  promise of government i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  s t r i k e s  d e c l i n e s .  
- 
workers become f r e e  t o  tune t h e i r  s t r i k e  a c t i v i t y  t o  t h e  rhythms of t h e  I I 
economy. Tlie t h r e a t  o r  promise of government i n t e r v e n t i o n  depends on t h e  
s t r u c t u r e  of power among l a b o r ,  management and t h e  government. 
E lec t ions ,  Dcmonstrations and P o l i t i c a l  Systems 
The l e s son  is more gene ra l .  The s imple  model of t h e  p o l i t y  l a i d  
ou t  e a r l i e r  provides  a  u s e f u l  s t a r t i n g  p o i n t ,  bu t  i t  misses  t h e  importance 
of p o l i t i c a l  c o a l i t i o n s  and of t h e  means of a c t i o n  b u i l t  i n t o  t h e  e x i s t i n g  
p o l i t i c a l  o rgan iza t ion .  The use  of e l e c t i o n s  t o  do pub l i c  bus ines s  is a  
major ca se  t n  po in t .  P o l i t i c a l  s c i e n t i s t s  have long s i n c e  no t i ced  t h a t  
t h e  e s t a b l i s l m e n t  of b inding n a t i o n a l  e l e c t i o n s  promotes t h e  growth of po- 
l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  -- not  only  because  governments tend t o  l e g a l i z e  e l e c t i o n s  
and p a r t i e s  a t  t h e  same t ime b u t  because e l e c t o r a l  compet i t ion g i v e s  such I 
a  p a t e n t  advantage of i n t e r e s t s  which a r e  organized i n  p a r t i e s .  I t h i n k  
t h e  e f f e c t  of e l e c t o r a l  systems on t h e  p a t t e r n  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  is even 
more gene ra l .  A comparison of tl ie h i s t o r i e s  of con ten t ious  c o l l e c t i v e  ac- 
t i o n  i n  I t a l y ,  Germany, France and England ( T i l l y .  T i l l y  and T i l l y  1975) sug- .  
g e s t s  a  c l o s e  connect ion between t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n  of n a t i o n a l  e l e c t i o n s  and 
t h e  use  of formal  a s s o c i a t i o n s  of a l l  s o r t s  a s  v e h i c l e s  f o r  c o l l e c t i v e  ac- 
t i o n .  The g r c n t  p r o l i f e r a t i o n '  of c lubs ,  c i r c l e s  and s o d a l i t i e s  i n  t h e  
French. German and I t a l i a n  r e v o l u t i o n s  of 1848 ( i n  which expanding t h e  e l ec -  
t o r a t e  and inc reas ing  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e  of e l e c t i o n s  were s t anda rd  
p a r t s  of t h c  r evo lu t iona ry  program) i l l u s t r a t e s  t h e  connect ion.  The ex- 
I 
per i ence  of those  same c o u n t r i e s  a l s o  makes p l a u s i b l e  t h e  hypothesis  t h a t  
t h c  growth of e l e c t i o n s  promotes t h e  c r y s t a l l i z a t i o n  and spread of t h e  de- 
monstra t ion a s  n  form of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  
Why? Because of an umbrella e f f e c t :  t h e  l e g a l  umbrella r a i s e d  t o  
p r o t e c t  t h e  e l e c t o r a l  p roces s ,  and t o  keep i t  huddled i n  tl ie c e n t e r  away 
from the  r a i n ,  has  a  ragged edge. There i s  s h e l t e r  f o r  o t h e r s  a t  i t s  mar- 
g ins .  Tlie g r a n t  of l e g a l i t y  t o  en  e l e c t o r a l  a s s o c i a t i o n  o r  an  e l e c t o r a l  
assembly p rov ides  a  c la im t o  l e g a l i t y  f o r  a s s o c i a t i o n s  nnd assemblies  which 
a r e  no t  q u i t e  e l e c t o r a l ,  no t  only e l e c t o r a l  o r  not  e l e c t o r s l .  The 
g r a n t  of l e g a l i t y  lowers  t h e  group 's  c o s t s  of mob i l i za t ion  and c o l l e c t i v c  
a c t i o n .  I t  a l s o  provides  a  p r e s t i g i o u s ,  a c c e s s i b l e  model f o r  a c t i o n  i n  
gene ra l .  I n  t h e  United S t a t e s  of t h e  1960s we f i n d  a  grudgtng g r a n t  of 
l eg i t imacy  t o  t h e  Black Panther  P a r t y ,  t he  Miss i s s ipp i  Freedom Democratic 
Pa r ty ,  t h e  Peace and Freedom Pa r ty .  
Agents of t h e  government t r i e d  t o  ha ra s s  a l l  t h e s e  o rgan iza t ions  o u t  
of e x i s t e n c e  a t  one time o r  ano the r .  But t h e r e  formed on i m p l i c i t  coa l i -  
t i o n  between t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  and "white l i b e r a l s "  w i th  n  s t r o n g  i n t e r e s t  
i n  a  broad d e f i n i t i o n  of accep tab le  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t y .  The c o a l i t f o n  
made i t  ha rde r  f o r  t h e  government t o  withhold from t h e  q u a s i - p a r t i e s  r i g h t s  
t o  o rgan ize ,  r e c r u i t ,  assemble, s o l i c i t ,  p u b l i c i z e  and demonstra te  which 
e s t a b l i s h e d  p a r t i e s  exe rc i sed  a s  s ma t t e r  of course .  Yet i t  was not  a  pure  
power p l ay .  The f a c t  t h a t  movements w i th  important  a c t i v i t i e s  and objec- 
t i v e s  b e s i d e s  winning e l e c t i o n s  had chosen t o  o rgan ize  i n  t h e  g u i s e  of po- 
l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  i t s e l f  a f fo rded  them a  p r o t e c t i o n  unava i l ab l e  t o  s i m i l a r  
movements which chose  t o  o rgan ize  a s  autonomous communities, m i l i t a r y  
u n i t s  o r  c o n s p i r a t o r i a l  networks. So doing,  t o  be su re ,  they r an  t h e  r i s k  
of coop ta t ion ,  i n f i l t r a t i o n  and easy  s u r v e i l l a n c e .  There l i e s  t h e  e t e r n a l  
dilemma o f  tlie m i l i t a n t  group which f i n d s  a  p r o t e c t i v e  c l e f t  i n  tlie l e g a l  
system: s o l i d a r y  r e s i s t a n c e  witti a  chance of d e s t r u c t i o n ,  o r  a d a p t a t i o n  
wi th  a  chance of abso rp t ion  o r  d i s s o l u t i o n .  
Why should t h e  demonstra t ion prosper  a s  a  consequence of t h e  growth 
of e l e c t i o n s ?  Because i ts b a s i c  form resembles t h a t  of tlie e l e c t o r a l  ss- 
sembly, and because i t  provides  an  e f f e c t i v e  means of d i s p l a y i n g  tlie 
s t r e n g t h  of a  c o o t e s t a n t ,  sometimes of i n f luenc ing  t h e  outcome of an e l e c t i o n .  
The demonstra t ion we know en te red  t h e  s tandard r e p e r t o i r e  of co l -  I 
l e c t i v e  a c t i o n s  i n  most western  c o u n t r i e s  du r ing  t h e  n ine t een th  cen tu ry .  
In  England and America, neve r the l e s s .  we can s e e  i ts form c r y s t a l l i z i n g  be- 
f o r e  1800. For s e v e r a l  c e n t u r i e s ,  Englishmen had gathered i n  l a r g e  num- 
b e r s  on c e r t a i n  s tandard ho l idays ,  such a s  Guy Fawkes' Day. During t h e  
f e s t i v i t i e s  they o f t e n  expressed t h e i r  c o l l e c t i v e  op in ions  of t h e  d a y ' s  he- 
roes ,  v i l l a i n s  and foo l s .  They paraded e f f i g i e s ,  f l o a t s ,  charades  and 
p l aca rds .  Hangings, f u n e r a l s ,  e x i t s  from p r i s o n ,  roya l  b i r t h d a y s ,  an- i 
nouncements of m i l i t a r y  v i c t o r i e s  drew crowds end, sometimes, concer ted 
expres s ions  of demands, sympathies o r  complaints .  I n  a l l  t hese  cases ,  t h e  
a u t h o r i t i e s  provided t h e  occas ion  and. t o  some degree ,  t h e  sanc t ion  f o r  t h e  
assemblies  i n  question,. Contested e l e c t i o n s  f e l l  e a s i l y  i n t o  t h e  same pat- 
t e r n ,  and t h e  assemblies  of suppor t e r s  of d i f f e r e n t  cand ida t e s  acquired 
a  degree  of p r o t e c t i o n .  
I n  t h e  fu l l - f l edged  demonstra t ion.  t h e  crowd became more autonomous, 
choosing its own occasion and manner of assembly. A f t e r  1750, t h e  preaen- 
t a t i o n  of a  p e t i t i o n  t o  Par l iament  o r  t o  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  now and then  
brought t oge the r  thousands of people  i n  support  of a  common p o s i t i o n .  The 
famous Gordon r i o t s  of 1778 began wi th  a  meeting and march organized around 
t h e  p r e s e n t a t i o n  t o  Psr l iament  of t h e  P r o t e s t a n t  Assoc ia t ion ' s  p e t i t i o n .  
s igned by some 44,000 people ,  a g a i n s t  t h e  Ca tho l i c  Emancipation Act of t h a t  
year .  Lord George Gordon led fou r  g r e a t  columns of demonstra tors  t o  t h e  
House of Commons. They were t h e  nuc leus  of t h e  l a r g e  crowd t h a t  formed 
and waited through t h e  s e s s i o n  i n  Par l iament  Square. La te  a t  n i g h t ,  "one 
s e c t i o n  of tlie crowd moved o f f  towards t h e  p r i v a t e  chape l  of t h e  Sar- 
d i n i a n  ambassador i n  Duke S t r e e t ,  Lincoln 's  Inn F i e l d s ,  ano the r  t o  t h e  
chape l  a t t ached  t o  t h e  Bavarian Embassy i n  Warwick S t r e e t ,  S t .  James'. 
The f i r s t ,  known t o  be  f requented by Engl ish  C a t h o l i c  gen t ry ,  was burned 
t o  t h e  ground; both  were plundered and ransacked and t h e i r  con ten t s  burned 
i n  t h e  s t r e e t s "  ( ~ u d e '  1971: 221-222). 
The e l e c t o r a l  assembly came i n t o  its own a s  t h e  s e t t i n g  of dcmon- 
s t r a t i o n a  i n  t h e  same pe r iod .  At t h e  f i n a l e  of t h e  1769 e l e c t i o n  campaign 
of t h e  popular  he ro  John Wilkes: 
Wilkes'  suppor t e r s  formed themselves i n t o  v a r i o u s  cavalcades  t h a t  
paraded peace fu l ly  through t h e  s t r e e t s  of London be fo re  proceeding 
t o  Brentford  t o  c a s t  t h e i r  v o t e s .  One of t hcae  s e t  ou t  from tlie 
P r ince  of Orange i n  Jermyn S t r e e t .  be fo re  whom were c a r r i e d  s i x  o r  
seven f l a g s  ( B i l l  of R igh t s ,  Magna C a r t s ,  e t c . ) ,  a l l  badges of t h e  
d i f f e r e n t  s o c i e t i e s  of which Mr. Wilkes had been made a  member 
( ~ u d ;  1962: 69). 
As i t  happens. Par l iament  r e fused  t o  s e a t  Wilkes a f t e r  h i s  e l e c t i o n  hy a  
resounding ma jo r i ty .  That f a c t  i n i t i a t e d  ano the r  g r e a t  p e t i t i o n  d r i v e , .  
t h i s  one nat ionwide i n  scope; many of t h e  p e t i t i o n s  a r r i v e d  a t  Par l iament  
o r  t h e  King's door  t o  t h e  accompaniment of demonstra t ing crowds. Wilkes' 
suppor t e r s  i n  h i s  r epea ted  s t r u g g l e s  w i th  t h e  government employed t h e  
mass p e t i t i o n  march widely  t o  e x h i b i t  t h e i r  growing s t r e n g t h .  
That innovat ion took a  long s t e p  toward t h e  c r e a t i o n  of t h e  demon- 
s t r a t i o n  a s  a  d i s t i n c t i v e ' f o n  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  Two more changes 
would complete t h e  t ransformat ion:  t h e  e l imina t ion  of t h e  p e t i t i o n  a s  a  
necessary  p r e t e x t  f o r  t h e  show of s t r e n g t h ,  and tlie g e n e r n l i z a t i o n  of 
t he  form of a c t i o n  beyond King and Par l iament .  I n  t h e  s t r u g g l e s  between 
London Rad ica l s  and t h e  C r a m  which blazed i n  t h e  l a s t  decades  of t h e  
e igh teen th  cen tu ry ,  t hose  f u r t h e r  changes began t o  occur .  
By t h e  1790s. t h e  Radical  s o c i e t i e s  of London and e lsewhere  organized 
demonstra t ions ,  l a r g e  ones ,  w i th  g r e a t  frequency. I n  S h e f f i e l d ,  according 
t o  E.P. Thompson: 
Demonstrations were held  a t  t h e  end of November t o  c e l e b r a t e  t h e  
success  of t h e  French a rmies  a t  Valmy, and they were r epor t ed  i n  
t h e  S h e f f i e l d  Reg i s t e r  . . . , a weekly newspaper which supported 
the  reformers .  A process ion of f i v e  o r  s i x  thousand drew a quar- 
t e r ed  roas t ed  ox through t h e  s t r e e t s  amid t h e  f i r i n g  of cannon. 
I n  t h e  process ion were -- "a c a r i c a t u r e  p a i n t i n g  r ep resen t ing  
Br i t ann ia  -- Burke r i d i n g  on a swine -- and a f i g u r e ,  t h e  upper 
p a r t  of which wss t h e  l i k e n e s s  of a Scotch Sec re t a ry ,  and t h e  lower 
p a r t  t h a t  of an  Ass . . . t h e  po le  of L ibe r ty  l y i n g  broken on 
t h e  ground, i n sc r ibed  'Truth  i a  L ibe l '  - - - t h e  Sun breaking from 
behind a Cloud, and t h e  Angel of Peace, w i th  one hand dropping t h e  
'Rights  of Man', and extending t h e  o t h e r  t o  r a i s e  up B r i t a n n i a  
(Thompson 1963: 104). 
The symbols a r e  e x o t i c ,  reminiscent  of William Blake. I t  is easy t o  for-  
g e t ,  however, t h a t  twent ie th-century demonstra tors  o f t e n  c a r r y  symbolic 
c o f f i n s ,  and dummies, and masks. The b a s i c  form of t h a t  1792 demonstra t ion I 
I 
I 
In  She f f i e ld  i s  t h e  one we know today. i 
During t h e s e  same y e a r s  t h e  demonstra t ion was becoming a s t a n -  
dard way of doing pub l i c  bus ines s  i n  B r i t a i n ' s  North American co lon ie s .  
. Like t h e  contemporaneous b a t t l e s  over  Wilkes i n  England, t h e  American re-  
s i s t o n c e  t o  t h e  Stamp Act of 1765 helped s e p a r a t e  t h e  demonstra t ion from 
t h e  sanct ioned ossembly, helped e s t a b l i s h  i t s  importance a s  a r o u t i n e  in -  
strument f o r  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  of p o l i t i c a l  p re s su re .  On t h e  f o u r t e e n t h  of 
s t r e e t  i n t o  Boston; one r ep resen ted  t h e  t a x  stsmp d i s t r i h u t o r .  Andrew 
O l i v e r ,  t h e  o the r .  a l a r g e  boot con ta in ing  a d e v i l .  Tlle crowd which 
gathered r e fused  t o  l e t  t h e  e f f i g i e s  b e  taken down. 
Towards evening some men c u t  down t h e  e f f i g y  of t h e  stamp-mnster 
and placed i t  on a b i e r ,  which was c a r r i e d  through t h e  town ac- 
companied by a chee r ing  and lluzzaing mul t i tude:  "Liher ty  and proper- 
t y  fo reve r , "  "No stamps." "No Placemen." In  t h i s  concourse, 
"some of t h e  h i g h e s t  Reputotion" were walking " in  t h e  g r e a t e s t  
o r d e r , "  "and i n  solemn manner." At t h e  head of t h e  procesnion 
"Forty o r  f i f t y  tradesmen, decen t ly  d re s sed ,  preceded; and some 
thousands of t h e  mob followed . . . " The concourse, amidst  t h e  
acclamat ions  of l a r g e  numbers of people  l i n i n g  t h e  s t r e e t ,  went 
down b i n  S t r e e t .  turned i n t o  King S t r e e t  and stopped under t h e  
town hou ie  where Governor and Council were assembled. The mul t i -  
tude,  w e l l  knowing t h i s ,  "gave t h r e e  huzzas by Way of Defiance, 
and pass 'd  on" (Hoerder 1971: 153). 
The g r e a t  elm which held  t h e  e f f i g i e s  l a t e r  became famous a s  t h e  L ibe r ty  
Tree .  I t  was t h e  model f o r  thousands of l i b e r t y  t r e e s  consecrated.  and 
s t rugg led  ove r ,  i n  America. La te r  t h e  L ibe r ty  Tree  became a prime symbol 
i n  Revolut ionary France. I n  many h i s t o r i e s  t h e  r e s i s t a n c e  t o  t h e  Stamp 
Act counts  a s  t h e  beginning of t h e  American Revolution. The demonntrs- 
t i o n  took an  important  and du rab le  p l a c e  i n  t h e  American r e p e r t o i r e  of 
c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n s  s a  t h a t  r evo lu t iona ry  movement swel led.  
The c a s e  of t h e  demonstra t ion t eaches  a g e n e r a l  l e s son .  Tlle forms, 
f r equenc ie s  and personnel  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  depend i n t i m a t e l y  on tile 
e x i s t i n g  s t r u c t u r e  of government and p o l i t i c s .  When we begin  r e f i n i n g  t h e  
August two e f f i g i e s  appeared, suspended from s g r e a t  t r e e  on a s t r a t e g i c  
s imple  model of government, p o l i t y  and contenders  w i th  which we s t a r t e d ,  
we must pay a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  s p e c i f i c  r u l e s  of p o l i t y  membership, t h e  
e x i s t i n g  p a t t e r n  of r e p r e s s i o n  and f n c i l i t a t i o n ,  t h e  r i g h t s  claimed by 
d i f f e r e n t  contenders .  Our e lementary  model does l i t t l e  more then spe- 
c i f y  i n  what connect ions  each of t h e s e  v a r i a b l e s  should be  s i g n i f i c a n t .  
On t h e  ques t ion  of p o l i t i c a l  r i g h t s ,  f o r  i n s t ance ,  t h e  argument 
unfolded so  f a r  f a v o r s  a  view of t h e  r i g h t  t o  v o t e ,  t o  p e t i t i o n ,  t o  
assemble, t o  pub l i sh ,  and s o  on a s  a )  c o n s i s t i n g  not  of a  g e n e r a l  pr in-  
c i p l e ,  b u t  of a  s p e c i f i c  c l a im of a  de f ined  contender  on a  c e r t a i n  gov- 
e r m e n t ,  b) coming i n t o  being a s  t h e  r e s u l t  of s t r u g g l e s  among mobilized 
contenders  and governments. Thus t h e  common idea  of s t anda rd  s e t  of 
p o l i t i c a l  r i g h t s  g radua l ly  extended from a  sma l l  e l i t e  t o  t h e  g e n e r a l  popu- 
l a t i o n  is misleading.  Not wrong, because  on t h e  whole t h e  s h a r e  of t h e  
populat ion having en fo rceab le  c la ims on va r ious  n a t i o n a l  governments w i th  
r e s p e c t  t o  v o t i n g ,  p e t i t i o n i n g ,  assembling,  and pub l l sh ing  has  expanded 
enormously over  t h e  l a s t  two c e n t u r i e s ,  has  i nc reased  i n  d i s t i n c t  s t e p s  
from e l i t e s  t o  o rd ina ry  people ,  has  not  con t r ac t ed  d r a s t i c a l l y  once i t  
has  g r a m .  Never theless  mis leading,  because  t h e  s i m i l a r  c la ims o rd ina ry  
people hnve had on o t h e r  governments ( e s p e c i a l l y  l o c a l  governments) have 
gene ra l ly  dwindled i n  t h e  same process ,  and because  each s t e p  of t h e  ex- 
pansion hns u s u a l l y  occurred i n  response t o  t h e  demand of some wel l -  
def ined contender  o r  c o n l i t i o n  of contenders .  
The f a c t  t h a t  t h e  r i g h t s  c o n s i s t  of en fo rceab le  c la ims on t h e  gov- 
ernment by p a r t i c u l n r  groups makes i t  l e s s  puzzl ing t h a t  such elementary 
r i g h t s  a s  nssembly nnd p e t i t i o n  should be  s o  e a s i l y  denied t o  cha l l enge r s  
whose pe r sona l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,  o h j e c t i v e s  o r  a c t i v i t i e s  a r e  unacceptable  
t o  most o t h e r  groups: p r o s t i t u t e s ,  m i l l e n n i a l i s t s .  F a s c i s t s ,  homosexuals. 
The d e n i a l  of r i g h t s  t o  a  cha l l enge r  on ly  t h r e a t e n s  t h e  r i g h t s  of e x i s t i n g  
members of t h e  p o l i t y  when t h e  c h a l l e n g e r ' s  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,  o rgan iza t ion .  
o b j e c t i v e s  o r  a c t i v i t i e s  resemble those  of some members, o r  when o  coa l i -  
t i o n  between cha l l enge r  and member has  formed. 
A l l  our i n q u i r i e s  i n t o  t h e  forms and f r equenc ie s  of c o l l e c t i v e  
a c t i o n  even tua l ly  l ead  u s  back t o  ques t ions  of power. A  c l o s e  look st 
compe t i t i ve ,  r e a c t i v e  and p r o a c t i v e  forms of a c t i o n  d i s s o l v e s  t h e  common 
d i s t i n c t i o n  between "p re -po l i t i ca l ' '  and " p o l i t i c a l "  p r o t e s t .  A c a r e f u l  
exp lo ra t ion  of t h e  con tex t  of s t r i k e  a c t i v i t y  cha l l enges  t h e  sepnra t ion  
of "economic" and " p o l i t i c a l "  c o n f l i c t s  from each o t h e r .  A t hough t fu l  re-  
f l e c t i o n  on t h e  demonstra t ion,  t h e  c h a r i v a r i  and t h e  food r i o t  r a i s e s  fun- 
damental doubts  about  any e f f o r t  t o  s i n g l e  ou t  a  c l a s s  of spontaneous, ex- 
p r e s s i v e ,  impuls ive ,  evanescent  crowd a c t i o n s  -- al though i t  conf i rms 
t h e  importance of c r e a t i v i t y ,  innovat ion,  dramo and symbolism w i t h i n  t h e  
l i m i t s  s e t  by t h e  e x i s t i n g  r e p e r t o i r e  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  nnd t h e  e x i s t i n g  
s t r u c t u r e  o f  power. 


CiIAPTER 6: COLLECTLVE VIOLENCE 
B r i t i s h  Rrawls a s  C o l l e c t i v e  Violence 
"We n l l  know what a  nomination day i s  l i k e , "  commented The Times 
i n  June 1868. 
The p re s id ing  func t iona ry  bespeaks  s f a i r  hea r ing  f o r  both  s i d e s ,  
and i t  is w e l l  i f  he g e t s  t o  t h e  end of h i s  few sen tences  wi thout  
d e r i s i v e  chee r s  and i r o n i c a l  c r i e s  e x p l i c a b l e  only  by a  l o c a l  
h i s t o r i a n .  Af t e r  t h a t  no one g e t s  s hear ing.  Unceasing clamour 
p r e v a i l s ;  proposers ,  seconders ,  and cand ida t e s  speak i n  dumb show, 
o r  con f idc  t h e i r  s en t imen t s  t o  t h e  r e p o r t e r s ;  heads a r e  broken, 
blood flows from numerous noses ,  and t h e  judgment of t h e  e l e c t o r s  
is gene ra l ly  sub jec t ed  t o  a  s eve re  t r a i n i n g  a s  a  p re l imina ry  t o  
t h e  vo t ing  of t h e  fol lowing day (Richter  1971: 21). 
A s  Donald R ich te r  s ays ,  t h e  j e e r s  and brawls  which r e g u l a r l y  accompanied 
nincteenth-century e l e c t i o n s  b e l i e  both  t h e  o r d e r l y  r e p u t a t i o n  of V ic to r i an  
B r i t a i n  and t h e  no t ion  t h a t  e l e c t o r a l  reform + r egu la r  p o l i c i n g  c i v i c  
calm. Nineteenth-century B r i t i s h  e l e c t i o n s  -- and much o t h e r  p u b l i c  l i f e  
i n  B r i t a i n  a s  w e l l  -- ran v i o l e n t .  "Public rowdiness and r e s i s t a n c e  t o  
a u t h o r i t y , "  concludes  R ich te r ,  "have been nu r tu red  i n t o  t h e  B r i t i s h  
c h a r a c t e r  through c e n t u r i e s  of independence and p o l i t i c a l  i n t r ans igeance"  
(Richter  1971: 28). R i c h t e r ' s  i d e a  resembles t h e  sent iment  of t h e  
nineteenth-century a u t h o r i t i e s :  t h a t  they were dea l ing  wi th  n a t u r a l l y  
unruly  people who had t o  be  checked, t r a i n e d  and c i v i l i z e d .  
The d i f f i c u l t y  w i th  t h i s  s o r t  of c h a r a c t e r o l o g i c a l  exp lana t ion  of 
v io l ence  is t h a t  i t  e x p l a i n s  too much, o r  nothing st a l l .  Too much, i n  
t h a t  t h e r e  is no v i o l e n t  a c t i o n  t o  which i t  could not  apply  i n  p r i n c l p l e ,  
and t h e r e f o r e  no way t o  prove i t  wrong. Nothing st a l l .  i n  t h a t  i t  
f i n a l l y  reduces  t o  a  d e s c r i p t i o n  of what has  t o  be  exploined.  Aval lnble  
accounts  of n ineteenth-century B r i t i s h  electoral v io l ence ,  however, g i v e  
u s  hope of escaping from t au to logy  and of d e t e c t i n g  r egu lo r  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  
between tlie p a t t e r n  of c o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence  and tlie n a t u r e  of c u r r e n t  
s t r u g g l e s  over  r i g h t s  and power. 
As i t  happens. R ich te r  himself g i v e s  u s  nome va luab le  informat ion 
on t h e  o r i g i n s  of B r i t i s h  e l e c t o r a l  rowdiness. "It wns no t  u n c m o n , "  
he r e p o r t s :  
f o r  agen t s  of t h e  cand ida t e s ,  no t  always wi thout  t h e  l a t t e r ' s  
cognizance,  t o  h i r e  gangs of r u f f i a n s  from nearby collieries t o  
i n t i m i d a t e  and b u l l y  r i v a l  v o t e r s .  A w i tnes s  be fo re  t h e  Pnrlinmentnry 
Committee i n v e s t i g a t i n g  t h e  e l e c t i o n  of 1868 t e s t i f i e d  t h a t  a t  
B r i s t o l  L i b e r a l  agen t s  from London organized end paid " f ly ing  
columns," bands of from 200 t o  300 men r e c r u i t e d  from t h e  B r i s t o l  
suburbs.  isp posed i n  quas i -mi l i t a ry  format ion and armed with  
bludgeons, they appeared on e l e c t i o n  day a t  v a r i o u s  p o l l i n g  booths  
and drove off  Conservat ive  vo te r s "  (Richter  1965: 180). 
More g e n e r a l l y ,  t l ie suppor t e r s  of a  g iven cand ida t e  -- hf red  o r  no t  -- 
o f t e n  made a  hol iday of t h e  e l e c t i o n ,  s p o r t i n g  t h e i r  co lo r s .  d r i n k i n g  
amply t o  t h e  h e a l t h  of t h e i r  champion, j e e r i n g  h i s  r i v a l s ,  brawling wi th  
t h e  b e a r e r s  of o t h e r  c o l o r s .  This  behavior  may exemplify "publ ic  rowdincsa 
and r e s i s t a n c e  t o  a u t h o r i t y , "  b u t  i t  n l s o  i d e n t i f i e s  a  c l e n r e r  l i n k  betwecn 
v io l ence  and organized s t r u g g l e s  f o r  power than The Times commentntor was 
ready t o  concede. 
Two y e a r s  be fo re  t h e  1868 e l e c t i o n ,  t h e  Tory government which had 
newly come t o  power announced, through D i s r a e l i .  t h a t  i t  would no t  neces- 
s a r i l y  t ake  up par l iamentary  reform i n  t h e  next  s e s s i o n .  The Reform 
Lesgue c a l l e d  f o r  a mass meeting i n  Hyde Park on 23 J u l y  1866. The 
meeting was t h e  occasion f o r  what F ranc i s  Sheppard c a l l s  t h e  "only 
s i g n i f i c a n t  outbreak 'of  v iolence"  i n  t h e  g r e a t  campaign l ead ing  up t o  
t h e  Reform B i l l  of 1867: 
The law o f f i c e r s  of t h e  Crown had decided t h a t  t h e  Crown had t h e  
r i g h t  t o  c l o s e  t h e  g a t e s ,  and t h e  llome Sec re t a ry .  Spencer Walpole, 
now decided t o  e x e r c i s e  t h i s  r i g h t .  On being informed of t h i s  t h e  
l e a d e r s  of t h e  League decided neve r the l e s s  t o  march t o  llyde Park, 
and i f  prevented from e n t e r i n g ,  t o  proceed t o  T r a f a l g a r  Square. 
P r in t ed  l e a f l e t s  t o  t h i s  e f f e c t  were d i s t r i b u t e d  i n  l a r g e  numbers. 
When t h e  l e a d e r s  of t h e  p rocess ion  reached Marble Arch they found 
t h e  g a t e s  c lo sed  and a l a r g e  body of p o l i c e  assembled. A f t e r  being 
refused admission by t h e  p o l i c e  commissioner, S i r  Richard Mayne. 
Beales  and t h e  crowd near  him l e f t  f o r  T r a f a l g a r  Square. But o t h e r  
p roces s ions  were s t i l l  s r r i v i n g ,  c o n t r o l  broke down, and soon a 
densely-packed mass of men were p re s s ing  a g a i n s t  t h e  r a i l i n g s .  The 
r a i l i n g s  and stonework were o ld  and week, and breach a f t e r  breach 
was qu ick ly  made a long Park Lane and t h e  Bayswater Road. The p o l i c e  
r e s i s t e d  t h e s e  incu r s ions ,  and s c u f f l i n g  broke o u t ,  but  many thousands 
of people  were now i n s i d e  t h e  park,  and even s company of t h e  
Grenadier  Guards, whose a r r i v a l  was loud ly  cheered,  could no t  o u s t  
t h e  invade r s  except  by t h e  u s e  of f i r ea rms .  Af t e r  an hour o r  two 
of c h e e r f u l  speech i fy ing  darkness  began t o  f a l l ,  and t h e  crowd 
d i spe r sed  v o l u n t a r i l y "  (Sheppard 1971: 341). 
' Except perhaps  f o r  t h e  good chee r ,  t h e  a f f a i r  was a textbook example of 
l a rge - sca l e  c o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence :  one group under takes  a l a r g e  a c t i o n  
which d i r e c t l y  o r  i n d i r e c t l y  s t a t e s  a c la im;  a second group cha l l enges  
t h a t  claim: they s t r u g g l e .  The group s t a t i n g  t h e  counterc la im is o f t e n  
a s p e c i a l i z e d  r e p r e s s i v e  f o r c e  -- p o l i c e ,  t roops ,  posse ,  v i g i l a n t e  -- 
a c t i n g  on behalf  of t h e  dominant c l a s s e s .  No doubt some of t h e  demonstm- 
t o r s  i n  1866 were angry,  some were drunk, and some enjoyed t h e  rough-and- 
tumble. But t h e  breaking down of f ences  and t h e  s c u f f l i n g  wi th  p o l i c e  
was a by-product of t h e  p l ay  of c la im and counterc la im.  That is  t h e  
s tandard s t r u c t u r e  of c o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence .  
Violence: Concept and R e a l i t y  
I n  o r d e r  t o  g e t  t h a t  po in t  s t r a i g h t ,  however, we have t o  d i spoae  
of some s e r i o u s  conceptual  problems. "Violence" o f t e n  s e r v e s  a s  a 
c a t c h a l l  con ta in ing  a l l  t h e  v a r i e t i e s  of p r o t e s t ,  m i l i t a n c y ,  coe rc ion ,  
d e s t r u c t i o n  o r  muscle-f lexing which a given obse rve r  happens t o  f e a r  o r  
condemn. Violence,  a s  Henry Bienen comments, " c a r r i e s  over tones  of 
' v i o l a t i n g ' ,  and we o f t e n  use  v io l ence  t o  r e f e r  t o  i l l e g i t i m a t e  force"  
(Bienen 1968: 4) .  Grundy and Weinstein (1974: 113) a r r a y  competing 
d e f i n i t i o n s  of v i o l e n c e  on a continuum from narrow t o  broad: 
narrow: those  u s e s  of phys i ca l  f o r c e  which a r e  p roh ib i t ed  by a 
normative o r d e r  presumed t o  be l e g i t i m a t e :  
i n t e rmed ia t e :  any use  of p h y s i c a l  fo rce ;  
broad: a l l  d e p r i v a t i o n s  of a s s e r t e d  human r i g h t s .  
I n  g e n e r a l ,  they po in t  o u t ,  de fende r s  of c o n s t i t u t e d  a u t h o r i t y  p r e f e r  
narrow d e f i n i t i o n s .  Opponents p r e f e r  broad ones. I n  betwecn, t h e  p l a c e  
t h e  " l i b e r a l  democrats who d e f i n e  v io l ence  a s  any u s e  of phys i ca l  fo rce .  
because they  would l i k e  t o  j u s t i f y  r e v o l u t i o n s  a g a i n s t  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  
regimes which do not  have b u i l t - i n  mechanisms f o r  peace fu l  change" (Grundy 
and Weinstein 1974: 113). 
We have, however, p r a c t i c a l  a s  w e l l  a s  p o l i t i c a l  r ea sons  f o r  s e l e c t i n g  
the  middle term. The narrow d e f i n i t i o n  of v io l ence  a s  i l l e g i t i m a t e  f o r c e  
in t roduces  t h e  deba te  about  t h e  proper  scope of t h e  a u t h o r i t i e s  i n t o  t h e  
way t o  begin .  The broad d e f i n i t i o n  of v io l ence  t o  i nc lude  a l l  v i o l a t i o n s  
of human r i g h t s  not  onl)  r e q u i r e s  agreement on t h e  c h a r a c t e r  of those  
r i g h t s ,  but  a l s o  expands t h e  phenomenon t o  such a  l a r g e  range of s o c i a l  
r e l a t i o n s  a s  t o  make sys t ema t i c  s t u d y  of i t  almost unthinkable .  I f  we 
r e s t r i c t  our  a t t e n t i o n  t o  human a c t i o n s  which damage persons  o r  o b j e c t s ,  
we have a t  l e a s t  a  chance t o  s o r t  o u t  t h e  r e g u l a r i t i e s  i n  t h e  appearance 
of t hose  a c t i o n s .  
Even t h a t  r e s t r i c t i o n  c a l l a  immediately f o r  f u r t h e r  d i s t i n c t i o n s .  
Violence s o  de f ined  s t i l l  inc ludes :  
very  d e l i n e a t i o n  of t h e  phenomenon t o  be  i n v e s t i g a t e d  -- an  unpromising 
-- c u t  thumbs 
-- murders 
- hockey games 
- r e b e l l i o n s  
-- normal wear of sutomobi les  o r  t h e  roads  they t r a v e l  
I 
-- d i s p o s a l  of noxious wastes  
- c i g a r e t t e  smoking 
The obvious temptat ion i s  t o  add some q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  concerning t h e  
i n t e n t i o n s  of t h e  a c t o r s :  they want t o  d e s t r o y ,  they a r e  angry,  they 
seek  power, o r  something e l s e .  The t r o u b l e  w i th  l e t t i n g  much depend on 
i n t e n t i o n s  is t h a t  i n t e n t i o n s  a r e  mixed and hard t o  d i s c e r n .  The judgments 
o u t s i d e r s  make concerning t h e  i n t e n t i o n s  of p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  c o n f l i c t s  
u s u a l l y  i nc lude  i m p l i c i t  t h e o r i e s  of causa t ion  and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  Even 
wi th  f u l l  knowledge, i n t e n t i o n s  o f t e n  t u r n  out  t o  be  mlxed and d ive rgen t ,  
o f t e n  change o r  m i s f i r e  i n  t h e  cour se  of t h e  a c t i o n .  We must nsk 
i n t e n t i o n s  when. 
Violence, fur thermore,  is r a r e l y  a  s o l o  performnnce. It usua l ly  
grows ou t  of an  i n t e r a c t i o n  of opponents.  Whose i n t e n t i o n s  sliould count :  
t h e  sma l l  group of demonstra tors  who g a t h e r  on t h e  s t e p s  of t h e  c a p i t a l .  
t h e  l a r g e r  group of s p e c t a t o r s  who even tua l ly  g e t  drawn i n t o  t h e  a c t t o n .  
t h e  p o l i c e  who f i r s t  s t and  guard and then s t r u g g l e  t o  d i s p e r s e  t h e  crowd? 
Both i n  theory and i n  p r a c t i c e .  then. i n t e n t i o n s  provide sliaky c r i t e r i a  
f o r  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  of v io l ence  from nonviolence.  
I n  he r  b r i l l i a n t  e s say  on v io l ence .  Hannah Arendt urged a  fundnmental 
d i s t i n c t i o n  between power and v io l ence .  Power, i n  he r  view, I s  " the  
human a b i l i t y  no t  j u s t  t o  a c t  bu t  t o  a c t  i n  conce r t . "  'Bu t  t h e  d i f f i c u l t t e s  
w i th  which we a r e  w r e s t l i n g  appear  i n  one f a c t :  Arendt never  q u i t e  
de f ined  v io l ence .  Th i s  was t h e  c l o s e s t  approach: 
Violence i s  d i s t i ngu i shed  by its ins t rumen ta l  c h a r a c t e r .  Phenomeno- 
l o g i c a l l y ,  i t  is c l o s e  t o  s t r e n g t h ,  s i n c e  t h e  implements of v io l ence ,  
l i k e  a l l  o t h e r  t o o l s ,  a r e  designed and used f o r  t h e  purpose of 
mu l t ip ly ing  n a t u r a l  s t r e n g t h  u n t i l ,  i n  t h e  l a s t  s t a g e  of t h e i r  
development. they can s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  i t  (Arendt 1970: 46).  
As a  d i s t i n c t i o n  i n  p o l i t i c a l  philosophy -- t h a t  is. i n  t h e  p r i n c i p l e 8  
upon which we can reasonably  found s system of government and by which 
we can j u s t i f y  o r  condemn pub l i c  a c t i o n s  -- Arendt ' s  t r ea tmen t  of power 
and violence is illuminating. As a guide to observation of acting people. 
however, it has the fatal flaw of resting on exactly the features of col- 
lective action which observers and participants dispute most passionately. 
That is precisely because they are the features of the action which will 
bring on it justification from some and condemnation from others. Justi- 
fication end condemnation are important business, but they are not our 
business here. 
Nor do any easy alternatives lie close at hand. We may try to de- 
fine "normal" or "expected" or "legitimate" uses of force in social life. 
and define deviations from them as violent. That approach not only re- 
quires the (difficult) assessment of the normal, expected state of af- 
fairs, but also tends to define away violence exerted by professional 
specialists in coercion: police, soldiers, mafiosi, muggers. If, on the 
other hand, we turn to the amount of damage sustained by the individuals 
or objects involved, we face the difficulty of determining how direct 
and material the damage must be: Does a firm's dumping of garbage which 
promotes disease count? Does the psychic burden of enslavement count? 
I recite these tedious complications in order to emphasize that in 
the present state of knowledge 5 definition will be arbitrary in some 
regards and debatable in others. People do not agree on whet they will 
call violent. What is more, their disagreement springs to an important 
extent from differences in political perspective. My own inclination is 
towsrd what Terry Nardin cells e "brute harm" conception of violence: any 
observable interaction in the course of which persons or objects are 
seized or physically damaged in spite of resistance. (Direct or indirect 
resistonce, in the form of attacks on persons. erection of barriers, 
standing in the way, holding on to the persons or objects at issue, and 
so on, enters the definition in order to exclude self-destruction, pot- 
latches, ceremonial mutilation, urban renewal and other collective damsge 
in which all partiea are more or less agreed to the damage. In short, 
to certify the preaence of complicating interests.) 
Further distinctions start from there: collective vs. individual, 
depending on the number of parties to the interaction; games va. nongnmea, 
depending on the extent to which all participants begin with en agreement 
to work toward a determinate set of alternative outcomes by fo.llowing 
sane standard rules; continuous vs. discontinuous, depending on how great 
a time span we observe and how large an interval we permit to elapse be- 
fore we call the action at an end; and so forth. 
Some Lineaments of Violence 
Once collective violence is defined in these terms, interesting con- 
clusions begin to emerge from the close examination of the actual record 
of violent events. Our study of thousanda of violent incidents occurrii~g 
in western Europe since 1800 reveals several strong tendencies which nf- 
fect our understanding of the roots of violence. 
First, most collective violence -- in the sense of interactions which 
produce direct damage to persons and obJects -- grows out of nctions which 
ere not intrinsically violent, and which are basically similar to n much 
larger number of collective actions occurrilig without violence in the 
same periods and s'ettings. The clearest example is the demonstration: 
Some group displays its strength and determination in the presence of the 
public, of the agents of the state. and perhaps of its enemies as well. 
The great majority of demonstrations pass without direct damage to per- 
sons or property. But a small proportion do turn to violent encounters 
between police and demonstrators, or attacks on property by the demon- 
strators. When that happens, we conventionally use a new word for the 
event -- "riot" -- and thereby obscure its connection witn nonviolent 
events. The demonstration is such a common way of doing political busi- 
ness in modern Europe that even the small proportion of violent outcomes 
is enough to make the demonstration the most frequent setting for collec- 
tive violence. The strike, the parliamentary session, the public meeting. 
the fiesta follow something like the same pattern: the great majority of 
them going off without violence, the violent ones not differing in any 
fundamental way from the rest. 
A second important feature of collective violence which stands out 
in the modern European record is the heavy involvement of agents of the 
state, especially repressive agents like police and soldiers. This is, 
unsurprisingly, a matter of scale: the fewer the people involved, the 
less likely that repressive agents will be there. Rut it does not mean 
simply that the larger the scale of violence the more likely the police 
are to step in. For in the niodern European experience repressive forces 
are themselves the most consistent initiators end performers of collective 
violence. 
There is a division of labor: repressive forces do the largest part 
of the killing and wounding, while the groups they are seeking to con- 
trol do most of the damage to objects. The division of labor follows from 
the usual advantage repressive forces have with respect to arms and mili- 
tary discipline; from the common tactics of demonstrators, strikers and 
other frequent participants in collective violence, which are to violate 
symbolically-charged rules and prohibitions whose enforcement is the af- 
fair of agents of government; from the typical sequence of events, in 
which demonstrators are carrying on an action which is illegal yet non- 
violent, and repressive forces receive the order to stop them by what- 
ever means are necessary. The means are often violent. 
Violence in America 
Since no one has done the necessary detailed studies of contemporary 
Latin America. North America. Africa or Asia, it is hard to say h w  
generally these generalizations apply. The fragments of evidence n w  
available indicate that they apply very widely in contemporary countries 
with strong governments. Jerome Skolnick (1969: 258) says in aummary of 
one part of his analysis of contemporary American protests. "It is mLs- 
leading to ignore the part played by social control agencies in aggrn- 
vating and sometimes creating a riot. It is not unusuel. a8 the Kerner 
Commission observed, for a riot to begin @ end with police violence." 
A chronological review of violence in American labor-management dis- 
putes makes it clear both that over the long run police, troops and plant 
guards have done the bulk of the killing and wounding, and that the typical 
starting point has been some sort of illegal but nonviolent collective 
action by the workers -- a walkout, a sitdown, a demonstration. picketing. 
sending of delegations. In their sketch of the usual circumstances in 
which the total of at least 700 persons died in American "labor violence" 
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Taft and Ross report: - 
Facing inflexible opposition, union leaders and their members fre- 
quently.found that nothing, neither peaceful persuasion nor the heads 
of government, could move the employer towards recognition. Frus- 
tration and desperation impelled pickets to react to strike-breakers 
with anger. Many violent outbreaks followed efforts of strikers to 
restrain the entry of strike-breakers and raw materials into the 
struck plant. St~ch conduct, obviously illegal, opened the opportunity 
for forceful police measures. In the long run, the employer's side 
was better equipped for success. The use of force by pickets was 
illegal on its face, but the action of the police and company guards 
were in vindication of the employer's rights (Taft end Ross 1969: 
289-290). 
The same general pattern recurs in the bulk of contemporary American col- 
lective violence: a group undertakes an illegal andlor politically unac- 
ceptable action, forces of order seek to check the group, a violent en- 
counter ensues, the "rioters" -- for that is the label the group acquires 
at the moment of violent contact with police or troops -- sustain most 
of the casualties. 
Reflecting on the long succession of violent encounters between 
cl~sllengers end power-holders in America. Richard Rubenstein makes an im- 
portant observation: 
At the outset, one thing seems clear: those groups which achieved 
success without participating in sustained rioting, guerrilla terror- 
ism or outright insurrection were not necessarily more talented, 
hard-working or "American" than those that resorted to higher levels 
of violence. The resistance of more powerful groups to change is 
one key struggle; another is the match between out-group charac- 
teristics and the needs of a changing political-economic system I 
(Rubenstein 1970: 15-16). 
Then he goes on to contrast the fluidity of the economic and political 
arrangements open to the immigrants of 1880-1920 with the formation, in 
the 1930s and 1940s, of a new ruling coalition quite resistant to dis- 
myth of peaceful progress and the culpability of the violent -- it is the 
existence of this coalition, exercising power through a highly centralized 
Federal bureaucracy, which helps keep emerging groups powerless and de- 
pendent" (p. 17). The consequence, in Rubenstein's view, is that recent 
bids for power have met determined resistance and brought forth the pious 
recommendation that the members of the groups involved attempt to enter 
the system as individuals, on their own merits. rather than dentroying 
the system through collective efforts to wrest benefits from it. 
Rubenatein's analysis includes both an idea of how the American eys- 
tem usually works and a notion of the changes it has undergone since the 
1930s. The general picture corresponds to William Gameon's portrayal of 
"stable unrepresentetion" in American politics: " . . . the American po- 
litical system normally operates to prevent incipient competitors from 
achieving full entry into the political arena" (Gamaon 1968 : 18). That 
description applies to all political systems; the real questions are: How 
great are the obstacles? How do they vary from system to system and time 
to time? 
That brings up the second part. Has the American system closed down 
since the 1930~7 To try that question out seriously, we shall need much 
more precise information than we now have concerning the fates of succes- 
sive challengers. Gamson's investigation does not reveal any significantly 
increased tendency for the recent challengers in his sample to fail. But 
his investigation deals with small numbers, and stops in 1945. It is not 
obvious that recent challengers -- antiwar students, organized blacks, goy 
activists and aircraft manufacturers are likely candidates for the post- 
1940 list -- met more resistance than craft unions, Prohibitionists or 
Abolitionists had in the nineteenth century. There is probebly variation 
placement: "Ironically, since these are the groups most wedded to the 
I 
I over t ime,  and t h e r e  may w e l l  be  a  long-run t r end .  Both a r e  s u r e l y  too 
s u b t l e  t o  show up i n  a  few offhand comparisons. 
P o l i t i c a l  Action and Involvement i n  Violence 
I n  t h e  terms we were us ing  e a r l i e r ,  Rubenatein is saying t h a t  members 
of t h e  p o l i t y ,  a c t i n g  mainly through a g e n t s  of t h e  s t a t e ,  have banded to- 
ge the r  t o  r e s i s t  t h e  c la ims of newly-mobilized c h a l l e n g e r s  f o r  membership. 
His moat prominent ca se  i s  organized b l acks .  The a n a l y s i s  a p p l i e s  more 
gene ra l ly  t o  t h e  pant  and p re sen t  con ten t ion  of wheat farmers ,  women, be- 
l i e v e r s  i n  Temperance, s t u d e n t s  and organized l abo r .  I n  t h e s e  c a s e s  and 
many o t h e r s ,  t h e  acceptance of t h e  group 's  c o l l e c t i v e  c la ims would a ign i -  
f i c a n t l y  r e a l l o c a t e  t h e  reaourcea  under t h e  c o n t r o l  of t h e  p o l i t y ,  rede- 
f i n e  the  r u l e s  of membership f o r  f u r t h e r  cha l l enge r s ,  change t h e  l i k e l y  
c o a l i t i o n s  i n s i d e  and o u t s i d e  t h e  p o l i t y .  I n  such caaea ,  t h e  main l i n e  be- 
tween v io l ence  and con ten t ion  f o r  power c o n s i s t s  of t h e  repeated sequence 
i n  which members of t h e  cha l l eng ing  group p u b l i c l y  l a y  c l a im t o  some apace, 
o b j e c t ,  p r i v i l e g e ,  p r o t e c t i o n  o r  o t h e r  r e source  which they cons ide r  due 
them on g e n e r a l  grounds, and t h e  a g e n t s  of t h e  government (backed by t h e  
members of t h e  p o l i t y )  f o r c i b l y  r e s i s t  t h e i r  c la ims.  C o l l e c t i v e  p roac t ion  
on t h e  one s i d e ,  c o l l e c t i v e  r e a c t i o n  on t h e  o t h e r .  
A complete p i c t u r e  of t h e  p rocess  l i n k i n g  con ten t ion  and v io l ence ,  
however, r e q u i r e s  a  d i s t i n c t i o n  between c h a l l e n g e r s  and members on t h e i r  
way ou t  of t h e  p o l i t y .  Members l oa ing  t h e i r  p o s i t i o n  a r e  more l i k e l y  t o  
f i nd  themselves t r y i n g  t o  mainta in  exc lus ive  c la ims t o  some p a r t i c u l a r  
r e sou rce  -- a school ,  a  d i s t i n c t i v e  costume, a  sou rce  of income, a  t a x  
exemption -- and unable t o  e n l i s t  t h e  support  of o t h e r  members o r  of 
agen t s  of t h e  government i n  mainta ining those  c l a ims .  Under t hose  c i r -  
cumstances, they commonly a t t empt  t o  e x e r t  t hose  c la ims on t h e i r  own, and 
t o  keep o t h e r s  from cla iming t h e  same resources .  
Then two d i f f e r e n t  sequences a r e  l i k e l y  t o  produce c o l l e c t i v e  vio- 
l ence  invo lv ing  d e c l i n i n g  members of a  p o l i t y .  The f i r s t  is l i k e  t h e  one 
involving new c l a iman t s  f o r  membership i n  t h e  p o l i t y .  i n  t h a t  agen t s  of 
t h e  government d i r e c t l y  r e e f a t  t h e  c l a ims  of t h e  p a r t i n g  member t o  keep ex- 
e r t i n g  t h e i r  former r i g h t s  t o  c e r t a i n  reaources .  The second p i t a  t h e  
p a r t i n g  member d i r e c t l y  a g a i n s t  o t h e r s  seeking t o  a c q u i r e  t h e  d j apu ted  
resources :  v i g i l a n t e  movements. p r i v a t e  armies. and gangs of thugs  a r e  en- 
p e c i a l l y  l i k e l y  t o  e n t e r  t h e  a c t i o n  a t  t h i s  p o i n t ,  a s  t h e  o l d  member seeks  
t o  s u b s t i t u t e  its own f o r c e  f o r  t h a t  of t h e  now-unreliable government. 
The r e g i o n a l  movement of r e s i s t a n c e  a g a i n s t  a  c e n t r a l i z i n g  s t a t e  
commonly t akes  t h i s  form ( see  Hechter 1975). So does  t h e  c l a s s i c  European 
food r i o t ,  i n  which t h e  members of a  community c o l l e c t i v e  d i s p u t e  t h e  r i g h t  
of anyone t o  s t o r e  g r a i n  i n  t imes  of hunger o r  s h i p  g r a i n  o u t  of t h e  commu- 
n i t y  when l o c a l  people  s t i l l  need food, and r e i n f o r c e  t h e i r  d l a p u t e  by 
a c t i n g  i n  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  r o l e  of t h e  a u t h o r i t i e s :  inventorying t h e  g ro in  
on hand, accumulating i t  i n  a  pub l i c  p lace .  and s e l l i n g  i t  o f f  a t  a  p r i c e  
l o c a l l y  determined t o  be  j u s t  and reasonable  ( s ee  C. T i l l y  1975. L. T i l l y  
1971). So, f i n a l l y ,  do a  v a r i e t y  of f a s c i s t  movements formed i n  oppos i t i on  
t o  t h e  th rea t en ing  c l a ims  of a  mobi l ized working c l a s a .  
The sequences invo lv ing  new contenders  and d e c l i n i n g  members mean 
t h a t  c o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence  t ends  t o  c l u s t e r  around e n t r i e s  i n t o  t h e  p o l i t y  
and e x i t s  from i t .  When membership is s t a b l e ,  c o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence  is l e s s .  . 
preva len t .  The most important  s i n g l e  reason f o r  t h a t  c l u s t e r i n g  is t h e  
p ropens i ty  of t h e  government's r e p r e s s i v e  f o r c e s  t o  a c t  a g a i n s t  new con- 
t ende r s  and d e c l i n i n g  members. 
Some i n d i c a t i o n s  of t h e  l i n k s  between c o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence  and 
As Table 6-1 shows, a significant proportion of all the events 
included terror or collective violence. More important, the proportions 
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struggles nt the edge of the polity appear in Dee Wernette's nnnlysis of 
the Germnn elections of September 1930 and July 1932 -- crucial moments 
in the ride of the Nnzis and the disappearance of the communists from Ger- 
man political life. Among other things. Wernette coded "politicnl events" 
reported in the Kiilnische Zeitung during 'the two months preceding ench of 
rose as the struggle became more acute: 27 percent of the events involved 
collective violence. nine percent terror and eight percent attscks on 
property in 1930. while the figures for 1932 were 57 percent, 25 percent 
and thirteen percent. (The categories are not. of course, mvtually exclu- 
sive.) The leading participants in violent events, by far, ere Nazis, 
Cotmnuniats. and police. The chief settings of collective violence were 
major areas of Comnunist strength: the regions of Berlin, Cologne, Diissel- 
dorf and so on -- the areas in which the Nazis concentrated their campaign 
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Table 6-1: Percent of All Political Events Preceding the German Elections 
of September 1930 and July 1932 Involvlng Different Types of 
Action. 
to extirpate the Communists. In fact, the most frequent eventn were Nnzt- 
Communist clanhes and attacks of each on the other's property. The col- 
the elections. The events he enumernted included 1) non-violent, organized 
polltical activities such as electoral rallles; 2) acts of terrorimn such 
as bombings and ambushes touching manifestly political targets; 3) Eights 
and collective violence involving at'least one group clearly identified by 
political affiliation; 4 )  repressive acts by the state, such as police in- 
vestigations. arrests and trials. 
total number of events 
lective violence grew directly from the struggle for places in the 
Cerman polity. 
I do 'not mean that' the sequences I have described are the only ones 
which produce collective violence, just that they are the moat regular and 
Type of Action 
election-oriented 
nonviolent action 
other nonviolent action 
acts of terror 




reports of trials 
bans on organizations 
bans on activities 
percent in 1930 
33 
Percent in 1932 -- 
15 
reliable. Routine testing among established members of a polity pro- 
duces a certain amount of violent conflict. but it tends to be limited; 
and treated as a regrettable error. Conventional combats among teams. 
communitiea. youth groups or schools sometimes fit the pattern of "teeting" 
violence. but more often escape it; they. too, operate oa a small scale. 
within large restrictions. Drunken brawls, private vengeance. festival 
mdness, impcllsive vandalism, all reach a dangerous magnitude now and then. 
What is wre. the frequency of conventional combats, brawls, vendettas 
and so on undoubtedly varies with the basic conceptions of honor, obli- 
gation and solidarity which prevail within a population. Nevertheless. I 
would say tlmt in populations under tile control of atates all these forms 
account for only a smell proportion of the collective violence which 
occurs, and change far too gradually to account for the abrupt surges end 
recessions of collective violence which appear in such populations. The 
chief source of variation in collective violence is the operation of the 
polity. 
Nor do I mean that moat collective violence goes on in calculating 
calm. Par from it. Both those who are arguing for the acquisition of 
rights on the basis of general principles end those who are fighting for 
the defense of privilege on the basis of custom and precedent are usually 
indignant, and often enraged. Hments of dangerous confrontation (as Louis 
Cirard saye of the French Revolutions of 1830 and 1848, and almost every- 
one saye of the Prencl~ Events of Hey, 1968) frequently bring an air of 
festival, of ext~iliration. of release from ordinary restrictions. Plenty 
of individual venting of resentments and settling of old scores takes place 
under the cover of collective action in the name of high principle. The 
argument up to this point simply denies the common conclusion that the 
. 
rage. the exhiliration or the resentment cause the collective action. 
If these arguments are correct. they produce a paradoxical lesson 
for researchers: to understand and explain violent actions, you must under- 
stand nonviolent actions. Any study which treats violent events alone 
deals with the product of two different sots of determinants: 1) the de- 
terminants of collective action in general. whether it produces violence 
or not; 2) the determinants of violent outcomes to collective action. We 
encountered a similar problem in the explanation of strikes: While in some 
sense a group of workers chooses to strike or not to strike. the strike is 
simply one of several alternative ways to deal with grievances: slowdowns. 
political pressure, sabotage, and individual grumbling are also possible. 
That is why we can't simply infer the level of discontent from the fre- 
quency of strike attempts. Furthermore, whether a strike actually occurs 
is a product of strategic estimates and strategic interaction on the part 
of at least two contenders; when either party is much stronger and wilier 
than the other, the grievance is likely to be settled. or squashed. short 
of a strike. 
Snyder and Kelly (1976) find that from 1878 through 1903 ltalian 
strikes were more likely to be violent if they were large. long and/or 
oriented to wage demands rather than union organization. Contrary to many 
arguments which proceed immediately from grievances to strikes. thcy find 
no relationship between the frequency of violence in strlkes and the rate 
of industrial growth or wage changes. Contrary to the findlnga of Shorter 
and Tilly (1971) for Prance, they find thnt on the average violent strikes 
were less successful then nonviolent strikes. These are important results. 
They emphasize all the more the necessity of separating the determinants 
of collective action (in this case, the decision to strike) in general 
from t h e  de t e rminan t s  of v i o l e n t  outcomes t o  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  
I n  our f i r s t  ca t egory  of de t e rminan t s ,  we f i n d  such i t ems  a s  t h e  
frequency of v i o l a t i o n s  of e s t a b l i s h e d  r i g h t s ,  t h e  mob i l i za t ion  l e v e l s  of 
d i f f e r e n t  contenders  f o r  power, t h e  c u r r e n t  c o a t s  of d i f f e r e n t  forms of 
a c t i o n  which a r e  i n  t h e  a v a i l a b l e  r e p e r t o i r e ,  and s o  on. In  t h e  second, 
we f i n d  t h e  presence o r  absence of counter-demonstra tors ,  t h e  t a c t i c s  of 
r e p r e s s i v e  fo rces ,  t h e  l eng th  of t ime du r ing  which opposing p a r t i e s  a r e  
i n  d i r e c t  con tac t  w i th  each o t h e r ,  and s o  on. Each of t h e  two sometimes 
changes wh i l e  t h e  o t h e r  remains more o r  l e s s  t h e  same: demonstra t ions  be- 
come more f r equen t ,  a l though t h e  percentage of demonstra t ions  which pro- 
duce s t r e e t - f i g h t i n g  remains t h e  same; t h e  a u t h o r i t i e s  g e t  tougher w i th  
s t r i k e r s ,  a l though s t r i k e  p r o p e n s i t i e s  have not  a l t e r e d .  E i t h e r  one 
changes t h e  frequency of c o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence .  A proper  exp lana t ion  of 
v io l ence  l e v e l s  must decompose i n t o  a t  l e a s t  t h e s e  two components. 
Out of t h e  e n t i r e  s t ream of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n ,  on ly  a  sma l l  p a r t  
produces v io l ence .  The c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  which produces v io l ence  a t t r a c t a  
d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e  a t t e n t i o n  because  1 )  t h e  immediate c o s t s  t o  t h e  p a r t i -  
c i p a n t s  tend t o  be  g r e a t e r ,  more v i s i b l e  and more dramat ic  than i n  non- 
v i o l e n t  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n ;  2) t h e  even t s  i n  ques t ion  o f t e n  invo lve  t h e  
i n t e r v e n t i o n  of t h e  a u t h o r i t i e s ;  t h e  s u t h o r i t i e s  i n t e r v e n e  because they 
f ind  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s  -- o r  those  of t h e i r  a l l i e s  -- t h rea t ened  by t h e  
o t h e r  a c t o r s .  C o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence  is not .  by and l a r g e ,  t h e  r e s u l t  of 
a  s i n g l e  group 's  possess ion by an  emotion. sent iment ,  a t t i t u d e  o r  i dea .  
I t  grows, f o r  t h e  moat p a r t ,  ou t  of s t r a t e g i c  =act ion among groups. 
I n  t h e  modern western  expe r i ence ,  t h e  most f r equen t  s e t t i n g s  f o r  
c o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence  a r e  con ten t ious  ga the r ings :  assemblies  of people  who 
mnke v i s i b l e  c o l l e c t i v e  c la ims which c o n f l i c t  w i th  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  of o t h e r  
groups. Content ious  g a t h e r i n g s  s u c h ' a s  t h e  demonstra t ion,  t h e  s t r i k e .  t h e  
so-cal led  food r i o t  and t h e  t a x  p r o t e s t  a r e  n o t ,  on t h e  whole. i n t r i n s i c a l l y  
v i o l e n t .  In  f a c t ,  most of them occur  wi thout  v io l ence .  
The v i o l e n t  v e r s i o n s  of t h e  demonstra t ion.  t h e  s t r i k e ,  t h e  food 
r i o t  and t h e  t a x  p r o t e s t  do not  form a  d i s t i n c t l y  s e p a r a t e  c l s s s  of even t s .  
They o r d i n a r i l y  occur  i n  t h e  midst  of s t r i n g s  of s i m i l a r  even t s  which a r e  
I 
q u i t e  s i m i l a r  t o  them except  f o r  t h e  f a c t  t h n t  they produce no damage o r  
s r j z u r e  of persons  o r  proper ty .  They a r e .  f o r  t h e  moat p a r t ,  t h e  membcrs 
of t h e  s t r i n g s  i n  which o t h e r  p a r t i e s  r e a i s t  t h e  c l a ims  being made. The 
o t h e r  p a r t i e s  a r e  more l i k e l y  t o  r e s i s t  i f  t h e  contender  making t h e  c l a ims  
l a c k s  a  l a r g e  advantage i n  power o r  i f  t h e  c la ims t h r e a t e n  t h e i r  s u r v i v a l .  
But v i o l e n t  and nonviolent  even t s  of t h e  same gene ra l  t ype  c l u s t e r  to- 
ge the r  s u f f i c i e n t l y  f o r  u s  t o  employ t h e  v i s i b l e ,  v i o l e n t  even t s  a s  a 
t r a c e r  of t h e  ebb and flow of con ten t ious  g a t h e r i n g s  i n  gene ra l .  
Changing Contexts  f o r  C o l l e c t i v e  Violence 
The competitive/reactive/proactive scheme provides  n  convenient 
means of summing up t h e  l a r g e s t  t r e n d s  i n  t h e  e v o l u t i o n  of t h e  mnjor con- 
t e x t s  of c o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence  i n  western  c o u n t r i e s  over  t h e  l a s t  fou r  o r  
f i v e  c e n t u r i e s .  Two main p rocesses  have dominated a l l  t h e  r e s t :  1 )  t h e  
r i s e  of n a t i o n a l  s t a t e s  t o  preeminent p o s i t i o n s  i n  a  wide v a r i e t y  of po- 
l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t i e s ;  2) t h e  i n c r e a s i n g l y  a s s o c i a t i o n a l  c h a r a c t e r  of t h e  
p r i n c i p a l  contenders  f o r  power a t  t h e  l o c a l  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  n a t i o n a l  l e v e l .  
I n  1500, no fu l l - f l edged  n a t i o n a l  s t a t e  w i th  unquestioned p r i o r i t y  over  
t h e  o the r  governments w i th in  i ts t e r r i t o r y  e x i s t e d  anywhere i n  t h e  West. 
England was probably t h e  c l o s e s t  approximation. The England of 1500 was. 
however, on ly  f i f t e e n  y e a r s  p a s t  t h e  s l a y i n g  of King Richard 111 by Henry 
Tudor a t  Bosworth F ie ld .  I t  was f r e s h  from t h e  widely-supported r e b e l l i o n s  
of Lsmbert Simnel and Perkin Warbeck. It had yet to effect the union with 
Scotland. It still harbored a number of great lords who controlled their 
own bands of armed retainers. Government itself consisted largely of 
shifting, competing coalitions among great magnates and their retinues, 
the king being the greatest magnate of the strongest coalition. Become 
Henry VII, Henry Tudor began the large work of statemaking which Henry 
VIII and Elizabeth so vigorously continued. 
A century and a half after 1500, a great civil war reopened the 
question of whether the centralized royal apparatus the Tudors, and then 
the Stuarts, had begun building would be the dominant politicnl organi- 
zation in England. In fact, the state which emerged in 1688 had rather 
different contours from the one the Tudors and Stuarts had been building. 
The strength and autonomy of Parliament far exceeded anything a cool ob- 
server of the England of 1600 or 1620 could reasonably have anticipated. 
In 1500 most states faced serious challenges to their hegemony from 
both inside and outside the territory. Only a small minority of the hun- 
dreds of more or less autonomous governments survived the next two centuries 
of statemaking. Moat power was concentrated in politics of smaller than 
national scale: communities, city-states, principalities, semi-autonomous 
provinces. Most contenders for power in those polities were essentially 
communal in structure: craft brotherhoods, families, peasant communities. 
The predominnnt forms of collective violence registered those circumstances: 
wars between rival governments, brawls between groups of artisans, battles 
bong the youth of neighboring communes, attacks by one religious group 
on another. 
The rise of the state threatened the power (and often the very sur- 
vival) of all these small-scale polities. They resisted. The statemakers 
only won their struggle for predominance over the furious resistance of 
princes, communes, provinces and peasant communities. For several cen- 
turies the principal forms of collective violence therefore grew from 
reactive movements on the part of different segments of the general popu- 
lation: communally-based contenders For power fought againat loss of mem- 
bership in polities, indeed against the very destruction of the politiea 
in which their power was invested. Collective resistance to conscription. 
to taxation, to billeting, to a whole variety of other exactions of the 
state exemplify this reactive road to collective violence. 
For a century or more in the experience of most West European coun- 
tries, however, the most frequent form of violence-producing movement 
simed at the krket more directly than at the state. Thot was the food 
riot. The name is misleading: most often the struggle turned about raw 
grain rather than edibles, and most of the time it did not reach the 
point of physical violence. The classic European food riot had three 
main variants: the retributive action, in which a crowd attacked the per- 
sona, property or premises of someone believed to be hoarding or profi- 
teering; the blockage, in which a group of local people prevented the 
shipment of food out of their own locality..requiring it to be stored 
andlor sold locally; the price riot, in which people seized Atored food 
or food displayed for sale, sold it publicly at a price they declared to 
be proper, and handed the money over to the owner or merchant. 
In the best-documented cases -- England and France of the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries -- the blockage occurred more frequently than the 
price riot, and much more often than the retributive action. In those 
two countries, the food riot practically disappeared some time during the 
nineteenth century. Later, questions of food supply motivated dramatic 
c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n s  now and then,  b u t  almost always i n  t h e  form of demon- 
s t r a t i o n s  i n  which producers  complained about  low p r i c e s  o r  consumers com- 
pla ined about  h igh p r i c e s .  
The t iming of t h e  food r i o t ' s  r i s e  and f a l l  i s  r evea l ing .  In  Eng- 
land,  France and some o t h e r  p a r t s  of western  Europe, t h e  food r i o t  d i s -  
placed t h e  t ax  r e b e l l i o n  a s  t h e  most f r equen t  v i o l e n t  form of c o l l e c t i v e  
a c t i o n  toward t h e  end of t h e  seven teen th  cen tu ry .  I t  dec l ined  p rec ip i -  
t ous ly  i n  England j u s t  a f t e r  1820. i n  Germany and France j u s t  a f t e r  1850. 
only  t o  l i n g e r  on i n  p a r t s  of Spain  and I t a l y  i n t o  t h e  twen t i e th  cen tu ry .  
The ca l enda r  d i d  not  conform t o  t h e  h i s t o r y  of hunger; indeed t h e  
g r e a t  k i l l i n g  famines of Medieval and Renaissance Europe were d i sappea r ing  
a s  t h e  food r i o t  came i n t o  i t s  own, and pe r  c a p i t a  food supply was pro- 
bably  inc reas ing  through much of t h e  pe r iod .  In s t ead ,  t h r e e  c o n j o i n t  
c l~anges  account f o r  t h e  timing: 1 )  t h e  p r o l e t a r i a n i z a t i o n  of t h e  popula- 
t i o n ,  which meant a  d r a s t i c  d iminut ion i n  t h e  p ropor t ion  of households 
which produced enough food f o r  t h e  s u b s i s t e n c e  of t h e i r  own members, a  
g r e a t  expansion i n  t h e  number dependent on t h e  market f o r  s u r v i v a l ;  
2) t h e  commercia l iza t ion of food product ion,  which included t h e  b u i l a i n g  
of n a t i o n a l  markets  and t h e  promotion of t h e  i d e a s  t h a t  t h e  n a t i o n a l  
markets should  have p r i o r i t y  over  l o c a l  needs and t h a t  t h e  market ' s  
o p e r a t i o n  tended t o  s e t  a  j u s t ,  proper  and e f f i c i e n t  p r i c e ;  3) t h e  d i s -  
mant l ing of t h e  ex tens ive  p rev ious ly -ex i s t i ng  c o n t r o l s  over  t h e  d i s t r i b u -  
t i o n  of food, which gave t h e  l o c a l  populat ion a  p r i o r  c la im over  food pro- 
duced and so ld  i n  s l o c a l i t y ,  and bound t h e  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  t o  provide 
f o r  t h e  aubs i a t ence  of t h e  l o c a l  poor. 
E.P. Thompson has  c a l l e d  t h e  e n t i r e  process  a  d e c l i n e  i n  t h e  o ld  
Moral Economy, a  s h i f t  from a  bread nexus t o  a  cash nexus. People r e s i s t e d  
t h e  p rocess  s o  long a s  l o c a l  s o l i d a r i t y  and some c o l l e c t i v e  memory of t h e  
l o c a l i t y ' s  p r i o r  c la ims survived.  To an  important  degree ,  t h e  crowd's 
a c t i o n s  o f  b locking.  i nven to ry ing ,  s t o r i n g ,  d e c l a r i n g  o  p r i c e  and holding 
a  p u b l i c  s a l e  f o r  t h e  b e n e f i t  of t h e  l o c a l s  f u l f i l l e d  what had p rev ious ly  
been t h e  o b l i g a t i o n s  of t h e  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  i n  dea l ing  wi th  sho r t ages  
and high p r i c e s .  Mag i s t r a t e s  o r  mayors o f t e n  acknowledged t h a t  f a c t  i m -  
p l i c i t l y  by acqu ie sc ing  i n  t h e  r o u t i n e ;  when they took t h e  i n i t i o t i v e  
themselves, t h e  crowd u s u a l l y  s topped i ts work. 
The immediate o b j e c t s  of t h e  crowd's a t t e n t i o n  were c m o n l y  l o c a l  
o f f i c i a l s ,  bake r s ,  r i c h  f a rmers  and,  e s p e c i a l l y ,  g r a i n  merchants.  The 
s t r u g g l e  p i t t e d  t h e  c la ims of t h e  n a t i o n a l  market a g a i n s t  t h e  c l a ims  of t h e  
l o c a l  populat ion.  For t h a t  reason,  t h e  geography of t h e  f w d  r i o t  re- 
f l e c t e d  t h e  geography of t h e  g r a i n  market: tending t o  form s r i n g  around 
London, P a r i s ,  ano the r  c a p i t a l  o r  a  major p o r t ,  concen t r a t ing  e s p e c i a l l y  
a long r i v e r s ,  c a n a l s  end major roads .  For t h e  a c u t e  Engl ish  c r i s e s  of 
1795-96 and 1800-01. Stevenson remarks: "The map shows t h e  extremely 
c l o s e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  of d i s tu rbances  t o  t h e  communications network i n  t h e  
product ion a r e a s  around London i n  thege two stlortogee. The most s t r i k i n g  
p a t t e r n  o v e r a l l  is t h a t  of 1795-96 when a t  l e a s t  f i f t y  food d i s tu rbances  
took p l ace  a t  comunca t ion  c e n t r e s ,  e i t h e r  c o a s t a l  p o r t s ,  c a n a l  o r  r i v e r  
p o r t s ,  o r  towns w i t h i n  easy c a r t i n g  d i s t a n c e  of major populat ion cen t r e s "  
(Stevenson 1974: 43).  Yet t h e  r e f l e c t i o n  of t h e  market came through a  
d i s t o r t i n g  mi r ro r ,  f o r  t h e  most thoroughly c o m e r c i a l i z e d  a r e a s ,  ad j acen t  
t o  l a r g e  o l d  c i t i e s ,  d i d  no t  t y p i c a l l y  produce food r i o t s .  There, t h e  
market had a l r e s d y  won o u t  over  l o c a l  r i g h t s  t o  t h e  food supply.  
Desp i t e  t h e  s a l i e n c e  of t h e  market. t h e  food r i o t  a l s o  r e s u l t e d  
i n  p a r t  from t h e  r i s e  of t h e  n a t i o n a l  s t a t e .  In  g e n e r a l  (a l though wi th  
g r e a t  h e s i t a t i o n s ,  v a r i a t i o n s  and d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  outcome) European s t a t e -  
makers ac t ed  t o  promote a l l  t h r e e  of t h e  processes  under lying t h e  food 
r i o t :  p r o l e t a r i a n i z a t i o n ,  commercia l iza t ion,  d i sman t l ing  of l o c a l  con- 
t r o l s .  A s  t h e i r  dependent governmental s t a f f s ,  urban popu la t ions  and non- 
a g r i c u l t u r a f  l abo r  f o r c e s  swel led,  t h e  managers of s t a t e s  in tervened in-  
c r eas ing ly  t o  promote marketing. (There i s  i rony  i n  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  they 
ac t ed  thus  i n  t h e  nome of f r e e i n g  t h e  market . )  As Stevenson says  of t h e  
English c r i s i s  of 1795: 
The government, however, was determined t o  keep o u t  of t h e  i n t e r n a l  
corn t r a d e  and a t tempted t o  keep up t h e  normal c i r c u l a t i o n  of 
g ro in ,  s o  t h a t  t h e  l a r g e  urban c e n t r e s  would be  supp l i ed .  On 
t h e s e  grounds t h e  government r e fused  t o  y i e l d  t o  t h e  p l e a s  of 
l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  and i n t e r f e r e  w i th  t h e  normal movement of g r a i n  
. . . I t  was r epor t ed  t o  t h e  Home O f f i c e  t h a t  s topping t h e  move- 
ment of g r a i n  had become s o  widespread t h a t  coun t ry  m i l l e r s  were 
s a i d  t o  be  f r igh tened  t o  send g r a i n  t o  t h e  c a p i t a l  except  by n i g h t .  
In  an a t tempt  t o  f r e e  t h e  c i r c u l a t i o n  of g r a i n  from these  checks 
t h e  government passed an a c t  t o  prevent  t h e  s topp ing  of g r a i n  by 
making t h e  whole hundred l i a b l e  t o  f i n e  and i n d i v i d u a l s  l i a b l e  t o  
f i n e  and imprisonment (Stevenson 1974: 41-42). 
In  t h a t  c r i s i s ,  many loco1  o f f i c i a l s  sought t o  r e s t r i c t  t h e  f low of g r a i n  
away from t h e i r  own markets.  Within t h r e e  decades ,  however, t h e  market 
and t h e  n n t i o n a l  government had won t h e i r  b a t t l e ;  few mayors and magis- 
t r a t e s  chose  t o  counter  t h e  n a t i o n a l  w i l l ,  and few hungry crowds harbored 
t h e  hope of making them do so .  One of t h e  Engl ish  forms.of c o l l e c t i v e  
a c t i o n  had wi thered away. 
Two t h i n g s  even tua l ly  put  an  end t o  t h e  predominance of t h e  r e a c t i v e  
forms, althougli a t  t imes  and tempos which v a r i e d  markedly from one p a r t  of 
t h e  West t o  ano the r .  F i r s t ,  t h e  s t a t e  won almost everywhere. One may 
a s k  how complete t h e  v i c t o r y  of t h e  s t a t e  was i n  t h e  remote s e c t i o n s  
of v a s t  t e r r i t o r i e s  such a s  Canada, A u s t r a l i a  o r  Brnz i l ,  and s p e c u l a t e  
whether r ecen t  su rges  of s ec t iona l i sm i n  Belgium. Great  B r i t a i n  and even 
France presage t h e  end of s t a t e  c o n t r o l .  Yet on t h e  whole t h e  two cen- 
t u r i e s  a f t e r  1700 produced an enormous concen t r a t ion  of r e sou rces  and 
means of coe rc ion  under t h e  c o n t r o l  of n a t i o n a l  s t a t e s ,  t o  t h e  v t r t u n l  
exc lus ion  of o t h e r  l e v e l s  of government. Second, a  whole s e r i e s  of orgnni- 
z a t i o n n l  changes c l o s e l y  l i nked  t o  u rban iza t ion .  i n d u s t r i a l i z n t i o l ~  and t h e  
expansion of c a p i t a l i s m  g r e a t l y  reduced t h e  r o l e  of t h e  communal group a s  
a  s e t t i n g  f o r  mob i l i za t ion  and a s  a  r e p o s i t o r y  f o r  power; t h e  a s s o c i a t i o n  
of one kind o r  ano the r  came t o  b e  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  v e h i c l e  f o r  c o l l e c t i v e  
a c t i o n .  The r i s e  of t h e  jo in t - s tock  company, t l ie p o l i t i c a l  p n r t y ,  tlie 
l abo r  union, t h e  c lub  a l l  belong t o  t h e  same gene ra l  t r end .  
Working toge the r ,  t h e  v i c t o r y  of t h e  s t a t e  and t h e  r i s e  of t h e  ss- 
s o c i a t i o n  transformed t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n s  which most commonly produced 
v io l ence .  In  coun t ry  of t e r  coun t ry ,  p o l i t i c s  na t iona l i zed ;  tlie p o l i t y  
which mat tered was t h e  one which c o n t r o l l e d  t h e  n n t i o n a l  s t a t e ;  t h e  cru- 
c i a l  s t r u g g l e s  f o r  pa re r  went on a t  a  n n t i o n a l  s c a l e .  And tlie p a r t i c i p a n t s  
i n  t hose  s t r u g g l e s  were most o f t e n  organized a s  a s s o c i a t i o n s .  The s t r i k e .  
t he  demonstra t ion,  t h e  pa r ty  consp i r acy ,  t h e  organized march on t h e  c a p i t a l .  
t h e  par l iamentary  s e s s i o n ,  t h e  mass meeting become t h e  usua l  s e t t i n g s  f o r  
c o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence .  The s t a t e  became an  i n t e r e s t e d  p a r t i c i p a n t  Ln a l l  
c o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence  -- a s  policemen, a s  pn r ty  t o  t h e  c o n f l i c t ,  a s  t e r t i u s  
gaudens. 
The discovery t h a t  c o l l e c t i v e  'v iolence i s  a  by-product of t h e  
same political processes which produce nonviolent collective action does 
not mean, then, that it is an uninteresting by-product. The occurrence 
of damage to persons or objects gives us some small assurance that at 
least one of the parties to the collective action took it seriously. 
More important, violence makes collective action visible: authorities, 
participants and observers tend to set darn some record of their actions. 
reactions and observations. Collective violence therefore serves as s 
convenient trscer of major alterations in collective action as a whole. 
Like all tracers. we must use it with care. 
CIWPTER SEVEN: REVOLUTION AND REBELLION 
Revolutionary Situations and Revolutionary Outcomes 
We have encountered our share of Big Words on the way from mobili- 
zation to revolution. Interest, power and violence have all turned out 
to be controversial concepts not only because they refer to complex reali- 
ties but also because alternative definitions of each of them tend to im- 
ply alternative political programs. That is why Stephen Lukes npesks of 
"pluralist ," "reformist" and [truly] "rsdlcsl" definitions of parer. The 
same is certainly true of our final Big Word: revolution. Revoli~tionary 
reality is complex. And whether it includes coupn, sssossinations, ter- 
rorism or slow, massive changes such as induetriolieation is controversial 
not only because the world is complex, but also becaune to call something 
revolutionary is. within most forms of western political discourse, to 
identify it as good or bad. 
Nevertheless, most western analysts of revolution restrict their de- 
finitions by means of two sorts of requirements: 1) by insisting that the 
actors and the action meet some demanding standards -- tl~at they be booed 
on an oppressed class, that they have a comprehensive program of social 
transformation in view. or some other Cause of seriouness; 2) by dealing 
only with cases in which parer actually changes hands. Peter Cnlvert, for 
example, builds the following elements into his conception of revolution: 
(a) A process in which the political direction of a state hecomes 
increasingly discredited in the eyes of either the populntion an a 
whole or certain key sections of it . . . 
(b) A change of government (transition) at s clearly defined point 
in time by the use of armed force, or the credible threat of its 
use;  namely, an  event. 
I 
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(c) A more-or-less coherent  programme of change i n  e i t h e r  t h e  pol- 
i t i c a l  o r  t h e  s o c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  of o  s t a t e ,  o r  both ,  induced by 
t h e  p o l i t i c a l  l e a d e r s h i p  a f t e r  a  r evo lu t ionory  even t ,  t h e  t r a n s i -  I 
t i o n  of power, has  occurred.  
(d)  A p o l i t i c a l  myth t h a t  g i v e s  t o  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  l e a d e r s h i p  r e s u l -  
t i n g  from a  r evo lu t iona ry  t r a n s i t i o n  shor t - term s t a t u s  a s  t h e  l e g i t -  1 
imate government of t h e  s t a t e  (Ca lve r t  1970:4). 
i 
Thus, he  goes on,  " in  o rde r  t o  i n v e s t i g a t e  f u l l y  t h e  concept of r evo lu t ion ,  I 
i t  would be  necessary  t o  s tudy i n  d e t a i l  process ,  event ,  programme, and 
myth a s  d i s t i n c t  phenomena" (Ca lve r t  1970:4). He conf ines  h i s  own s tudy  
t o  r evo lu t ionory  even t s :  changes of government accomplished by fo rce .  
That cho ice  g r e a t l y  i n c r e a s e s  t h e  number of c a s e s  he has  t o  examine, s i n c e  
most such even t s  do no t  meet h i s  c r i t e r i a  a ,  b  and c .  Yet t h e  i n s i s t e n c e  
on armed f o r c e  and on an a c t u a l  t r a n s f e r  of power e l imina te s  many i n s t a n c e s  
i n  which competing obse rve r s  s e e  something r evo lu t iona ry :  t h e  I n d u s t r i a l  
Revolution, r e v o l u t i o n s  from above, t h e  legendary General S t r i k e  of t h e  
s y n d i c a l i s t s ,  and s o  on. On t h e  o t h e r  hand. t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  has  a  hard- 
nosed q u a l i t y  which many advocates  of r evo lu t ion  w i l l  f i n d  unacceptable ;  i t  
does no t  i n s i s t  t h a t  t h e  pa r ty  which s e i z e s  power be d i sposses sed ,  pro- 
g r e s s i v e  o r  even angry. 
No concept of r evo lu t ion  can escape some such d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  because i 
no conceptuol izer  con avoid  making some such choices .  Never theless ,  we 
can c l e a r  a  good d e a l  of conceptual  ground by means of a  s imple  d i s t i n c t i o n  
between r evo lu t iona ry  s i t u a t i o n s  and revolutionor)! outcomes. Most s i g n i f i -  
c a n t  disagreement about  t h e  proper d e f i n i t i o n  of r evo lu t ion  f a l l s  some- 
where .a long t h e s e  two dimensions. 
Revolut ionary S i t u a t i o n s  
The d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of a  r evo lu t ionory  s i t u a t i o n ,  a s  
Leon Trotsky s a i d  long  ago, is t h e  presence of more than one bloc  e f f ec -  
t i v e l y  e x e r c i s i n g  c o n t r o l  over  s s i g n i f i c a n t  p a r t  of t h e  s t a t e  appa ra tus :  
The h i s t o r i c a l  p repa ra t ion  of a  r evo lu t ion  b r ings  about.  i n  t h e  
pre-revolut ionary per iod,  a  s i t u a t i o n  i n  which t h e  c l a s s  which is 
c a l l e d  t o  r e a l i z e  t h e  new s o c i a l  system, a l though no t  y e t  mi s t e r  
of t h e  country ,  has  a c t u a l l y  concentra ted i n  i t s  hands a  s i g n i f i -  
c s n t  s h a r e  of t h e  s t a t e  power, wh i l e  t h e  o f f i c i a l  appa ra tus  of t h e  
government i s  s t i l l  i n  t h e  hands of t h e  o ld  l o r d s .  That is t h e  i n i -  
t i a l  dua l  power i n  every r evo lu t ioo .  
But t h a t  i s  no t  its on ly  form. I f  t h e  new c l a s s ,  pLaced i n  power 
by a  r e v o l u t i o n  which i t  d i d  not  want, is i n  essence an a l r eady  o l d ,  
h i s t o r i c a l l y  be l a t ed ,  c l a s s ;  i f  i t  was a l r e a d y  worn o u t  be fo re  i t  
was o f f i c i a l l y  crowned; i f  on coming t o  power i t  encounters  on an- 
t a g o n i s t  s u f f i c i e n t l y  mature and reaching o u t  its hand toward t h c  
helm of s t a t e ;  then in s t ead  of one u n s t a b l e  two-power cqui l ibr ium,  
t h e  p o l i t i c a l  r e v o l u t i o n  produces ano the r ,  s t i l l  l e s s  s t a b l e .  To 
overcome t h e  "anarchy" of t h i s  twofold sovereignty  becomes a t  cvcry 
new s t e p  t h e  t a s k  o f  t h e  r evo lu t ion  -- o r  t h e  counter- revolut ion 
(Trotsky 1965: 224). 
The shadow of Russia i n  1917 f a l l s  da rk  a c r o s s  t h i s  passage. From t h e  
p a r t i c u l a r  i n s t ance ,  neve r the l e s s ,  comes an  idea  of gene ra l  value .  Trot-  
s k y ' s  i dea  of d u a l  sovereignty  c l a r i f i e s  a  number of f e a t u r e s  oE revolu-  
t i ona ry  s i t u a t i o n s .  Pe t e r  Amann has  gone s o  f a r  a s  t o  f a sh ion  i t  i n t o  a  
s e r v i c e a b l e  d e f i n i t i o n  of r evo lu t ion  i t s e l f :  f o r  him, a  r evo lu t ion  begins  
when more than one "power bloc" regarded a s  l e g i t i m a t e  and sovereign by 
some of a  coun t ry ' s  people emerges, and ends when on ly  one power b loc  
remains. 
Amann's adap ta t ion  of Trotsky has  t h e  advantage of n e a t l y  i d e n t i f y i n g  
t h e  common p r o p e r t i e s  of coups, c i v i l  wars and f u l l - s c a l e  r e v o l u t i o n s  
wi thout  r e q u i r i n g  knowledge of what happened nex t .  It sti l l  pe rmi t s  
t h e i r  d i s t i n c t i o n  i n  terms of t h e  i d e n t i t i e s  of t h e  power b l o c s  themselves. 
At t h e  same time i t  I d e n t i f i e s  a  weakness i n T r o t s k y ' s f o r m u l s t i o n :  t h e  
i n s i s t e n c e  t h a t  a  s i n g l e  c l a s s  makes a  r evo lu t iona ry  s i t u a t i o n .  ,Barring- 
ton Moore's t rea tment  of t h e  g r e a t e s t  modern r e v o l u t i o n s  c o r r e c t s  t h a t  
weakness by t r a c i n g  o u t  t h e  c o a l i t i o n s  of c l a s s e s  which t o r e  down t h e  o l d  
regimes. Thus f o r  Moore a  c o n l l t i o n  of workers,  bourgeois  and peasan t s  
made t h e  French Revolution, even i f  t h e  workers and peasan t s  l o s t  o u t  
f a i r l y  soon. What is more, Moore argues t h a t  t h e  c h a r a c t e r  of t h e  revolu- 
t i ona ry  s l t u a t i o n  shaped t h e  r evo lu t iona ry  outcome. The f a c t  t h a t  i t  
was bourgeois  + peasants  + workers r a t h e r  than t h e  d i f f e r e n t  c o a l i t i o n s  
which made t h e  American, Engl ish  o r  Russian r evo lu t ions ,  i n  Moore's view, 
pushed France toward t h e  a t t enua ted  par l iamentary  democracy s h e  maintained 
i n  t h e  n ine t een th  and twen t i e th  c e n t u r i e s .  
Two of T ro t sky ' s  r e s t r i c t i o n s  t h e r e f o r e  seem unnecessary: 1 )  t h a t  
each of t h e  b locs  c o n s i s t  of a  s i n g l e  s o c i a l  c l a s s ;  2)  t h a t  t h e r e  be  on ly  
two sucli b locs  a t  any po in t  i n  time. E i t h e r  of t h e s e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  would 
e l i m i n a t e  most of t h e  s tandard c a s e s  of r evo lu t ion  -- not  l e a s t  t hose  of 
France, China and Mexico. 
 rots sky's idea  r e t a i n s  i t s  o n a l y s t i c  r e s i l i e n c y  i f  expanded t o  in- 
c lude  b locs  c o n s i s t i n g  of c o a l i t i o n s  of c l a s s e s  and/or o t h e r  groups and 
t o  a l low f o r  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of t h r e e  o r  more s imul taneous  blocs .  =- 
sove re ign ty  is then  t h e  i d e n t i f y i n g  Eeature  of r evo lu t iona ry  s i t u -  
a t i o n s .  A r evo lu t iona ry  s i t u a t i o n  begins  when a  government previously  . 
under t h e  c o n t r o l  of a  s i n g l e ,  sovereign p o l i t y  becomes t h e  o b j e c t  of ef -  
f e c t i v e ,  competing, mutual ly  exc lus ive  c la ims on tlie p a r t  of two o r  more 
d i s t i n c t  p o l i t i e a .  I t  ends when s s i n g l e  sovereign p o l i t y  r e g a i n s  con- 
t r o l  over  t h e  government. 
Such a  m u l t i p l i c a t i o n  of p o l i t i e s  occu r s  under fou r  d i f f e r e n t  con- 
d i t i o n s :  
1. The members of one p o l i t y  a t t empt  t o  subord ina t e  another  pre- 
v ious ly  d i s t i n c t  p o l i t y .  Where t h e  two p o l i t i e s  a r e  c l e a r l y  sovereign 
and independent a t  t h e  o u t s e t  we a r e  l i k e l y  t o  cons ide r  t h i s  con- 
f l i c t  a  s p e c i a l  v a r i e t y  of war. Circumstances l i k e  t h e  annexat ion 
of Texas t o  t h e  United S t a t e s  o r  t l ie t r a n s f e r s  of power t o  va r ious  
communist regimes i n  Eas t e rn  Europe a t  t h e  end o f  t h e  Second World 
War f a l l ,  i n  f a c t ,  i n t o  an unce r t a in  a r e a  between war and r evo lu t ion .  
2. The members of a  p rev ious ly  subord ina t e  po l i t y .  such a s  t h e  
group of contenders  holding power over  a  r eg iona l  government, a s s e r t  
sovereignty .  Here tl ie words " r ebe l l i on"  and "revol t"  s p r i n g  r e a d i l y  
t o  mind. Yet i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s  i t  has  become q u i t e  usual  t o  c a l l  one 
ve r s ion  of such even t s  a  c o l o n i a l  o r  n a t l o n o l  r evo lu t ion  -- e s p e c i a l l y  
i f  t h e  outcome is independence. 
3. Contenders n o t  holding membership i n  t h e  e x i s t i n g  p o l i t y  mob1,llze 
i n t o  a  b loc  s u c c e s s f u l l y  e x e r t i n g  c o n t r o l  over  some por t ion  of t h e  
governmental appa ra tus .  Despi te  t h e  o t t r a c t i v e n c s s  of t h i s  ve r s ion  
t o  l e a d e r s  of t h e  d i sposses sed ,  i t  r a r e l y ,  i f  eve r ,  occu r s  i n  a  
pure form. 
4. The more usual  c i rcumstance is t h e  f ragmentat ion of an e x i s t i n g  
p o l i t y  i n t o  two o r  more b l o c s  each e x e r c i s j n g  c o n t r o l  over some p a r t  
of t h e  government. That f ragmentat ion f r equen t ly  invo lves  t h e  emer- 
gence o f  c o a l i t j o n s  between e s t ab l i shed  members of t h e  p o l i t y  and 
mobi l iz ing nonmembers. 1 
I 
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How would we recognize  t h e  o n s e t  of m u l t i p l e  sove re ign ty?  The ques t ion  
I 
i s  s t i c k i e r  than i t  seems a t  f i r s t  g lance.  Nei ther  tlie presence nor t h e  i 
expansion of a r e n s  of autonomy o r  of r e s i s t a n c e  on t h e  p a r t  of t h e  s u b j e c t  I 
populntion i s  a  r e l i a b l e  s ign .  A 1 1  governments e x c i t e  some s o r t s  of r e s i s -  I 
tance,  and a l l  governments e x e r t  incomplete c o n t r o l  over  t h e i r  s u b j e c t s .  
I 
That was t h e  po in t  of t h e  e a r l i e r  a n a l y s i s  of r ep re s s ion ,  t o l e r a t i o n  and 
f a c i l i t a t i o n .  Most s t a t e s  f a c e  con t inu ing  marginal cha l l enges  t o  t h e i r  i 
sovereignty:  from wi th jn ,  band i t s ,  v i g i l a n t e s ,  r e l i g i o u s  communities, na- 
t i o n a l  m i n o r i t i e s  o r  uncompromising s e p a r a t i s t s  hold them o f f .  From with- 
o u t ,  powerful s t a t e s  i n f i l t r a t e  them and encroach on t l i e i r  p re roga t ives .  
A 1 1  of t hese  c i rcumstances  have some d i s t a n t  k i n s h i p  t o  r evo lu t ion ,  b u t  
they do no t  c o n s t i t u t e  r evo lu t iona ry  s i t u a t i o n s .  Even r i v a l  c l a ims  t o  
t hose  of t h e  e x i s t i n g  p o l i t y  by t h e s d h e r e n t s o f  d isplaced regimes, m i -  I 
I 
l i t a r y  movements o r  o u t s i d e  s t a t e s  a r e  q u i t e  common. The c l a ims  them- 
s e l v e s  do no t  amount t o  n  r evo lu t iona ry  s i t u a t i o n .  
The ques t ion  is whether some s i g n i f i c a n t  p a r t  of t h e  s u b j e c t  popu- 
l a  t i o n  honors t h e  c la im.  The r evo lu t iona ry  moment a r r i v e s  when p rev ious ly  
ocqulescent  members of t h a t  populat ion f i n d  themselves confronted wi th  
s t r i c t l y  incompat ible  demands from t h e  and form an a l t e r n a t i v e  
body c la iming c o n t r o l  over  t h e  government, o r  c la iming t o  & t h e  Rovcrn- 
ment . . . and those  p rev ious ly  acqu ie scen t  people obey t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  
body. They pay t axes ,  provide men t o  its armies ,  feed i ts f u n c t i o n a r i e s ,  
honor i ts symbols, give, t ime to  i t s  s e r v i c e ,  o r  y i e l d  o t h e r  r e sources  des- 
p i t e  t h e  p r o h i b i t i o n s  of a  s t i l l - e x i s t i n g  government they Formerly obeyed. 
Mul t ip l e  sove re ign ty  has  begun. When on ly  one p o l i t y  e x e r t i n g  e x c l ~ r s l v e  
c o n t r o l  over  tl ie government remains, and no r i v n l s  a r e  s u c c e s s f u l l y  pres-  
s i n g  t h e i r  c l a ims  -- however t h a t  hsppeiis -- t h e  r evo lu t iona ry  s i t u a t i o n  
has  ended.* 
Revolut ionary Outcomes 
"A revolut ion."  w r i t e s  Samuel Huntington. "is a  r ap id .  fundnmentnl, 
and v i o l e n t '  domestic change i n  t h e  dominant v a l u e s  and myths of a  s o c i e t y ,  
i n  i t s  p o l i t i c a l  i n s i t u t i o n s ,  s o c i a l  s t r u c t u r e .  l eade r sh ip .  and govern- 
ment a c t i v i t y  and p o l i c i e s .  Revolut ions  a r e  t hus  t o  be d i s t i n g u i s l ~ e d  
from i n s u r r e c t i o n s ,  r e b e l l i o n s ,  r e v o l t s ,  coups, and wars of independence" 
(Huntington 1968: 264). Hunt ington 's  d e f i n i t i o n  s t r e s s e s  outcomes, n o t  
t h e  p o l i t i c a l  p roces ses  which l e a d  t o  t hose  outcomes. Such outcomes a r e  
r a r e .  Depending on how generously  one i n t e r p r e t e d  t h e  vo rds  "rapjd" and 
"fundamental", i t  would be easy  t o  a rgue  t h a t  no r evo lu t ion  hns ever  
occurred,  and hard t o  a rgue  t h a t  t h e  number of t r u e  c a s e s  exceeds n  ha l f -  
dozen. Pe t e r  ~ s l v e r t ' s  d e f i n i t l o n o f  r evo lu t ion ,  which we looked a t  
e a r l i e r ,  is somewhat l e s s  demanding than Hunt ington 's .  I t  merely re-  
q u i r e s  t h a t  a  government be  d i s c r e d i t e d ,  t h a t  a  new group s e i z e  t h e  gov- 
ernment by fo rce ,  t h a t  t l ie newcomers in t roduce  a  program of change, and 
* I r e g r e t  t o  s s y  t h a t  i n  an  e a r l i e r  ve r s ion  of t h i s  chap te r  ( T i l l y  1975 ). 
I used t h e  word "revolut ion"  f o r  t h e  c i rcumstsnces  I am h e r e  c a l l i n g  o revol-  
t i o n a r y  s i t u a t i o n  
t l ia t  a  myth l e g i t i m a t i n g  t h e  t r a n s f e r  of power come i n t o  being. Except f o r  
t h e  discrediting, these  cond i t i ons ,  too, a r e  outcomes; t h e r e  is no r e l i a -  
b l e  way t o  know whether a  r e v o l u t i o n  is occur r ing  u n t i l  t h e  whole process  
has  ended. 
For t h e  moment, I propose an  even l e s s  demanding s t anda rd  than Cal- 
v e r t ' s .  A r evo lu t iona ry  outcome i s  t h e  displacement  of one s e t  of power- 
ho lde r s  by ano the r .  That s imple  d e f i n i t i o n  l e a v e s  many r e f e r e n c e  p o i n t s  
ovn t l ab l e :  power over  tl ie means of product ion,  power over  symbols, power 
over  government. P rov i s iona l ly ,  l e t  u s  t a k e  power over  government a s  our  
r e f e r e n c e  po in t .  A r evo lu t iona ry  outcome is  t h e  displacement  of one s e t  
of members of :he p o l i t y  by ano the r  s e t .  C lea r ly ,  a  r evo lu t ionory  s i t u a t i o n  
can occur wi thout  n r evo lu t ionory  outcome; i n  t h e  s imp les t  ca se ,  t h e  
J 
e x i s t i n g  members of t h e  p o l i t y  bea t  down t h e i r  c h a l l e n g e r s  a f t e r  a  per iod 
of e f f e c t i v e ,  competing, mutual ly  e x c l u s i v e  c la ims.  I t  is a t  l e a s t  l og ic -  I 
! 
a l l y  poss ib l e  f o r  s revo lu t iona ry  outcome t o  occur  wi thout  a  r evo lu t iona ry  
s i t u a t i o n ,  through t h e  g radua l  a d d i t i o n  and/or  s u b t r a c t i o n  of members of 1 
t h e  p o l i t y .  
In  gene ra l ,  how does t h e  displacement of one s e t  of powerholders by ' 
another  happen7 The answer depends i n  p a r t  on t h e  t ime-perspect ive  we 
adopt .  I n  t h e  s h o r t  run,  t h e  ques t ion  concerns  t a c t i c s  and t h e  ba l ance  
of fo rces .  In T ro t sky ' s  a n a l y s i s  of t h e  October Revolution, f o r  example. 
t h e  t a c t i c a l  problems of winning over t h e  Petrogrod g a r r i s o n  and then of 
cap tu r ing  t h e  Winter Palace  loom ve ry  l a r g e ;  gene ra l i zed .  T ro t sky ' s  con- 
c e r n s  p l a c e  t h e  c o n t r o l  o r  n e u t r a l i z a t i o n  of t h e  a v a i l a b l e  m l l i t a r y  f o r c e  
a t  t l ie c e n t e r  of t h e  shor t - run c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  a  t r a n s f e r  of power. 
I n  t h e  medium run ,  we a r r i v e  a t  t h e  cons ide ra t ions  which have domin- 
a t e d  t h i s  book: t h e  presence of mobilized contenders  i n  e f f e c t i v e  c o a l i -  
t i o n s .  The medium run of T ro t sky ' s  a n a l y s i s  concerns  Lhe peasants  who 
had been mobi l ized v i a  t h e  army. t h e  organized workers of Petroarad and 
Moscow, tlie p a r t i e s  and t h e  p rocesses  by which each of them mobi l ized 
and formed c o a l i t i o n s .  I n  t h i s  medium run, r ep re s s ion  and f a c i l i t a t i o n  
f i g u r e  a s  we l l  -- no tab ly  i n  t h e  d i s c r e d i t i n g  and wenkening of t h e  
T s a r i s t  regime by tlie war. I t  i s  In  t h i s  medium run t l ia t  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o r  
emergence of a  r evo lu t iona ry  s i t u a t i o n  c o n t r i b u t e s  t o  -- and m y  be es- 
s e n t i a l  t o  -- a  r evo lu t iona ry  outcome. Without t h e  appearance of mul- 
t i p l e  sove re ign ty  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  t r a n s f e r o f  power is e i t h e r  impossible  o r  
h i g h l y  un l ike ly .  
I n  t h e  long run,  i n t e r e s t s  and o rgan iza t ion  begin  t o  t e l l .  I n  t h i s  
book, we have on ly  faced t h e  cha l l enge  of l ong  run a n a l y s i s  i n t e r m i t t e n t l y ,  
through quick gl impses  a t  t h e  consequences of p r o l e t a r i a n i z n t l o n ,  t h e  
development of c a p i t a l i s m ,  s t a t e m k i n g ,  u rban iza t ion  and i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n .  
The quick gl impses  have, however, been graphic  enough t o  conunt~nicate t h e  
fundamental importance of threotened c l a s s  i n t e r e s t s .  Over t h e  long  run. 
t h e  r eo rgan iza t ion  of production c r e a t e s  t he  ch ie f  h f s t o r i c a l  a c t o r s .  
t h e  major c o n s t e l l a t i o n s  of i n t e r e s t s ,  t he  b a s i c  t h r e a t s  t o  t hose  i n t e r -  
e s t s ,  and t h e  p r i n c i p a l  cond i t i ons  f o r  t r a n s f e r s  of power. 
S i t u a t i o n s  and Outcomes Combined 
Our concep t s  w i l l  do b e t t e r  work f o r  u s  i f  we tu rn  them i n t o  cont inuo.  
A s i t u a t i o n  can be more o r  l e s s  r evo lu t iona ry .  The c e n t r a l  ques t ion  is: 
a t  t h e  po in t  i n  time which we a r e  eva lua t ing ,  how much w u l d  i t  c o s t  t o  
e l i m i n a t e  t h e  s p l i t  between t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  p o l i t i e s 7  How nea r ly  i r r e -  
vocable  is  t h e  s p l i t 7  We should t r y  t o  make t h a t  jugement from intormot ion 
a v a i l a b l e  a t  the, po in t  i n  time we a r e  judging, r a t h e r  than from even tua l  
outcomes. I f  we want t o  judge a  completed r evo lu t ion  a s  a  whole, 
we can f i x  on t h e  mean s p l i t  between p o l i t i e s ,  t h e  owximum s p l i t ,  t h e  i n i -  
t i a l  s p l i t  o r  t h e  time-function a s  a  whole. In  any case ,  one  extreme is 
no m u l t i p l e  sove re ign ty  a t  a l l ,  t h e  o t h e r  an  i r r e v o c a b l e  s p l i t .  Inbetween 
a r e  d i v i s i o n s  c o s t i n g  t h e  p a r t i e s  varying amounts t o  e l imina te .  The 
c o s t  d e f i n i t e l y  inc ludes  t h e  c o s t  of r ep re s s ion  t o  t h e  r e p r e s s o r s  and 
I 
I 
t l ie r ep re s sed .  The sum of a l l  payof f s  and foregone b e n e f i t s  should a l s o  
e n t e r  i n .  I f  so ,  t h e  es t imated c o s t  w i l l  obviously  depend on t h e  time- 
period considered -- and w i l l  obviously  inc lude  some th ink ing  about  what 
might have happened i f  . . . 
An outcome can a l s o  be more o r  l e s s  r evo lu t iona ry .  Now the  c e n t r a l  1 
ques t ion  is: how c l o s e  d i d  t h e  e x i s t i n g  members of t h e  p o l i t y  come to  
being compLetely d i sp l aced?  We may s e t t l e  f o r  a  s imple  h a d  count .  We 
may weight t h e  heads by t h e i r  power p r i o r  t o  t h e  change, bu t  st i l l  s e t t l e  
f o r  count ing how many heads r o l l e d .  We may t r y  t o  e s t ima te  t h e  power of 
a l l  previously  e x i s t i n g  members be fo re  and a f t e r .  I n  any case ,  one extreme 
w i l l  be t h e  maintenance o r  r e s t o r a t i o n  of t h e  s t a t u s  quo a n t e ,  t h e  o t h e r  
extreme tlie complete e l imina t ion  o f  previous  members from tlie p o l i t y .  In  
between w i l l  be varying deg rees  of d isplacement .  i 
The dec i s ion  whether t o  c a l l  an  event  a  r evo lu t ion  now looks  l i k e  
Figure  7-1. P o l i t i c s  a s  usual  i nvo lves  l i t t l e  o r  no displacement  of exis-  
t i n g  members of t h e  p o l i t y ,  and no more than low-cost s p l i t s  between a l -  I 
t e r n a t i v e  p o l i t i e s .  Coups invo lve  higher-cost  s p l i t s  (a l though no t  i r -  
revocable  ones ) ,  but  r e s u l t  i n  r e l a t i v e l y  l i t t l e  displacement of e x i s t i n g  
members. S i l e n t  r evo lu t ions ,  i f  they occur ,  produce major d isplacements  
wi th  l i t t l e  o r  no development of a  r evo lu t iona ry  s i t u a t i o n .  Great  revolu-  ! 
t i o n s  a r e  extreme i n  both  r ega rds :  ex t ens ive  s p l i t s  between a l t e r n a t i v e  
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p o l i t i e s ,  l a rge - sca l e  displacement  of e x i s t i n g  members. In  F igu re  7-1, 
Line A r e p r e s e n t s  a  gencrous d e f i n i t i o n  of r evo lu t ion :  eve ry th ing  t o  t h e  
r i g h t  g e t s  counted. Line  B s t a t e s  a  r e s t r i c t i v e  d e f i n i t i o n ;  on ly  g r e a t  
r evo lu t ions  q u a l i f y .  
Altliougl~ t h e  diagram is  e n t i r e l y  conceptual ,  i t  he lps  p inpo in t  some 
important  t h e o r e t i c a l  i s s u e s .  S tuden t s  of r evo lu t ion  d i s a g r e e  over  t h e  
combinations of outcome and r evo lu t iona ry  s i t t r a t i o n  which a r e  a c t u a l l y  
poss ib l e  i n  t h i s  world. To s imp l i fy  a  complex s e t  of d isagreements ,  l e t  
u s  look a t  t h r e e  i d e a l i z e d  maps of t h e  p o s s i b l e  and t h e  impossible: 
"Syndical is t" ,  "Marxist" and "Brintonian". They appear i n  Figure  7-2. 
Thc S y n d i c a l i s t  argument, i n  i t s  s imp les t  form, runs:  t h e  more ex tens ive  
the  r evo lu t iona ry  s i t u a t i o n ,  t h e  more sweeping t h e  r evo lu t iona ry  outcome. 
I t  is a  c a u s a l  argument. I t  s a y s  t h e  c r e a t i o n  of an  i r r evocab le  s p l i t  be- 
tween a l t e r n a t i v e  p o l i t i e s  w i l l ,  i n  i t s e l f ,  produce a  t o t a l  d isplacement  
o f  t h e  e x i s t i n g  ho lde r s  of power. I t  a l s o  says :  t h e  l e s s  ex t ens ive  t h e  
r evo lu t iona ry  s i t u a t i o n ,  t h e  l e s s  ex t ens ive  t h e  t r a n s f e r  of power. 
Tlie Marxlst argumcnt ( e s p e c i a l l y  a s  a r t i c u l a t e d  by such r evo lu t iona ry  
t h e o r i s t s  a s  Cramsci and Lenin) d i sag rees .  I t  a rgues  t h a t  many a  revolu-  
t i ona ry  s i t u a t i o n  f a i l s  t o  produce a  r evo lu t iona ry  outcome -- f o r  l a c k  o f  
a  vanguard, f o r  l a c k  of a  d i s c i p l i n e d  r evo lu t iona ry  pa r ty ,  f o r  l a c k  of 
t h e  r i g h t  c l a s s  c o a l i t i o n s ,  and so on. But i t  a g r e e s  wit11 t h e  s y n d i c a l i s t  
nrgument i n  one important  regard:  no r evo lu t iona ry  t r a n s f e r s  of power oc- 
cu r  wi thout  ex t ens ive  revolutionary s i t u a t i o n s .  Thus a  two-part revolu- 
t i ona ry  s t r a t e g y :  c r e a t e  (o r  look f o r )  a  r evo lu t iona ry  s i t u a t i o n ;  o rgan ize  
the  p o l i t i c a l  means f o r  a  r evo lu t iona ry  outcome. 
Crane Rrinton d e l i b e r a t e l y  took t h e  oppos i t e  view. He argued import- 
a n t  i n t e rna l .  l i m i t s  on t h e  c r e a t i o n  of any r evo lu t iona ry  s i t u a t i o n ;  reac-  
t i o n  was i n e v i t a b l e .  He suggested,  fur thermore,  t h a t  t he  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
between s i t u a t i o n  and outcome was nega t ive :  t h e  more r evo lu t iona ry  t h e  
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s i t u a t i o n ,  t h e  l e s s  r evo lu t iona ry  t h e  outcome. A people who went through 
a  maJor r evo lu t ion  r e tu rned ,  wi th  r e l i e f ,  more o r  l e s s  t o  t h e  s t a r t i n g  
po in t .  But t h e  more s e n s i b l e  g r a d u a l i s t s ,  thought Brinton,  produced mn- 
j o r  a l t e r a t t o n s  of t h e  power s t r u c t u r e .  The arguments among S y n d i c a l i s t s ,  
Marxis ts  and Br in ton ians  a r e  wi th  us  today. 
F igu re  7-3 o f f e r s  a  r ev i sed  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  of t r a n s f e r s  of power 
i n  terms of t h e  e x t e n t  t o  which r evo lu t iona ry  s i t r ~ n  t i o n s  and/or  r evo lu t ion -  
a r y  outcomes occur .  The diagram t e l l s  u s  t o  t ake  a k o a d  view of revolu- 
t i o n ,  r e q u i r i n g  on ly  some minimum combination of r evo lu t iona ry  s i t u a t i o n  
and r evo lu l iona ry  outcome t o  q u a l i f y  an event  a s  a r evo lu t ion .  It a s s e r t s  
t h a t  t h e  phenomena we c a l l  "coups", " in su r rec t ions" ,  " c i v i l  wars" and 
" f u l l - s c a l e  r evo lu t ions"  ove r l ap ,  I ~ u t  n o t  complete ly .  Each has  i ts own 
c l i a r n c t c r i s t i c  range o f  outcomes and r evo lu t iona ry  s i t u a t i o n s .  But t h e  
b a s i c  d i f f e r e n c e s  among them regard t h e  i d e n t i t i e s  of t h e  p a r t i e s  t o  t h e  
t r a n s f e r  of power: i n  t h e  coup, members of t h e q w l i t y  d i s p l a c e  each o t h e r ;  
i n  a  f u l l - s c a l e  r evo lu t ion  much o r  a l l  of t h e  p rev ious ly  dominant c l a s s  
l o s e s  power. and so  on. 
Although t h e  diagram does  no t  say so  e x p l i c i t l y ,  t h e  oblong f o r  " c i v i l  
war" brushes  t h e  extreme r evo lu t iona ry  s i t u a t i o n ,  i r r evocab le  s p l i t ,  t o  
remlnd u s  t h a t  one common outcome of c i v i l  war i s  t h e  permanent d i v i s i o n  
of a  t e r r i t o r y  p rev ious ly  c o n t r o l l e d  by a  s i n g l e  government i n t o  two o r  
more autonomous t e r r i t o r i e s .  The diagram i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  ex t ens ive  revol-  
u t iona ry  outcomes do no t  occur wi thout  ex t ens ive  r evo lu t iona ry  s i t u a t i o n s .  
Rut i t  den ie s  t h e  converse: extremely r evo lu t iona ry  s i t u a t i o n s  do n o t  
n e c e s s n r i l y  produce extremely r evo lu t iona ry  outcomes. The deba te  over  
dcE in i t fons  tokes  u s  i n t o  n deba te  over  t h e  subs t ance  o f  p o l i t t c a l  c o n f l i c t  
and t h e  strtrcLure of r evo lu t ion .  
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Some of our  most va luab le  ana lyses  of r evo lu t ion  and r e b e l l i o n  do 
no t  concern t h e  s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  one o r  t h e  o t h e r ,  but  t h e  place- 
ment of d i f f e r e n t  s o r t s  of groups wi th in  some equ ivn len t  of t h e  diagram. 
Some o f  t h e  ana lyses  concen t r a t e  on t h e  m o b i l i z a b i l i t y  of d i f f e r e n t  s o r t s  
of groups f o r  d i f f e r e n t  k inds  of a c t i o n :  f o r  r evo lu t iona ry  ac t iv i sm,  f o r  
p o l i t i c s  a s  u sua l ,  and so  on. E r i c  Wolf's comparison o f  twent ie th-century 
a g r a r i a n  r e b e l l i o n s  emphasizes t h e  r e l a t i v e  m o b i l i z a b i l i t y  of poor, mid- 
d l e  and r i c h  peasants ,  a l though i t  a l s o  s a y s  important  t h ings  about  t h e  
way expanding c a p i t a l i s m  impinges on r u r a l  a r e a s  and on t h e  i n t e r e s t s  of 
d i f f e r e n t  groups o f  peasan t s  w i th in  them. 
Some ana lyses  g ive  t h e i r  primary a t t e n t i o n  t o  t he  correspondence 
between d i f f e r e n t  forms of p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n  and d i f f e r e n t  c o n f i g u r a t i o n s  
of i n t e r e s t s ,  wh i l e  saying r e l a t i v e l y  l i t t l e  about  mob i l i za t ion  o r  about  
t h e  p o l i t i c a l  p roces ses  l ead ing  t o  p a r t i c u l a r  a c t i o n s  and outcomes. 
They commonly t ake  t h e  form of comparisons f o  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  forms 
of a c t i o n  of people i n  c o n t r a s t i n g  s t r u c t u r a l  s e t t i n g s .  J e f f r e y  Pa ige ' s  
Agrar ian Revolution is  on ou t s t and ing  case  i n  po in t .  Paige  sums up h i s  
guiding hypotheses i n  t h e s e  terms: 
A. A combination of both  n o n c u l t i v o t o r s  and c u l t i v a t o r s  dependent 
on l and  a s  t h e i r  p r i n c i p a l  sou rce  of income l e a d s  t o  an a g r a r i a n  
r e v o l t  . . . 
8 .  A combination of n o n c u l t i v a t o r s  dependent on income from commer- 
c i a l  c a p i t a l  and c u l t i v a t o r s  dependent on income from l and  l e a d s  t o  
a  reform commodity movement . . . 
C. A combinaton o f  n o n c u l t i v a t o r s  dependent on income from c a p i t a l  
and c u l t i v a t o r s  dependent on income from wagcs t o  a  reform l abor  move- 
ment . . . 
D, A  combination of n o n c u l t i v o t o r s  dependent on income from l end  
and c u l t i v a t o r s  dependent on income from wnges l e n d s  t o  r evo lu t ion  
(Paige  1975: 70-71). 
Paige  then conducts  two s o r t s  of a n n l y s i s  t o  v e r i f y  t h e s e  hypotheses: 
a  comparison of r u r a l  s o c i a l  movements i n  135 expor t  s e c t o r s  of 70 r e l o -  
t i v e l y  poor c o u n t r i e s  from 1948 t o  1970, and d e t a i l e d  c a s e  s t u d i e s  of 
Peru, Angola and Vietnam. The evidence looks  good f o r  h i s  argument. 
Note how t h e  argument works: i t  c r o s s - t a b u l a t e s  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  of 
c u l t i v a t o r s  and n o n c u l t i v a t o r s ,  deduces t h e  c h a r a c t e r  and e x t e n t  of t h e  
i n t e r e s t  c o n f l i c t  r e s u l t i n g  from each combination, and p r e d i c t s  from 
t h e  c o n f l i c t  of i n t e r e s t s  t o  t h e  form of t h e  c u l t i v a t o r s '  p o l i t i c a l  ac- 
t i on .  The subs t ance  of hypo thes i s  D is t h a t  t h e  combinntion of l and  
and wages 
inc ludes  some forms of agricultural o rgnn iza t ion  which combine 
t h e  i n f l e x i b l e  behavior  of t h e  c u l t i v a t o r s  of a  landed e s t a t e  w i th  
t h e  s t r o n g  c u l t i v a t o r  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  of t h e  c o r p o r a t e  p l a n t a t i o n .  
When both  c o n d i t i o n s  e x i s t  s imul taneously ,  t h e  r e s u l t  is l i k e l y  t o  
be  an  a g r a r i a n  r evo lu t ion  i n  which a  s t r o n g  peasant-based ~ u e r r i l l o  
movement organized by a  n a t i o n a l i s t  o r  Communist pa r ty  a t t empt s  
t o  des t roy  both  t h e  r u r a l  upper c l a s s  t h e  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  of t h e  
s t a t e  and e s t a b l i s h  a  new s o c i e t y .  (Paige  1975: 358-359). 
Paige  then makes f u r t h e r  d i s t i n c t i o n s  concerning t h e  c o r r e l n t c u  of revol-  
u t iona ry  n a t i o n a l i s t  movements and r evo lu t iona ry  s o c i n l i s t  movements. A l -  
though i n  h i s  c a s e  s t u d l e s  Paige  is s e n s i t v e  nnd informot ive  about  mobil- 
i z a t i o n ,  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  and s t r a t e g i c  i n t e r a c t i o n ,  t h e  b a s i c  theory 
p r e d i c t s  a c t i o n  from i n t e r e s t s .  Here, i n s t e a d ,  we a r e  assuming i n t e r e s t s  
, and dea l ing  wi th  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  p roces ses  which l ead  from organized and 
c o n f l i c t i n g  i n t e r e s t s  t o  r evo lu t ion .  
Proximate Causes of Revolut ionary S i t u a t i o n s  
Let  u s  look more c l o s e l y  a t  t h e  imp l i ca t ions  o f  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  of 
a  r evo lu t iona ry  s i t u a t i o n  a s  m u l t i p l e  sovereignty .  By d e f i n i t i o n ,  t h e r e  
a r e  t h r e e  proximate causes  of m u l t i p l e  sovereignty:  
1. the  appearance of contenders ,  o r  c o a l i t i o n s  of contenders ,  ad- 
vancing exc lus ive  a l t e r n a t i v e  c l a ims  to  t h e  c o n t r o l  over  t h e  govern- 
ment which is c u r r e n t l y  exe r t ed  by t h e  members of t h e  p o l i t y ;  
2 .  commitment t o  t hose  c l a ims  by a  s i g n i f i c a n t  segment of t h e  sub- 
j e c t  populat ion ( e s p e c i a l l y  when those  commitments a r e  no t  simply 
acknowledged i n  p r i n c i p l e ,  bu t  a c t i v a t e d  i n  t h e  f a c e  of p r o h i b i t i o n s  
o r  con t r a ry  directives from t h e  government); 
3. i ncapac i ty  o r  unwi l l i ngness  of t h e  agen t s  of t h e  government t o  
suppres s  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  c o a l i t i o n  and lo r  t h e  commitment t o  i t s  
c l a ims .  
Tlie c i r i t i c a l  s i g n s  of a  r evo lu t iona ry  s i t u a t i o n ,  i n  t h i s  pe r spec t ive ,  
a r e  s i g n s  of t l ie emergence of an  a l t e r n a t i v e  p o l i t y .  These s i g n s  may pos- 
s i b l y  be r e l a t e d  t o  c 'onditions o t h e r  anal .ys ts  have proposed a s  p r e c i p i t a n t s  
of r evo lu t ion :  r i s i n g  d i scon ten t ,  va lue  c o n f l i c t ,  f r u s t r a t i o n  o r  r e l a t i v e  
dep r iva t ion .  Tlie r e ln t ions l i i p  must, however, be proved and no t  assumed. 
Even ' i f  i t  is proved t h a t  d i scon ten t ,  va lue  c o n f l i c t ,  f r u s t r a t i o n  and 
r e l a t i v e  deprivation do f l u c t u a t e  i n  c l o s e  correspondence t o  tlie emergence 
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and disappearance of a l t e r n a t i v e  p o l i t i e s  -- a  r e s u l t  which w u l d  sur-  
p r i s e  me -- t h e  th ing  t o  watch f o r  would a t i l l  be  tl ie commitment of a  
s i g n i f i c a n t  p a r t  of t h e  populat ion,  r e g a r d l e s s  of t h e i r  motives, t o  ex- 
c l u s i v e  a l t e r n a t i v e  c l a ims  t o  t h e  c o n t r o l  over  t h e  government c u r r e n t l y  
exe r t ed  by t h e  members of t l ie p o l i t y .  
So why d i d n ' t  t h e  United S t a t e s  break i n t o  r evo lu t ion  wi th  t h e  on- 
s e t  of t h e  Depression a f t e r  19301 I c l a im no s p e c i a l  wisdom. Assumlna 
t h e  working c l a s s  a s  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  cand ida t e  f o r  counter-mobilization, 
however, t h i s  l i n e  of argument s i n g l e s  o u t  f a c t o r s  such a s  t h e  fol.lowing: 
a  low i n i t i a l  l e v e l  of mob i l i za t ion ,  l a c k  of a l i e n a t e d  c o o l i t l o n  p a r t n e r s  
w i t h i n  t h e  p o l i t y ,  s h i f t  o f  tlie burden of e x t r a c t i o n ,  a t  l e a s t  r e l a t i v e l y .  
t o  unmobilized groups such a s  b l acks ,  t r a d i n g  of concess ions  which were 
r e l a t i v e l y  t o  t h e  government (For example, tlie r i g h t  o f  i n d u s t r i a l  unions  
t o  organize)  f o r  t h e  g r a n t i n g  of l o y a l t y . .  The f a s c i s t s  of Germany and 
I t a l y  went ano the r  r o u t e ,  by d e l i b e r a t e l y  demobi l iz ing t h e  working c l a s s .  
The o t h e r  n a t i o n s  of t h e  world paid t h e  c o s t  of t h e  demobi l iza t ion,  i n  t he  
form of t h e  Second World War. 
I n  an  e s say  which Followed h i s  l a r g e  comparative work. Ba t r ing ton  
Moore (1969) proposed fou r  p recond i t i ons  f o r  major r evo lu t ions :  
1. t h e  e l i t e ' s  l o s s  of u n i f i e d  c o n t r o l  over  army, po l i cy  and o t h e r  
i n s t rumen t s  of v iolence:  
2. t h e  emergence of a c u t e  c o n f l i c t s  of i n t e r e s t  w i th in  t h e  "dominant 
c l a s ses" ;  
3 .  t h e  development of widespread cha l l enges  t o  p r e v a i l i n 8  modes of 
thought and to  t h e  predominant expiana t i o n s  of justifications of 
human s u f f e r i n g ;  
4 .  t h e  mob i l i za t ion  of a  r evo lu t iona ry  mass, most probably through 
some sudden d i s r u p t i o n  of everyday l i f e  coupled with i n c r e a s e  of 
misery. 
The f i r s t  two a r e  e s s e n t i a l l y  t h e  same cond i t i on :  t h e  f ragmentat ion of 
t h e  p o l i t y  i n t o  more than one c o a l i t i o n ,  each a  p o t e n t i a l  c la imant  t o  ex- 
c l u s i v e  c o n t r o l  of t h e  government, and each a  p o t e n t i a l  c o a l i t i o n  pa r tne r  
wi th  c h a l l e n g e r s  t h a t  a r e  mobi l iz ing r a p i d l y .  Condition 3) may we l l  oc- 
c u r r  both i n s i d e  and o u t s i d e  t h e  p o l i t y ,  a s  t hose  o u t s i d e  expres s  t h e i r  
ou t r age  a t  being excluded and some of t hose  i n s i d e  respond t o  t h e i r  com- 
p l a i n t s  w i th  sympathy o r  manipula t ion.  
The mob i l i za t ion  of a  r evo lu t iona ry  mass d e s c r i b e s  t h e  r a p i d  appear- 
ance of a  new cha l l enge r .  Nothinginmy a n a l y s i s  o r  i n  my h i s t o r i c a l  re-  
f l e c t i o n  l e a d s  me t o  assume t h a t  t h e  mob i l i za t ion  must be sudden o r  t h a t  
i t  must come from imni se ra t ion .  But l i g h t n i n g  mob i l i za t ion ,  i f  i t  occurs .  
does  reduce t h e  chances  f o r  t h e  incremental  cha l l eng ing ,  t e s t i n g  and coal-  
i t ion-format ion which belong to  t h e  r o u t i n e  a c q u i s i t i o n  of power, and con- 
c e n t r a t e s  t h e  a t t e n d a n t  c o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence  i n  a  s h o r t  per iod of t ime. 
We have narrowed t h e  focus  of exp lana t ion  and p r e d i c t i o n  considerably .  
I t  now comes down t o  spec i fy ing  and d e t e c t i n g  t h e  c i rcumstances  under 
which t h r e e  r e l a t e d  cond i t i ons  occu r :  1 )  t h e  appearance of contenders  
making exc lus ive  a l t e r n a t i v e  c l a ims ,  2) s i g n i f i c a n t  commitments t o  those  
c l a ims ,  3) r e p r e s s i v e  incapac i ty  of t h e  government. The s h o r t  run condi- 
t i o n s  of t h e s e  outcomes m a y k  q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  from t h e  long  run changes 
which make them poss ib l e .  Let  u s  concen t r a t e  f o r  t h e  moment on t h e  s h o r t  
run cond i t i ons .  
A 1  t e r n a t i v e s  t o  t h e  E x i s t i n g  P o l i t y  
What 1 mean by "exc l r~s ive  a l t e r n a t i v e  c l a ims  t o  c o n t r o l  of t h e  govern- 
ment" comes o u t  d rama t i ca l ly  i n  an a r t i c l e  w r i t t e n  ahout  a  year a f t e r  t h e  
October Revolution, a s  t h e  o t h e r  p a r t i e s  which has  jo ined t h e  revoln- 
t i o n a r y  c o a l i t i o n  were being squeezed o u t  of power: 
Now, however. t h e  cour se  of world even t s  and t h e  b i t t e r  l e s s o n s  
der ived from t h e  a l l i a n c e  of a l l  t h e  Russian monarchists wi th  
Anglo-French and American imper ia l ism a r e  proving in p r a c t i c e  
t h a t  a  democrat ic  r e p u b l i c  is  a  bourgeois-democrntlc r epub l i c .  
which is a l r e a d y  ou t  of d a t e  from t h e  po in t  of view of t h e  problems 
which imper ia l ism has  placed be fo re  h i a to ry .  They show t h a t  t h e r e  
i s  no other a l t e r n a t i v e :  e i t h e r  Sov ie t  government triumphs i n  every 
advanced coun t ry  i n  t h e  world, 5 t h e  most r eac t iona ry  imper ia l ism 
triumphs, t h e  most snvage imper ia l ism,  wl~ich is t h r o t t l i n g  t h e  
smal l  and weak n a t i o n s  and r e i n s t a t i n g  r e a c t i o n  a l l  over  t h e  world 
-- Anglo-American imper ia l ism,  which has  p e r f e c t l y  mastered t h e  
a r t  o f  us ing t h e  form of a  democratic r epub l i c .  
One o r  t h e  o t h e r .  
T h e r e i s  no middle course;  u n t i l  q u i t e  r e c e n t l y  t h i s  vlcw was re-  
garded a s  t h e  b l ind  f ana t i c i sm of t h e  Bolsheviks. 
But i t  turned o u t  t o  be  t r u e  (Lenin 19670: 35).  
These c l a ims  came from a  pa r ty  a l r e a d y  i n  power. But they were addressed 
t o  r evo lu t iona ry  s t r a t e g i s t s  i n  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  who wished t o  con t inue  a  
c o l l a b o r a t i v e  approach wi th in  Russia i t s e l f .  
When can we expect  t h e  appearance of contenders  (o r  c o a l i t i o n s  of 
contenders)  advancing e x c l u s i v e  a l t e r n a t i v e  c l a ims  t o  t h e  con t ro l  of t h e  
government c u r r e n t l y  exe r t ed  by t h e  members of t h e  p o l i t y ?  The ques t ion  
is a  t r i f l e  mis leading,  f o r  such contenders  a r e  a lmost  always wi th  u s  i n  
t h e  form of mi l l enn ia1  c u l t s ,  r a d i c a l  c e l l s  o r  r e j e c t s  from p o s i t i o n s  of 
power. The r e a l  ques t ion  is when such contenders  p r o l i f e r a t e  and/or  mo- 
b i l i z e .  
Two pa ths  l end  t o  t h a t  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  and/or  mob i l l za t ion .  The f i r s t  
i s  t h e  f l o u r i s h i n g  of groups which from t h e i r  i ncep t ion  hold t o  t r s n s -  
forming aims which a r e  incompat ible  w i th  t h e  cont inued power of t h e  members 
of t h e  p o l i t y .  T ru ly  other-worldly  and r e t r e a t i s t  groups seeking t o t a l  
withdrawal from contemporary l i f e  do no t  f u l l y  q u a l i f y ,  s i n c e  i n  p r i n c i p l e  
! 
they can prosper so  long  a s  t h e  r e s t  of t h e  world l e t s  them a lone .  True 
r a d i c a l s ,  t r u e  r e a c t i o n a r i e s ,  a n a r c h i s t s ,  preachers  of theocracy,  monis ts  
of almost every persuasion come c l o s e r  t o  t h e  mark. 
The second path  is t h e  tu rn ing  of contenders  from o b j e c t i v e s  which 
o r e  cumpat ible  w i th  t h e  s u r v l v o l  of t h e  p o l i t y  t o  o b j e c t i v e s  which s p e l l  
i t s  doom: a  c l a im t o  a l l  power, a  demand f o r  c r i t e r i a  of membership I , 
which would exhaust  a l l  t h e  a v a i l a b l e  resources ,  o r  exclude a l l  its pre- 
s e n t  members. 
t 
Why and how the  f i r s t  s o r t  of group -- t h e  group committed from t h e  
s t a r t  t o  fundomentnl t ransformat ion of t h e  s t r u c t u r e  of power -- forms 
remains one o f t h e m y s t e r i e s  of ou r  time. Mox Weber taught  t h a t  such groups 
formed nround charismatic i n d i v i d u a l s  who o f f e r e d  a l t e r n a t i v e  v i s i o n s  of 
t h e  world, v l s i o n s  t h a t  made sense  of t h e  contemporary chaos. Marx sug- 
ges t ed  t h a t  from time t o  time o  few i n d i v i d u a l s  would swing s o  f r e e  of 
t h e i r  ,ass igned p l aces  i n  t h e  e x i s t i n g  c l a s s  s t r u c t u r e  t h a t  they could 
view t h e  s t r u c t u r e  a s  a  whole and t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  process  producing i t ;  
they could then teach t h e i r  view t o  o t h e r s  who were sti l l  caught  i n  t h e  
s t r u c t u r e .  S ince  Morx and Weber we have had some he ro ic  concep tua l i z ing  
and c a t a l o g i n g  of t he  v a r i e t i e s  of i n t r i n s i c a l l y  r evo lu t iona ry  s roups  
( s e c  Smelser 1963, L ipse t  and Raab 1970. Gomson 1968) .  But t h e  r i s e  and 
f a l l  of d i v e r s e  movements of p r o t e s t  s i n c e  World War I1 has  shown u s  
t h a t  we s t i l l  have a lmost  no power t o  a n t i c i p a t e  where and when such com- 
mi t t ed  groups w i l l  appear .  
The tu rn ing  of contenders  from compat ible  o b j e c t i v e s  i s  rnt l ier  l e n s  
of a  mystery ,  because we can wi tnes s  i t s  occurrence a s  o l d  members l o s e  
t h e i r  p o s i t i o n  i n  t h e  p o l i t y  and ss cha l l enge r s  a r e  refused a c c e s s  t o  
power. The former i s  t h e  r e c u r r e n t  h i s t o r y  of r ight-win& ac t iv i sm.  t h e  
l a t t e r  t h e  s tandard cond i t i on  f o r  lef t -wing ac t iv i sm.  Marx himself gave 
/ 
t h e  c l a s s i c  a n a l y s i s  of t h e  p rocess  of r a d i c a l i z a t i o n  away from some 
s o r t  of accommodation wi th  t h e  e x i s t i n g  system toward nn e x c l r ~ s i v e ,  revol-  
u t iona ry  p o s i t i o n .  l l i s  areument was p r e c i s e l y  t h a t  through repeated 
v i c t i m i z a t i o n  under bourgeois  democracy ( a  v i c t imiza t ion .  t o  be  su re .  
d i c t a t e d  by t h e  l o g i c  of c a p i t a l i s m )  workers would g radua l ly  t u rn  away 
from i t s  i l l u s i o n s  toward c lass-conscious  mi l i t ancy .  That he should 
have overes t imated t h e  p o l a r i z i n g  e f f e c t s  of i t i d u s t r i a l  cap i tn l i sm and 
underes t imated t h e  a b s o r p t i v e  c a p a c i t y  of t h e  p o l i t i e s  i t  suppor ted does 
not  reduce t h e  accuracy of h i s  pe rcep t lon  of t h e  r e l o t i o n s l ~ i p s .  So fo r  
a s  n s r x  was concerned o  newly-brmingand growing c l n s s  was t h e  only  candi- 
d a t e  f o r  such a  t ransformat ion.  In  f a c t .  t h e  gene ra l  p r i n c i p l e  appears  
t o  apply  a s  w e l l  t o  n a t i o n a l  m i n o r i t i e s ,  age-sex groups, r eg iona l  popu- 
l a t i o n s  o r  any o t h e r  mob i l i z ing  group which makes repeated unsuccessful  
b i d s  f o r  power. 
The e l a b o r a t i o n  of new ideo log ie s ,  new creeds .  new t h e o r i e s  of hw 
t h e  world works, I s  p a r t  and p a r c e l  of both patlis t o  a  r evo lc~ t fona ry  posi- 
t i o n :  t h e  emergence of brand-new c h a l l e n g e r s  and t h e  tu rn ing  of e x i s i n g  
contenders .  Flost l i k e l y  t h e  a r t i c u l a t i o n  of i deo log ie s  which c a p t u r e  
and formulate the problems of such oontenders in itself accelerates their 
mobilization and change of direction; how great an independent weight 
to attribute to ideological innovation is another recurrent puzzle in 
th6 analysis of revolution. 
The need for elaboration of ideologies is one of the chief reasons 
for the exceptional importance of intellectuals in revolutionary movements. 
The reflections of s leading French Marxist intellectual on current 
political stracegy are revealing: 
The revolutionary party's capacity for hegemony is directly linked 
to the extend of its influence in the professions and in intellec- 
tual circles. It can counter bourgeois ideology to the degree that 
its inspires their inquiries and draws their vanguard into reflec- I 
tion on an "alternative model," while respecting the independence of 
these inquiries. The mediation of the intellectual vanguard is in- 
dispensable in combatting and destroying the grip of the dominant 
ideology. It is also necessary in order to give the dominated classes 
a language end a means of expression which will make them conscious 
of the reality of their subordination end exploitation (Gorz 1969: 
This is e congenial doctrine for an intellectual to hold. Yet it corres- 
ponds to a vigorous reality: as Barrington Moore suggests, an outpouring 
of new thought articulating objectives incompatible with the continuation 
of the existing polity is probably our single most reliable sign that the 
first condition of s revolutionary situation is being fulfilled. 
Acceptance of Alternative Clsims 
The second condition in commitment to the claims by a nignficant seg- 
ment of the subject popu'ation. The first and second conditions overlap. 
since the veering of an already-mobilized contender toward exclunive al- 
ternative claims to control of the government simultaneously eatnblinhes 
the claims and produces commitment to them. Yet expansion of commitment 
can occur without the establishment of any new exclus1,ve claims tliro~lgli 
a) the further mobilization of the contenders involved, end b) the eccep- 
tsnce of those claims by other individunls and groups. It is in accounting 
for the expansion and contraction of this sort of commitment that attitud- 
inal analyses of the type conducted by Ted Gurr, James Dsvies end Neil 
Smelser should have their greatest power. 
Two classes of action by governments have s strong tendency to ex- 
pand commitment to revolutionary claims. The first is the sudden failure 
of the government to meet specific obligations which members of the sub- 
ject population regard as well established and crucial to their own 
welfare. I have in mind obligations to provide employment, welfare ser- 
vices, protection, access to justice, and the other.mjor services of 
government. 
Italy, for example, experienced a series of crises of thts sort at 
' 
the end of World War I, despite the fact that she had ended up on the 
"winning" side. The demobilization of the army threw over two million 
men on a soft labor market, the fluctuation and relaxation of controls 
over food supplies and prices aggrieved millions of consumers. and pea- 
sants (including demobilized soldiers) began to tnke into their own hands 
the redistribution of land they argued the government had promlsed during 
the war. The consequent withdrawal.of commitment from the government opened 
the way to fascism. Both Right and Left mobilized in response to the 
government's inability to deliver on its promises. In the event, the re- 
gime chose t o ~ t o l e r a t e  o r  suppor t  t h e  F a s c i s t  strong-arm squadr i  i n  t h e i r  
e f f o r t  t o  d e s t r o y  t h e  most e f f e c t i v e  working c l a s s  o rgan iza t ions .  For 
t h a t  reasons  ( r a t h e r  than any fundamental s i m i l a r i t y  i n  t h e i r  s o c i n l  bases )  
t he  i n i t i a l  geographic  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of I t a l i a n  Fascism resembled t h e  d i s -  
t r i b u t i o n  of s o c i a l i s t  s t r e n g t h :  t h e  Po Val ley,  t h e  no r the rn  i n d u s t r i a l  
c i t i e s .  and SO f o r t h .  The Right :  Fur Right c o a l i t i o n  worked, more o r  
l e s s ,  i n  c rush ing  the  organized segments of t h e  L e f t .  But i t  l e f t  t h e  
F a s c i s t s  i n  nea r ly  autonomous c o n t r o l  of l a r g e  p a r t s  of I t a l y :  m u l t i p l e  
sovereignty .  
The c a s e  of postwar I t a l y  has  a  t h r e e f o l d  importance, f o r  i t  i l l u s -  
t r n t e s  n  process  which was widespread (a l though g e n e r a l l y  l e s s  a c u t e )  
e lsewhere  i n  Europe a t  t h e  same time. It f a l l s  i n t o  s ve ry  gene ra l  pat- 
t e r n  i n  which t h e  end of war ( v i c t o r i o u s  o r  no t )  produces a  c r i s i s  of 
governmental i ncapac i ty .  F i n a l l y ,  i t  demonstra tes  tlie way i n  which 
movements of p r o t e s t  themselves no t  c l e a r l y  " r igh t "  o r  " l e f t "  i n  o r i e n t a -  
t i o n  sonctime open t h e  way t o  s right-wing ( o r ,  f o r  t h a t  ma t t e r ,  l e f t -  
wing) s e i z u r e  of power. 
The second c l a s s  of governmental a c t i o n  which commonly expands t h e  
commitment of important  segments of t h e  populat ion t o  r evo lu t iona ry  c l a ims  
i s  s rap id  o r  unexpected i n c r e a s e  i n  t he  government's demand f o r  su r r ende r  
of r e sou rces  by i t s  s u b j e c t  populat ion.  An i n c r e a s e  i n  t axes  is t h e  
c l e a r e s t  example, bu t  m i l i t a r y  c o n s c r i p t i o n ,  t h e  commandeering of land. 
crops  o r  farm animals  and t h e  imposi t ion of corvees  have a l l  played 
an  h i s t o r i c a l  r o l e  i n  t h e  inci tement  of oppos i t i on .  Gabr i e l  Ardant 
(1965) a rgues ,  w i th  widespread evidence,  t h s t  increased t a x a t i o n  has  been 
tlie s i n g l e  moat important  s t imu lus  t o  popular r e b e l l i o n  throughout wes- 
t e r n  h i s t o r y .  Furthermore, he  p o i n t s  o u t  t h a t  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  circum- 
s t a n c e s  of t a x  r e b e l l i o n s  i n  Europe s i n c e  1500 a r e  no t  what mont historians 
have thought.  In s t ead  of being e i t h e r  tlie l a s t  r e s o r t  of t hose  who a r e  
i n  such misery  t h a t  any more t a x a t i o n  w i l l  des t roy  tl~em o r  t h e  f i r s t  
r e s o r t  of p r iv i l eged  p a r t i e s  who r e f u s e  t o  l e t  anything s l l p  away from 
them, t h e  r e b e l l i o n  a g a i n s t  new t a x e s  most commonly a r i s e s  wherc com- 
mun i t i e s  f i n d  themselves incapab le  of marketing enough of t h e i r  goods 
t o  a c q u i r e  t h e  funds  demanded by t h e  government. 
Ardsnt cons ide r s  " incapable  of marketing" t o  mean e i t h e r  t h s t  t h e  
l o c a l  economy is i n s u f f i c i e n t l y  commercialized o r  t h a t  t h e  market f o r  
t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  products  of t h e  community i n  ques t ion  has  con t r ac t ed .  
E r i c  I Jo l f ' s  a n a l y s i s  of t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between penssn t s  and t h e  market.  
however, sugges t s  t h s t  " incapab i l i t y "  r e f e r s  more gene ra l ly  t o  any 
demands which would make i t  impossible  f o r  people t o  f u l f i l l  t h e  ob- 
l i g a t i o n s  which bind them t o  t h e  l o c a l  commun;ty, and whose f u l f i l l m e n t  
makes them honorable  men. It fo l lows  d i r e c t l y  from Wolf's orgument 
t h a t  increased t a x a t i o n  i n  t h e  f a c e  of l i t t l e  commercinl izat ion o r  t h e  
c o n t r a c t i o n  of demand f o r  t h e  products  a l r eady  being marketed by a  
peasant  community t ends  t o  have d e v a s t a t i n g  e f f e c t s  on t h e  s t r u c t u r e  of 
t h e  community. 
Other t ypes  of communities f a c e  d i f f e r e n t  v e r s i o n s  of t h e  some 
problems. The consequence is t h a t  r a p i d l y  increased e x t r a c t i o n  of 
r e sou rces  by t h e  government -- which i n  western  c o u n t r i e s  has  most 
f r equen t ly  occurred i n  p repa ra t ions  f o r  war -- r e g u l a r l y  persuades  some 
segment of t h e  populat ion t h a t  t h e  government is no longe r  l eg i t imn te .  
wh i l e  those  who oppose i t  a r e .  
Such n  s h i f t  i n  p o s i t i o n  sometimes occu r s  r a p i d l y ,  wi th  l i t t l e  
advance warning. This  appears  t o  be e s p e c i a l l y  l i k e l y  when n  contender  
or set of contenders mobilizes quickly in response to a general threat 
to its ponition -- an invasion, an economic crisis, a major attempt by 
landlords, the state or someone else to deprive them of crucial resources. 
We find the villagers of northern England rising in a Pilgrimage of 
Grace to oppose Henry VIII's disposscasion of the monasteries, EIexican 
peasnntn banding together to resist the threat of takeover of their 
common lands, Jnpanese countrymen recurrently joining bloody uprisings 
ngainst the imposition of new taxes. 
This defensive mobilization is not simply a cumulation of individual 
dlssatisfections with hardship or a mechanical group response to depri- 
vntfon. Whether it occurs nt all depends very much, as Eric Wolf and 
others have shown, on the pre-existing structure of power end solidarity 
within the pop~rlation experiencing the threat. Furthermore, its character 
is not intrinsically either "revolutionary" or "counter-revolutionary"; 
that depends mainly on the coalitions the potential rebels make. This 
defensive mobilization is the most volatile feature of n revolutionnry 
situation. both because it often occurs fast and because new coalitions 
between n rapidly-mobilized group and established contenders for power 
can suddenly create s signiticant commitment to en alternative polity. 
If thst is thc case, there may be something to the common notion 
that revolutions are most likely to occur when a sharp contraction in 
well-being follows a long period of improvement. Jsmea Davies has 
propounded the idea under the label of "J-curve hypothesis" end Ted ' 
Gurr has treated it ss one of the chief variants of his general condition 
for rebellion: a widening of the expectation-achievement gap. All the 
attempts to test these attitudinal versions of the theory tlnve been 
dogged by the difficulty of measuring chnnges in expectations and 
achievements for large populations over substantial blocks of time nnd 
by the tendency of most analysts to work from the fact of revolution 
back to the search for evidence of short-run deprivation and then 
further back to the search for evidence of long-run improvement, not 
necessarily with respect to the same presumed wonts, needs, or expecta- 
tiona. The latter procedure has the advantage of slmost alwnys pro- 
ducing s fit between the data and the theory, and the dlsndvantage of 
not being a reliable test of the theory. The question remains open. 
Assuming that sharp contractions following long exponsions 
produce revolutionary situations with exceptionnl frequency, however. 
the line of argument pursued here leads to en interesting alternative 
explanation of the J-curve phenomenon. It is that during a lonu rut1 
of expanding resources, the government tends to take on commitments 
to redistribute resources to new contenders and the polity tends to 
admit challengers more easily because the relative coat to existing 
members is lower when resources are expanding. In the event of quick 
contraction. the government has greeter commitments, new mnttera of 
,- right, to members of the polity, and has ncquitted partial cmitmcnts 
to new contenders, perhaps not members of the polity, but very likely 
forming coalitions with members. The government faces a choice between 
1) greatly increasing the coercion applied to the more vulnerable 
segments of tlie population in order to bring up the yield of resources 
for reallocntion or 2) breaking commitments where thst will incite 
the least dangerous opposition. Either step is likely to lend to n 
defenaive mobilization, and thence to a threat of revolution. Such a 
situation does, to be sure, promote the disappointment of rising 
expectations. But the principal link between tlie J-curve end the 
revolutionary situation, in this hypothesis, lies in the changing 
r e l a t i o n s  between contenders  and government l i k e l y  t o  occur i n  a  per iod 
of expanding r e sources .  
In  a  longer  h i s t o r i c a l  view, t h e  changes which have most o f t e n  
produced t h e  rapid  s h i f t s  i n  commitment away from e x i s t i n g  governments 
and e s rab l i shed  p o l i t i e s  a r e  p roces ses  which d i r e c t l y  a f f e c t  t h e  autonomy 
of sma l l e r  u n i t a  w i th in  t h e  span of t h e  government: t h e  r i s e  and f a l l  
of c e n t r n l i z e d  s t a t e s ,  t h e  expansion and c o n t r a c t i o n  of n a t i o n a l  markets,  
t h e  concen t r a t ion  and d i s p e r s i o n  of c o n t r o l  over  p rope r ty .  P r o s p e r i t y  
and dep res s ion ,  u rban iza t ion  and r u r a l i z a t i o n ,  i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n  and 
d e i n d u s t r i n l i z a t i o n ,  s a n c t i f i c a t i o n  and s e c u l a r i z a t i o n  occur i n  a  
d i spe r sed  and incremental  f a sh ion .  
Although s ta temaking,  t h e  expansion and c o n t r a c t i o n  of markets  and 
p rope r ty  s h i f t s  a l s o  develop inc remen ta l ly  most of t h e  time, they a r e  
e s p e c i a l l y  s u s c e p t i b l e  of producinp, dramat ic  con f ron ta t ions  of r i g h t s .  
p r i v i l e g e s  and p r i n c i p l e s ;  t h i s  t a x  c o l l e c t o r  wants tlie family  cow. 
t h i s  merchant proposes t o  buy t h e  v i l l a g e  commons, t h i s  p r ince  f a i l s  t o  
p r o t e c t  h i s  s u b j e c t s  from b a n d i t s .  S. N. E i sens t ad t  (1963) has  brought 
o u t  t h e  extreme v u l n e r a b i l i t y  of v a s t  b u r e a u c r a t i c  empires t o  over- 
ckpansion and t o  damage a t  t h e  c e n t e r ;  bo th ,  i n  h i s  a n a l y s i s ,  tend t o  
produce r e b e l l i o n s  i n  which p e r i p h e r a l  agen t s  of t h e  empire seek t o  
e s t a b l i s h  autonomous c o n t r o l  over  t h e  l ands ,  men, o rgan iza t ions  and 
weal th  f i r s t  mobilized by t h e  empire. Fernand Drnuclel (1966) has  
s t r e s s e d  t h e  frequency wi th  which band i t ry  and r e l a t e d  s t r u g g l e s  f o r  
l o c a l  power p r o l i f e r a t e d  a s  t h e  ephemeral s t a t e s  of seventeenth-century 
Europe con t r ac t ed .  I n  a l l  t h e s e  cases ,  spokesmen f o r  l a rge - sca l e  
o rgan iza t ion  and c e n t r i p e t a l  p roces ses  f i n d  themselves locked i n  s t r u g g l e  
w i th  advocates  of sma l l - sca l e  autonomy. 
I n  o rde r  t o  produce m u l t i p l e  sove re ign ty ,  and thua become revolu- 
t i ona ry ,  commitments t o  some a l t e r n a t i v e  c la imant  must be a c t i v a t e d  
i n  t h e  f a c e  of p r o h i b i t i o n s  o r  con t r a ry  d i r e c t i v e s  from t h e  government. 
The moment a t  which some people  belonging t o  members of t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  
c o a l i t i o n  s e i z e  c o n t r o l  over  some por t ion  of t h e  government, and o t h e r  
people  no t  p rev ious ly  a t t ached  t o  t h e  c o a l i t i o n  honor t h e i r  d i r e c t i v e s  
marks t h e  beginning of a  r evo lu t iona ry  s i t u a t i o n .  That acceptance of 
d i r e c t i v e s  may, t o  be  s u r e ,  occur a s  a  r e s u l t  of du res s  o r  decept ion 
a s  w e l l  of convers ion t o  t h e  cause .  A mixture  of du res s ,  decept ion 
and convers ion w i l l  o f t e n  do t h e  job. 
The presence of a  coherent  r evo lu t iona ry  o rgan iza t ion  mnken a  
g r e a t  d i f f e r e n c e  a t  e x a c t l y  t h i s  po in t .  An o rgan izn t lon  f a c i l i t a t e s  
t h e  i n i t i a l  s e i z u r e  of c o n t r o l ,  sp reads  t h e  news, a c t i v a t e s  t h e  com- 
mitments a l r eady  made by s p e c i f i c  men. I f  s o ,  I.enin pkovides n  more 
r e l i a b l e  guide  t o  r evo lu t iona ry  s t r a t e g y  than S o r e l ;  Lcnin 's  c lo se ly -  
d i r e c t e d  c o n s p i r a t o r i a l  pa r ty  c o n t r a s t s  sha rp ly  wi th  t h e  spontnneous 
and pu r i fy ing  r e b e l l i o n  i n  which S o r e l  placed h i s  hopes. But t h e  
e x i s t e n c e  of such an  o rgan iza t ion  a l s o  makes t h e  s t a r t  of r evo lu t ion  
more c l o s e l y  dependent on t h e  d e c i s i o n s  of a  smal l  number of men -- and 
thus ,  pa radox ica l ly ,  s u b j e c t  t o  chance end id iosync rasy .  
I n  tlie l a s t  a n a l y s i s ,  a c t i v a t i o n  of r evo lu t iona ry  commitments 
happens through an ex tens ion  of t h e  same processes  which c r e a t e  t h e  
c m i t m e n t s .  C o n s p i r a t o r i a l  o rgan iza t ion  simply linppens t o  be t h e  one 
which maximizes t h e  oppor tun i ty  of t h e  committed t o  c n l c u l a t e  t h e  r i g h t  
moment t o  s t r i k e  a g a i n s t  t h e  government. The government's sudden 
i n a b i l i t y  t o  meet its own r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  ( a s  i n  t h e  German in su r -  
r e c t i o n s  du r ing  t h e  d i s i n t e g r a t i o n  of t h e  imper in l  war e f f o r t  i n  1918) 
or lts violation of the established rights of its subject population (as 
in the 1640 rebellions of Portugal and Catslonia against Castile, which 
followed Olivsres' attempt to squeeze exceptional resources from those re- 
luctant provinces for the conduct of his war with France) can simultaneously 
spread and activate the commitment to its revolutionary opposition. 
In a case like that of the Tsiping rebellion, the rapid mobilization 
of s contender advancing exclusive alternstive claims to control over the 
government itself leads quickly and inevitably to s break end to an armed 
struggle. The drsmntic weakening of a government's repressive capacity 
through war, defection or catastrophe can simultaneously create the possi- 
bility of revolution and encourage the revolutionaries to make their bid; 
the quick succession of the French revolution of 1870 to the defeat of the 
Emperor by Prussis falls into this category. 
Governmental Inaction 
Condition ehree is the incapacity or unwillingness of the agents of 
the government to suppress the alternstive coalition or the commitment to 
its claims. Three paths are possible: a) sheer insufficiency of the avail- 
able mesns of coercion; b) inefficiency in applying the means; c) inhibi- 
tions to their application. The starkest cases of insufficiency occur 
when the bslsnce of coercive resources between the government and the sl- 
ternstive coalition swings suddenly toward the latter, because the govern- 
ment l~ss suffered a sudden depletion of its resources (as in s lost war). 
because the alternstive coslition has managed a sudden mobilization of re- 
of the alternstive coalition in a rough and unknown terrain and the ndop- 
tion of tactics unfamiliar to the professions1 forcen of the government all 
raise the cost of suppression as well. 
Ted Gurr (1969: 235-2361 develops an interesting argument about 
the balance of coercive resources between a government end its opponents. 
In his phrasing. "The likelihood of internal war incressen as the ratio 
of dissident to regime coercive control approaches equality." (For 
"equality," read "one;" Walter Korpi has expanded a similar argument into 
a general model of conflict.) Gurr is referring directly to the pro- 
bable magnitude of collective violence; where the balance strongly favors 
the government, goes the argument, only dispersed acts of rebellion occur; 
where the balance strongly favors its opponents, the government tends to 
be a pawn in their hands. The analysis applies even more plausibly to 
the likelihood of revolution, for an alternative coslition with large 
coercive resources is likely to seize control with at most an instant of 
multiple sovereignty, while an alternative coslition with small coercive 
resources will never get multiple sovereignty started. 
I 
Inefficiency in applying mesns which are, in principle, sufficient 
is harder to pin down and explain; the inefficient almost always plead 
insufficient means. William Lnnger (1969 esp. 321-322) 'contends that had 
the authorities not bungled their repression of various populnr movements 
the European revolutions of 1848 would never hsve occurred. To have con- 
fidence in his conclusion we hsve to assess the balsnce of coercive 
sources (as in the p ~ ~ i i n g  of private arms) or because a new contender 
with abundant co,?rcive resources has joined the coslition (as in the de- 
fection of troops or foreign intervention). However, the massing of rebels 
in locations remote from the centers of coercive strength, the implantation 
mesns between popular movements and governments as well as the political 
inhibitions to repress'ion. In pre-revol~~tionsry 1848 the governments 
clearly had the edge in men, weapons, supplies and coercive technique. 
The strong commitment of the new bourgeois who had been acquiring signi- 
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ficant roles in European governments to certain kinds of civil liberties 
and various working-class movements, however. both stayed 'the government's 
hand. Prom a strictly instrumental perspective, all such inhibitions ere 
"inefficient." Yet not to distinguish them from tlie apparent incompetence 
of the Egyptian reglme toppled in 1952 or the Turkish sultanate displaced 
in 1919 blurs the essenti.al explanation of these events. 
Inhibitions to the application of available coercive means are 
more interesting than shortages or inefficiency, because they are so like- 
ly to flow from the political process itself. The great importance of 
coalitions between established members of the polity and revolutionary 
challengers exemplifies the point very well. The United States of the 
1960s witnessed the constant formation and reformation of coalitions be- 
tween groups of intellectuals, opposition politicians, Black Liberation 
movements, students and peace activists, some within the American polity 
and some outside of it. The total effect of these coalitions fell con- 
siderahly short of revolution, but while operating they shielded those 
whose principles offered the greatest challenge to the existing distri- 
bution of power from the treatment they received from police, troops end 
other repressors when acting on their own. 
Despite the implications of this example, however, the most cru- 
cial coalitions over the whole range of revolutions surely link chsllen- 
gers directly with military forces. The Egyptian and Turkish revolutions 
stand near the extreme at which the chief claims to alternative control 
of the government come from within tlie military itself; in both cases 
soldiers dominated a coalition linking dissident politicians and local 
movements of resistance. In the midst of the range we find events like 
the Russian revolution, in which the militory were for from paramount, 
but important segments of the military defected, disintegrated or refused 
to repress their brethren. The more extensive the pre-revolutionary coo- 
litions between challengers end militory units, tlie more likely this is to 
happen. 
In this respect and others, war bears a crucial relationship to 
revolution. Walter Laqueur (1968: 501) puts it this way: 
War appears to have been the decisive factor in the emergence of 
revolutionary situations in modern times; most modern revolutions, 
both successful and abortive, have followed in the wake oE war 
(the Paris Commune of 1871, the Russian revolution of 1905. the 
various revolutions after the two World Wars, including the Chinene 
revolutions). These have occurred not only in the countries that 
suffered defeat. The general dislocation caused by war. tlie ma- 
terial losses and humn sacrifices, create o climate conducive to 
radical change. A large section of the population has been armed; 
human life seems considerably less valunble than in peacetime. 
In a defeated country authority tenda to disintegrate, and acute 
social dissatisfaction receives additional impetus from s sense 
of wounded national prestige (the Young Turks in 1908, Naguib and 
Nasser in 1952). The old leadership is discredited by defeat, and 
the appeal for radical social change ond.nationa1 reossertion 
thus falls on fertile ground. 
No doubt the statement suffers from a superabundance of explanations. Still 
it points out the essential relationship between war and tlie repressive ca- 
pacity of the government. 
Although war temporarily places large coercive resources under the 
c o n t r o l  of a  government, i t  does  no t  guarantee  t h a t  they w i l l  be  adequate  
t o  tile demnnds placed upon them, t h a t  they w i l l  be  used e f f i c i e n t l y ,  o r  
t h a t  they w i l l  even remain under t h e  government's f i rm  c o n t r o l .  Defeat 
and/or  demobi l iza t ion provide e s p e c i a l l y  f avorab le  c i rcumntances  f o r  revo- 
l u t i o n  because  they combine t h e  presence of s u b s t a n t i a l  coe rc ive  r e sources  
w i th  unce r t a in  c o n t r o l  over  t h e i r  use .  
War a l s o  m a t t e r s  i n  q u i t e  a  d i f f e r e n t  way. By and l a r g e ,  wars have 
always provided t h e  p r i n c i p a l  occasions  on which s t a t e s  have r a p i d l y  in- 
creased t h e i r  l e v i e s  of r e sou rces  from t h e i r  s u b j e c t  populat ions .  Conscrip- 
t i o n  is only  t h e  se l f - ev iden t  ca se .  Demands f o r  t axes ,  forced l o a n s ,  food, 
non-mil i tary  l abo r ,  manufactured goods and raw m a t e r i a l s  fo l low t h e  same 
p a t t e r n .  The increased e x a c t i o n s  almost always meet widespread r e s i s t a n c e .  
which t h e  agen t s  of s t a t e s  counter  w i th  pe r suas ion  and f o r c e .  
Despi te  t h e  advantage of having ex tens ive  e s t a t e s  t o  squeeze and a  
wealthy church t o  d i sposses s ,  t h e  Tudors pressed t h e i r  England hard t o  
support  t h e  m i l i t a r y  f o r c e s  they committed t o  s ix teenth-century warfare .  
They faced s e r i o u s  r e b e l l i o n  i n  1489, 1497, 1536, 1547, 1549, 1553 and 1569. 
The l a s t  t h r e e  -- K e t t ' s ,  Wyat t ' s  and t h e  Northern Rebel l ion -- cen te red  on 
d y n a s t i c  i s s u e s  and cons i s t ed  l a r g e l y  of r i s i n g s  engineered by r e g i o n a l  
mngnntes. Tlie f i r s t  f o u r ,  on t h e  o t h e r  hand, were popular r e b e l l i o n s ;  
every one 'of  them began wi th  t h e  crown's sudden l ay ing  hand on r e sources  
p rev ious ly  ou tn ide  i t s  c o n t r o l .  The gene ra l  p a t t e r n  i s  t h e  same a s  I 
have a l r eady  desc r ibed  f o r  t a x  r e b e l l i o n s :  t h e  r ap id  mob i l i za t ion  of an 
e n t i r e  populat ion which then cha l l enges  t h e  ve ry  i n j u s t i c e  of t h e  r o y a l  
demand f o r  men, money o r  goods. 
Proximate Causes of Revolut ionary Outcomes 
Let u s  focus  on t h e  s h o r t  and medium runs ,  r e se rv ing  f o r  l a t e r  an- 
o t h e r  look a t  longlrun conditions f o r  r evo lu t iona ry  outcomes. Three s e t s  
of cond i t i ons  appear  t o  be  powerful proximate causes  of s i g n i f i c n n t  t r ana -  
f e r s  of power: 1 )  t h e  presence of a  r evo lu t iona ry  s i t u a t i o n :  mcllttple eov- 
e r e ign tv :  2) r evo lu t iona ry  c o a l i t i o n s  between cha l l enge r s  and members of 
t h e  p o l i t y ;  3) c_ontrol of s u b s t a n t i a l  f o r c e  by t h e  r evo lu t iona ry  c o a l i t i o n .  
To what e x t e n t  t h e  development of a  r evo lu t ionnry  n i t u a t i o n  is a  
symptom, r a t h e r  than a  cause ,  of a  r evo lu t iona ry  outcome is not  cosy t o  
r e so lve .  In  a  long view, whether a  r evo lu t io r~nry  d i v i s i o n  of t h e  p o l i t y  
occu r s  depends on t h e  same cond i t i ons  wliicli determine wllether a  major 
t r a n s f e r  of power occurs :  t h e  format ion of a  c o a l i t i o n  of mobilized con- 
t e n d e r s  organized around i n t e r e s t s  which p i t  them and a  s u b s t n n t i n l  seg- 
ment of t h e  populat ion a g a i n s t  t h e  dominant members of t h e  p o l i t y .  In  
. t h a t  long view, whether t h e  t r a n s f e r  of power occu r s  through a  brenk i n  
t h e  p o l i t y ,  t h e  t h r e a t  of a  break. o r  a  more g radua l  succenuion does  not  
ma t t e r  much. Nonetheless ,  I would hazard t h i s  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n :  t h e  more ex- 
t e n s i v e  t h e  r evo lu t iona ry  s i t u a t i o n ,  t h e  g r e e t e r  t h e  l i ke l lhood  of an ex- 
t e n s i v e  t r a n s f e r  of power. That is, indeed, one of t h e  i m p l i c i t  messages 
of F igu re  7-3, t h e  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  of pa re r  t r n n s f e r s .  
An ex tens ive  r evo lu t iona ry  s i t u a t i o n  -- a c o s t l y  s p l i t  hetween t h e  
e x i s t i n g  p o l i t y  and an  e f f e c t i v e  a l t e r n a t i v e  c o a l i t i o n  -- Increanea t h e  
l i k e l i h o o d  o f  an ex tens ive  t r a n s f e r  of power i n  s e v e r a l  ways. The more ex- 
t e n s i v e  t h e  r evo lu t iona ry  s i t u a t i o n ,  t h e  harder  i t  i~ f o r  any orgnnized 
group o r  segment of t h e  populat ion t o  avoid  committing i t s e l f  t o  one s i d e  
o r  t h e  o t h e r .  That commitment makes i t  more d i f f i c u l t  f o r  any contender  
t o  r e c o n s t i t u t e  i ts o l d  m u l t i p l e  a l l i a n c e s  i n  t h e  p o ~ t - r e v o l u t i o n n r y  s e t -  
t lement .  The more ex tens ive  t h e  revolr r t ionary s i t i ~ a t i o n ,  t h e  morc ex- 
pe r i ence  the  r evo lu t iona ry  c o a l i t i o ~ l  w i l l  have i n  fo rg ing  i t s  own In- 
s t ruments  of government independent of t h e  e x i n t i n g  ho lde r s  of power. Tlie 
p a r t y ,  t h e  nrmy o r  t h e  i n s u r r e c t i o n a r y  committee becomes t h e  s k e l e t o n  (or  
pertlops t h e  b l u e p r i n t ,  o r  both)  of t h e  new government. The more exten- 
s i v e  t h e  r evo lu t iona ry  s i t u a t i o n ,  t h e  more oppor tun i ty  and j u s t i f i c a t i o n  
t h e  r evo lu t iona ry  c o a l i t i o n  w i l l  have t o  a t t a c k  t h e  persons  and r e sources  
of t h e  powerholders,  and thus  t o  block t h e i r  chances t o  r e g a i n  power l a t e r .  
These g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s  a r e  not  new. They a r e  a  s t anda rd  p i ece  of 
r evo lu t iona ry  wisdom. Wri t ing i n  December, 1948, Moo Tse-Tung put  i t  t h i n  
way: 
The r ag ing  t i d e  of China's r e v o l u t i o n  is f o r c i n g  a l l  s o c i a l  s t r a t a  
t o  dec ide  t h e i r  a t t i t u d e .  A  new change is t ak ing  p l ace  i n  t h e  ba- 
l ance  of c l a s s  f o r c e s  i n  China. Mul t i t udes  of people a r e  breaking 
away from Kumintnng in f luence  and c o n t r o l  and coming over  t o  t h e  
r evo lu t iona ry  cnmp; and t h e  Chinese r e a c t i o n a r i e s  have f a l l e n  i n t o  
hopeless  s t r a i t s .  i s o l a t e d  and abandoned. As t h e  Peop le ' s  Mar of 
L ibe ra t ion  draws c l o s e r  and c l o s e r  t o  f i n a l  v i c t o r y .  a l l  t h e  revolu-  
t i ona ry  people and a l l  f r i e n d s  of t h e  people w i l l  u n i t e  more s o l i d l y  
and, led  by t h e  Communist Pa r ty  of China, resol .u te ly  demand t h e  com- 
p l e t e  d e s t r u c t i o n  of t h e  r e a c t i o n a r y  f o r c e s  and t h e  thoroughgoing 
development of t h e  r evo lu t iona ry  f o r c e s  u n t i l  a  people ' s  democrat ic  
r epub l i c  on n  country-wide s c a l e  i s  founded and a peace based on 
u n i t y  and democracy i s  achieved (Moo 1961: 305).  
The exper ience of China i n  t h e  fol lowing yea r s  conf i rms t h e  gene ra l  r e l a -  
t i o n s h i p  between t h e  ex tens iveness  of t h e  r evo lu t iona ry  s i t u a t i o n  and t h e  
thoroughness of t h e  t r a n s f e r  of power. 
C o a l i t i o n s  between Members and Cha l l enge r s  
The second proximate cause  of s i g n i f i c a n t  power t r a n s f e r s ,  however, 
works a g a i n s t  t h e  f i r s t  t o  some e x t e n t .  I t  is t h e  format ion of c o a l i t i o n s  
between members of t h e  p o l i t y  and t h e  contenders  sdvancing exclunive  nl -  
t e r n a t i v e  c l a ims  t o  c o n t r o l  over  t h e  government. The r e l a t i o n s h i p  is ac- 
t u a l l y  c u r v i l i n e a r :  I f  no such c o a l i t i o n  e x i s t s .  t h a t  d iminishes  t h e  
chance t h a t  t h e  r evo lu t iona ry  c o a l i t i o n  w i l l  win -- t h a t  t h e r e  w i l l  be any 
t r a n s f e r  of power a t  a l l .  The e x i s t e n c e  of a  c o a l i t i o n  inc reanes  t h e  
l i k e l i h o o d  of some t r a n s f e r  of power. But i f  t h e  c o a l i t i o n s  o r e  exten- 
s i v e ,  t h e  r evo lu t iona ry  se t t l emen t  w i l l  tend t o  r e s t o r e  t h e  p rev ious  
s t a t u s  quo. The wise  r evo lu t iona ry  who w i s l ~ e s  t o  produce a  l a r g e  t r ans -  
f e r  of power forms t h e  minimum necessary  c o a l i t i o n  wi th  e x i s t i n g  members 
of t h e  p o l i t y ,  and f o r c e s  h i s  c o a l i t i o n  p a r t n e r s  t o  breok i r r evocab ly  wi th  
o t h e r  members of . the p o l i t y .  
The n a t u r e  of such a c o a l i t i o n  is f o r  a  member of t h e  p o l i t y  t o  
t r a d e  r e sources  w i th  a  c h a l l e n g e r ,  f o r  example, an exchange of Jobs  f o r  
e l e c t o r a l  suppor t .  Such a  c o a l i t i o n  is always r i s k y ,  s i n c e  t h e  cha l l enge r  
w i l l  always be  on t h e  l o s i n g  end of t h e  exchange a s  compared wltll t h e  va lue  
of t h e  r e sources  when t r aded  among members of t he  p o l i t y .  and t h e r e f o r e  
disposed t o  move i ts ex tens ive  mobilized renources  e lsewhere .  Never thcleus  
t h e  cha l l enge r  i s  l i k e l y  t o  accep t  a  c o a l i t i o n  where i L  o f f e r s  a  defense  
a g a i n s t  r ep re s s ion  o r  deva lua t ion  of i ts re sources  and t h e  member is l i k e l y  
t o  accep t  i t  when t h e  p o l i t y  i s  c l o s e l y  d iv ided ,  o r  when no c o a l i t i o n  port- 
n e r s  a r e  a v a i l a b l e  w i th in  t h e  p o l i t y ,  o r  when i ts own membership is i n  
jeopardy f o r  want of r e sou rces .  
A c l n s s i c  r evo lu t iona ry  t a c t i c  a l s o  f a l l s  under t h e  heading of 
challenger-member c o a l i t i o n :  t h e  pene t r a t ion  of on o rgan iza t ion  whlch nl -  
ready has  an e s tob l i s l i ed  p l a c e  i n  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  of power. A s  e n r l y  a s  1901. 
Lenin was enunc ia t ing  such an approach t o  t r a d e  unions: 
Every Social-Democratic worker should a s  f a r  a s  p o s s i b l e  a s s i s t  and 
a c t i v e l y  work i n  t hese  o rgan iza t ions .  But, wh i l e  t h i s  i s  t r u e ,  i t  
i s  c e r t a i n l y  not  i n  our i n t e r e s t  t o  demand t h a t  only  Social-Demo- 
c r o t s  should he e l i g i b l e  f o r  memhersliip i n  t h e  " t rade"  unions ,  s i n c e  
t h a t  would on ly  narrow t h e  scope of our  i n f luence  upon t h e  masses. 
Let every worker who unders tands  t h e  need t o  u n i t e  f o r  t h e  s t r u g g l e  
a g a i n s t  t h e  employers and t h e  governments j o i n  t h e  t r a d e  unions. 
The very aim of t h e  t r a d e  unions  would be  impossible  of schievement,  
i f  they d id  not  u n i t e  a l l  who have a t t a i n e d  a t  l e a s t  t h i s  e lementary  
degree  of unders tanding.  i f  they were not  very  broad organ iza t ions .  
The broader  t hese  o rgan iza t ions .  t h e  broader  w i l l  be  our i n f luence  
over  them -- an  in f luence  due,  no t  only  t o  t h e  "spontaneous" devel- 
opment of t h e  economic s t r u g g l e ,  bu t  t o  t h e  d i r e c t  and conscious  
e f f o r t  of t h e  s o c i a l i s t  t r a d e  union members t o  i n f luence  t h e i r  c m -  
rodes  (Lenin 1967b: 191) .  
In  t h e s e  cases ,  t h e  t r a d e  unions  were normolly e s t a b l i s h e d  members of t h e i r  
r e s p e c t i v e  p o l i t i e s ,  wh i l e  t h e  S o c i a l  Democrats i n  ques t ion  were chal len-  
g e r s  s t i l l  o u t s i d e  t h e  p o l i t y .  I n  t h i s  same message, Lenin concludes  by 
recornending t h e  c o n t r o l  of t h e  l a r g e ,  open, l e g a l  union by t h e  s e c r e t ,  
c losed,  d i s c i p l i n e d  r evo lu t iona ry  p a r t y .  
S p l i n t e r  groups of i n t e l l e c t u a l s  appear  t o  have a  s p e c i a l  pro- 
pens i ty  t o  form c o a l i t i o n s  o u t s i d e  t h e  p o l i t y .  They t r a d e  o f f  i d e o l o g i c a l  
work p u b l i c i t y  f o r  t h e  demands of t h e  cha l l enge r ,  l eade r sh ip  s k i l l s  and 
acces s  t o  persons  i n  high p l aces  f o r  v a r i o u s  forms of suppor t :  personnel  
f o r  demonstra t ions ,  e l e c t o r a l  s t r e n g t h ,  de fense  a g a i n s t  o t h e r  t h rea t en ing  
cha l l enge r s ,  and s o  on. Ana lys t s  of r evo lu t ion  a s  d i v e r s e  a s  Crane Brinton 
and Barr ington Moore hove considered t h e  "dese r t i on  of t h e  i n t e l l e c t u a l s "  
t o  be  a  c r u c i a l  e a r l y  omen of a  r evo lu t iona ry  s i t u a t i o n .  The "deser t ion"  
may, of course ,  c o n s i s t  of i n d i v i d u a l  acceptance of e x c l r ~ s i v e  a l t e r n a t i v e  
c la ims t o  c o n t r o l  of t h e  government. I t  may a l s o  toke t h e  form of r e j e c t -  
i ng  ell cla ims,  i n  good a n a r c h i s t  fashion: But t h e  n h i f t s  i n  commitment 
by i n t e l l e c t u a l s  which c o n t r i b u t e  most t o  has t en ing  a  r evo lu t iona ry  s i t u n -  
t i o n ,  i n  my view, c o n s i s t  of c o a l i t i o n s  between r evo lu t iona ry  cha l l enge rn  . 
and groups of i n t e l l e c t u a l s  having memberallip i n  t h c  p o l i t y .  The pro- 
pens i ty  of French lef t -wing i n t e l l e c t u a l s  t o  form such c o a l i t i o n s  -- with- 
o u t  q u i t e  r e l i n q u i s h i n g  t h e i r  own c l a ims  t o  power and p r i v i l e g e  -- is legen- 
dary.  
Control  of S u b s t a n t i a l  Force  
Con t ro l  over t h e  major organized means of coe rc ion  wi th in  t h e  popu- 
l a t i o n  is  p i v o t a l  t o  t h e  success  o r  f a i l u r e  of any e f f o r t  t o  s e i z e  power. 
Within a l l  contemporary s t a t e s ,  t h a t  means c o n t r o l  of t h e  m i l i t a r y  f o r c e s .  
Although d e f e c t i o n  of t h e  m i l i t a r y  is by no means a  s u f f i c i e n t  cond i t i on  
f o r  a  takeover  by t h e  r e b e l s ,  no t r a n s f e r  of power a t  a l l  is l t k e l y  i n  a  
r evo lu t iona ry  s i t u a t i o n  i f  t h e  government r e t a l n a  complete c o n t r o l  of t h e  
m i l i t a r y  p a s t  t h e  opening of t h a t  s i t u a t i o n  (Chorley 1943, Andreski 1968. 
Russe l l  1974). 
D.E.H. Russe l l  took up t h e  ques t ion  i n  t h e  case  of fou r t een  twen- 
t i e th -cen tu ry  mass r e b e l l i o n s ,  seven of them succesnful .  neven of them un- 
succes s fu l :  
auccess fu l  unsuccessful  
Afghanis tan 1929 Aus t r i a  1934 
Albania 1924 Burma 1953 
Bo l iv i a  1952 Colombia 1948 





I t a l y  1949 
Spain 1934 
By "rebel l ion" .  Runsel l  means "a form of v i o l e n t  power s t r u g g l e  i n  which 
t h e  overthrow of t he  regime i s  th rea t ened  by means t h a t  i nc lude  violence"  
(Russe l l  1974: 56).  By s u c c e s s f u l  r e b e l l i o n ,  which s h e  equa te s  w i th  revo- 
l u t i o n ,  Russe l l  means those  i n  which t h e  r e b e l s  o r  t h e i r  chosen represen-  
t a t i v e s  assume t h e  p o s i t i o n s  of power. Her d i s t i n c t i o n  between r e b e l l i o n  
and r evo lu t ion  p a r a l l e l s  t h e  d j s t i n c t i o n  between r evo lu t iona ry  s i t u a t i o n  
ond r evo lu t iona ry  outcome, except  t h a t  i t  excludes  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of revo- 
l u t i o n  wl thout  r e b e l l i o n .  In  t h e  fou r t een  c a s e s ,  Russe l l  works ou t  a  s c a l e  
f o r  t h e  d i s l o y a l t y  of t h e  governmental armed fo rces .  The s c a l e  appears  i n  
Table  7.1. As t h e  t a b l e  shows, t h e  d i s l o y a l t y  s c o r e  has  t h r e e  components: 
tlie degree  of d i s l o y n l t y  (D), t h e  t iming of d i s l o y a l t y  (T), and t h e  propor- 
t i o n  of t h e  armed f o r c e s  which were d i s l o y a l  (P). The b a s i c  formula, w i th  
adjus tments  f o r  t h e  number of d i f f e r e n t  armed f o r c e s  involved and t h e  d i f -  
f e r e n t  phases of t h e i r  a c t i o n ,  is t h e  product  of t h e  t h r e e  components: 
D x T x P. R u s s e l l  found some ove r l ap  between t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n s  of loy- 
a l t y  s co rea  f o r  successful and unsuccessful  r e b e l l i o n s .  For example, . 
tlie Burmese r e b e l l i o n  of 1954 f a i l e d  d e s p i t e  wide support  from t h e  armed 
fo rces .  For ano the r ,  t h e  d e f e c t i o n s  of ~ a t i s t a ' s  armed f o r c e s  t o  Cas t ro ' a  
s u c c e s s f u l  Cuban r evo lu t ion  were few and l a t e .  On t h e  average,  never the-  
l e s s ,  t h e  s u c c e s s f u l  r e b e l l i o n s  had much h ighe r  d i s l o y a l t y  s co res .  Fur ther-  
more, i n  no case  d i d  success  come without  some armed f o r c e  d i s l o y a l t y  s ig -  
n i f i c a n t l y  be fo re  t h e  end of t h e  r e b e l l i o n .  Th i s  l a s t  is  n e c e s s a r i l y  
R u s s e l l ' s  most c o n t r o v e r s i a l  f i nd ing ;  one can e a s i l y  argue t h a t  i t  merely 
shows t h a t  t h e  armed f o r c e s ,  too,  even tua l ly  s e e  which way t h e  r evo lu t iona ry  
Table  7.1: D.E.H. R u s s e l l ' s  Armed Force  Di s loya l ty  Sca le .  
1. Degree of d i s l o y a l t y  (D) 
0  = w i l l i n g ,  e n t h u s i a s t i c  f i g h t e r s  
1 = unwi l l i ng  f i g h t e r s ,  e .g .  surrendered r e a d i l y  
2  = n e u t r a l ,  e.g. s tood by wi thout  r e s i s t i n g .  ran away 
3  - a c t i v e l y  helped r e b e l s ,  e .g .  gave arms, informed r e b e l s  of 
t roop maneuvers and b a t t l e  p l a n s  
4  = fought  on t h e  s i d e  of t h e  r e b e l s  
2. Time a t  which d i s l o y a l  (T) 
0  = never  ( i n  t h e  l a s t  5% of tlie d u r a t i o n )  
1 = near  t h e  end ( i n  t h e  l a s t  6-252 of t h e  d u r a t i o n  
2  about  halfway through (from 26-752 of t h e  d u r a t i o n )  
3  = nea r  t h e  beginning ( i n  t h e  f i r s t  6-25% of t h e  d u r a t i o n )  
4- from t h e  s t a r t  ( i n  t h e  f i r s t  0-5% of t h e  d u r a t i o n )  
3. P ropor t ion  of armed fo rcea  d i s l o y a l  a t  a  p n r t i c u l a r  t ime (P) 
0  = none (0-1%) 
0.5 - few (2-107.) 
1 = some (11-252) 
2  - cons ide rab le  (26-502) 
3 - major i ty  (51495%) 
4  = a l l  (96-1OOX) 
Source: Russe l l  1974: 74. 
wind is blowing. Since  Russe l l  e x p l i c i t l y  b u i l d s  i n  t h e  t iming of d i s -  
l o y a l t y ,  however, t h e  gene ra l  r e s u l t s  look s o l i d .  
I t  fo l lows more o r  l e s s  d i r e c t l y  t h a t  t h e  g r e a t e r  t h e  coe rc ive  
r e sources  -- Lncluding p r i v a t e  armies ,  weapons and segments of t h e  
n n t i o n o l  armed f o r c e s  -- i n i t i a l l y  c o n t r o l l e d  by t h e  r evo lu t iona ry  
c o a l i t i o n ,  t he  more l i k e l y  a  t r a n s f e r  of power. Likewise, t h e  e a r l i e r  
movement of coe rc ive  r e sources  t o  t he  a l t e r n a t i v e  c o a l i t i o n ,  t h e  more 
l i k e l y  a  t r a n s f e r  of power. The mob i l i za t ion  of o t h e r  r e sources  probably 
a f f e c t s  t h e  chances of acqu i r ing  power s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a s  w e l l ,  bu t  a t  a  
. lower r a t e  t han  t h e  mob i l i za t ion  of coe rc ive  means. It a l s o  fol lows 
t h a t  t h e  presence of e x i s t i n g  members of t h e  p o l i t y  i n  t h e  r evo lu t iona ry  
c o a l i t i o n  w i l l  i n c r e a s e  t h e  chances f o r  some t r a n s f e r  of power ( a l thoug l~  
i t  reduces  t h e  chances f o r  a  complete wres t ing  of power from members 
of t h e  p o l i t y )  both because of t h e  a d d i t i o n a l  r e sou rces  i t  b r i n g s  t o  
~ l l e  c o a l i t i o n  and becnuse of t h e  g r e a t e r  l i ke l ihood  t h a t  t h e  armed 
f o r c e s  w i l l  d e f e c t ,  waver o r  remain n e u t r a l  when confronted wi th  e s t ab -  
l i s h e d  members of t h e  p o l i t y .  
Revolutionary Sequences and C o l l e c t i v e  Violence 
We have explored t h r e e  proximate causes  of r evo lu t iona ry  s i t u a t i o n s :  
1 )  t h e  oppenrnnce of contenders ,  o r  c o a l i t i o n s  of contenders ,  advancing 
exc lus ive  a l t e r n a t i v e  c la ims t o  t h e  c o n t r o l  over  t h e  government which 
i s  c u r r e n t l y  exe r t ed  by the  members of t h e  p o l i t y ;  2 )  commitment t o  
t h e s e  c la ims by a  s i g n i f i c a n t  segment of t h e  s u b j e c t  popu la t ion ;  3) in-  
c a p a c i t y  o r  unwillingmess of t h e  agen t s  of t h e  government t o  suppres s  
t h e  n l t e r n a t i v e  c o a l i t i o n  and lo r  t h e  commitment t o  i t s  c la lms.  Another 
t r i a d  summarized proximate causes  of r evo lu t iona ry  outcomes: a )  t h e  
presence of a  r cvo lu t ionn ty  s i t u a t i o n ;  b) revolut5onory c o a H t i o n s  between 
cha l l enge r s  and members of t h e  p o l i t y :  c )  c o n t r o l  of s u b s t a n t i a l  fo rce  
by t h e  r evo lu t iona ry  c o a l i t i o n .  Put t o g e t h e r ,  t h e  i tems a r e  a  r e c l p c  
f o r  r evo lu t ion .  
To sum up t h e  imp l i ca t ions  of t h e  r e c i p e ,  we might put  t o g e t l ~ c r  an 
i d e a l i z e d  r evo lu t iona ry  sequenc& 
1. g radua l  mob i l i za t ion  of contenders  making exc lus ive  c la ims t o  
governmental c o n t r o l  and/or  unscceptable  t o  t h e  members of t h e  p o l i t y ;  
2 .  r ap id  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  number of people accep t ing  those  c la ims 
and/or  r a p i d  expansion of t h e  c o a l i t i o n  inc lud ing  t h e  unacceptable  
o r  exc lus ive  contenders ;  
3. unsuccessful  e f f o r t s  by t h e  government ( a t  t h e  behest  of members 
of t h e  p o l i t y )  t o  suppres s  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  coalition and/or t h e  
acceptance of i t s  c la ims:  t h i s  may w e l l  i nc lude  a t t empt s  a t  forced 
demobi l iza t ion s e i z u r e ,  deva lua t ion  o r  d i s p e r s i o n  of t h e  r e sources  
a t  t h e  d i s p o s a l  of contenders ;  
4. es t ab l i shmen t  by t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  coal  1 t i o n  of e f f e c t i v e  c o n t r o l  
over  some por t ion  of t h e  government -- a  t e r r i t o r i a l  branch,  a  
f u n c t i o n a l  subd iv i s ion ,  a  p o r t i o n  of i ts personnel ;  
5 .  s t r u g g l e s  of t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  c o a l i t i o n  t o  mainta in  o r  expnnd 
t h a t  c o n t r o l ;  
6 .  r econs t ruc t ion  of a  s i n g l e  p o l i t y  through t h e  v i c t o r y  of t h e  
a l t e r n a t i v e  c o a l i t i o n .  througb its d e f e a t ,  o r  t h roug l~  t h e  e s t a b -  
l i shment  of a  modus v ivend i  between t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  c o o l i t i o n  nnd 
some o r  a l l  of t h e  o l d  members; f ragmentat ion of t he  r evo lu t iona ry  
c o a l i t i o n ;  
7 .  r e h . p o s i t i o n  of r o u t i n e  governmental c o n t r o l  throughout t h e  
sub jec t  populat ion.  
I l a y  o u t  tlie sequence not t o  propose a  new " n a t u r a l  h i s t o r y "  of r e v o l u t i o n  
i n  t h e  a t y l e  of Lyford P. Edwards o r  Crane Brinton,  bu t  t o  i d e n t i f y  t h e  
l o g i c  of t h e  previous  d i scuss ion .  
That l o g i c  d i f f e r s  cons ide rab ly  from t h e  common idea  of r evo lu t ion  
a s  a  s o r t  of t ens ion - re l ease .  I f  a  t ens ion - re l ease  model of r evo lu t ion  
were c o r r e c t ,  one might reasonably  expect  t h e  l e v e l  of c o l l e c t i v e  
v io l ence  t o  mount uns t ead i ly  t o  t h e  climax -- t h e  r evo lu t iona ry  s i t u a t i o n  
i t s e l f  -- and then d e c l i n e  r ap id ly .  A t  t h a t  po in t .  presumably, t h e  
t ens ion  is dissipated. The "content ion"  model I have been fol lowing 
sugges t s  o  d i f f e r e n t  sequence. I t  does not  p r e d i c t  c l e a r l y  t o  t h e  
curve of v io l ence  be fo re  a  r evo lu t ion ,  s i n c e  t h a t  depends on t h e  p a t t e r n  
of mob i l i za t ion  and con ten t ion  l ead ing  t o  t h e  e s t ab l i shmen t  of m u l t i p l e  
sove re ign ty .  Yet i t  does  deny t h e  n e c e s s i t y  of a  bui ldup of v io l ence  
be fo re  a  r evo lu t ion .  
On t h e  o t h e r  hand, t h e  con ten t lon  model makes i t  appear l i k e l y  
t h a t  once m u l t l p l c  sove re ign ty  beg ins ,  c o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence  w i l l  con t inue  
a t  high l e v e l s  long a f t e r  t h e  b a s i c  i s s u e  i s  decided,  and w i l l  t ape r  
o f f  g radua l ly .  Schemat ical ly ,  t h e  c o n t r a s t  appears  i n  F igu re  7-4. There 
a r e  s e v e r a l  reasons  f o r  t h i s  gene ra l  p r e d i c t i o n .  F i r s t ,  tlie appearance 
of m u l t i p l e  sovereignty  pu t s  i n t o  ques t ion  t h e  achieved p o s i t i o n  of 
every s i n g l e  contender ,  whether a  member of t h e  p o l i t y  o r  not .  and there-  
fore tends  t o  i n i t i a t e  a  gene ra l  round of mutual t e s t i n g  among contenders .  
That t e s t i n g  i n  i t s e l f  produces c o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence .  
Second, t h e  s t r u g g l e  of one p o l i t y  a g a i n s t  i t s  r i v a l  amounts t o  
war: a  b a t t l e  fought w i th  unl imited means. Since  c o n t r o l  of t h e  e n t i r e  
F igu re  7-4: The Timing of C o l l e c t i v e  Violence i n  Tension-Release and 
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government i s  a t  s t a k e ,  h igh c o s t s  and high r i s k s  a r e  j u s t i f i e d .  High 
c o s t s  and high r i s k s  i nc lude  d e s t r u c t i o n  of persons  and proper ty .  
Third ,  t h e  r evo lu t iona ry  c o a l i t i o n  is l i k e l y  t o  fragment once t h e  
i n i t i a l  s e i z u r e  of c o n t r o l  over  t h e  c e n t r a l  governmental appa ra tus  occurs .  
and t h a t  f ragmentat ion i t s e l f  tends  t o  produce f u r t h e r  s t r u g g l e s  involving 
v io l ence .  The r evo lu t iona ry  c o a l i t i o n  fragments f o r  s e v e r a l  reasons:  
i t  t a k e s  a  l a r g e r  mobi l ized mass t o  s e i z e  power than t o  mainta in  i t ;  t h e  
i n e v i t a b l e  divergence of some major o b j e c t i v e s  of t h e  contenders  w i t h i n  
tlie c o a l i t i o n  w i l l  come t o  t h e  f o r e  once t h e  common o b j e c t i v e  of s e i z u r e  
of power has  been accomplished; t hose  contenders  which have mobilized 
r ap id ly  up t o  t h e  po in t  of r e v o l u t i o n  e r e  a l s o  l i k e l y  t o  demobi l ize  
r a p i d l y  due t o  t h e  underdevelopment of t h e i r  o rgan iza t ion  f o r  t h e  manage- 
ment of t h e  mobilized r e sources ,  and thus  w i l l  tend t o  l o s e  p o s i t i o n  i n  
t h e  next  rounds of t e s t i n g .  
Four th ,  t h e  v i c t o r i o u s  p o l i t y  still  f a c e s  t h e  problem of reimposing 
rou t ing  governmental c o n t r o l  over  t h e  s u b j e c t  populat ion even a f t e r  
m u l t i p l e  sovereignty  has  ended. As t h e  government r e t u r n s  t o  i t s  work 
of e x t r a c t i n g  and r e d i s t r i b u t i n g  r e sources ,  i t  f i n d s  people  r e l u c t a n t  t o  
pay t axes ,  g i v e  up t h e i r  l and ,  send t h e i r  sons  t o  war, devote  t h e i r  t ime 
t o  l o c a l  admin i s t r a t ion .  And s o  a  new round of v i o l e n t  imposi t ion and 
v i o l e n t  r e s i s t a n c e  begins .  Where t h e  i n i t i a l  l ocus  of t h e  r evo lu t ion  
is c o n s t r i c t e d ,  t h i s  is l i k e l y  t o  show up a s  a  spread of c o l l e c t i v e  
v io l ence  t o  o t h e r  p a r t s  of t h e  populat ion.  In  a  c e n t r a l i z e d  governmental 
system, t h e  most common sequence is  t h e r e f o r e  l i k e l y  t o  be  a l a r g e  and 
d e c i s i v e  s t r u g g l e  s t  t h e  c e n t e r  followed by a  more w i d e ~ p r e a d  bu t  l e s s  
c r i t i c a l  s e r i e s  of b a t t l e s  through t h e  r e s t  of t h e  t e r r i t o r y 1 .  
Within t h i s  framework, s e v e r a l  c o n d i t i o n s  appear l i k e l y  t o  a f f e c t  
t h e  o v e r a l l  l e v e l  of v i o l e n c e  produced by a  r evo lu t ion .  In  gene ra l ,  t h e  
l a r g e r  t h e  number of contenders  involved i n  t h e  a t r u g g l e  f o r  pa re r  
(holding cons t an t  t h e  number of peop le  involved) ,  t h e  higher  tlie l e v e l  
of v io l ence ,  because t h e  number of mutual t e s t s  of p o s i t i o n  hetween 
contenders  l i k e l y  r i s e s  exponen t i a l ly  w i th  t h e  number of contenders .  
The g r e a t e r  t h e  f l u c t u a t i o n  i n  c o n t r o l  of va r ious  segments of t h e  govern- 
ment by d i f f e r e n t  c o a l i t i o n s  of contenders ,  t h e  higher  t h e  l e v e l  of 
v io l ence ,  both  because t h e  s e i z u r e  of c o n t r o l  i t s e l f  b r i n g s  v i o l e n t  
r e s i s t a n c e  and because each change of c o n t r o l  s e t s  o f f  f u r t h e r  t e s t i n g  
of p o s i t i o n .  
F i n a l l y ,  t h e  c h a r a c t e r  of t h e  r e p r e s s i v e  means under government 
c o n t r o l  s t r o n g l y  e f f e c t s  t h e  degree  of v io l ence .  The connect ions  a r e  
obvious y e t  complicated:  t h e  u s e  of l e t h a l  weapons f o r  c r w d  c o n t r o l  
i n c r e a s e s  d e a t h s  through c o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence ,  t h e  d i v i s i o n  of l s b o r  
between s p e c i a l i s t s  i n  domestic o rde r  (po l i ce )  and war (armies)  probably 
dec reases  i t ,  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  o v e r a l l  r e p r e s s i v e  capac i ty  of t h e  
government is probably c u r v i l i n e a r  ( l i t t l e  damnge t o  persons  o r  p rope r ty  
where t h e  government has  g r e a t  r e p r e s s i v e  c a p a c i t y ,  l i t t l e  damage where 
i ts r e p r e s s i v e  capac i ty  is a l i g h t ) ,  t h e  l e v e l  of v io l ence  probably r i s e s  
a s  t h e  armament of t h e  government and of i ts opponents spproaclles 
e q u a l i t y .  A l l  of t hese  r e l a t ionsh ips , and  more, a r e  p l a u s i b l e ,  b u t  no 
more than s l i v e r s  of sys t ema t i c  evidence f o r  t h e i r  a c t u a l  v a l i d i t y  e x i s t .  
I f  t h e s e  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s  have something t o  them, tl ie e x t e n t  of 
c o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence  produced by a  r evo lu t ion  should be  only  weakly and 
i n d i r e c t l y  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t o  which t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of pa re r  
changes. A ze ro  r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  of pa re r  (which most of u s  would c a l l  a  
f a i l u r e  o f  t h e  r evo lu t ion )  can occur  a s  nn outcome of any of t he  i d e a l  
stages presented before, although it becomes less probable as the stages 
proceed. 
Revolutionary Outcomes and Further Structural Changes 
! 
Under what conditions does extensive structural change accompany or 
result from a revolution? To the degree that structural change means 
transter of power from class to class, party to party, contender to 
contender, to be sure, we have already examined the question. But if it 
means further redistribution of resources, changes in the quality of 
life, urbanization, industrinlizstion, moral'reconstruction, everything 
depends on the time scale one adopts. 
Relatively few permanent changes of this sort actually occur in the 
course of revolutions. Engels. Sore1 and Fanon all held out the hope 
of a vast moral regeneration within the act of revolution itself: the 
historical experience is sadly lacking in examples thereof. The other 
I 
structural renrrangements which occur in the course of revolutions are 
typically temporary: the mobilization of men, loyalties, organizational 
talents and weapons at a national level which recedes as the new structure 
of power crystallizes, the disruption of daily routines for festivals, 
deliberations, emer~encies, the provisional appearance of commissars, 
governing committees, task forces. Michael Walzer has brilliantly 
portrayed a revolutionary outlook for seventeenth-century England, Richard 
Cobb a revolutionary mentality for eighteenth-century France; nevertheless. 
for the outlooks and mentalities of most people, revolutions are but I 
I 
passing moments. 
A few great revolutions provide exceptions to this absence of short-. 
run transformation; that is perhaps what permits us to call them great 
revolutions. Although the nobles and the clergy regained some of their 
position in France with and after Napoleon, the confiscation and sale of 
aristocratic and ecclesiastical property from 1790 to 1793 permnnently 
shifted the weight away from those two powerful classes. The soviets 
survived the Bolshevik Revolution. The Chinese communists began reor- 
ganizing village structure almost as soon as they were on the scene. 
Contrary to the world-weary view of Crane Brinton, who argued tliat a 
revolution took a country through tremendous turmoil to a posltion 
approximately the same as it would have occupied anyway after an 
equivalent lapse of time, it may be that the extent of structurnl 
alteration occurring while multiple sovereignty persists is our best sign 
of the depth of the permanent change to be produced by tlic revolution. 
Over the long run, revolutions appear to chan~e the direction of 
structural transformation to the extent that they produce a transfer of 
power. Where there is s large transfer of power among classes, tllc 
particular coalition which gnins profoundly shapes the subsequent 
political development of the country. Barrington Moore's comparison of 
India, Japan, China, the U.S., France, England, Germany and Russia makes 
precisely tliat point. Military coups almost never produce any significant 
structural change -- despite the declarations of national renovation 
which ritually accompany them these days -- because they involve minor 
rearrangements among extremely limited sets of contenders. The apparent 
exceptions to this rule, revolutions from above llke those of Japan and 
Turkey, ordinarily have a reforming segment of the ruling elite effec- 
tively cutting bff their fellows from further access to power. and form- 
ing coalitions with classes proviously excludcd from power. 
However, the organizational means available to those who emerge from 
the revolution with power affect the degree of structural transformation 
deliberately promoted by the government in post-revolutionary years. In 
a discussion of the effect of the "confining conditions" under which a re- 
volutionary coalition seized power on its subsequent capacity to transform 
social organization, Otto Kirchheimer comes to the conclusion that the 
emergency powers accruing to states during twentieth-century crises like 
World War I drastically reduced the confinement of power-holders: 
The revolution of the 20th Century obliterates the distinction 
between emergency and normalcy. Movement plus state can organize 
tlie masses because: (a) the technical and intellectual equipment 
is now at hand to direct them toward major societal programs m- 
ther than simply liberating their energies from the bonds of tra- 
dition; (b) they have the means at hand to control people's live- 
lihood by means of job assignments and graduated rewards unavail- 
able under the largely agricultural and artisanal structure of 
tlie 1790s and still unavailable to the small enterprise and com- 
mission-merchant type economy of the 1850s and 1860s; (c) they have 
fallen heir to endlessly and technically refined propaganda de- 
vices substitut'ing for the uncertain leader-mass relations of the 
previous periods; and (d) they face state organizations shaken up 
by war dislocation and economic crisis. Under these conditions 
Soviet Russia could carry through simultaneously the job of an 
economic and a politic~l, a bourgeois and a post-bourgeois revolu- 
tion in spite of the exceedingly narrow basis of its political 
elite. On the other hand, the premature revolutionary combination 
of 1793-94 not only dissolved quickly, but left its most'advanced 
sector, the sans-culottes, with only the melsncl~oly choice between 
desperate rioting -- Germlnal 1795 -- or falling back into a pre- 
organized stage of utter helplessness and agony (Kirchheimer 
1965: 973). 
This analysis can be generalized. Despite the "confining conditions" 
faced by the French revolutionary coalitions of 1789-94. they seized a 
state apparatus which was already exceptionally centralized and powerful 
by comparison with those whlch had grown up elsewhere in the world. They 
were able to use that great parer, in fact. to destroy tlie juridical 
structure of feudalism, effect large transfers of wealth, subjugote the 
Church, bui1d.a mass army. The nineteenth-century revoli~tionnries who 
repeatedly seized control of the Spanish state grabbed an apparatus whose 
extractive and repressive capacities were insufficient to any task of na- 
tional transformation. 
It is true that the mobilization of contenders which occurs before 
and during a revolution may itself fncilitote a further nationnl mobili- 
zation, putting resources at the disposal of the state which were simply 
unavailable before the revolution: property, energy, information, loyal- 
ties. That is, indeed, a characteristic strategy of contempornry na- 
tional revolutions. The Chinese experience indicates that in the course 
of a long mobilizstion revolutionaries sometimes build nlternative innti- 
tutions which are potentially stronger than tlie existing state, and serve 
as the infrastructure of a strong new state when the revolutionories come 
to power. Most revolutionaries, however, seize a state apparatus without 
that long preparation of an organizational alternative. In those cases. 
the already-accrued power of the state affects the probability that funda- 
mental structural change will issue from the revolution much more atrong- 
ly than does the extent of mobilization during the revolution. 
These facile generalizations, I confess, do not do justice to a 
critical question. For on our estimate of the long-run effects of dif- 
ferent kinds of revolution must rest our judgment as to whether any par- 
t i c u l n r  r evo lu t ion ,  o r  r evo lu t iona ry  oppor tun i ty ,  is worth its c o s t .  I 
e s t ima te  some r e v o l u t i o n s  a s  worth i t .  But a t  p re sen t  no one has  enough 
sys t ema t i c  knowledge about t h e  probable  s t r u c t u r a l  consequences of one 
v a r i e t y  of r evo lu t ion  o r  another  t o  make such e s t ima te s  wi th  conf idence.  
Except. perhaps ,  i n  r e t r o s p e c t .  l l i s t o r i a n s  cont inue t o  deba te  what 
t h e  Engl ish .  French and Russian r e v o l u t i s n a  c o s t  and what they accomplished. 
In  t hose  canes  ( a t  l e a s t  i n  p r i n c i p l e )  they a r e  d e a l i n g  wi th  a c t u a l i t i e s  
r a t h e r  than p r o b a b i l i t i e s .  That  p o t e n t i a l  c e r t a i n t y ,  however, has  a  s e l f -  
d e s t r u c t i v e  s i d e ;  when i t  comes t o  an event  a s  sweeping a s  t h e  Engl ish  
Revolution, a lmost  every p rev ious  event  which l e f t  some t r a c e  i n  seven- 
teenth-century England i s  i n  some sense  a  "cause", and almost every sub- 
sequent  event  i n  t h e  country  and i ts ambit is i n  some sense  an "effect" .  
Making cause-and-effect  a n a l y s i s  manageable i n  t h i s  con tex t  means reducing 
t h e  r evo lu t ion  t o  c e r t a i n  e s s e n t i a l s ,  i d e n t i f y i n g  t h e  s u f f i c i e n t  condi- 
t i o n s  f o r  t hose  e s s e n t i a l s ,  and then  spec i fy ing  subsequent even t s  which 
would have been u n l i k e l y  wi thout  t h e  r evo lu t iona ry  e s s e n t i a l s .  So i n  f a c t  
t he  c a u s a l  a n a l y e i s  of r e a l ,  h i s t o r i c  r e v o l u t i o n s  and of r evo lu t ions  i n  
gene ra l  converge on s t a t emen t s  of p r o b a b i l i t y .  
CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSIONS AND NEW BEGINNINGS 
Back t o  t h e  Eighteenth  Century 
We began t h i s  i nqu i ry  toge the r  more than two c e n t u r i e s  ago, In 
1765. At t h a t  po in t  we wandered through England, watching people  a t t a c k  
poorhouses. We were t r a v e l e r s  i n  time, simply t r y i n g  t o  g e t  a  s ense  of 
t h e  t e x t u r e  and meaning of populnr c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  We went from t h e r e  
t o  a  r a t h e r  t ime le s s  world, a  world con ta in ing  a b s t r a c t  models 'of c o l l c c -  
t i v e  a c t i o n .  We climbed up t h e  mob i l i za t ion  s i d e  from i n t e r e s t  t o  organ- 
i z a t i o n  t o  mob i l i za t ion  t o  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  We then climbcd down t h e  
oppor tun i ty  a ide ,  from r e p r e s s i o n / f a c i l i t n t i o n  t o  power t o  oppor tun i ty /  
t h r e n t ,  on ly  t o  r e t u r n  t o  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  Next we re-entercd time, 
equipped wi th  our  models. We made t h r e e  main c i r c u i t s :  tlrrouglr major 
changes i n  r e p e r t o i r e s  of con ten t ious  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n ,  tlrrough v a r i o u s  
forms of c o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence ,  i n t o  t h e  tu rbu lence  of: r evo lu t ion  and r e -  
b e l l i o n .  Here we a r e  now, back near  our  s t a r t i n g  point :  generaL r c f l e c -  
t i o n  on t h e  t e x t u r e  and meaning of popular c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  
Suppose we s p i r i t e d  o u r s e l v e s  back t o  1765. Armed with  tl te t each ings  
of: t h i s  book, what would we do? What we do t h a t  we cou ldn ' t  do 
when f i r s t  we t rod on Nacton Heath? 
One of t h e  f i r s t  t h ings  would be t o  r e s o l v e  t h e  gene ra l  "turbulence" 
of 1765 i n t o  s p e c i f i c  groups, i n t e r e s t s ,  a c t i o n s  and r e l a t i o n s  among 
groups. We might. f o r  example, s t a r t  looking hard a t  such d i f f c r e n c e a  a s  
t hose  between t h e  Sussex poorhouse c o n f l i c t s  and t h e  a c t i o n  behind t h i s  
b r i e f  n o t i c e  f o r  1 0  January i n  t h e  Annual Reg i s t e r :  
Some thousands of weavers went Jn a  body t o  Westminster,  and prevented 
p e t i t i o n s  t o  both  houses of pnr l iament ,  i n  behalf of themselves and 
the i rnmerous  f a m i l i e s ,  most of them now, a s  they r ep resen ted ,  i n  
a s t a r v i n g  cond i t i on  f o r  want of work: and begging. a s  a  r e l i e f  
t o  t h e i r  m i s e r i e s ,  t h a t  they would, i n  t h e  p re sen t  s e s s i o n  of 
par l iament ,  g r a n t  a  gene ra l  p r o h i b i t i o n  of fo re ign  wrought s i l k s .  
We would want t o d l f f e r e n t i a t e t h a t  from t h e  R e g i s t e r ' s  r e p o r t  f o r  20 Apr i l :  
. . . t en  journeymen t a y l o r s  were t r i e d ,  on an  indic tment  f o r  con- 
s p i r i n g  toge the r  t o  r a i s e  t h e  wages, and l e s s e n  t h e  hours  of work, 
s e t t l e d  by an  o rde r  of s e s s ions ,  pursuant  t o  an a c t  of par l iament  f o r  
t h a t  purpose, when n i n e  of them, who were t h e  p r i n c i p a l  and committee- 
men of s e v e r a l  of t he  a s s o c i a t i o n s ,  which r a i s e d  a  fund t o  support  
each o t h e r  i n  such unlawful meetings, and who had d i s t i ngu i shed  
themselves by t h e  name of F l i n t s ,  were found g u i l t y ,  and received 
sen tence  according t o t h e i r  s e v e r a l  demer i t s ,  v i z .  two t o  b e  imprisoned 
one year  i n  Newgate, f i v e  f o r  t h e  space of s i x  months, and two f o r  
t h r e e  months; and were, bes ides ,  f i ned  one s h i l l i n g  each and ordered 
t o  f i nd  s e c u r i t y  f o r  t h e i r  behaviour. 
A t  t h e  30th of June, we would f i n d  a  b r i e f  mention of t h e  f a c t  t h a t  "Nine 
wh i t e  boys were l a t e l y  k i l l e d ,  and twenty made p r i sone r s ,  i n  a  ski rmish 
wi th  a  pa r ty  of dragoons, near  Dungannon i n  I r e l and . "  
The poor on Nacton Heath, t h e  weavers a t  Westminster,  t h e  F l i n t s  i n  
London and t h e  Whiteboys a t  Dungannon were a l l  a c t i n g  c o l l e c t i v e l y .  That 
a l e r t s  us  t o  an  explanatory agenda beginning wi th  t h e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  of t h e  
r e l evan t  populnt ions ,  i n t e r e s t s ,  o rgan iza t ion ,  mob i l i za t ion ,  r e p r e s s i o n /  
f a c i l i t a t i o n ,  power, and o p p o r t u n i t y l t h r e a t ,  a s  we l l  a s  a c l o s e  look a t  
t h e  s p e c i f i c  forms, i n t e n s i t i e s  and outcomes of t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  
It a l s o  draws our  a t t e n t i o n  t o  important  d i f f e r e n c e s  among t h e  fou r  
For one  th ing ,  t h e  poorhouse a t t a c k s  have a  r a t h e r  r e a c t i v e  tone: an  
a t t empt  t o  defend t h e  p a r i s h  poor a g a i n s t  i n c a r c e r a t i o n .  The weavers '  
p e t i t i o n  march and t h e  t a i l o r s '  i n c i p i e n t  wage demands l e a n  i n  t h e  pro- 
a c t i v e  d i r e c t i o n :  a l t hough  both groups m y  we l l  have been responding t o  
t h r e a t s  t o  t h e i r  l i v e l i h o o d ,  t h e  c l a ims  they made were f o r  advnntages they 
d i d  no t  c u r r e n t l y  enjoy. The quick n o t e  on t h e  Whiteboys o f f e r s  no in fo r -  
mation on t h e  c l a ims  a t  i s sue .  But when we l e a r n  t h a t  t h e  Whiteboys oE 
I r e l a n d  were famous a n t i - B r i t i s h  g u e r r i l l a  war r io r s ,  we r e c e i v e  an indic-  
a t i o n  t h a t  t h e i r  sk i rmish  f e l l  somewhere i n  t h e  range of c o l l e c t i v e  
compet i t ion and c o l l e c t i v e  r e a c t i o n .  
For ano the r  t h ing ,  t h e  c o n t r a s t i n g  accoun t s  g i v e  an i n k l i n g  of t h e  
p r e v a i l i n g  schedule  of r ep res s ion :  no v i s i b l e  penalties f o r  t h e  p e t i t i o n  
march. j a i l  s en tences  f o r  t h e  mobi l iz ing t a i l o r s ,  a r r e s t s  and shoot ing 
f o r  a t t a c k e r s  of Sussex poorhouses, n i n e  dead among t h e  Whiteboys. The 
fou r  incompletely-documented c a s e s  a r e  a  s l i m  b a s i s  f o r  any gene ra l  con- 
c l u s i o n s ,  y e t  they immediately draw a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  v a r i a b i l i t y  of re-  
p re s s ion  wi th  t h e  a c t i o n  and group i n  ques t ion .  They a l s o  s t a r t  u s  th ink-  
i n g  about  what was changing: sending thousands of weavers t o  p re sen t  n  
p e t i t i o n  was a  s i g n i f i c a n t  innovat ion,  wh i l e  j a i l i n g  people f o r  conce r t ing  
t h e i r  wage demands would p r a c t i c a l l y  d i sappea r  over  t h e  next  century.  
F i n a l l y ,  even t h e s e  Eragmentnry news s t o r i e s  g i v e  u s  some reason t o  
b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  r e p e r t o i r e  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  p r e v a i l i n g  i n  t h e  
B r i t a i n  and I r e l and  of 1765 d i f f e r e d  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  from t h e  forms nvn i l -  
a b l e  t o  o rd ina ry  twent ie th-century people. Although t h e  p e t i t i o n  march 
would have a  s i g n i f i c a n t  p l ace  i n  t h e  demonstra t ion 's  a n c e s t r y ,  t h e  demon- 
s t r a t i o n  i t s e l f  had no t  y e t  en t e red  t h e  r e p e r t o i r e .  Tlie e t i k e  was no t  then 
a  t o o l  r e a d i l y  a v a i l a b l e  t o  workers -- p a r t l y ,  a s  we have seen,  because 
groups. 
of tlie r ep re s s ion  v i s i t e d  upon any workers who a t tempted t o  conce r t  t h e i r  
wage demands. The r e p e r t o i r e  va r i ed  from one p a r t  of B r i t a i n  t o  another ,  
from one s o c i a l  c l a s s  t o  ano the r .  But i t  was d i s t i n c t l y  an e ighteenth-  
cen tu ry  r e p e r t o i r e .  
I f  we took a  somewhat longer  view, we would f i n d  t h e  r e p e r t o i r e  
chnnging. Indeed, some s i g n i f i c a n t  a l t e r a t i o n s  i n  t h e  whole p a t t e r n  of 
c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  were occu r r ing  i n  t h e  B r i t a i n  of t h e  1760s and 1770s. 
The year  1766, f o r  example, brought  one of t h e  most widespread s e r i e s  of 
food r i o t s  t o  appear  i n  modern B r i t a i n ;  more gene ra l ly ,  food r i o t s  became 
very common i n  t h e  v i l l a g e s  and smal l  towns of B r i t a i n  du r ing  t h e  middle 
decades  of tlte e igh teen th  cen tu ry ,  and on ly  began t h e i r  d e f i n i t v e  d e c l i n e  
a f t e r  1830. I n  London (end, t o  some ex ten t ,  i n  o the r  major c i t i e s )  we 
wi tnes s  a  d i f f e r e n t  t r end .  There we s e e  a  Radical  movement forming on a  
middle-c lass  base  with important  a l l i a n c e s  among s k i l l e d  workers; they 
brought t oge the r ,  among o t h e r  t h ings ,  t h e  demand f o r  domestic p o l i t i c a l  
reform and the  criticism of t h e  crown's po l i cy  i n  America. Such s k i l l e d  
workers a s  t h e  silk-weavers who marched on Par l iament  were bu i ld ing  l a rge -  
s c a l e  o rgan iza t ions  and applying p re s su re  i n  t h e  n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c a l  a r ena .  
The Radicals ,  t h e  suppor t e r s  of John Wilkes, t h e  s i lk-weavers  and o the r  
organized con tende r s  f o r  power, fur thermore,  were shaping new means of 
exe rc i s ing  t h e i r  s t r e n g t h .  They pressed t h e  r i g h t  t o  assemble f o r  p e t i -  
t i o n i n g  and f o r  e l e c t i o n s  beyond i t s  o l d  l i m i t ,  and began t o  c r e a t e  a  
prototype of t h e  twent ie th-century demonstra t ion.  
The decnde a f t e r  1765 was l i k e w i s e  an  important  t ime of t r a n s i t i o n  
i n  America. The American t r a n s i t i o n ,  t o  be su re ,  d i f f e r e d  g r e a t l y  from 
t h e  B r i t i s h :  i t  went from t h e  g r e a t  r e a c t i o n  a g a i n s t  t h e  Stamp Act t o  t h e  
opening of a  t r u l y  r evo lu t iona ry  s i t u a t i o n  -- of m u l t i p l e  sove re ign ty  -- i n  
a l l  t h e  co lon ie s .  To r e t u r n  t o  t h e  B r i t i s h  periodicn.l.s of 1765. The 
Gentleman's Magazine s tepped up its covernge of Americsn news a t  t h e  
end of t he  yea r .  For example: 
.. 1 October: T h i s  day is appointed t o  b e  held a t  New-York i n  
North America, a gene ra l  congres s  of a l l  t l ie c o l o n i e s ,  i n  o rde r  -- 
t o  draw up a  remonstrance t o  be  presented t o  h i s  majes ty  nga ina t  
t h e  stamp d u t i e s ,  and o t h e r  burtliens l a i d  upon t h e  co lon ice ,  by 
t h e  l a t e  a c t  of t h e  B r i t i s h  par l iament .  
5  October: . . . t h e  s h i p s  a r r i v e d  a t  Ph i l ade lph ia ,  wi th  t h e  stamps 
on board, f o r  Maryland, New Je r sey ,  and Pennsylvania, when s e v e r a l  
thousand c i t i z e n s  assembled i n  o rde r  t o  cons ide r  ways and menns f o r  
prevent ing t h e  stamp a c t  t ak ing  plnce  i n  t h a t  province. and a t  l e a s t  
came t o  a  r e s o l u t i o n  t o  r eques t  t h e  d i s t r i b u t o r  t o  r e s f g n  h i s  o f f i c e ;  
which a f t e r  some demur he i n  p a r t  d i d ,  a s s u r i n g  h i s  countrymen t h a t  
no a c t  of h i s ,  o r  h i s  depu t i e s ,  should en fo rce  t h e  execut ion of t h e  
stamp-act i n  t h e  provinces  f o r  wliicli he  was c o m i s s i o n e d ,  be fo re  tlie 
same should be  g e n e r a l l y  put  i n  f o r c e  i n  t h e  neighbor ing co lon ie s .  
And a t  t h e  same time t h e  lawyers  en t e red  i n t o  an agreement not  t o  
purchase  any of t hose  stamps, g iv ing  i t  a s  t h e i r  oplnion,  t h a t  i t  
was impossible  t h e  du ty  imposed by them could be paid f o r  i n  gold 
and s i l v e r .  
4 November [ d a t e l i n e  New York] : Some ex t r ao rd ina ry  p repa ra t ions  i n  
Fo r t  George, f o r  t h e  secu r ing  t h e  stamped paper i n  t h a t  g a r r l s o n ,  -
having d i sp l eased  t h e  i n h a b i t a n t s  of t h i s  c i t y ,  s v a s t  number of 
them assembled l a s t  Frfday evening, and proceeded t o  tl ie f o r t  w e l l s ,  
where they broke open t h e  s t a b l e  of t h e  L-t G-r Cndwallnder 
Colden, Esq; took o u t  111s coach and a f t e r  c a r r y i n g  t h e  same t h r o '  
t h e  p r i n c i p a l  s t r e e t s  of t h e  c i t y ,  i n  triumph, marched t o  t h e  Com- 
mons where a  gal lows was e rec t ed ;  oh one end of which was suspended 
t h e  e f f i g y  of tlie g r e a t  man, having i n  h i s  r i g h t  hand s stamped b i l l  
of l a d i n g ,  and on h i s  b r e a s t  a p a p e r w i t h  t h e  fol lowing inscription: 
"The Rebel Drummer i n  t h e  year  1715." A t  h i s  back was f ixed  a  drum, 
a t  t h e  o the r  end of t h e  gal lows hung t h e  f i g u r e  of t h e  d e v i l .  Af t e r  
hanging a  cons ide rab le  time, they c a r r i e d  t h e  e f f i g i e s ,  wi th  t h e  
gal lows i n t i r e ,  being preceded by t h e  coach, i n  grand process ion,  t o  
t h e  g a t e  of t h e  f o r t .  from whence i t  was removed t o  t h e  bowling 
green,  under t h e  muzzles of t h e  f o r t  guns, where a  b o n f i r e  was i m -  
mediate ly  made, and t h e  dummer, d e v i l ,  coach LC.  were consumed 
admist  t l ie acclamat ions  oE some thousand s p e c t a t o r s .  The whole body 
next  proceeded t o  Vsux-hall ,  t h e  house of Major James, who, i t  was 
r epor t ed ,  was a  f r i end  t o  t h e  Stamp-act, from whence they took evey 
ind iv idua l  a r t i c l e ,  t o  a  ve ry  cons ide rab le  amount; and having made 
another  bonf i r e ,  t h e  whole was consumed i n  t h e  flames. 
The nex t  n i g h t ,  t h e  assembled crowd demanded t h a t  t h e  Lieutenant  Governor 
hand over  tl ie stamps. Af t e r  a  whi le ,  he  dec l a red  under p re s su re  t h a t  he  
would not  d j s t r i b u t c  t h e  stamps h imse l f ,  and f i n a l l y  put  them i n t o  t h e  hands 
of t h e  municipal co rpo ra t ion ,  i n  t h e  New York c i t y  h a l l .  Gentleman's 
Magazine of 1765 p r in t ed  many more r e p o r t s  on American Stamp Act r e s i s t a n c e ,  
no t  t o  mention m u l t i p l e  e s says  and commentaries on the  p o l i t i c a l  i s s u e s .  
We a l r e a d y  haveean i d e s  what happened i n  t h e  nex t  ten  years .  I n  t h e  
t r a d i n g  c i t i e s  of t h e  American c o a s t ,  a n t i - B r i t i s h  c o a l i t i o n s  Formed, 
drawing e s p e c i a l l y  on t h e  merchants,  lawyers ,  tradesmen and craf tsmen,  bu t  
o f t e n  a ided by such groups a s  s a i l o r s  and longshoremen. In  a  complex i n t e r -  
p lay between B r i t i s h  a u t h o r i t i e s  and American c o l o n i s t s ,  t l ie Amcricans 
moved uns t ead i ly  toward a  gene ra l  boyco t t  on p o l i t i c a l  and economlc Lrnns- 
a c t i o n s  wi th  t h e  B r i t i s h .  They moved toward tlie f a sh ion ing  of a  s e t  of 
governmental i n s t i t u t i o n s  -- committees, assemblies ,  c o u r t s  and associn-  
t i o n s  -- p a r a l l e l  t o  B r i t i s h  c o l o n i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  and independent of 
them. A s  s i g n i f i c a n t  numbers of Americans began t o  t ake  t h e i r  d i r e c t i o n s  
from those  p a r a l l e l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  and t o  r e j e c t  t h e  o r d e r s  of Lieutenant  
Governors and o t h e r  B t d t i s h  o f f i c i a l s ,  s r evo lu t iona ry  s l t u o t i o n  was undcr- 
way. The outcome, t oo ,  was a t  l e a s t  a  l i m i t e d  r evo lu t ion :  thousnnds of 
prominent suppor t e r s  of t h e  B r i t i s h  l e f t  t l ie c o l o n i e s ,  t h e  Americans ac- 
qu i r ed  p o l i t i c a l  independence, and t h e  middle-c lass  members of t h e  revol-  
u t iona ry  c o a l i t i o n s  wielded excep t iona l  power i n  t h e  shaping of t h e  new 
p o l i t y .  
The s t r u g g l e s  of t h e  1760s i n  B r i t a i n  and America c l e a r l y  belong i n  
t h e  world we have been exp lo r ing  i n  t h i s  book: t h e  world of con ten t ious  
c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  Other people have often por t rayed t h a t  world a s  f u l l  
o f  "mobs", "disorders"  and "mass movements". We have seen many of t h e  
even t s  those  w r d s  r e f e r  t o ,  and i n  t h e  p rocess  have no t i ced  r epea ted ly  
how misleading t h e  words a r e .  Mob, d i so rde r  and mass movement a r e  top- 
down words. They a r e  t hewordso f  a u t h o r i t i e s  and e l i t e s  f o r  a c t i o n s  of 
o t h e r  people -- and, o f t e n ,  f o r  a c t i o n s  which th rea t en  t h e i r  owl i n t e r e s t s .  
The bottom-up approach we have taken i d e n t i f i e s  t h e  connect ions  between 
tlie c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n s  OF o rd ina ry  people and t h e  ways they o rgnn ize  around 
t h e i r  workaday i n t e r e s t s .  That approach a l s o  h e l p s  c l a r i f y  how much 
of t h e  v i o l e n c e  which e l i t e  obse rve r s  have been inc l ined  t o  a t t r i b u t e  t o  
t h e d i s o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  despe ra t ion  o r  agg res s ive  impulses of t h e  masses is 
a c t u a l l y  a  by-product of i n t e r a c t i o n s  between groups which a r e  pursuing 
t h e i r  ends i n  r e l a t i v e l y  r o u t i n e  ways and r i v a l s  o r  a u t h o r i t i e s  who chal-  
l enge  t h e  c l a ims  embodied i n  t hose  r e l a t i v e l y  r o u t i n e  a c t i o n s .  
Theor iz ing About C o l l e c t i v e  Act ions  
We could ,  i f  we wanted, now fo rma l i ze  t h e  a n a l y s i s  of t h e  S p i t a l f i e l d s  
weavers, t h e  Nacton poorhouse-wreckers, t h e  Stamp Act crowds i n  New York. 
The fo rma l i za t ion  would c o n s i s t  of mapping t h e  i n t e r e s t s  of t he  p a r t i c i -  
pants ,  e s t ima t ing  t h e  c u r r e n t  s t a t e  of oppor tun i ty  and t h r e a t  w i th  r e s p e c t  
t o  those  i n t e r e s t s ,  checking, t h e i r  mob i l i za t ion  l e v e l s ,  gauging t h e i r  power 
pos i t i ons ,  then see ing  t o  what e x t e n t  t h e s e  v a r i a b l e s  accounted f o r  t h e  
i n t e n s i t y  and c h a r a c t e r  of t h e i r  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  One s t e p  back from 
t h a t  fo rma l i za t ion  we would f i n d  ou r se lves  examining t h e  p r e v a i l i n g  pat- 
t e r n  of r ep res s ion  a n d  f a c i l i t a t i o n ,  t h e  impact of t h e  v a r i o u s  groups '  
o rgan iza t ion  on t h e i r  mob i l i za t ion  and on t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s ,  t h e  e f f e c t  of 
c o a l i t i o n s  wi th  o t h e r  contenders  on t h e i r  c u r r e n t  power p o s i t i o n s ,  and s o  
on. 
Thnt is t h e  easy p a r t :  showing t h a t  concepts  such a s  mob i l i za t ion  
and r ep res s ion  po in t  t o  broadly  s i m i l a r  p roces ses  i n  d i f f e r e n t  s e t t i n g s ,  
and apply  convenient ly  i n  t hose  va r ious  s e t t i n g s .  We would be s u r p r i s e d  
and disappointed i f  i t  came ou t  o therwise;  a f t e r  a l l ,  t h e  concepts  were 
meant t o  be q u i t e  general .  Yet t h e  easy p a r t  has  i t s  s a t i s f a c t i o n s .  I t  
he lps  i d e n t i f y  some unexpected and p o t e n t i a l l y  f r u i t f u l  comparisons -- 
between, f o r  i n s t ance ,  t h e  mob i l i za t ion  of B r i t i s h  r a d i c a l s  i n  t h e  1760s 
and t h e  mob i l i za t ion  of American r a d i c a l s  i n  t h e  1960s. It b r ings  o u t  
t h e  r i c h n e s s  nnd re levance of h i s t o r i c a l  m a t e r i a l s  f o r  t h e  concerns  of 
contemporary nnn lys t s  of p o l i t i c a l  processes .  Thse two advantages combjne 
t o  produce a  t h i r d  advantage: tlie r ecogn i t i on  t h a t  h i s t o r i c a l  exper iences  
n r e  an  important and a c c e s s i b l e  domain f o r  t h e  t e s t i n g  and refinement of 
arguments and exp lana t ions  of c o l l e c t i v e  ac t ion .  
There we a r r i v e  a t  t h e  hard p a r t .  The hard p a r t  is  t h e  r e s e n r c l ~  
agenda: s o r t i n g  populat ions  i n t o  members of t h e  p o l i t y ,  c l ~ o l l e n a e r s  and 
non-actors; i d e n t i f y i n g  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s  r e l i a b l y ;  measuring t h e  e x t e n t  
and c h a r a c t e r  of r e p r e s s i o n / f a c i l i t a t i o n  t o  which they a r e  s u b j e c t ;  de- 
termining whether i t  is t r u e ,  a s  argued e a r l i e r ,  t h ~ t  r i c h  popu la t ions  
tend t o  mob i l i ze  o f f e n s i v e l y ,  poor populat ions  t o  mobi l ize  de fens ive ly ;  
determining whether i t  is t r u e ,  ns  I have a s s e r t e d  r epea ted ly ,  t l int t h e  
gene ra l  e f f e c t  of sus t a ined  r ep res s ion  is  no t  t o  bu i ld  up t ens ions  t o  
t h e  po in t  of a  g r e a t  exp lon io~ l ,  but  t o  reduce t h e  o v e r a l l  l e v e l  of col-  
l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  
This  is  t h e  hard p a r t .  It is n o t  on ly  hard because i t  involves  many 
v a r i a b l e s  and i n t e r a c t i o n s  among t h e  v a r i a b l e s .  It is a l s o  hnrd because 
t h e  measurement problems a r e  so  l a rge ;  dev i s ing  gene ra l ly  comparable and 
meaningful. measures of o rgan iza t ion ,  mob i l i za t ion ,  power, r ep re s s ion ,  and 
s o  on l i e s  beyond t h e  FreRent s t a t e  of t h e  a r t .  That is why t h i s  book has  
s o  o f t e n  turned t o  t h e  problems of measurement. P l en ty  of work t o  do 
the re .  
The accounts  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  i n  B r i t a i n  and America we havc j u s t  
reviewed a l s o  r e c a l l  a  major t h e o r e t i c a l  problem. I n  t h e  mob i l i za t ion  
model which t h i s  book has  employed, c o l l e c t i v e  i n t e r e s t s  a r e  given a  p r i o r i .  
We impute them from some gene ra l  h i s t o r i c a l  a n a l y s i s  (my p re fe r r ed  nnaly- 
sis heing Marx' r e l a t i o n  o f  d i f f e r e n t  segments of t h e  populat ion t o  t h e  
p r e v a i l i n g  means of product ion)  o r  we determine them empi r i ca l ly  (my pre- 
f e r r e d  procedure  being t o  pay a t t e n t i o n  t o  what people soy a r e  t h e i r  griev-,  
ances, a s p i r a t i o n s  and r i g h t s ) .  The t h e o r e t i c a l  d i fF icu l . t i e s  mn l t ip ly .  
Mobi l iza t ion,  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  nnd a c q u i s i t i o n  o r  1.088 of power f r equen t ly  
a l t e r  a  group 's  i n t e r e s t s .  How should we t ake  t h a t  a l t e r a t i o n  i n t o  ac- 
count?  The imputat ion of i n t e r e s t s  and t h e  empi r i ca l  d e r i v a t i o n  o f t e n  
c o n f l i c t  w i th  each o t h e r ;  Len in i s t8  speak of " f a l s e  c o n s c i o ~ ~ s n e s s " .  Does 
t h a t  make sense?  
Another problem has  been wi th  u s  from t h e  s t a r t ,  and has  r e fused  
t o  go away: t h e  connect ion between c a u s a l  and purposive  exp lana t ions  of 
c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  We have o s c i l l a t e d  between t h e  two without  i n t e g r a t i n g  
them f i rmly.  The mobf l i za t ion  model s e r v e s  f o r  shor t - run ana1ysb.s. 
When we t ake  up a  s e r i e s  of a c t i o n s  such a s  t h e  Stamp Act r e s i s t a n c e  i n  
Phi l .adelphia  and New York we s o r t  our o h S e ~ a t i 0 n S  i n t o  i n t e r e s t s ,  organ- 
i z a t i o n ,  mobilization, rep res s ion ,  power, oppor tun i ty  and c o l l e c t i v e  
a c t i o n  i t s e l f .  But we u l t ima te ly  v i sus l i . ze  t h e  va r ious  groups involved 
a s  under taking t h e i r  a c t i o n  purposively:  seeking t o  r e a l i z e  t h e i r  i n t e r -  
e s t s  wi th  t h e  means a t  t h e i r  d i s p o s a l  w i th in  t h e  l i m i t s  s e t  by t h e i r  re- 
l a t i o n s h i p  t o  t h e  world around them. I have a l r eady  pointed ou t  t he  
l i m i t a t i o n s  of t h e  mob i l i za t ion  model: t l ie l a c k  of allowance f o r  uncer- 
t a i n t y  nnd f o r  s t r a t e g i c  i n t e r a c t i o n .  t h e  focus  on q u a n t i t y  r a t h e r  than . 
qt~nl.i . ty,  t h e  measurement d i f  f i c u l t i e s  i nhe ren t  i n  each of its v a r i a b l e s .  
Even i f  we f i n d  ways of overcoming t h e s e  l i m i t a t i o n s ,  however, we a r e  
s t i l l  d e a l i n g  with a  purposive  model. 
In  coping wi th  long-rlln changes i n  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n ,  we have gener- 
a l l y  turned from purposive  to  causa l  models. The p o l i t y  model has  served 
us  i n  t h i s  way; f o r  example, i t  provides  a  crude exp lana t ion  of t h e  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  among groups which a r e  
ga in ing  power, groups which a r e  l o s i n g  power, and groups which a r e  main- 
t a i n i n g  t h e i r  power. Chal lengers  gaining p o l i t i c a l  power, runs  one p a r t  
of t he  explannt ion,  tend t o  s h i f t  toward c o l l e c t i v e  p roac t ion ,  bu t  a t  
diminished l e v e l s ;  t h a t  ia  becsuae ti le governmental appa ra tus  p r o t e c t s  
them from t h r e a t s  and because reduced c o s t s  of mob i l i za t ion  and collective 
a c t i o n  mean they can r e a l i z e  t h e  same i n t e r e s t  w i th  l e s s  e f f o r t .  Thua 
t h e  c r u c i a l  changes a f f e c t  c o n s t r a i n t s ,  not  i .n tent ions .  
Another kind of c a u s a l  argument has  a l s o  f igu red  prominently i n  t h e  
ana lyses  of previous  chap te r s .  It concerns tlie e f f e c t s  of very 1.arge 
s o c i a l  changes, notably  s ta temaking,  p r o l e t a r i a n i z a t i o n  and i n d u s t r i a l i z n -  
t i on .  There 1 have argued r epea ted ly  t h a t  t h e  change i n  ques t ion  simultnne- 
ous ly  a f f e c t e d  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  and t h e  o rgan iza t ion  of va r ious  contenders  
f o r  power, and thereby a f f e c t e d  thei r  mob i l i za t ion  and c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  
I n  t h e  c a s e  of peasant  r e s i s t a n c e  t o  t h e  increased t a x a t i o n  accompanying 
a  t a  temaking: 
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This  is n o t  a  complete account ,  s i n c e  s t a t e m k i n g  a l s o  a f f e c t s  r ep re s s ion1  
f a c i l i t a t i o n  and power. Never theless ,  t h i s  account c l e a r l y  d i f f e r s  from 
t h e  s t anda rd  Durkheimian arguments i n  which t h e  discrepancy between t h e  
pace of s t r u c t u r a l  change and tlie i n s t i t u t l o ~ l a l i z a t i o n  of s o c i a l  c o n t r o l  
determines  t h e  l i ke l ihood  of c o n f l i c t  and p r o t e s t .  Al.though t h e  argu- 
ment has  important  imp l i ca t ions  f o r  changes i n  t h e  plrrposes of peasant  
c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n ,  i t  i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  a  c a u s a l  argument. 
I n  p r i n c i p l e ,  i t  should no t  be hard t o  i n t e g r a t e  t h e  purposive  and 
causa l  ana lyses .  In  p r i n c i p l e ,  we can i n t e g r a t e  them by con t inu ing  t o  
t h ink  of group dec i s ion  r u l e s  and t a c t i c a l  computations ( t h e  purposive  
p a r t )  which ope ra t e  w i th in  s e v e r e  c o n s t r a i n t s  s e t  by t h e  con tende r ' s  
i n t e r n a l  o rgan iza t ion .  i t s  r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  o t h e r  groups, and t h e  c u r r e n t  
s t a t e  of o p p o r t u n i t i e s  and t h r e a t s  i n  t h e  world ( t h e  causa l  p a r t ) .  
I n  p r a c t i c e ,  t h a t  is  no t  s o  easy.  We might t r y  t o  do i t  by g radua l ly  
btti ld ltig time i n t o  t h e  b a s i c  mobil i z a t i o n  model: showing, f o r  i n s t ance .  
how a  contender ' s  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  a t  one po in t  i n  time changes t h e  con- 
d i t i o n s  wlticl~ a r e  r e l e v a n t  t o  t h e  next  round of a c t i o n .  I n  t h e  agenda 
s e t  by t h e  model, t h a t  means showing how t h e  form, i n t e n s i t y  and outcome 
of t h e  a c t i o n  a f f e c t  t h e  contender ' s  i n t e r e s t s ,  o rgan iza l lon  and mobili-  
za t ion .  i t s  power p o s i t i o n ,  dle new o p p o r t u n i t i e s  and t h r e a t s  con f ron t ing  
i t ,  and t h e  r e p r e s s i o n / f a c i l i t n t i o n  t o  which i t  is s u b j e c t .  I n  a  very 
s h o r t  run,  we can ignore  some o f  these r e l a t i o n s h i p s  because they w i l l  
rennin  e s s e n t i a l l y  t h e  name. Over a  s e r i e s  of shor t - run snapshots ,  how- 
eve r ,  t h e i r  e f f e c t s  w i l l  hegin t o  accumulate, and t o  a f f e c t  -5, d r i f t  of 
t he  s i t u a t i o n  a s  a  whole. 
A s e r i e s  o f  many such shor t - r im p o r t r a i t s  should  i n t e g r a t e ,  l i k e  a  
many-Cramed movie, i n t o  a  cont inuous  account of t h e  process  by which col-  
l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  clinnges and flows. The d i f f i c u l t y ,  however, i s  obvious: 
f o r  t h e  a n a l y s i s  of any p a r t i c u l a r  i n s t a n t  we can a f f o r d  t o  t r e a t  t h e  sc-  
t i o n s  of oLhcr groups (and t h e  con tende r ' s  r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  o t h e r  groups) 
a s  f e a t u r e s  o f  t h e  environment. As soon a s  time e n t e r s ,  t h e  a c t i o n s  and 
r e a c t i o n s  of t h e  o t h e r s  become c r u c i a l .  I n  t h e  s h o r t  run,  we have s t r a -  
t e g i c  i n t e r a c t i o n .  In  t h e  longe r  run, we have changing c o a l i t i o n s ,  c leavages  
and s t r u c t u r e s  of power. The p o l i t y  model we have used i n  t h i s  book 
s i n g l e s  o u t  only  one a s p e c t  -- t h e  relationship of contenders  t o  eovern- 
ments -- of a  complex s e t  of changes. I n  o rde r  t o  i n t e g r a t e  t h e  c a u s a l  
and purposive  arguments unfoldcd i n  t h i s  book, we need more. We need o 
much f u l l e r  a n a l y s i s  of power s t r u a g l e s .  c o o l i t t o n s .  and o t h e r  forms oE 
i n t e r a c t i o n  among contenders .  For s t u d e n t s  o f  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n ,  t h a t  
i s  the  next  chal lenge.  
The Importance of H i s to ry  
H i s t o r i c a l  a n a l y s i s ,  taken s e r i o u s l y ,  w i l l  he lp  us fasltionmorc adc- 
q u a t e  models of power s t r u g g l e s .  The h i s t o r i c a l  record is  r i c h  nnd r e l e -  
vant .  I t  permits  us  t o  fol low m u l t i p l e  groups and t h e i r  r e l a t i o n s  ove r  
s u b s t a n t i a l  b locks  of t ime. C o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n ,  con ten t ion  and s t r u g g l e s  
f o r  p o l i t i c a l  power a r e  e s p e c i a l l y  l i k e l y  t o  l eave  t h e i r  t r a c e s  i n  t h e  
h i s t o r i a n ' s  raw ma te r i a l s .  
I t i s to ry  i s  more than an abundant source  of datn .  I t  ma t t e r s  fo r  
i t s  own sake; i t  p u t s  ou r  own exper ience i n t o  pe r spec t ive  and sometimes 
he lps  t o  exp la in  i t .  The h i s t o r y  o f  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  is  a  f a s c i n a t i n g  
inqu i ry  which t akes  11s i n t o  d i f f e r e n t  pa ths  from t h e  h i s t o r y  of p o l i t i c a l  
thought o r  t h e  h i s t o r y  of powerholders,  a l though the  t h r e e  sorLs of h i s -  
t o ry  c r o s s  f r equen t ly .  The d i f f e r e n t  h i s t o r i c n l  t r a j e c t o r i e s  of t h e  
demonstra t ion and the  s t r i k e  i n  western c o i t t ~ t r i e s .  f o r  example, he lp  us  
understand t h e  d i f f e r e n t  p l aces  they occupy i n  today 's  p o l i t i c a l  rcper-  
t o i r e s ,  h e l p  us g ra sp  such p e c u l i a r  t h ings  a s  t h e  r e l a t i v e l y  g r e a t e r  
frequency wi th  which t h e  demonstrations of our  own time produce co l l ec -  
t i v e  violence;  a f t e r  a l l ,  i n  most western c o u n t r i e s  s t r i k e s  were once 
ve ry  common s e t t i n g s  f o r  shootinp,,  brawling and a t t a c k s  on bu i ld ings  o r  
equipment. 
llistorians commonly treat the history of collective action as a sub- 
sldsldiary form of political, social or economic history: strikes and 
demonstrations serve as the moral equivalent of the statesman's memoirs. 
provide evidence of the quality of life among the lower orders, lend 
themselves to the measurement of the impact of economic fluctuations. 
Those are all legitimate uses of the evidence on strikes and demonstrations. 
Taken in its w n  terms, however, tl~e history of collective action cuts 
across political history, social history, economic history as we usually 
imngine them. The categories and periods of collective action's history 
do not follw simply from those of political, social or economic history. 
Collective nction follows its own course. Our repeated glimpses of his- 
torical experience in this book have given us clear indications of the impact 
oncollective nction of changes in power structure and in the organization 
of production, but they have also shown us how the existing repertoire of 
collective action and the previous experience of the collective actors 
constrain the way they act together on interests, aspirations and grievances. 
Instead of treating it ns a minor elaboration of political or social his- 
tory -- for example, as the subject which George Rude labeled The Crowd 
in llistory -- we have nome warrant to write the history of collective ac- -
tion in its own terms. 
BeEore we stake out a new liistorical field, however, we should not ask 
merely whether it 1s conceivable and interesting. We have to ask whether 
it is coherent, worthwile and accessible. In the case of collective 
action, the answer to all three seems to be: yes. The subject is coherent 
in several fundamental regards: any given population tends to have a 
fairly limited and well-established set of means for action on shared In- 
terests, and to change tt~ose means little by little; the available means 
of action, the results of action, the Intensitities and loci of nctlon 
change in an intelligible manner in the course of such large-scale changes 
as industrialization and statemaking; we can rensonnbly ask the same 
questions about interest, organization, opportunity and action in wide- 
ly different settings, and can even expect similar answers to some qucs- 
tions to come back from very different times and places. 
Worthwhile? In the long run, the reaults of tl~e inquiry will tell 
us. In advance, we can see at least that the study of collective action 
gets us to the problems that concerned the ordinary actors of history in 
a way that almost no other inquiry does. It takes its place with the 
historical study of work and the family: it is about the logic, fmme- 
work and content of everyday life. 
The question of accessibility is harder to settle. Too little of 
the work of making the evidence for collective action available and com- 
prehensible has been done. Interest, opportunity, organization, action 
-- none of them is easy to reconstruct at a distance of o century or two. 
The action is less difficult than the rest, because the most precise and 
voluminous records come from legal authorities. The nutlloritics tried 
to establish what happened in order to punish it this time and prevent it 
next time. As for interest, opportunity and orgnnization, we muat either 
infer them from the action itself, guess at them on the basis of general 
arguments, or piece them together from scattered, brittle materials. 
When dealing with the actions of ordinary people, most historians content 
themselves wihh the first two choices: describe what the people did, then 
deduce what interests they were pursuing, what opporttmities to pursuo 
those interests they faced and how they were organized from what they said 
and did during the action, as well as from general argumenta concerning the 
character of crowds, the nature of pensant life, the mennlng of resistance 
to conscription, and similar notions. 
In the absence of direct, s'olid evidence concerning interest, op- 
portunity and organization, the indirect approach combining general ar- 
guments with observations from the action can serve us well. A11 we need 
are sound general arguments, well-documented actions, and the wit to cor- 
rect the general arguments when the actions prove them wrong. In analy- 
zing the actions of the seventeenth-century rural rebels who show up in 
history books under such quaint names as Bonnets-Rouges, Camisards and 
Croquants, Yves-Mar;e ~brce frames a useful argument. At that time, ac- 
cording to Berce, the local community was the main locus of rural solid- 
arity and the chief repository of rights in which rural people had a strong 
investment. The expansion of the state under Louis XI11 and Louis XIV 
threatened both the solidarity and the rights. 
To each form of local solidarity. ~ e r c g  argues, corresponded a form 
of rebellion: revolts of insecurity based on the institutions of common 
defense ngalnst 'marauders, food riots based on the communal arrangements 
for provisioning in hard times, forceful defense of common agricultural 
rights based on the previous exercise and recognition of those rights, 
rebellions against direct taxes based on the long participation of the 
, 
local community in the assessment of those taxes, armed resistance to 
indirect taxes based on the prior existence of local cl~annels for the 
trading of the items now subject to inspection, taxation and seizure. 
Says Berce: 
It is roughly from 1660 to 1680 that, irreversibly, communal 
powers were dismantled, their military, judiciary and fiscal 
prerogatives choked or revoked, their established rights and 
privileges crushed. The chronology of great popular rebell- 
ions follows the same rhythm. Then these reactions of col- 
lective violence died away as the building of the state suc- 
ceeded (Berce 1974a: 117). 
~erc:'s au-ry underestimates the importance of expanding capitalism. 
Yet it pinpoints themes which do recur, time and time again, in seven- 
teenth-century revolts: established rights being crushed, long-respect- 
ed privileges being swept aside. miat much appears in the action itself, 
as when, in 1636, the peasants of Saintonge declared "... that they were 
good Frenchmen and would die, rather than live any longer under the ty- 
ranny of Parisians who had reduced them to the despair and extreme pov- 
erty in which our province now find themaelves because of the great tax 
assessments and new burdens that they have imposed upon us and invented 
in this reign ..." (Berce 1974b: 736). 
The complaint from Saintonge illustrates both the promise and the 
penalty of working with observations of collective action olone. The 
promise is that people who act together generally have their own idea 
of the grievances, hopes and interests which motivate them. and a notion 
of their chances of success. If the "tyranny of Parisians" resppears in 
complaint after complaint, we have some reason to believe thnt the people 
of Saintonge had a genuine grievance ogainst demands from outside. The 
penalty, however, is that the rhetoric of rebellion does not reveal the 
origin or factual basis of the grievance: how to distinguish, for exam- 
ple, betwzen a longstanding condition recently become intolerable be- 
cause of changing aspirations or self-definitions, and new privations 
which violate longstanding rights7 
Part of the remedy consists of paying attention to the whole pat- 
tern of actions and complaints: in old-regime France, almost everyone 
who made a public lament complalned of "extreme poverty;" if you did 
otherwise, there was the chance the tax collector would bite harder the 
next time lie passed by. Complaints of "new burdens" and "Parisian ty- - 
ranny." on the other hand. varied from place to place, time to time, 
group to group. In that variation over place, time and group we have 
a chance to try out our ideas concerning the interests, opportunities 
and organization lying behind the collective action. In the case of 
~ercc's argument, we con determine whether there was, indeed, a tendency 
for regions just coming under firm royal control to mount major resis- 
tance movements, then lapse into docility as the state won out. (There 
wns, although the connections were more complex than ~erci's scheme al- 
lows. ) 
Nevertheless, a broad correlation between the rhythm of statemaking 
and the rhythm of rebellion will leave open many alternative interpre- 
tations of the interests, opportunities and organization at work. Event- 
ually we will have to try to observe them directly. Two apparently con- 
tradictory strategies apply. The first is the more obvious: dig into 
the evidence concerning the settings in which collective action occurs. 
I 
With enough spadework, it is often possible to discover the interests. 
I 
I 
opportunities and organization in operation outside the great episodes 
of action. But eventually we will need comparisons with places, times 
and groups in which little or no action occurred: if we find "extreme 
poverty" in the setting of every seventeenth-century rebellion, does 
that mean the peasants who did not rebel were less poor? That sort of 
question leads us to the second strategy: broad comparisons of places, 
times, and groups which differed in interest, opportunity end organiza- 
tion. Did their collective action, or lack of it, vary accordingly? 
In writing the history of collective action, we have a choice hc- 
tween historical particularism and the attempt to compare and generalize. 
In one view, all such comparisons are odious, First because they inevit- 
ably warp the interpretation of the past to ftt the preoccupation of 
the present, second because they wrench each event from the only con- 
text which can give it substance. "The Burgundian of the seventeenth 
century," Gastron Roupnel tells us, "did not bear the mark of the modern 
age. At the bottom of his soul there wns something so old that it 
was as if the Gauls were still around him in their new land where his- 
tory had not yet arrived" (Roupnel 1955: xxx). If so, presumnb1.y 
neither the Burgundian nor the American of our own time con reconstitute 
' or explain the events of seventeenth-century Rurgundy without projecting 
himself across the chasm between the present and on corlier age. Com- 
parisons will only serve to map the depth and contours oE the chasm. 
The depth and width of the chasm, however, are questions of fact, 
not of fnith. We can, to some degree, determine whether the patterns 
and explanations which help us order the collective action of thc 
seventeenth century give us any grip o,r~ that of the twentieth -- pro- 
vide usable categories for our observations, brin~ out obscure connec- 
tions, anticipate features which are not readily visiblc at first sight. 
The points at which the seventeenth-century categories €nil are clues to 
change, signals thot we have something new to explnin. Our attempt to 
move across the centuries may lead to the conclusion thot different 
centuries require fundamentally different approaches to collective 
action. Then that conclusion, and the delineation of the essential 
breaks between one mode of action and another, will be accomplLshments 
in themselves. 
The History of collective Action in Modern France 
How, then, might we set concrete historical experience into the 
framework this book has built up? The historical work consists of 
grouping actions within the historical experience into governments, con- 
tenders, polities, coalitions, processes of mobilization, and so on. 
Other fundamental phenomena, such as changes in beliefs, demographic 
change. or demographic crisis, enter the account only in so far as they 
affect the pattern of pursuit of interests and contention for power. 
In the case of France since 1500, the largest frame for analysis 
shows us the interplay of a gradually urbanizing, industrializing and 
proletarianizing population with a national state which was at first 
emerging, then establishing priority, then consolid~ting its hold on 
the population. The two sets of processes depended on each other to some 
degree -- for example, in the way that expanding taxation drove peasants 
to market goods they would otherwise have kept at home, on the one hand, 
nnd the way thnt the degree of commercialization of land, labor, and 
ngricultural production set stringent limits on the return from land 
taxes, income taxes, or excise taxes, on the other. Rut their timing 
differed. The epic periods of French state-making were the times of 
Louis XI11 and Louis XIV. Those periods had their share of economic 
turmoil. Furthermore, they saw both a significant increase in the impor- 
tnnce of Paris and n few other major cities for the life of France as a 
whole and the oprend of trade and small-scale manufacturing through the 
towns and villages of the entire country. Yet in terms of productivity. 
organization and sheer numbers of persons involved, the urbanization, in- 
dustrialization and yroletarianization of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries produced incomparably greater changes. To oversimplify outrage- 
ously, the drama consists of two acts: flrst a fast-growing state acting 
on a slow-moving population and economy; then a tast-changing population 
and economy dealine with a consolidating state. 
In analyzing this interplay, we need to ask over and over for dif- 
ferent places and points in time wlwt contenders for power (potentinl and 
actrtal) the existing social structure made available, and what governments 
the existing stage of statemaking left them to contend over. n ~ e  most 
strenuous current debates over the history bf  the turbulent French seven- 
teenth century, for example, pivot, first, on the extent to whlch the 
national government squeezed out its provincial rivals and acquired firm 
control over Frnech social life; second, and even more strenuously. on 
the extent to which the operative divisions of the population were social 
classes in something like a Marxian sense (soe Mor~snier 1970, Lebrun 1967, 
Porchnev 1963. Lublinakaya 1968). 
The analytic scheme I have laid out provides no pat answers to those 
serious questions; if it did, one would have to suspect that its prin- 
cipal assertions were true by definitlon. It does suggest thnt the 
tracing of the actual issues, locations and personnel of violent encoun- 
ters in seventeenth-century France will provide crucip.1 evidence on the 
pace and extent of political centralization, as well as on the nature of 
the groups which were then engaged in struggles for power. The basic 
research remains to be done. Yet the recurrent importance of new taxn- 
tion in seventeenth-century rebellions, the npparent suhsidence of those 
rebellions toward the end of the century, and the frequent involvement of 
whole peasant communities in resistance to the demands of the crown nll 
point toward a decisive seventeenth-century battle among locnl and nntion- 
a1 polities. 
Not that nll struggle ended then. As Tocqueville declared long ago, 
the Revolution of 1789 pitted centralizers agalnst guardians oC provincial 
autonomies. The contest betwecn crow and provincinl parlemcnts (which 
led quite directly to the calling for the Estates General, which in turn 
became the locus of multiple sovereignty in-1789) continued the strug- 
gle of the seventeenth century. Throughout the Revolution, in fact, 
the issue of predominance of Paris and the national government remained I 
open, with tax rebellions, movements against conscription and resistance 
I 
I 
to the calls of the nation for food recurring when the center weakened 
and when its demands increased sharply. Most of the events of the so- 
called peasant revolt of 1789 took the form of food riots and other 
classic eighteenth-centt~ry local conflicts. 
Yet they did not just represent "more of the same," because they 
came in extraordinary clusters, because theyoccurred in the presence of 
. multiple sovereignty, and because the participants began to form coali- 4 
i 
ttotis with other contenders for power. Now, the exact contours of the 
major contenders and the precise nature of their shifting alliances are 
the central issues of the big debates about the history of the Revolution 
(see e.g. Cobhan 1964, Hazauric 1970). But it is at least roughly true 
to say that a loose coalition among peasants, officials, urban commer- 
cial cLasscs and small but crucial grotlps of urban craftsmen and stlop- 
keepers carried the revolution through its first few years, but began to 
fall apart irrevocably in 1792 and 1793. Looked at from the point of 
vlew of coalition-formation and multiple sovereignty, the Revolution 
breaks into a whole series of revolutionary situations, from the first 
declaration of sovereignty by the Third Estate in 1798 to the final 
defeat of Napoleon in 1815. 
Agagn, in this perspective we begin to grasp tile significance of 
matertally trivial events like the taking of the Bastille. For the at- 
tack by Parisjans on the old fortress finally set a crowd unambiguously 
against the regime, revealed the uncertain commitment of part of the 
armed forces to the government. brought the King to his ffrst accessions 
to the popular movement (his trip to tlie Natio~~sl Assembly on thc 15th 
of July and his trip to Paris on the 17th) and stimulated a serles of 
minor coups in the provinces: 
Until. July 14th the handful of revolutlonary instituttons sct 
up in the provinces were disparate and isolated. Ilcnccfonsnrd 
most of the towns and many of the villagcs of Prance wore to 
imitate Paris with extraordinary swiftness. During the uceks 
that followed the fall of tlie Bastille there arose evcrywhcre 
revolutionary Toron Councils of permanent committees, and citizen 
militias which soon assumed the name of national guards (Godechot 
1970: 273). 
So if we date the start of multiple sovereignty from the Third Estate's 
Tennis Court Oath to remain assembled despite the prohibitions of 
the King, we still have to treat July 15th and its immediate nftcr- 
math as a great expansion of the revolutionary coalition. 
Obviously the three proximate conditions for a revolutlonary sltu- 
ation enumerated earlier -- coalitions of contenders ndvnncing exclu- 
sive alternative claims, commitment to those claims, Failure of the 
government to suppress them -- appeared in the France of 1789%'' Whnt 
cannot be obvlous from a mere chronicle of the events is how long cach 
of the conditions existed. what caused them and whether they were suf- 
ficient to cause the collapse of the old re~ime. At least these are 
researchable questions, as contrasted with attempts to ask directly 
whether the rise of the bonrgeoisie, the increase in relattve deprivn- 
tion or the decay of the old elite "caused" the Revolution. What is 
more, they call attention to the probable importance of shifting coali- 
tions among lawyers, officials, provincial magnates, peasants and wor- 
Indeed, these reactive forms of collective action renched their climnx 
around the Revolution of 1848, before fading rnpidly to insignificance. 
From the mid-century crisjs we can date the date the definitive 
reduction of the smaller polities in whtch Frenchmen had once done 
most of their political business. the virtual disappearance of communal 
contenders for power, the shift of all contenders townrd associntional 
kers in the nationwide political maneuvering of 1787 to 1789, as well 
as to the effect of "defensive" mobilization of peasants and workers in 
response to the multiple pressures impinging on them in 1789. 
The Revolution produced a great transfer of power. It stamped out 
a new and difinctive political system. Despite the' Restoration of 1815, 
the nobility and the clergy never recovered their pre-revolutionary 
position, some segments of the bourgeoisie greatly enhanced their power 
over the national government. and the priority of that national govern- 
ment over ell others increased permanently. In Barrington Moore's analy- 
sis, whose main lines appear correct to me, the predominance of the 
organization and action at a national level. The massive urbanizntion 
and industrialization of France which gained momentum ofter 1830 
transformed the available contenders for power, especially by crenting 
a large, new urban working class based in factories and other large 
1 
organizations. From that point on, the demonstration, the meeting. the 
strike wer? the usual matrices of collective violence as well as the 
settings in which an enormous proportion of all struggles for power 
coalition of officials, bourgeois and peasant in the decisive early 
phases OF the Revolution promoted the emergence of the attenuated parlia- 
mentary democracy which characterizes post-revolutionary France (Moore 
1966, ch. IT; for explication and critique see Rokkan 1969, Rothman 1970.. 
Stone 1967). At thet scale and in the details of public administration, 
education, ideology and life style, the Revolution left s durable heri- 
tage . 
None of the old conflicts, nevertheless, disappeared completely with 
the Revolution. The counter-revolutionary vendce, despite having come 1 
close to destruction in 1793, again rose in rebellion in 1794, 1795, 
1799, 1.815 and 1832. Further revolutions overcame France as a whole in 
1830, 1848, and 1870. Host of the characteristic forms of resistance to 
demands from the center -- food riots, tax rebellions, movements against 
conscri,ption, and so on -- continued well into the nineteenth century. 
went on. Collective action evolved with the organization of public 
life. 
A Last Case'in Point: Rural Collective Action in Burgundy 
If this broad sketch of the evolution of collective action holds 
for France as a whole, it m y  still lose its verisimilitude when compared 
to the experience of particular local populations. In Caston Roupnel'a 
opinion, which I quoted earlier, the old-regime Burgundian was so dif- 
ferent from his modern counterpart that a historian hns to apply differ- 
ent explanatory principles to his behavior. 
Roupnel!s challenge to us is to discover vhether we can understand 
and explain the co1,lective action of old-regime Burgundy in terms which 
are relevant to the time and place, yet still hnve meaning in other -- 
and especially later -- times and placea. I think we can. Old-regime 
Burgundians felt the effects of two momentous processes: the expansion 
of c a p i t a l i s m  and t h e  concen t r a t ion  of power i n  t h e  French n a t i o n a l  
s t a t e .  They f e l t  t h e  expansion of c a p i t a l i s m  conc re t e ly  i n  t h e  growth 
of an  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o l e t a r i a t ,  t h e  s h i f t  toward cash-crop product ion,  
t h e  d e c l i n e  of communal p rope r ty  r i g h t s  i n  f avo r  of i n d i v i d u a l  owner- 
s h i p ,  and a  number of o the r  ways. They f e l t  t h e  concen t r a t ion  of s t a t e  
power i n  tlie r i s i n g  importance of r o y a l  o f f i c i a l s  i n  theregion.  t h e  
d e c l i n i n g  autonomy of t h e  Parlement and t h e  mun ic ipa l i t y  of Di jon,  t h e  
increased c o n t r o l ,  t a x a t i o n  and s a l e  of l o c a l  o f f i c e s  by t h e  Crown, and 
a  number of o the r  ways. 
The c o n f l i c t s  over s ta temaking a r e  most v i s i b l e  i n  t h e  seventeenth  
cen tu ry ,  e s p e i c a l l y  du r ing  t h e  Fronde of t h e  1640s and 16508, when Bur- 
gundy wns t h e  s i t e  of major r e b e l l i o n s  a g a i n s t  t h e  Crown. The c o n f l i c t s  
o v e r c a p i t a l i s m a r e  more v i s i b l e  i n  t h e  e igh teen th  cen tu ry ,  when s t r u g g l e s  
f o r  c o n t r o l  of land. l abo r  and c rops  r ecu r red  throughout t h e  province.  
Let u s  t ake  a  b r i e f  look a t  t h e  e ighteenth-century s t r u g g l e s ,  t h lnk  about  
t h e i r  r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  t h e  expansion of c a p i t a l i s m ,  and then compare them 
with t h e  r u r a l  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  of t h e  n ine t een th  cen tu ry .  
I n  r u r a l  Burgundy, e ighteenth-century con ten t ion  had a  s t r o n g  a n t i -  
c a p i t a l i s t  f l a v o r .  I t  was t h e  golden age  of food r i o t s .  The c r i s e s  of 
1709, 1758 and 1775 brought t h e i r  c l u s t e r s  of c o n f l i c t s ,  and o t h e r s  
appeared between t h e  g r e a t  c r i s e s .  That is t h e  meaning of t h e  1770 
e d i c t  o f t h e P a r l e m e n t  of Burgundy which forbade,  l i k e  s o  many o t h e r  e d i c t s  
of t h e  per iod 
t o  g a t h e r  and s t o p  wagons loaded wi th 'whes t  o r  o t h e r  g r a i n ,  on 
roads ,  i n  c i t i e s ,  towns o r  v i l l a g e s ,  on pain  of s p e c i a l  prose- 
c u t i o n  . . . (Archives ~ 6 p a r t e m e n t a l e s  ~ G t e  d'Or [Di jon]  C 81) 
That blockage of g r a i n  expressed t h e  demand of o rd ina ry  people  t h a t  tlle 
needs of t h e  community have p r i o r i t y  over t h e  requirements  of t h e  mnr- 
ke t .  The market,  and t h e r e f o r e  t h e  merchants a s  w e l l .  
The second common form of a n t i c s p i t a l l s t  a c t i o n  was l e s s  r o u t i n e  
and more i r o n i c .  It was l o c s l  r e s i s t a n c e  t o  t h e  l a n d l o r d ' s  consol ida-  
t i o n  of l ends  and of r i g h t s  i n  t h e  land.  The i rony l i e s  i n  ou r  normnl 
r e a d i n e s s  t o  p l a c e  t h e  l and lo rds  themselves i n  t h e  a n t i c a p i t a l i s t  camp. 
A s  t h e  g r e a t  r e g i o n a l  h i s t o r i a n  P i e r r e  d e  Saint-Jacoh showcd, t l ie 
Burgundisn l a n d l o r d s  of t h e  per iod -- i nc lud ing  both  t h e  "old" n o b j l t t y  
and t h e  ennobled o f f i c i a l s  and merchants -- played t h e  c a p i t a l i s t  game 
by s e i z i n g  t h e  f o r e s t s ,  usurping common l ands ,  enc los ing  f i e l d s  and 
i n s i s t i n g  on c o l l e c t i n g  a l l  t h e  use  f e e s  t o  which t h e i r  manors gnve them 
cla im.  Rural  people  fought  back. S u i t s  a g a i n s t  l and lo rds  m u l t i p l i e d .  
a  f a c t  which d e  Saint -Jacob i n t e r p r e t s  a s  evidence not  only  of s e i g n i o r i s l  
agg res s ion  bu t  a l s o  of an i n c r e a s i n g  l i b e r a t i o n  of t h e  peasan t s  from 
t r a d i t i o n a l  r e spec t .  
Where t h e  l awsu i t  was impossible  o r  i n e f f e c t i v e ,  peosants  r e s i s t e d  
t h e  s e i z u r e  of connnons by occupying them, r e s i s t e d  enc losu res  by brcnking 
t h e  hedges o r  fences .  A s  P i e r r e  de  Sajnt-Jacob d e s c r i b e s  it: 
The wardens of A th ie  were a t t acked  by tlie people  of Viserny 
f o r  t r y i n g  t o  fo rb id  e n t r y  t o  a  shepherd. On tlie l ends  o f  
Bernard d e  Fon te t t e .  P i e r r e  ~ 6 s a r  du C r e s t ,  t h e  l o r d  of Sa jn t -  
Aubin, organized an unusual. exped i t i on .  He went w i th  17 men 
armed wi th  "guns ,  s t a k e s  and s t aves"  t o  hreak down t h e  enclo- 
su re s .  They l e d  i n  40 c a t t l e  under t h e  p r o t e c t i o n  of two guards  
"with guns and hunt ing dogs," and kept  t h e  t ennn t s  of Bernard 
d e  F o n t e t t e  from h r ing ing  i n  t h e i r  c a t t l e .  In  Charmois, a t  t h e  
urging of two women, a  band of peasan t s  went t o  break down a  fence 
s e t  up by t h e  ove r see r  of Grenand who could do nothing b u t  watch 
and r ece ive  t h e  j e e r s  of t h e  crowd. I n  Pan th i e r ,  a  merchant wanted 
t o  erkclose h i s  meodow; he g o t  a u t h o r i z a t i o n  from t h e  l o c a l  c o u r t .  
People  assembled i n  t h e  squa re  and decided t o  break t h e  hedges, which 
was done t h a t  n igh t .  They l e d  i n  t h e  horses .  The merchant wanted 
t o  chase  them away, bu t  t h e  young people  who were guarding them 
stopped him, "saying t h a t  t hey  were on t h e i r  own p rope r ty ,  i n  a  
pub l i c  meodow, t h a t  they had broken t h e  enc losu res  and t h a t  they 
would brenk them aga in  . . ." (Saint-Jacob 1960: 370-371). 
A s  we can s e e ,  t h e  oppos i t i on  was n i t  d i r e c t e d  s p e c i f i c a l l y  a g a i n s t  t h e  
landed n o b i l i t y ,  bu t  a g a i n s t  t h e  l and lo rds  of any c l a s s  who chewed a t  
t h e  c o l l e c t i v e  r i g h t s  of t h e  r u r a l  community. I f  i n  Longecourt i n  1764 
i t  wns t h e  lo rd  who demanded h i s  own s h a r e  of t h e  commons, i n  Darois  two 
yea r s  l a t e r  t h e  Chapter of Sainte-Chapel le ,  i n  Di jon,  t r i e d  t o  t a k e . 0  
sha re  of t h e  communal woods, and i n  ~ i l l ~ - l e - ~ d l 6  i n  1769 i t  was a  for- '  
mer-notary who enclosed a  meadow only t o  s e e  t h e  d i t c h e s  f i l l e d  i n  by 
t h e  l o c a l  people  (A.D. ~ $ t e  d ' o r  C 509, C 543, C 1553). 
What a  c o n t r a s t  w i th  r u r a l  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  a f t e r  t h e  Revolut ionl  
Food r i o t s  d i d  su rv ive  u n t i l  t h e  middle of t h e  n ine t een th  cen tu ry .  For 
example, i n  A p r i l  1829 a  crowd i n  C h f t i l l o n  forced M. Beaudoin, ope ra to r  
of a  f l o u r  m i l l .  t o  s e l l  h i s  wheat a t  5  f r a n c s  and 25 sous  pe r  double  
bushe l ,  when he had posted t h e  p r i c e  a t  5F30 (A.D. ~ & e  d'Or M 8  I1 4). 
At t h e  next market,  s e v e r a l  b r igades  of gendarmes were on hand t o  prevent  
such "disorders"  (A.D. C"ated0r  8  M 27).  Although t h e  food r i o t  cont in-  
ued t o  f l o u r i s h .  pos t - r evo lu t iona ry  r u r a l  s t r u g g l e s  hore  ha rd ly  a  t r a c e  
of t h e  r e s i s t a n c e  agn ins t  t h e  l and lo rds .  In s t ead  they concerned t h e  
p o l i c i e s ,  and e s p e c i a l l y  t h e  f i s c a l  p o l i c i e s ,  of t h e  s t a t e .  
The a c t i v e  groups of t h e  n ine t een th  cen tu ry  came e s p e c i a l l y  from 
t h e  sma l l  l andho lde r s  and t h e  workers of t h e  commercialized, f u l l y  cap i to -  
l i s t  vineyards .  Robert Laurent po r t r ays  t h o t  s o r t  of p r o t e s t  a s  L t  
took p l a c e  j u s t  a f t e r  t heRevo lu t ion  of 1830: 
. . . i n  September, t h e  announcement o f  t h e  resllmption of t h e  
inventory of wine on the  premises of  winegrower^ s t a r t e d  turbu- . 
l e n t  demonstra t ions ,  n e a r - r i o t s ,  i n  Beatlne. On t h e  12 th  of Sep- 
tember a t  t h e  time of t h e  Nat ional  Guard review " c r i e s  of anger 
a g a i n s t  t h e  Revenue Adminis t ra t ion [ l a  ~ e f g i e ~  r o s e  from I t s  very 
ranks ."  Told t h o t  t h e  r e s i d e n t s  of t h e  suburbs  planned t o  go 
t o  t h e  t a x  o f f i c e s  i n  o rde r  t o  burn t h e  r e g i s t e r s  a s  they hod i n  
1814, t h e  mayor thought i t  prudent t h a t  evening t o  c a l l  t h e  a r t i l -  
l e r y  company t o  arms and convoke p a r t  of t h e  Notional Guord f o r  
5 o ' c lock  t h e  nex t  morning. On t h e  13th .  toward 8A.H., "a huge 
crowd of winegrowers and workers," shout ing "down wi th  t h e  wolves," 
"down wit11 e x c i s e  taxes." occupied t h e  c i t y  h a l l  square .  To calm 
t h e  demonstra tors  t h e  mayor had t o  send t h e  Not ional  Guard home a t  
once.  h he crowd then d i spe r sed  gradual ly"  (I.aurent 1957: I .  484- 
485). 
Desp i t e  t h a t  peace fu l  d i s p e r s i o n ,  t h e  a u t h o r i t i e s  had t o  deloy t h e  inven- 
t o ry  of wine. I n  iqeursault i t  was l e s s  peaceful :  t h e  winegrowers drove 
ou t  t h e  t a x  men. 
What is more, t h e  an t i - t ax  movement connected d t r e c t l y  t o  p o l i t i c a l  
movements. The winegrowing a r e a  s tood o u t  f o r  i t s  republ iconism;  t h a t  
was e s p e i c a l l y  t r u e  of t h e  h i n t e r l a n d s  of Dijon and Beaune. A 1 1  t h l n g s  
considered,  we observe a  s i g n f i c n n t  t r ansb rma t ion  of t h e  r e p e r t o i r e  of 
c o l l e c t i v e  s c t i o n  i n  Burgundy. As compared wi th  t h e  means of nc t ion  
' 
p r e v a i l i n g  he fo re  t h e  Revolut ion,  t hose  of t h e  n ine t een th  cen tu ry  were 
1.ess t i e d  t o  s communal hase. more a t t ached  t o  n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c s .  Assoc- 
i a t i o n s ,  c l u b s ,  s o c i e t i e s  played an inc reas ing  p a r t .  Yet t h e r e  were 
important  c o n t i n i ~ i t i e s :  t h e  s u r v i v a l  of t h e  c h a r v a r i ,  t h e  food r i o t ,  t h e  
c l a s s i c  ant i - tnxrebe1l . ion;  t h e  p e r s i s t e n t  o r i e n t a t i o n  t o  t h e  p r o t e c t i o n  
of l o c a l  I n t e r e s t s  nga lns t  t l ie c l a ims  of t h e  s t a t e  and t h e  market r a t h e r  
than t o  t h e  c r e a t i o n  of a  b e t t e r  f u t u r e .  The o ld  regime r e p e r t o i r e  
of c o l l e c t i v e  nc t ion  survived tlie Revolution. The forms of n c t i o n  
themselves a l t e r e d ,  adapted t o  new cond i t i ons ;  among o t h e r  t h i n g s ,  we 
n o t i c e  a  s o r t  o f p o l i t i c i z a t i o n  of a l l  t h e  forms. New forms of c o l l e c -  
t i v e  a c t i o n  n rosc ;  t h e  demonstra t ion and t h e  s t r i k e  became s tandard 
evcn t s  i n  Burgundy. That hundred y e a r s  spanning t h e  Revolution was a  
per iod of t ransformat ion and of growth of tlie means of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  
\&a t  of t h e  Revolut ion 's  own p lace  i n  t h a t  t r ans fo rma t ion  and growth 
of tlie means of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n ?  The Revolution brouglit an ex t r a -  
o rd ina ry  l e v c l  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n ,  a  p o l i t i c i z a e i o n  of a l l  i n t e r e s t s  
and thus  of almost a l l  t h e  means of ac t ion .  a  c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  of power 
and thus  of almost a l l  t h e  means of a c t i o n ,  a  c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  of power 
and thus  of s t r i ~ g g l e s  f o r  power, a  f r enzy  of a s s o c i a t i o n  and thus  of ac- 
t i o n  on t h e  h n s i s  of a s s o c i a t i o n n ,  a  promotion of t h e  cond i t i ons  f o r  
t h e  development of c a p i t a l i s m  and hourgeoin hegemony and thus  of a  moun- 
t i n g  t h r e a t  t o  n o n - c a p i t a l i s t ,  non-bourgeois i n t e r e s t s .  I f  t h a t  sum- 
mary is c o r r e c t ,  t h e  Revolution ac t ed  a s  a  fundamental s t a g e  i n  t h e  course  
of a  t r sns fo rma t ion  f a r  longer  and l a r g e r  than t h e  Revolution i t s e l f .  
Like t h e  seventeenth-ccnturyconsol idat ionof  t h e  n a t i o n a l  s t a t e ,  t h e  
changes of t h e  Revolut ion l ed  t o  n s i g n i f i c a n t  a l t e r a t i o n  of t he  pre- 
v a i l i n g  modes of popular  c o l l e c t i v e  a c l i o n .  
The evo lu t ion  of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  had not  ended, however. Although 
t h e  Di jon winegrowers' demonstra t ions  of t h e  1830s c e r t a i n l y  d i s p l a y  
many more f a m i l i a r  f e a t u r e s  than t h e  r e g i o n a l  t a x  r e b e l l i o n s  of t h e  
1630s. they a l s o  show t h e i r  age .  Nowadays, tlie succes so r s  of those  wine- 
growers t y p i c a l l y  assemble o u t s i d e  the  depar tmental  c a p i t a l .  grouped 
around p l aca rds  and banners  i d e n t i f y i n g  t h e i r  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  and s u m n r -  
i z i n g  t h e i r  demands. The c l a s s i c  c h a r i v a r i  and food r i o t  have vanished, 
a long wi th  s number of o t h e r  forms of s c t i o n  which p e r s i s t e d  i n t o  t h e  
n ine t een th  cen tu ry .  ~ o d a y ' s  l a rge - sca l e  a c t i o n s  a r e  even morc heav i ly  
concen t r a t ed  i n  Di jon,  Beaune and o the r  c f t i e s  than they were i n  t h e  
1830s. Labor unions and p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  o f t e n  appear  i n  t h e  a c t i o n .  
Although p r i c e s  and t a x e s  con t inue  t o  b e  f r equen t  causes  f o r  complaint .  
such e x o t i c  ques t ions  a s  American warmaking i n  Vietnam and t h e  f u t u r e  
of s t u d e n t s  i n  s p o r t s  and phys i ca l  educat ion e x e r c i s e  many a crowd. A s  
t h e  world has  changed, s o  has  i ts c o l l e c t i v e  nc t ion .  
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APPENDIX 1. PROCEDURES FOR THE STUDIES OP STRIKES A N D  COLLECTI.VE VIO- 
LENCE I N  FRANCE 
I n  a  n u t s h e l l ,  t h e  s t r a t e g y  of t h e  French s tudy  hds been t o  p l ace  
p a r t i c u l a r  even t s  i n  time, space and s o c i a l  s e t t i n g ,  no t  s o  much t o  ac- 
count  f o r  any s i n g l e  event  a s  t o  d e t e c t  how l a rge - sca l e  s o c i a l  change 
and a l t e r a t i o n s  of t h e  s t r u c t u r e  of power a f f e c t e d  t h e  p a t t e r n  of co l l ec -  
t i v e  a c t i o n .  We d e a l  s e p a r a t e l y  wi th  s t r i k e s  and wi th  v i o l e n t  even t s ,  
a l though v i o l e n t  s t r i k e s  appear  i n  both ha lves  of t h e  a n a l y s i s .  S t r i k e s  
r e p r e s e n t  a  f r equen t ,  important ,  well-documented and usua l ly  nonviolent  
form of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  V io len t  even t s  tend t o  be  better-documented 
than t h e i r  nonviolent  c o u n t e r p a r t s ,  and t h e r e f o r e  s e r v e  a s  a  b iased b u t  
u s e f u l  t r a c e r  o f  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  i n  gene ra l .  
The s t u d i e s '  w i n  components a r e :  
1. The enumeration and d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  every s t r i k e  f o r  which we 
could ga the r  a  s tandard body of i n f o r m t i o n  from 1830 t o  1968, 
f o r  a  t o t a l  of approximately  110,000 s t r i k e s ;  t h e  most d e t n i l e d  
a n a l y s i s  concen t r a t ed  on t h e  36,000 s t r i k e s  r epor t ed  i n  t h e  
S t a t i a t i q u e  d e s  ~ r h e s  from 1890 through 1935. 
2. The enumeration and d e s c r i p t i o n  of every v i o l e n t  event  meeting 
c e r t a i n  s t anda rds ,  t o  be d i scussed  i n  a  moment, from 1830 through 
1960; our  ana lyses  d e a l  wi th  roughly 2,000 v i o l e n t  even t s .  
3. Indexing of change i n  s o c i a l  o rgan iza t ion  i n  France a s  a  whole 
and i n  i t s  geographic  subd iv i s ions  -- communes, ar rondissements  
and. e s p e c i a l l y .  t h e  85  t o  95 depar tments  -- over  t h e  per iod 
1830 t o  1960. 
4 .  Assembling of ( f u r  l e s s  complete. f a r  more t e n t a t i v e )  i n f o r m -  
t i o n  on p o l i t i c a l  s t r u c t i l r e  and a c t i v i t y  f o r  France u s  a  whole 
and f o r  some t imes and p l aces  w i th in  i t  from 1830 t o  1960. 
5. Use of a l l  t h r e e  types  o f  evidence i n  t h e  a n a l y s i s  of v a r i a t i o n s  
i n  t h e  form,' i n t e n s i t y ,  l ocus ,  s o c i a l  composition and p rec ip i -  
' t a t i n g  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  s t r i k e s  and v i o l e n t  even t s ;  t h e  a n a l y s i s  
s t r e s s e s  t h e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of long-run s h i f t s  i n  t h e  p a t t e r n  
of c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n ,  and t h e  v e r i f i c a t i o n  o r  f a l s i f i c a t i o n  of 
a l t e r n a t i v e  t h e o r i e s  concerning t h e  e f f e c t s  of large-f icale  soc- 
i a l  change on  collective^ a c t i o n .  
A compreliensive r e p o r t  o f  t h e  s t r i k e  s t u d i e s  appears  i n  S t r i k e s  i n  France, I 
1830-1968. by Edward Shor t e r  and Char les  T i l l y .  The most gene ra l  sum- 
mary o f  t he  s t u d i e s  of French c o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence  i s  chap te r  two o f  - 
Rebel l ious  Century, by Char les  T i l l y ,  Louise  T i l l y  and Richard T i l l y .  I 
The Rebel l ious  Century a l s o  summarizes ou r  s t u d i e s  of I t a l y  and Germany. - 1 
For more d e t a i l  on t h e  French, German and I t a l i a n  f ind ings ,  c o n s u l t  t h e  I 
r e p o r t s  l i s t e d  i n  t h e  bibl iography.  Because S t r i k e s  i n  France c o n t a i n s  I 
an e x t e n s i v e  d i scuss ion  of sou rces  and pro,cedures, wh i l e  The Rebel l ious  I I 
I Century s u m r i z e s  them r a t h e r  qu ick ly ,  t h e  fol lowing d i scuss ion  w i l l  
focus  on t h e  a n a l y s i s  of c o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence  r a t h e r  than s t r i k e s .  
of p o l i t i c a l  yearbooks, l i k e  t h e  & p o l i t i q u e ;  d) long s e r l c s  O F  French 
newspapers, no tab ly  t h e  Honi teur  un ive r se l .  & C o n s t i t ~ ~ t i o n n e l .  Lo Gaze t t e  
d e s  Tribunaux, t h e  Jou rna l  des  De'bats. Le Temps and Le Monde; e) r e g u l a r  -- 
secondary sou rces ,  i nc lud ing  r eg iona l  l ea rned  and a n t i q u a r i a n  jou rnn l s .  
We work l a r g e l y  from microfilmed cop ie s  o f  t h e s e  sou rces .  
There  a r e  fou r  over lapping samples of even t s  under cons ide ra t ion  
The f i r s t  i nc ludes  each s t r i k e  r epor t ed  i n  t h e  S t a t i s t i q u e  des  ~ r h v e s ,  
t h e  S t a t i s t i q u e  annue l l e ,  t h e  Revue f r a n p a i s e  d e  T r a v a i l ,  t h e  Assoc lo t ions  
p r o f e s s i o n n e l l e s  o u v r i a r e s  and s e v e r a l  o t h e r  pub l i ca t ions  tn  any year  
from 1830 t o  1960. The second c o n s i s t s  of a  hnphazard c o l l e c t i o n  of con- 
f l i c t s  and s h o r t  pe r iods  on which we happen t o  have excep t iona l ly  d e t a i l -  
ed evidence,  evidence pe rmi t t i ng  c a r e f u l  s tudy of t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  and 
of t he  sequence of a c t i o n :  The June Days of 1848, t h e  r c s i s t n n c e  t o  Louis 
Napoleon's 1851 coup d ' e t a t .  and a  number of o t h e r s .  The t h i r d  -- our  
"general  sample" -- c o n t a i n s  every even t  meeting c e r t a i n  minimum c r i t e r i a  
( t o  be  d i scussed  i n  a  moment) which t r a i n e d  r ende r s  encountered i n  scan- 
n ing newspapers con t inuous ly ,  day by day, over  each year  from 1830 through 
Although i n  p r i n c i p l e  ou r  work could be done i n  o t h e r  ways, we have 
r e l i e d  heav i ly  on high-speed d i g i t a l  computers £of t a b u l a t i o n  and quan- 
t i t a t i v e  a n a l y s i s .  The codebooks mentioned here ,  f o r  example, a r e  es-  
s e n t i a l l y  s e t s  of i n s t r u c t i o n s  f o r  t h e  p repa ra t ion  of comparable punched 
c s r d s  from t h e  row d e s c r i p t i o n s  of v i o l e n t  even t s  encountered 
i n  a r c h j v a l  documents, newspapers and p o l i t i c a l  h i s t o r i e s .  
The bas i c  d a t a  f o r  t he  s tudy ,  indeed, come from a )  documents i n  
French a rch ives ,  mainly r e p o r t s  on c o l l e c t i v e  c o n f l i c t s  and government 
responses  t o  them; b)  published s e r i e s  of governmental r e p o r t s  and s t a -  
t i s t i c s  concerning t h e  admin i s t r a t ion  of j u s t i c e ,  populat ion censuses ,  
s t r i k e s ,  s p e c i a l  i n q u i r i e s ,  l a b o r  o r g s n i z a t i o n ,  and s o  on; c )  long s e r i e s  
1860, t h r e e  randomly-chosen months per  year  from 1861 t o  1929, and each 
year  from 1930 through 1960; t h e r e  were two d i f f e r e n t  newspnpers f o r  each 
day i n  most years ,  t h r e e  newspapers i n  a  few c a s e s  of f a u l t y  coverage. 
The f o u r t h  -- our  " in t ens ive  sample" -- is composed of every event  i n  
t he  gene ra l  sample es t imated t o  i nvo lve  a t  l e a s t  1.,000 person-days (1.000 
people  f o r  one day. o r  500 f o r  two days ,  o r  700 on t h e  f i r s t  pl.us 300 
on t h e  second. and so  on) ,  p lus  every t e n t h  even t  o f  a l l  t h e  r e s t .  The 
gene ra l  sample has  about  2.000 i n c i d e n t s  i n  i t ,  t h e  i n t e n s i v e  sample d- 
bout 400. 
The a c t u a l  d e s c r i p t i o n  of the  i n c i d e n t s  i n  t h e  two samples comes 
no t  on ly  from t h e  newspaper accounts ,  bu t  a l s o  from t h e  n rc l l i va l  m t e r i -  
a l s ,  h i s t o r i c a l  works and o t h e r  sou rces  enumerated e a r l i e r .  The in ten-  
s i v e  sample r e c e i v e s  e x t e n s i v e  v e r i f i c a t i o n  and very d e t a i l e d  coding, 
t h e  gene ra l  sample a  l e s s  i n t e n s i v e  t reatment .  The sys t ema t i c ,  and l a rge -  
l y  q u a n l i t n t i v e ,  a n a l y s i s  of t h e s e  coded accounts  d e a l  wi th  - 
1. t h e  i n t e n s i t y ,  form, p a r t i c i p a n t s ,  and geographic incidence o f  
v i o l e n t  even t s  f o r  each major per iod under s tudy;  
2.  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between t h e s e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of c o l l e c t i v e  
v io l ence  and t h e  n a t u r e  of s o c i a l  changes occu r r ing  i n  t h e i r  
s e t t i n g s ;  
3. cova r io t lon  of c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of i nd iv idua l  even t s ,  i nc lud ing  
t h e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of common p r e c i p i t a n t s ,  s t anda rd  sequences 
of even t s ,  r e g u l a r  outcomes; 
4 .  connect ions  between t h e  c h a r a c t e r  of i n d u s t r i a l  c o n f l i c t  and 
t h e  p a t t e r n  of c o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence  i n  an  a r e a  and/or  per iod;  
5. changes of t hese  p a t t e r n s  ove r  time. 
Obvlouuly, t hese  ana lyses  use  s tandard indexes  of va r ious  s o c i a l  changes 
by a r e a  and year  a s  we l l  a s  t h e  coded accoun t s  of v i o l e n t  events .  
SOME MATTERS OF DEFINITION* 
The s tudy  o f  France a l s o  r e l i c s  f o r  i n t e rna l .  cons i s t ency  on n s e t  
of s t anda rd  d e f i n i t i o n s .  The c r u c i a l  one i d e n t i f i e s  t h e  "v io l en t  event ."  
Without defending i t ,  I s h a l l  have t o  p re sen t  t h a t  d e f i n i t i o n  and t h e  
r u l e s  o f  thumb we have developed f o r  its a p p l i c a t i o n .  Anyone who has  
a l r e a d y  worked wi th  d e s c r i p t i o n s  oC c o l l e c t i v e  c o n f l l c t s  w i l l  qu ick ly  
n o t i c e  two th ings  about  t h e s e  r u l e s  of thumb. F i r s t ,  they form t h e  b r i d s e  
between on a b s t r a c t  d e f i n i t i o n  and a  p a r t i c u l a r  per iod and place:  o t h e r  
pe r iods  and d i f f e r e n t  p l aces  would no doubt r e q u l r e  somewhat d i f f e r e n t  
b r idges .  Second, even i n  t h e  c a s e  of France the  r u l e s  of thumb Lcave o 
good d e a l  of room f o r  judgment and a  cons ide rab le  number of ambiguous 
c a s e s .  I o n l y  c l a im t h a t  t hese  c r i t e r i a  i n  most c a s e s  permit n  f n l r l y  
f i n  determinat ion o f  whether a  p a r t i c u l a r  s e t  o f  events  makesup a "vio- 
l e n t  event" on t h e  b a s i s  of informat ion one has  e a r l y  i n  t h e  game. 
*I have cr ibbed most o f  t h e  fol lowing s e c t i o n  from t h e  in t roduc t ion  t o  
t h e  i n t e n s i v e  sample codebook, which i n  t u rn  drew hcnvi1.y from s t a f f  memo- 
randa by Lutz Berkner and Char les  T i l l y .  
Here is t h e  gene ra l  d e f i n i t i o n :  
A "v io l en t  event" i s  an  i n s t a n c e  of mutual and c o l l e c t i v e  coercion 
wi th in  an  au tonomous 'po l i t i ca l  system which s e i z e s  o r  phys i ca l ly  damages 
pe r sons  o r  o b j e c t s .  
C o l l e c t i v e  Coercion 
One formntlon of a t  l e a s t  50 persons  must be  p re sen t ,  r ep re sen t ing  
e i t h e r  t h e  f o r c e s  of r e b e l l i o n  o r  t h e  f o r c e s  of r ep re s s ion .  This  has  
been done mainly a s  a  p r a c t i c a l  measure, s i n c e  we f e e l  t h a t  l a r g e r  groups 
a r c  more l i k e l y  to  be  r epor t ed  and r e l e v a n t  informat ion is more r e a d i l y  
a v a i t a b l e  on them i n  the  sou rces .  - 
However, fo r  over  ha l f  of ou r  i n c i d e n t s ,  no exac t  o r  approximate 
number of p a r t i c i p n n t s  is repor t ed .  We have decided t o  adopt  a  List of 
words which a r e  o f t e n  used t o  d e s c r i b e  t h e  i n c i d e n t s ,  and we a r e  t en t a -  
t l v e l y  assc~ming t h a t  they mean t h e  involvement of a  l a r g e  group o f  peo- 
p l e ,  i . e . ,  over  50. 
mr~l.tLtude r i v o l t  e  
rasscmblemen t  r e b e l l i o n  
/ 
reunion i n s u r r e c t i o n  
Eoule L e u t e  
nttroupement 6 c h a u f f o u r ~ c  
t roupe bngarre  
tumul te  
t r o u b l e  
I f  an inc iden t  meets t h e  c r i t e r i a  of damage o r  v io l ence  (below) 
and no number of p a r t i c i p a n t s  is given,  we inc lude  i t  i n  t h e  sample i f  
i t  is  desc r ibed  by one of t hese  terms. This  does  not  mean t h a t  t h e s e  
a r e  t h e  on ly  terms which could be used (e .g . .  i n c i d e n t ,  man i f e s t a t ion ,  
a g i t a t i o n ,  s e d i t i o n ,  r i x e ,  bouleversement,  f&e) ,  bu t  t h e  ones we have 
chosen imply t h e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  of a  r e l a t i v e l y  l a r g e  group of people .  
We a r e  us ing t h e s e  terms t o  determine t h e  e x t e n t  of v io l ence ,  but  
on ly  a s  an  i n d i c a t o r  of p a r t i c i p a t i o n .  
Ad jec t ives  of s i z e  used wi th  t h e s e  words a r e  important .  Thus. any 
a d j e c t i v e  sugges t ing  a l a r g e  s i z e  (reassemblemcnts nombreux, r o u l c  i m -  
mense) means i t  is  included.  Diminutives ( p e t i t e  f o u l e ,  e t c . )  keep t h e  
i n c i d e n t  ou t  of t h e  sample. 
This  excludes  any independent v i o l e n t  a c t i v i t y  undertaken by an 
i n d i v i d u a l  o r  a  sma l l  group of i n d i v i d u a l s .  Thus we do not  i nc lnde  a s sas -  
s i n a t i o n s ,  murders,  t h e f t s ,  o r  o t h e r  cr imes,  c o m j t t e d  by l e s s  tlinn 50 
people  (o r  a  group de f ined  by o t h e r  t han  one of our c o l l e c t i v e  terms) .  
However, we inc lude  v io l ence  by a  group on t h e  per iphery of a  l a r g e r  dem- 
o n s t r a t i o n .  This  a l s o  excludes  a c t i o n  by unknown persons  such n s  snbo- 
t age ,  bombs, o r  f i r e s .  We t ake  t h e s e  i n t o  account ,  but  they a r e  no t  t o  
be  included i n  t h e  b a s i c  sample. 
Mutual 
This  means t h n t  t h e r e  must be a t  l e a s t  two a n t a g o n i s t i c  format ions  
involved. However, one m y  be jnvolved by t h e  proxy of i t s  p rope r ty  o r  
symbols. We inc lude  any oppos i t i on  t o  t h e  symbols o r  r e p r e s e n t n t i v c s  
of a u t h o r i t y  o r  ano the r  group. Violence must be d i r e c t e d  a t  someone e l s e ;  
thus ,  workers a t t a c k i n g  a  newspaper o f f i c e  a r e  included,  whi le  formers 
des t roy ing  t h e i r  own produce i n  p r o t e s t  t o  government farm p o l i c i e s  a r e  
not .  
Se i zu re  o r  ~ h y s i c i l ~ ~ a m a g e  of Persons o r  Objects  
Any dead o r  wounded mnke t h e  i n c i d e n t  qual icy.  The major problem 
c a s e s  involve r e s i s t a n c e  t o  p o l i c e  when i t  is not  c l e a r  whether anyone 
was h u r t ,  e.g.,  s t ones  thrown a t  t roops  o r  mounted gendarmes surrounded 
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by a  mob. Se i zu re  of persons  o r  o b j e c t s  wi thout  phys i ca l  i n j u r y  is  a l s o  
a  problem. In  gene ra l ,  i f  persons  o r  o b j e c t s  a r e  s e i zed  over  r e s i s t a n c e ,  
t h a t  is  enough. I f  t h e  s e i z i n g  group f i g h t s  o f f  ano the r  group o r  breaks  
through a  phys i ca l  b a r r i e r  of some s o r t ,  r e s i s t a n c e  has  occurred.  
We fnclude any damage done by one group t o  someone e l s e ' s  p rope r ty  
by a t t a c k i n g  o r  s e i z i n g  c o n t r o l  of i t .  Besides  s i g n i f i c a n t  d e s t r u c t i o n  
t h i a  i nc ludes  broken windows o r  symbolic minor damage. It does no t  in-  
cl.ude damage t o  one 's  own p rope r ty  ( farmers  des t roy ing  own c rops ,  mer- 
chan t s  burning t h e i r  own reco rds  i n  p r o t e s t )  and i t  must be done by a  
group -- which excludes  sabotage,  f i r e s ,  bombings of unknown o r i g i n s .  
Se i zu re  of o b j e c t s  i nc ludes  " t axa t ion  populai re"  -- t h e  f o r c i b l e  s e i z u r e  
of g r a i n  o r  o t h e r  f o o d s t u f f s ,  Eollowed by t h e i r  pub l i c  s a l e  a t  a  pro- 
claimed " j u s t  p r i ce . "  I t  a l s o  inc ludes  non-violent  occupat ion of bu i ld -  
i n g s  such a s  sit-down s t r i k e s .  I n  o rde r  t o  handle  t h e  huge number of 
sit-downs i n  1936. 1937, and 1938, we have grouped them i n t o  departmen- 
t a l  summaries f o r  each month. 
These c r i t e r i a  c l e a r l y  exclude any l a r g e  p o l i t i c a l  ga the r ings  t h a t  
do no t  end i n  v io l ence  o r  crowds which shout  t h r e a t s  of v io l ence  bu t  
t ake  no a c t i o n .  
Within an Autonomous P o l i t i c a l  System 
This  segment of t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  excludes  war and border  i n c i d e n t s .  
I t  a l s o  excludes  any v io l ence  w i t h i n  a  c lo sed  i n s t i t u t i o n  o u t s i d e  t h e  
gene ra l  p o l i t i c a l  sphe re  such a s  p r i s o n s ,  asylums and h o s p i t a l s .  I f  they 
break out  of t h e s e  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  however, they must be included.  We in-  
c lude  army mut in i e s  s i n c e  t h e  members of t h e  armed f o r c e s  a r e  p a r t  of 
t h e  p o l i t i c a l  community. 
Boundaries of Violent  Events 
When one of t h e  a c t i o n s  j u s t  d i scussed  has  occurred,  we must s e t  
some l i m i t s  i n  t ime, space and personnel  on t h e  even t s  t o  be recorded 
I 
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i and ana l i zed .  When two o r  more such a c t i o n s  occu r ,  we must a l s o  decide  
whether they a r e  p a r t s  of t h e  "same" even t ,  o r  r e l a t e d  ones. An evcnt  bc- 
g i n s  when a t  l e a s t  two of t h e  format ions  t ak ing  p a r t  i n  t h e  v i o l e n t  a c t i o n  
begin  a  cont inuous  i n t e r a c t i o n  and ends when t h e  l a s t  two format ions  end 
t h e i r  cont inuous  i n t e r a c t i o n .  It occupies  a l l  t h e  space i n  which a  spec- 
t a t o r  could d i r e c t l y  observe t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n  wi thout  b e n e f i t  of mechanical 
dev ices .  The p a r t i c i p a n t s  a r e  a l l  persons  who perform t h e  c r u c j a l  a c t i o n ( s ) .  
a l l  persons  who i n t e r a c t  w i th  them d i r e c t l y  i n  t h e  cour se  of t h n t  a c t i o n ,  
p l u s  a l l  persons  a c t i n g  c o l l e c t i v e l y  wi th  members of e i t h e r  of t h e  F i r s t  
two c a t e g o r i e s  i n  t h e  s t ream of a c t i v i t y  i nc lud ing  t h e  c r u c i a l  a c t i o n ( s ) .  
F i n a l l y ,  s e t s  of p a r t i c i p a n t s  f a l l  i n t o  s e p a r a t e  format ions  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  
I t h a t  t hey  a c t  c o l l e c t i v e l y ,  communicate i n t e r n a l l y ,  oppose o t h e r  sets of 
p a r t i c i p a n t s  and a re .g iven  d i s t i n c t  i d e n t i t i e s  by observers .  Where we do 
no t  have enough informat ion t o  app ly  theue de f in i t l . ons  wi th  any r i g o r  -- 
which is o f t e n  -- we accep t  t h e  conven t iona l  obse rve r ' s  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of 
a c t o r s ,  s t a g e  and a c t i o n .  
When two v i o l e n t  a c t i o n s  occur  on t h e  same day o r  consecu t ive  days ,  
i n  t h e  same commune o r  a d j a c e n t  ones ( i n  P a r i s .  Lyon o r  Marse i l l e :  t h e  
same q u a r t e r  o r  ad j acen t  ones)  and t h e r e  is a  r easonab le  presumption of an  
" 
over l ap  of pe r sonne l  equa l  t o  t e n  pe rcen t  o r  more of t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  
t h e  s m a l l e r . a c t i o n ,  both  a c t i o n s  count  a s  p a r t  of t h e  same d i s tu rbance ,  
and a l l  of t he  in t e rven ing  time belongs  t o  t h e  event .  Three o r  more vio-  
l e n t  a c t i o n s  wi th  such connect ions  may compound i n t o  even t s  cover ing 
longer  pe r iods  and l a r g e r  t e r r i t o r i e s .  Two even t s  a r e  d i s t i n c t  hut  l inked 
when they occur  i n  t h e  same o r  consecut ive  months, and meet any of t h e s e  
cond i t i ons :  a )  concer ted a c t i o n  of a t  l e a s t  one format ion i n  one event  
w i th  a t  l e a s t  one format ion i n  t h e  o t h e r ;  b) s t rong  evidence of ove r l ap  i n  
personnel ;  c )  s t r o n g  evidence o f  t h e  p rov i s ion  of m a t e r i a l  a s s i s t a n c e  by 
t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  one event  t o  t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  t h e  o t h e r :  d)  o v e r t  
i m i t a t i o n  of t h e  a c t i o n  of one event  by a formation i n  ano the r ;  e )  o v e r t  
response a s  i nd ica t ed  by demands. s logans  o r  r i t u a l  a c t s .  Three o r  more 
even t s  may b e  l i nked  i n  t h i s  way. 
In  sllmmary, t h e  procedure  comes t o  t h i s :  
1. Scan t h e  sou rces  f o r  v i o l e n t  o c t i o n s .  
2. llaving loca t ed  a  v i o l e n t  a c t i o n ,  determine whether t h e  event  of 
which i t  i s  a  p a r t  meets t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  of "v io l en t  even t . "  
3. I f  i t  does ,  s e t  its boundar ies  i n  space,  t ime and personnel .  
4. I d e n t i f y  t h e  format ions  t ak ing  p a r t  i n  t h e  even t .  
5. Determine whether i t  is  l i nked  t o  any o t h e r  even t .  
6. Code. 
The diagram a t  t h e  end of t h i s  s e c t i o n  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  whole complics t -  
ed procedure .  
A. VIOLENCE 
1. one dead 
2. one wounded 
3. any damage t o  o b j e c t s  
4 .  s e i z u r e  of c o n t r o l  of o b j e c t s  
8 .  COLLECTIVE 
1. st l e a s t  50 persons  i n  one formation ( d i r e c t  evidence through 
numbers of p a r t i c i p a n t s  wounded o r  a r r e s t e d )  
2. i n d i r e c t  evidence of a  l a r g e  group through t h e  use  of o  c o l l e c -  
t i v e  terminology: 
mu l t i t ude  r/evolte dgsordre  
rassemblement r e h e l l i o n  t r o u b l e  
reunion (meu t e  
f o u l e  kchauff our'ee 
a t t roupement  b s g s r r e  
t roupe  tumulte  
i n s u r r e c t i o n  
C. MUTUAL 
1. two format ions  i n  c o n f l i c t  
2. a  format ion v e r s u s  an  ind iv idua l  
3. a  format ion ve r sus  o b j e c t s  o r  symbols r e p r e s e n t i n g  ano the r  group 
D. EXCLUDE: 
sabotage,  bombings, f i r e s  s e t  by unknown persons  
a s s a s s i n a t i o n s ,  murders,  c r imina l  a c t i v i t i e s  by i n d i v i d u a l s  
l a r g e  g a t h e r i n g s  where no v io l ence  breaks  ou t  even i f  they t h r e a t e n  
v io l ence  
r e b e l l i o n s  wi th in  c losed  i n s t i t u t i o n s :  p r i sons ,  h o s p i t a l s ,  asylums 
symbolic damage t o  one ' s  own p rope r ty  
E. BOUNDARIES: 
1. Begins wi th  cont inuous  i n t e r a c t i o n  of st l e a s t  two format ions .  
2. Ends wi th  t e rmina t ion  of cont inuous  i n t e r a c t i o n  of l e s t  two fo r -  
mations. 
3. Occupies space w i t h i n  which s p e c t a t o r  could observe i n t e r a c t i o n  
d i r e c t l y .  
4. P a r t i c i p a n t s :  performers  of v i o l e n t  a c t s ,  o t h e r s  i n t e r a c t i n g  d i -  
r e c t l y  wi th  them, p l u s  o t h e r s  a c t i n g  c o l l e c t i v e l y  wi th  e i t h e r  of 
t h e  f i r s t  two groups: t hey  a r e  d iv ided  i n t o  format ions .  
F. MULTIPLE VIOLENT ACTIONS FORNING SINGLE EVENT 
1. Same day o r  consecut ive  days .  
2. Same commune o r  ad j acen t  communes ( i n  P a r i s ,  Lyon. Marse i l l e ,  
same q u a r t e r  o r  ad j acen t  q u a r t e r s ) .  
3 .  Overlap i n  personnel  of t en  pe rcen t  o r  more of t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  
i n  t h e  sma l l e r  a c t i o n .  
G .  DISTINCT BUT LINKED EVENTS: 
1. Same month o r  consecu t ive  months. 
2 .  Concerted a c t i o n  of format ions .  
OR 
3. Overlap i n  personnel .  
OR 
4 .  P rov i s ion  of m a t e r i a l  a s s i s t a n c e .  
Th i s  whole system o f  d e f i n i t i o n s  and procedures  works we l l  enough 
where t h e r e  a r e  good (and f a i r l y  uniform) accounts  of many p o l i t i c a l  d in-  
turbancea,  and where t h e r e  is an  i d e n t i f i a b l e  "autonomot~s p o l i t i c a l  system" 
wi th  a s i n g l e  c e n t r a l  a u t h o r i t y  tending t o  monopolize l e g i t i m a t e  c o n t r o l  
over  means of c o l l e c t i v e  coe rc ion .  I n  France i t s e l f ,  i t  wenkens du r ing  
long  in t e r r egna  l i k e  t h e  Occupation and t h e  Res i s t ance  of World Wnr 11. 
I n  I t a l y  and Germany, t h e  pe r iods  be fo re  u n i f i c a t i o n  p re sen t  s e r i o u s  prob- 
lems. The whole system would probably have t o  be r e c a s t  t o  handle  such 
c a s e s  a s  ZaYre ( formerly  t h e  Belgian Congo) a f t e r  1960, t h e  United S t a t e s  
from 1860 t o  1865 o r  western  Europe i t s e l f  be fo re  t h e  17 th  century.  The 
scheme a l s o  has  two q u i t e  i n t e n t i o n a l  f e a t u r e s  which s u i t  i t  we l l  f o r  t h e  
kind of a n a l y s i s  we have under taken,  bu t  might u n f i t  i t  f o r  some o t h e r  s o r t s  
of i nqu i ry :  1 )  i t  ignores  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  e f f e c t s  of t h e  event ,  g iv ing  no 
s p e c i a l  weight ,  f o r  example, t o  t h e  r e b e l l i o n  wliicli t opp le s  a  regime; 2) 
a l though t h e  c r i t e r i o n  of "violence" is a  f n i r l y  generous one, t h e  scheme 
bypasses  i n s t a n c e s  of nonviolent  coe rc ion  un le s s  they o r e  coupled wi th  
v io l ence .  Nei ther  a  pa l ace  r evo lu t ion  nor an u n f u l f i l l e d  t h r e a t  of m a s  
r i o t i n g  is l i k e l y  to  qun l i fy  a s  a  v i o l e n t  event  under its restrictions. 
These a r e  c o s t s  we hove accepted because of t h e  advantsges  of economy and 
p rec i s ion  they br ing;  f o r  o t h e r  i n v e s t i g a t o r s  and o t h e r  purposes, they may 
be c o s t s  too g r e a t  t o  bea r .  
OR 
5.  Overt imi t a t ion .  
OR 
6. Overt response by demands, s logans .  r i t u a l  a c t s .  
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SEARCH, FOR ADDITIONAL 
DATA IN ARCHIVES, PUB- 
LISHED SOURCES 
APPENDIX 2. MATER1AI.S FROM VIE STUDY OF COI.I.ECT1VE VIO1,ENCE 1.N FRANCE 
The m a t e r i a l  fo l lows  a  s i n g l e  r e l a t i v e l y  well-documented event  from 
n a r r a t i v e  account through coding and t r a n s c r i p t i o n  i n  mncl~lne-readable form 
t o  i t s  i n t e g r a t i o n  i n t o  a  q u a n t i t a t i v e  a n a l y s i s .  Fo res t  i nvas ions  of t h i s  
s o r t  (a l though not  t h i s  s c a l e )  were f r equen t  even t s  i n  t h e  Pyrenees from 
t h e  l a t e  1820 's  through t h e  Revolut ion of 1848. The Fores t  Code enacted 
by t h e  French government i n  1828 c u r t a i l e d  common r i g h t s  t o  g l ean ,  g r a z e  
and g a t h e r  firewood, i n  f avo r  of t h e  conso l ida t ion  of bourgeois  p rope r ty  
i n  woodlands. Poor people of t h e  mountains .  c l~n l l enged  t h e  Code Eor twen- 
t y - f ive  yea r s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  a t  moments when t h e  government weakened, a s  i n  
t h e  r e v o l u t i o n s  of 1830 and 1848. The c o n f l i c t  of l a  Bsrousse took p l ace  
j u s t  one month a f t e r  t h e  February Revolot ion of 1848. 
When I developed t h e  procedures  f o r  sampling and coding v i o l e n t  even t s  
i n  t h e  mid-19601s, I used t h e  word " p o l i t i c a l  d i s tu rbance"  t o  d e s c r i b e  t h e  
even t s  under s tudy.  As I worked wi th  t h e  m a t e r i a l ,  I r e a l i z e d  tlie phrase  
conta ined an  u n j u s t i f i e d  presumption and a  mis leading metaphor. S ince  
we enumerate even t s  on t h e  b a s i s  of s i z e  and t h e  presence of v io l ence  re-  
g a r d l e s s  of p o l i t i c a l  con tex t  o r  con ten t ,  t h e  word " p o l i t i c a l "  presumes 
what is t o  be  proven: t h a t  t h e  bulk  of c o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence  does ,  indeed. 
grow o u t  of p o l i t i c a l  processes.,  The word "disturbance" imp l i e s  malfunc- 
t i o n ,  abnormal i ty ,  a  break wi th  ord'inary l i f e  which our ana lyses  of tl ie 
evidence g e n e r a l l y  c o n t r a d i c t .  I now p r e f e r  t h e  c o l o r l e s s  "v io l en t  event". 
"v io l en t  i nc iden t "  o r  even " c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  producing violence."  Ilowever. 
t h e  o lde r  vocsbulary  pervades our  ma te r i a l ;  i t  would be d l s l ~ o n e s t  t o  ex- 
punge i t .  
The v i o l e n t  even t s  s tud ied  i n  France included every one meeting our  
c r i t e r i a  (some damage o r  s e i z u r e  of persons  o r  o b j e c t s ,  a t  l e a s t  one form- 
a t i o n  of f i f t y  persons  o r  more, a t  l e a s t  one formation non-miliory) we 
encountered i n  r ead ing  two d a i l y  n a t i o n a l  newspapers f o r  each day from 
1830 th roug l~  1860 and 1930 through 1960, p l u s  t h r e e  randomly-selected 
months pe r  year  from 1861 through 1929. The General  Sample inc ludes  a l l  I 
those  even t s .  The I n t e n s i v e  Sample, f o r  t h e  pe r iods  1830-60 and 1930-60 I 
on ly ,  i nc ludes  a l l  even t s  we e s t ima ted  t o  i nvo lve  a t  l e a s t  1 ,000 person- 
days p111s a sys t ema t i c  t en  pe rcen t  of t h e  remaining even t s .  The informa- 
, 
t i o n  coded comes from t h e  newspaper accoun t s ,  from h i s t o r i c a l  works, from 
p o l i t i c a l  yearbooks and from French a r c h i v a l  documents. 
The i tems i n  t h i s  s e t  i nc lude :  
1. Excerpts  from r e p o r t s  of a c o n f l i c t  between t roops  and " invaders  of 
f o r e s t s "  i n  l o  Barousse, March 1848. 
2. Repor ts  on P o l i t i c a l  Dis turbance used f o r  a b s t r a c t i n g  from newspapers, 
a r c h i v a l  documents and secondary sou rces  and a s  a cover s h e e t  f o r  photo- 
I 
cop ie s  of exce rp t s  from those  sou rces .  
1. 
3. Excerpt from t h e  I n t e n s i v e  Sample Codehook used i n  coding t h e  event  i n  
l a  Barousse. ! 
4. Excerpts  from t h e  coded ve r s ion .o f  t h e  even t ,  i nc lud ing  t h e  complete 
s e t  of code r ' s  comments. 
5 .  Segments of computer p r i n t o u t  i nc lud ing  a p a r t i a l  l i s t i n g  of t h e  card- 
image v e r s i o n  of t h e  I n t e n s i v e  Sample coding. 
6 .  Segment of computer p r i n t o u t  i nc lud ing  s complete 1 i s t i n g . o f  t h e  OSIRIS 
ve r s ion  of t h e  I n t e n s i v e  Sample coding. 
7 .  Machine ve r s ion  of Table  1 5  from Char les  T i l l y ,  "How P r o t e s t  Modernized 
i n  France" i n  1.lilliom Aydelot te ,  Al lan Bogue and Robert Fogel ,  e d s . ,  The 
Dimensions f Q u a n t i t a t i v e  Research i n  H i s to ry  (Pr inceton:  Pr inceton Uni- 
v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1972). 
8 .  Table  6 from Char l e s  T i l l y ,  "The Chaos of t h e  Living c i t y "  i n  Chnrles  
T i l l y ,  ed . ,  An Urban IJorld (Boston: L i t t l e ,  Brown. 1974). 
9. Graph r ep resen t ing  a f ive-year  moving average of our  e s t i m a t e s  of t o t a l  
p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  French c o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence ,  1830-1960. 
EXCERPTS FROM REPORTS ON EVENT 848 02 29 0 1  
" L e t t e r s  from Saint-Caudens w r i t t e n  t h e  4 th  of Marc11 nnnounce t l l s t  
o rde r  has  been r e s t o r e d  . . . The band of l o o t e r s  cons i s t ed  of almost 
2,000 people; a t  t h e  approach of t h e  l i n e  t roops  and t h e  Nat ional  Guard 
they r e t r e a t e d  toward t h e  mountains of l a  Barousse; bu t  having a r r i v e d  i n  
t h e  d e f i l e s ,  they resumed t h e  o f f ens ive .  The f r o n t  ranks ,  nrmed with  
guns, f i r e d ;  t h e  t roops  r e p l i e d  and rushed toward t h e i r  enemy with  bravery.  
The e v i l d o e r s  then escaped i n  every d i r e c t i o n  oc ros s  t h e  rough mountain 
t e r r a i n ,  and i t  was impossible  t o  fol low them. I t  appears  t h a t  many of 
them were sho t  a s  they t r i e d  t o  e n t e r  coves i n  t h e  mountains ides  . . . " 
(Le ~ i 2 c l e .  11 March 1848). 
"The t r o u b l e s  which broke ou t  i n  t h e  v o l l e y  of In Borousse were 
s t a r t e d  by i l l e g a l  u s e r s  of t h e  f o r e s t .  A l a r u e  number of i n h a b i t a n t s  of 
t h a t  v a l l e y  went t o  t h e  Cuard General  of t h e  F o r e s t s ,  who was ass igned t o  
execute  t h e  war ran t s  i s sued  a g a i n s t  them and burned a l l  h i s  papers  wh i l e  
he  was gone. Thence they went t o  t h e  o f f i c e  of t h e  C o l l e c t o r s  f o r  Na- 
t i o n a l  Lands, where they l i kewise  des t royed a l l  t he  r e g i s t e r s  and forced 
the  o f f i c e r s  t o  pay a c e r t a i n  sum of money a s  r e p s r n t j o n  f o r  t h e  l a t e s t  
f i n e s  t h e  o f f i c e r s  had c o l l e c t e d .  F inn l ly  t h e  same people  d i d  some damage 
t o  t h e  chateau of Lusson, belonging t o  M. Coulnrd, t h e  ex-deputy of 
A-17 
~ a ~ n a r e s ,  who has  been d i s p u t i n g  t h e  ownership bf c e r t a i n  f o r e s t s  wi th  
the  communes i n  t h e  v a l l e y .  We l e a r n  t h a t  a Ea i r ly  l a r g e  number of t rou-  
blemakers have been a r r e s t e d  and have a r r i v e d  a t  Bagnbres." (Le Moniteur,  
10 March 1848) 
"A band of about  1,000, most of them armed, organized i n  t h e  Hautes- 
~ ~ r e / n i e s  , . , During t h e  n i g h t  of 2-3 March, t h a t  horde invaded t h e  can- 
t ons  oE Saint -Ber t rand and s a i n t - ~ b s t  i n  t h e  arrondissement  of Safnt-  
Caudens (Haute-Garonne), p i l l a g e d  t h e  chateau of M. Coulnrd, t h e  former 
deputy,  a t  Lassan, and t h a t  of t h e  Duke of Rovigo a t  Barbazon, and f i n a l l y  
c o l l e c t e d  a kind of t r i b u t e  from a few well-to-do landowners i n  t h e  same 
a r e a .  The Nat ional  Cuard of v a r i o u s  communes jo ined wi th  l i n e  t roops  
s e n t  from Toulouse and Tarbes t o  r e s t o r e  o rde r .  The detachments s e n t  a f -  
t e r  t l ie miscrennts  found them. We o r e  t o l d  t h a t  25 were taken p r i s o n e r ,  
3 k i l l e d  and 6 o r  7 wounded." (Archives Na t iona le s  BB 18 1461. r e p o r t  of 
procureur  gbn&rnl ,  cour d'Appel,  Toulouse, 4 March 1848) 
"The change of regime occasioned f a i r l y  s e r i o u s  d i s o r d e r s  i n  t h e  
arrondissement of Saint-Caudens. A bond of peasan t s  from t h e  mountains 
of l a  Rarousse (~autes-I 'vr6n6es) spread through t h e  lowlands i n  hopes t h a t  
tlie f a l l  of t h e  monarchy might caune an economic ove r tu rn  which could 
ha rd ly  f a i l  t o  be  p r o f i t a b l e  t o  them. On t h e  2d of March, t h e  coach from 
~ a ~ n d r e s - d e - ~ u c h o n  wos robbed between Ber t ran and Bagiry, and t h e  news 
soon spread t h a t  1,500 o r  1 ,800 peasan t s  armed wi th  c l u b s ,  p i t c h f o r k s ,  
p i cks  and hunt ing r i f l e s  were p i l l a g i n g  tlie houses and c a s t l e s  of t h e  
a r e a ,  ond holdjng t h e i r  i n h a b i t a n t s  f o r  ransom . . . " (Antonin cayrG, 
"Des journ6es d e  f b v r i e r  aux journ'ees du ju in , "  i n  J a c q u ~ s  Godechot, ed.,  
La ~ Q v o l u t i o n  d e  1848 $ Toulouse e t  dons l a  Haute-Caronne (Toulouse, 1948). -
(The f u l l e s t  account ,  however, appears  i n  Louis Clarenc,  "Les t r o u b l e s  d e  
l a  Rarousse cn 1848," Annales du Midi 65 (1951), 329-348.) --- 
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Cards 31-39: FORHATION BACKGROUND 
A NOTE ON FORHATIONS 
Some v i o l e n t  a c t i o n  ( k i l l i n g  o r  wounding of persons ,  damage o r  s e i z -  
u r e  of proper ty)  brought t h e  even t s  under cons ide ra t ion  i n t o  t h e  sample of 
d i s tu rbances .  The p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  t h e  d i s tu rbance  inc lude  a l l  persons who 
performed t h e  v i o l e n t  a c t i o n ,  a l l  persons  who i n t e r a c t e d  wi th  them d i r e c t -  
l y  i n  t h e  cour se  of t h a t  a c t i o n ,  and a l l  persons  a c t i n g  c o l l e c t i v e l y  wi th  
members of e i t h e r  of t h e  f i r s t  two c a t e g o r i e s  i n  t h e  cont inuous  s t ream of 
a c t i v i t y  which con ta jns  t h e  v i o l e n t  a c t i o n .  
We d i v i d e  t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  up i n t o  format ions .  S e t s  of p a r t i c i p a n t s  
belong t o  d i a t i r i c t  format ions  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  they a c t  c o l l e c t i v e l y ,  
communicate i n t e r n a l l y ,  oppose o t h e r  s e t s  of p a r t i c i p a n t s  and/or  a r e  given 
s p e c i f i c  i d e n t i t i c s  meaningful o u t s i d e  t h e  d i s tu rbance  i t s e l f  ( .e .g .  "so- 
c i a l i s t e s " ,  "pnysans", "gendarmes") by t h e  obse rve r s .  Many format lons ,  
however, compound seve ra l  d i f f e r e n t  k inds  of people  -- f o r  example, ma i t r e s  
and compagnons; we do not  a s s i g n  them t o  s e p a r a t e  format ions  u n l e s s  they 
a r e  r epor t ed  t o  a c t  independent ly  o r  i n  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  ways. 
' .  , ,Most  d i s tu rbances  invo lve  two o r  t h r e e  e a s i l y  d i s t i n g u f s h a b l e  forma- 
t i o n s .  I n  an extreme c a s e ,  R formation can have only  one member -- f o r  ex- 
ample, tlie v i c t i m  of a  lynching.  A t  ano the r  extreme, a  d i s tu rbance  can in -  
volve  only  one formation -- f o r  example, t h e  unanimous d e s t r o y e r s  of a  cha- 
teau.  I n  very complicated d i s tu rbances ,  where t h e s e  p r i n c i p l e s  would per- 
m i t  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  of t en  o r  more d i f f e r e n t  format ions ,  we combine t h e  
p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n t o  n i n e  o r  fewer format ions  r ep resen t ing  t h e  most important  
d i v i s i o n s  i n  c o l l e c t i v e  ac t ion .  For example, i f  t h e  b i j o u t i e r s ,  t h e  eben- 
i s t e s  and tlie o r f 6 v r i e r s  each have t h e i r  own ba r r i cade ,  they would appear  
a s  s e p a r a t e  format ions  i n  t h e  coding of a  sma l l  d i s tu rbance ,  but  i n  a  very  
l a r g e  one could b e  combined i n t o  a  s i n g l e  format ion.  In  t h i a  ca se ,  choose 
t h e  code i n  c o l s .  37-38 wi th  g r e a t  ca re .  and COMMENT. 
Even i n  sma l l  d i s tu rbances ,  groups s p e c i a l i z e d  i n  tl ie maintenonce and 
r e s t o r a t i o n  of pub l i c  o r d e r  (which t h i s  codebook w i l l  c a l l  Repress ive  f o r  
s h o r t )  can always be  combined i n t o  a  s i n g l e  Eormation t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  
t h e i r  a c t i o n s  e r e  i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e .  Thus when Nat ional  Guards and t roops  
of t h e  l i n e  under a  s i n g l e  command d i s p e r s e  a  group of demot~s t rn td r s ,  t r e a t  
them a s  a  s i n g l e  format ion u n l e s s  they begin  t o  a c t  i n  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  
ways. Be s u r e  t o  COMHENT i f  t h e  code l eaves  any doubt how and what you 
have combined. 
I n  any case ,  i d e n t i f y  t h e  format ions  b e f o r e  s t a r t i n g  t o  code. When a 
format ion has  a  pub l i c  i d e n t i t y  more s p e c i f i c  than words l i k e  f o u l e ,  n t t roupe-  
ment, peuple ,  and s o  on, i n d i c a t e  ( f o r  exnmple. "P ro te s t sn t s " ,  "CRS", " l e s  





Cards 31-39: FORMATION BACKGROUND 
CARD NUMBER 
NUMBER FORMATIONS ARBITRARILY AND NOTE IN FILE 
31 Formation 1 to 39 Formation 9 
32 Formation 2 
IDENTIFYING DATA 
DO NOT CODE - WILL BE DUPLICATED AUTOMATICALLY FROM 
FIRST CARD 
PUBLIC IDENTITY OF FORMATION: ALPHABETIC 
If the formation has no definite public identity, 
leave blnnk. If it has a name, put it here. 
TYPE OF FORMATION 
01 Crowd (further identifying information unavailable) 
10 Crowd of common ideology 
11 Crowd of common political attachment 
12 Crowd of common religion 
20 Activist group 
21 Political cadres, hacks 
22 Terrorists 
23 Criminal group (brigands) 
24 Guerrilla insurgents 
25 Private (party) army 
26 Secret society 
cols. 37-38 
(cant's.) 
Cards 31-39: FORMATION BACKGROUND 
TYPES OF' FORMATION 
30 Military or paramilitary group 
31 National guard 
32 Civil guard 
33 Regular nrmy 
34 Gnrde mobile 
35 Milice bourgeoise 
36 Palace guard 
37 Bons citoyens (volunteers) 





43 Military police 
48 Police and militnry group: comment en- 
couraged 
49 Police plus public officials: 
MANDATORY CObfilENT 
50 Occupational group 
51 Workers of same industry 
52 Workers of snme factory 
53 Workers of same locality 
54 Union 
55 Students 
c o l s .  37-38 
(con'td;) 
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Cards 31-39: FORMATION BACKGROUND 
TYPES OF FORMATION 
60 Ou t s ide r s  (group r e p r e s e n t i n g  a  l o c a l i t y )  
61  Croup coming d i r e c t l y  from a  f o r e i g n  
coun t ry  
62 Croup coming from an  o u t s i d e  l o c a l i t y  
63 Croup of migrants  from o u t s i d e  France 
64 Croup of migrants  from ano the r  a r e a  of 
France 
70 Consumer group 
71 Users of t h e  same market 
72 Users of t h e  same wa te r  supply  
80 Pub l i c  o f f i c i a l s  
90 Combinations: MANDATORY COMMENT 
9 1  D e l i b e r a t e  combination f o r  purposes of 
b r e v i t y  i n  coding: MANDATORY COMMENT 
99 Others :  MANDATORY COMMENT 
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::1/1?'12 c ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ r ~ u r o : . - ' T l i ~ !  hI!rnf- IIO% I i s t c . :  r,rr! ~ c r t r ~ n ~ ~ ! - l ) ,  Trouhnt(1I-F,, m d  
L 
n n ~ l r y  :'!I&?). Tho co~xnurlnl inrormnt ion ~ G ? I .  tliom i t ~ l u  saxe e s  f o r  t hosc  col:l:liunc 
l i o t o d  on tho co rds  
21 t o  ,"/ *7 A- % p o l i l : i o ~ r \  tandoncy o r  npntlw notnd, ; : lnrtwc 
t- a t n t o s  *\lot t l ~ i a  rllstrlrbonco I~nd not!~irr:: t o  ?o wi th  p o l i t i u o  a r  
d r o i t s  l c r i t i m o s  
! 21 t o  2C!/42 !oson.Lncnt a g o i n s t  usnrors  : * l - v -  r '  Fe- ,- ' &&+ 
, =/4? Ac+icns by n n t i o n a l  c o v l t  which de l iva rod  i n t o  Iiands of 
p r i o t a i r c a  Innd ;~l i ich  rros f e l t  t o  bo oonnon 
71 t o  :2!'/48 Nunio~.oun proccs-verbntx o t c .  o::rtinot v i o l a t o r s  of Coda ?o r r . s t i o r  
-."A7 ,!!rmt:rous j.ncidan+.z o r  bri,:mdnKc oncl dost ruct io! .  occurrod 111 v11rio11s co:::mlmon. 
I 11s:-o ,~ou.ond a l l  v i c t i n o  t~o:c.tkcr. Thoso inclrrdc gr t5l ic  
o r f i c ~ n l s ( o o n d u c t o ~ ~ r  d ! ~D i l i ~ e n o o ,  n a i r a s ,  I~cccvour  do I '! . 'nro~iotromant n t o )  pro- 
pr!ctr\Li.rcs and w u r a r s .  
.53/.77 knrde nation nu^, m i l i t n i r o s ,  ~cndormos,  and soma p r i c a t o  
32/43 ~ l d n i n i s t r n t i o n , ~  employor, d ro  con t r ibu t ion ,  ?ropr? .otoi res  e t a .  
.73/45 Pol ico,  m i l i t n i r c s ,  na t ionn l  gunrd, and p r i o s t s .  
31/52 !!om of chnnzc i n  r o s i n ?  givos  h r i p m d s  a p r c t c r t  f o r  r c v o l t  ond an iul- 
s e t t .  ed s i t u a t i o n  t o  tnkc o d v o n t o ~ e  o f  - 11/56 t o r  t h e  f i r s t  3 drip, tho  r o b c l s  rriopondcd t o  no violoncc.  I b r r ,  On 
!:nrch h,  t h e y  mot t ho  rog rons ivq  Porme.tion i n  b n t t l c ,  both  s i d e s  usin:: f i roorms.  
I 
5 to~:ai!: of ovar  110@0 inhnbitnnts!?tobnl.  . Mationel p a r d  s l : r c n ~ t i l  i:..'t.:'rq,;! 
frola nn tu re  oE a c t i o n  and ~ i z o s  of tovrns 
<l /55 Fo~innt ion ynnernl ly  ox:onding. !.iondnys. 
42/55 Encli p 3 r t i c i p o n t  i n  t h i s  fonnnt ion nnc 
?.?/57 Thorc ne ro  conlo ' o f f b c i n l s  rnol t roi too '  
.! ./67 Clnrcnc ncnt iono n o  rsioundod nnd c tntc l :  
0 1 )  b u t  !?O i s  o f ton  rupcnkod, and uncd l?y 
,:'lnrenc. 10 .:roro proacocuted nnd Pour~d ruilt ; .  
51-52/13 Tho so?uonco p r c s a n t o l  bot:toen tho two XX codcs  i s  n o t  n  t r u o  ncquonco 
bu t  a ~ c c r c n t i o n  o f  n  t y p i c a l  i nc idon t .  10-12 i n c i d o n t s  of s i s l i l c r  n:.two l:oqnk 
plncc I?ol-::ccn ?cb. 2Pr&nd l.:nr. 3, ond t h o r c  i s  no roo  n  t o  coda thom s c  u , ~ ~ t i n l l : . .  
A f t e r  t h o  second :C, tho b a t t l e  of !.!arch 3  i s  codcd uimxt@~ C I S  V l ( r Q 9 .  . 
51/17 Invozion of mnir ie ,  buroou do 1' cnro;:i,, -*rcnunt o r  bwonu  o r  bho fornn'.icr. 
S t ~ h s c ~ u c n t  burnin;: of r cco rds  and n l o f ; r a n t l n s  ofl ' icicllc.  
53/31 A d i r r c r c n t  v ic t im-  n chatcnu ovmor - 51-53/43 Pnrch 8 ,  noon, n t  Antichnn. Roundin6 up of prisono1.s corltir~tr. : .rn:il 
5 : (20 !> .Tb. 
G5/1,! C h n n ~ c  i n  roy.in2 
- ~.'./,!.1 'l:oromtioll 55 i s  In.-! a.nfort.cmont f o r cc .  IIo~~:ovor,division botwu,.n 51 m d  5: 
con~bitp~r,  d i r l 'o roncos  of ocrup: : t io t~  and p ropo r ty  
GB/T,I- A ~ r m t  n~pnhr r  nP ~ ~ ~ b l i o  r c co rds  h u r n o j  i n  n h o s t  ovory  t c~vn ,  mos t l y  
!or tn i ; t~ i .~~: ;  t o  Codv ; ' o ro s t i c r ,  l i s t s  of o r f rncon ,  f i n o n  and prococ-vorbnus.  
9ccorc!:: ol' dohgs e l s o  b :~r iod .  :.:inor p r o p e r t y  dann::o t o  pr:bljc build in:;^. 1'. 
hu i so i . o rq s  hcusc rrns pillny.o:l and l lc rsc  s t o l r n  i n  I.:culoon-Daroosso. E. pig ,  3ona 
?ark qnd, somo vrino ~ m s  taken i n  Sos t ,  nrc:s nnd i n s i g n o  of a d m i n i s t r n t a u r  f o r c s t i o r  
o to1 .q .  : i l l n ~ o  i n  I&urcs-?r r rouss~~,  house invndod nnd p i l l n p d  i n  Antichnn, 
6 ,  non ~annozncld i n  T robn t  nnd Bor t ron ,  monny nnd provioiono s t o l c n  i n  Anlo. Pln:; 
t o r n  : in :enotwt. Inrgcs l ;  dmnaeo n t  a p r o p i n t a i r o ' s  cliotcnu i n  L..scan vciloro 
t r c c s  vrcro cu t .   rilles broken, doo r s  brokon i n ,  f u r n i t u r e  brokon o r  s t o l o n ,  and 
l i m n  nnd i:ooka dos t royod o r  tnken.  
' .6/55 T h i s  ic a lois/ o s t i n n t o .  30,000 r rnncs  .n~n:o n lonc  n t  cha toau  do Luscnn 
~ 6 / 7 3  r!lt11011:h c o n p l o t c l y  s t i f l o d ,  t h i s  d in tu rbnnco  s t i n u l n t c d  l n t o r  i nc iAcn t s ,  
notnbl:? n p l o t  t o  n soaos i nn to  Rocovour rlc I ' c n ~ c ~ i s t r o m c n t ,  gho n p r i l  17  d i s -  
t w b y ~ o  o t  S i : ~ n c ,  and t ' . c  i n c i d o n t  ~ t .  Rizc- i i i s tos  04; t ! ~  rnd of A p r i l .  
73/10 U48-33-lO(501-50.7) 
lI34~.~-08-11 
ivory m i c * ~ l t  t o codc bocntlso of ~ r c n t  ntwhcr o f  sxn l l ,  incidents. Sco t110 
modol ooqucncc co*lo devised t o  Iiand!o t h i s  and no to  t h n t  t h o r c  a r e  12  cor:.l:;w:ns 
involvbd. 
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APPENDIX 3. PROCEDURES FOR THE STUDY OF CONTENTIOUS GATIIERINGS I N  
GREAT BRITAIN 
Our newest l a r g e  e f f o r t  is a  s tudy  of c o n f l i c t s  i n  Great  B r i t o i n  
from 1828 through 1833. We have s e v e r a l  d i f f e r e n t  i n c e n t i v e s  f o r  trnder- 
t ak ing  t h e  new a n a l y s i s .  F i r s t ,  ou r  ana lyses  of v i o l e n t  even t s  i n  
I t a l y ,  Germany and France appeared t o  confirm our suppos i t i on  t h o t  t h e  
v io l ence  was on t h e  whole t h e  by-product of t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  of f u r t h e r  
i n t e r e s t e d  p a r t i e s  i n  a c t i o n s  which were not  i n t r i n s i c a l l y  v i o l e n t  and 
which occurred f r e q u e n t l y  w i t l ~ o u t  s i g n i f i c a n t  v io l ence .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  
we were i n t e r e s t e d  i n  t h e  frequency wi th  which t h e  v i o l e n c e  hegsn wi th  
t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  of t roops ,  p o l i c e  and o t h e r  specialized r e p r e s s i v e  fo rces .  
S ince  t h e  on ly  nonviolent  even t s  of which we had made l a rge .  sys t ema t i c  
enumerations f o r  some of t h e  same pe r iods  and p l aces  were s t r i k e s .  how- 
ever ,  we d i d  not  have t h e  evidence t o  look c l o s e l y  a t  t h a t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
between nonviolent  and v i o l e n t  c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n s .  
Second, i t  seemed worth making a  Sl~Stoined comparison hetwecn pnt- 
t e r n s  of c o n f l i c t  i n  n ineteenth-century B r i t a i n  and those  we ltod found 
on t h e  Cont inent .  S tuden t s  of modern Europe o f t e n  t h i n k  of n ineteenth-  
cen tu ry  B r i t a i n ' s  exper ience a s  s kind of succes s  s t o r y  -- st l e a s t  i n  
'Bvoiding" tl ie r e v o l u t i o n s  which occurred i n  France, Germany. l t o l y  ond 
e lsewhere .  A c l o s e  s tudy  of c o n f l i c t s  i n  B r i t a i n  sliould g ive  u s  t h e  means 
t o  r e t h i n k  t h o t  ques t ion .  Hore important ,  i t  sliould provide f i rmer  
ground f o r  choosing among obvious a l t e r n a t i v e  exp lana t ions  of t h e  d i f f e r -  
ences  between B r i t a i n  and t h e  con t inen t :  t h o t  B r i t a i n  had fewer of t h e  
kinds  of people  who made nineteenth-century r evo lu t ions  and r e b e l l i o n s .  
t h a t  t h e  most l i k e l y  r e b e l s  had fewer gr ievances ,  t h ~ t  r ep res s ion ,was  more 
e f f e c t i v e  i n  B r i t a i n ,  and s o  on. 
Our o r i g i n a l  hope was t o  examine t h e  changing p a t t e r n s  of c o n f l i c t  
i n  B r i t a i n  throughout t h e  n ine t een th  century.  With a  wide range of non- 
v i o l e n t  even t s  t o  cons ide r ,  however, bhat would have r equ i r ed  an  enormous 
e f f o r t  -- many times t h e  a l r eady  formidable  e f f o r t  pe r  year  i n  our  s t u d i e s  
of France and Germany. Af t e r  some p re l imina ry  enumerations i n  s c a t t e r e d  
yea r s  from t h e  end of t h e  e igh teen th  cen tu ry  t o  t h e  end of t h e  n ine t een th .  
we narrowed our  a t t e n t i o n  t o  1828-1833. That per iod recommends i t s e l f  
f o r  s e v e r a l  reasons .  F i r s t ,  i t  was a  time of major movements, c o n f l i c t s  
and c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n s :  Ca tho l i c  Emancipation, Reform agi ta t i0 .n .  i n d u s t r i a l  
c o n f l i c t ,  t h e  a t t a c k  on s e l e c t  v e s t r i e s ,  and t h e  g r e a t  a g r a r i a n  r e b e l l i o n s  
of 1830. Second, t h e r e  e x i s t  e x c e l l e n t  h i s t o r i c a l  s t u d i e s  of some of t h e  
pe r iod ' s  c o n f l i c t s  -- f o r  example. Capta in  Swing, by E.J .  Hobsbawn and 
George Rud; -- wi th  which we can compare our own r e s u l t s .  Third ,  we have 
some reason t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  per iod a c t e d  a s  an h i s t o r i c h 1  p ivo t  i n  some- 
th ing  l i k e  t h e  aame way t h a t  t h e  r e v o l u t i o n s  of 1848 d id  i n  France and 
Germany: marking, and perhaps producing, a  s h i f t  from r e a c t i v e  t o  p roac t ive ,  
from "backward-looking" t o  "forward-looking" c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  on t h e  p a r t  
of o rd ina ry  people. 
In  t h a t  per iod,  we a r e  a t t empt ing  t o  enumerate, d e s c r i b e  and ana lyze  
a  l a r g e  sho re  of a l l  the"content ious  gather ings"  which occurred i n  England, 
Scot land,  and Wales. Roughly speaking,  a  con ten t ious  ga the r ing  is an oc- 
ca s ion  i n  which t en  o r  more persons  o u t s i d e  t h e  government ga the r  i n  t h e  
some p lace  and make a  v i s i b l e  c l a im which, i f  r e a l i z e d ,  would a f f e c t  t h e  
i n t e r e s t s  of some s p e c i f i c  ~ e r s o n ( s )  o r  group(s)  o u t s i d e  t h e i r  own number. 
In p r i n c i p l e ,  t h e s e  ga the r ings  inc lude  j u s t  about a l l  t h e  even t s  covered 
i n  our e a r l i e r  enumerations of s t r i k e s  and c o l l e c t i v e  v io l ence .  They 
a l s o  inc lude  a  g r e a t  many o t h e r  eben t s :  demonstra t ions ,  p e t i t i o n  meetings. 
de l ega t ions ,  group poaching. and p l en ty  of o t h e r s .  Drawing t h e  boundaries 
bo th  generously  and c o n s i s t e n t l y  is a  d e l i c a t e  and l a b o r i o u s  tnsk.  
We a r e  s t i l l  a d j u s t i n g  t h e  procedures  f o r  t h a t  t a sk .  A f t e r  doing a  
t r i a l  enumeration and s u m s r y  coding of some even t s  from 1830, we did  
a  p re l imina ry  scanning of t h i r t y  randomly s e l e c t e d  ten-day blocks  from 
t h e  e n t i r e  s ix-year  per iod,  then proceeded t o  enumerate sys t emnt i ca l ly  
from t h e  beginning of 1828. We have completed t h e  pre l iminary enumeration 
of  1828. We f i n d  t h e  even t s  v i a  a  complete issue-by-issue reading of 
t h e  Morning Chronic le ,  The Times. Gentlemen's Magazine, Hansard's Pn r l i a -  
mentary Debates,  The Mirror  of Par l iament  end t h e  Annual R e ~ i s t e r .  Once t h e  
even t s  a r e  enumerated, we plan t o  look f o r  more informat ion nbout them i n  
t h e  papers  of t h e  Home O f f i c e  (of which we have a l r eady  b u i l t  up s u b s t a n t i a l  
s e l e c t i o n s  v i a  photocopy and microf i lm) ,  i n  o t h e r  p e r i o d i c a l s ,  and i n  
secondary h i s t o r i c a l  works. We a r e  s t i l l  making p l ans  f o r  coding of t h e  
informat ion i n  machine-readable form. The f i l e  f o r  t h e  s ix-year  per iod 
w i l l  probably d e s c r i b e  on t h e  o rde r  of 25.000 events .  
We a r e  a l s o  s lowly making p l ans  Eor t h e  c o l l e c t i o n  of d a t a  on t h e  
popu la t ions  and a r e a s  " a t  r i s k "  t o  con ten t ious  ga the r ings .  The u n i t s  of 
obse rva t ion  w i l l  c e r t a i n l y  inc lude  a l l  c o u n t i e s  of England. Scot land and 
Wales. They w i l l  probably inc lude  complete s e t s  of hundreds of pa r i shes  
w i t h i n  s e l e c t e d  coun t i e s .  I f  poss ib l e ,  they w i l l  a l s o  inc lude  p n r t i c u l n r  
popu la t ions  of p o t e n t i a l  a c t o r s  -- f o r  example, t h e  handloom weavers of 
Lanceshire  and t h e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  l a b o r e r s  of L e i c e s t e r s h i r e .  U l t ima te ly  
t h e  cho ice  of u n i t s  and of k inds  of d a t a  concerning those  u n i t s  w i l l  re- 
s u l t  from a  compromise between t h e  arguments we a r e  seeking t o  t e s t  and t h e  
c o s t s  of g e t t i n g  t h e  r e l e v a n t  evidence.  
Events t o  be Enumerated 
The even t s  a r e  "content ious  ga the r ings"  (CGs), O C C ~ ~ ~ O ~ R  i n  which t en  
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o r  more persons  o u t s i d e  t h e  government g a t h e r  i n  t h e  same p l ace  and make 
a v i s i b l e  c l a im which, i f  r e a l i z e d ,  would a f f e c t  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  of some 
s p e c i f i c  person(s)  o r  group(s)  o u t s i d e  t h e i r  own numbers. Most CGs i n  
our period f a l l  i n t o  one o r  more of t h e  fol lowing ca t egor i e s :  1 )  co l l ec -  
t i v e  v io l ence ,  2) meetings. 3) demonstra t ions ,  4) parades. 5) assemblies ,  
6) r a l l i e s ,  7) c e l e b r a t i o n s ,  8 )  d e l e g a t i o n s ,  9)  s t r i k e s ,  10) union a c t i v -  
i t i e s .  More p r e c i s e l y ,  t h e  even t s  included a r e  a l l  occasions:  
1. repor t ed  i n  t h e  London Times, Morning Chronicle, ,  Hanssrd's Pa r l i a -  
mentary Debates. Annual Reg i s t e r ,  Gentlemen's Magazine and lo r  The 
Mirror of Par l iament .  -- 
2.  occu r r ing  i n  England. Scot land o r  Wales, 
3. beginning on any d a t e  from 1 January 1828 through 31 December 1833, 
4 .  i n  which t e n  o r  more persons  o u t s i d e  t h e  government: 
a .  ga the r  i n  t h e  same p l ace ,  
b.  make a v i s i b l e  c l a im which, i f  r e a l i z e d ,  would a f f e c t  t h e  in- 
t e r e s t s  of some s e p e c i f i c  person(8) o r  group(s)  o u t s i d e  t h e i r  
own number. 
Terms which t h e r e f o r e  r e q u i r e  working d e f i n i t i o n s :  
repor ted 
occu r r ing  
i n  England, Scotland o r  Wales 
beginning 
, persons 
o u t s i d e  t h e  government 
ga the r  
same p l a c e  
v i s i b l e  c la im a f f e c t i n g  i n t e r e s t s  
s p e c i f i c  person(s)  o r  group(s)  
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r epor t ed .  Any mention i n  any con tex t .  I f ,  f o r  example, on M.P. l oye  on 
t h e  t a b l e  a p e t i t i o n  "from a numerous meeting i n  Oldham" which conforms 
t o  a l l  our  o t h e r  c r i t e r i a ,  t h a t  meeting e n t e r s  t h e  sample. In  par l iamentary  
deba te s ,  mentions of meetings do no t  need numerical  i n f o r m t i o n  t o  be in -  
c luded.  For example, i f  Mirror  of Par l iament  r e p o r t s  a meeting of pnr ish-  
i o n e r s  a t  P re s ton  t o  p e t i t i o n  Par l iament ,  bu t  mokes no mention of how many 
people a t t ended  t h e  meet ing,  we w i l l  assume p r o v i s i o n a l l y  t h a t  o t  l e a s t  
1 0  people  took p a r t .  
occur ing i n  England, Scot land or 'Wnles. Ten o r  more people must have 
a the red  wi th in  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  boundoriea ( inc lud ing  t e r r i t o r i a l  waters)  of 
England, Scot land o r  Wales. I f  any p a r t  of t h e  a c t i o n  occu r s  w i th in  those  
boundar ies ,  t h e  e n t i r e  event  f a l l s  i n t o  t h e  sample. 
Sometimes i t  is d i f f i c u l t  t o  determine how mnny people  a r e  involved 
i n  an event  o r  ac t ion .  I n  vague c a s e s  t ake  t h e  fol lowing terms t o  mean o t  
l e a s t  t en  people: 
AFFRAY DISTURBANCE NUMEROUS 
ASSPIBLY GANG RALLY 
BRAWL GATHERING RIOT 
CONCOURSE GENERAL BODYlBODY RIOTOUS ASSEMBLAGE 
CROWD . MOB TllRONC 
DEMONSTRATION MULTITUDE TUMULTUOUS ASSEMBLY 
beginning on a n y . d a t e  from 1 January 1828 through 31  December 1833 
The event  begins  a t  t h e  f i r s t  po in t  st which a t  l e a s t  t e n  of t h e  people  
who e v e n t u a l l y  make t h e  v i s i b l e  c l a im a r e  gathered wi thout  f u r t h e r  d i s -  
p e r s a l  be fo re  they  make t h e  c la im.  The day beg ins  a t  midnight.  
persons. Any human being who can reasonably be presumed to Ilave inten- 
tlonally participated in the making of the claim. 
outside the government. When officers ore acting in the capacity given 
them by their offices and no group of ten or more non-officers is acting 
wtth cl~em, we exclude the action. If ten or more officers act together 
. . 
but on their own responsibility, we include their action. Among the sets 
of people commonly named in discussions of English governments in the 
nineteenth century, we are actually distinguishing three categories, 
(6) officers, (b) public committees, and (c) citizenry. As officers. 
we are considering: 
Aldermen Judges Police Constables 
Bailiffs 
Beadles 
Justices Privy Councilers 
Justices of the Peace Schoolboards 
Boroughreeves Lord Lieutenants Sherif fs 
Burgesses Magistrates Scotch Guards 
Churchwardens Mayors Special Constables 
Common Councilers Members of Parliament Surveyors 
Constables Military (see below*) Town Councilers 
Coroners Militia Yeomanry 
Directors of the Poor Ministers and others of 
Grand Juries Overseers of the Poor essentially 
Guardians of the Poor Paymasters similar position. 
Horse Guards Police 
*(Militnry): Cavalry, Infantry, Dragoons, Hussars, Marines, Blues, Grays 
. . 
As public committees we are considering Town Meetings, Vestries, Select 
Vestries. Liveries, Improvement Commissions, Police Commissions, and es- 
sentially shilar organizations. 
. .  . 
Aa segments of the citizenry. we are considering Freeholders. Householders. 
Inhabitants, Landowners, Leypnyeri, Occupiers, Parishioners, Ratepayers, 
Tithepayers and essentially similar collections of people. One day we m y  
well want to analyze the actions of public committees, of segments of the 
citizenry, and of other groups (such as members of particular crofts. assoc- 
iations, age-sex groups or families) separately. For the present, the 
crucial distinction separates officers from all the rest. Officers often 
appear as parties in collective actions involving pub1.i~ committees, seg- 
ments of the citizenry and/or other groups. But the only circumstances un- 
der which their concerted action qualifies by itself is when they take 
part in a group of ten or more persons who on their own responsibility ns- 
aemble to make a publicly visible claim, demand or complaint. 
As citizens we are considering everyone else. 
gather'same place Ten or more persons, meeting, assembling or any of 
the key words used in Page A-42 to define a get-together. Place is 
defined as: 
a) specific location, church, inn. field, 
b) secondary location. town, parish, city. 
C) area location, county, hundred, etc. 
or any combination of these. 
visible claims affecting interesta of eome specific persons or groups 
We are trying to prepare a comprehensive list of occasions where people 
outside the government assemble to m k e  a publicly visible claim, demand, 
or complaint. At one time or another, we use all the following words to 
d e s c r i b e  what we're a f t e r :  c l a ims ,  demands, complaints ,  g r i evances ,  as-  
p i r a t i o n s ,  i n t e r e s t s .  d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n s .  Some of t hese  words, such a s  
"demands", c l e a r l y  have an o b j e c t  o u t s i d e  t h e  group. Others ,  l i k e  
"dissat is fact ions" ,  do no t  n e c e s s a r i l y  have o u t s i d e  o b j e c t s ;  one can 
e a s i l y  be  d i s s a t i s f i e d  wi th  onese l f .  We want t o  concen t r a t e  on a c t i o n s  
which & have a  t a r g e t  o u t s i d e  t h e  a c t i n g  group. Le t ' s  t a l k  about c l a ims  
nnd o b j e c t s  of c la ims. .  We a r e  t r y i n g  t o  bu i ld  a  sample of ga the r ings  i n  
which -- o r  by which -- people  a r t i c u l a t e  c la ims on a c t o r s  o u t s i d e  t h e i r  
own group. 
What s o r t s  of c la ims? B a s i c a l l y ,  any expec ta t ion  which would, i f  
r e a l i z e d ,  r equ i r e  t h e  o t h e r  a c t o r  t o  expend valued r e sources :  money, l abo r -  
power, informat ion,  and s o  on. What s o r t s  of a c t o r s ?  Bas loa l ly ,  any 
o t h e r  s e t  of r e a l  people. That excludes  a  group 's  c la ims on i t s e l f .  It 
excludes  a  group 's  c la ims on s u p e r n a t u r a l  o r  imaginary beings .  I t  does 
not  however, exclude c la ims on an imaginary "power s t r u c t u r e " ,  i f  t h e  
group identifies some r e a l  people  wi th  t h a t  s t r u c t u r e .  Nor does i t  exclude 
c la ims on r e a l  people i n  t h e i r  c a p a c i t i e s  a s  s e l f -dec l a red  agen t s  of 
supe rnn tu ra l  beings  o r  imaginary groups: p r i e s t s ,  soo thsaye r s ,  c h a r l a t a n s ,  
members of invented consp i r ac i e s .  It does no t  exclude c la ims on r e a l  
people  p re sen t  a t  t h e  same ga the r ing ,  j u s t  s o  long a s  t h e r e  i s  a  welthey 
scpa r s t io t i  between a c t o r s  and o b j e c t s  which i s  no t  simply an i n t e r n a l  
d i v i s i o n  of t h e  a c t i n g  group and which i s  more du rab le  than t h c  ga the r ing  
i t s e l f .  I n  f a c t ,  "any o t h e r  s e t  of r e a l  people" does not  e ~ c l u d e  any in-  
d i v i d u a l  anywhere, j u s t  s o  long a s  t h c r e  i s  a  ga the r ing  i n  which enough 
people a r t i c u l a t e  c la ims on t h a t  i nd iv idua l .  
When desc r ib ing  t h e  p o s s i b l e  con ten t  of such cla.tms, we enumerate: 
a )  p e t i t i o n i n g  o r  add res s ing  o r  memorializing l o c a l  o r  n a t i o n a l  
government, e i t h e r  f o r  o r  a g a i n s t  government; 
b)  oppos i t i on  t o  government po l i cy ,  form of govccnment o r  p n r t i c u l n r  
agen t s  of i t ;  
C) support  f o r  government; 
d)  suppor t  f o r  an  enemy of government; 
e )  c o n t r o l  of l o c a l  government o r  i n s t i t u t i o n ;  
f )  o t h e r  g r i evances  and d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n s ,  i nc lud ing  r e l i g i o u s ,  s o c i a l  
o r  economic I s s u e s ,  d i scuss ion  of complaints  about wagca, hours  
o r  cond i t i ons  of work; 
Here a r e  some r u l e s  of thumb f o r  t h e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of q u n l i f y i n g  
and non-qual i fying c la ims:  
1. In  t h e  absence of c o n t r a d i c t o r y  informat ion,  collective v io l encc  
c o n s t i t u t e s  prima f a c i e  evidence of a  c la im.  I f  t e n  o r  more persons  
a c t  t oge the r  t o  a t t a c k ,  damage o r  fo rc ib lyse i ze  n  person o r  object, 
t h a t  is p r o v i s i o n a l  evidence of n  c la im.  
2. Even i f  t h e  u l t i m a t e  aim of t h c  a c t i v i t y  is  t h e  making of some 
s o r t  of c la im,  pu re ly  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  e f f o r t s  do not  q u a l i f y  i n  
themselves. For example, t h e  c r e a t i o n  of a  l o c n l  Rcform Associa t ion 
does no t  i n  i t s e l f  c o n s t i t u t e  a  clnim. I f ,  on t h e  o t h e r  hand, t e n  
o r  more persons  who a r e  o rgan iz ing  an a s s o c i a t i o n  s t a t e  a  q u a l i f y i n g  
c l a im a s  they do so ,  t h a t  c l a im  counts .  
3. Bene f i t  suppe r s ,  b a l l s ,  expos i t i ons  and t h e  l i k e  do not  q u a l i f y  
i n  themselves, r e g a r d l e s s  of t h e  cnuse f o r  which they n r e  conducted. 
I f ,  however, we a c q u i r e  f u r t h e r  evldence of t h e  making of n cl.nim 
(e.g. a  claim-making proclamation by t h e  o rgan ize r s  of t h e  b e n e f i t ,  
o r  a  widely-cheered claim-making speech i n  t he  course  of t h e  e v e n t ) ,  
a  b e n c f i t  q u a l i f i e s  i n  t h e  same way any o t h e r  ga the r ing  q u a l i f i e s .  
4. A speech by a  s i n g l e  person which s t a t e s  a  c l a im,  a r t i c u l a t e s  a  1 
g r i evance  o r  makes a  demand c o n s t i t u t e s  evidence of a  c o l l e c t i v e  i 
cla im under any of t h e s e  cond i t i ons :  a )  t h e  group formal ly  adopts  t h e  
speake r ' s  views by p e t i t i o n ,  r e s o l u t i o n  o r  memorial; b) t h e  r e p o r t e r  
e x p l i c i t l y  imputes app rova l  of t h e  c l a im t o  t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  i n  t h e  1 
i 
ga the r ing ;  c )  t h e  group m a i n i f e s t l y  vo ices  an  opinion by chee r ing ,  
J e e r i n g  o r  o t h e r  vocnl  d i sp l ay .  
5 .  I f  a  ga the r ing  inc ludes  two o r  more f a c t i o n s ,  a t  l e a s t  one of 
which has  t en  o r  more p a r t i c i p a n t s ,  c la ims made by one of t h e  f a c t i o n s  
I 
on another  i f  t h e  i s s u e s  and d i v i s i o n s  i n  ques t ion  extend beyond t h e  
p a r t i c u l a r  ga the r ing  and t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  s e t  o f  p a r t i c i p a n t s .  For i 
example. when Henry Hunt and h i s  suppor t e r s  show up a t  a  p a r i s h  v e s t r y  I 
meeting and cha l l enge  t h e  powers of t h e  l o c a l  e l i t e  t o  c o n t r o l  t h e  I 
e l e c t i o n  of new v e s t r y  o f f i c e r s ,  t h e  d i v i s i o n  ex tends  beyond t h a t  1 
meeting and the  c l a im q u a l i f i e s .  
6. E x p l i c i t  suppor t  f o r  government, o r  d e n i a l  of suppor t  t o  government. 
q u a l i f i e s .  I t  can t ake  t h e  form of suppor t  f o r  i n s t i t u t i o n s  (Pa r l io -  
ment, t h e  p re sen t  government, t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n )  o r  of suppor t  f o r  s p e c i f i c  
o f f i c e r s  o f  government: t h e  aldermen, b a i l i f f s ,  bead le s ,  boroughreeves, 
and s o  on. l i s t e d  e a r l i e r .  I t  csn  t ake  t h e  form of d e l i b e r a t e  d e n i a l  
of suppor t  f o r  t h e s e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  o r  o f f i c e r s .  The i n s t i t u t i o n s  and 
o f f i c e r s  must b e . c u r r e n t l y  i n  o f f i c e ;  f o r  example, a  c e l e b r a t i n g  ban- 
que t  f o r  a  member-elect of Par l iament  does not  i n  i t s e l f  q u a l i f y .  
Evidence of such support  o r  d e n i a l  i nc ludes  a )  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  even t s ,  
i nc lud ing  c e l e b r a t i o n s  and f e s t i v i t i e s ,  wl~oae commonly-understood 
purpose is t h e  d i s p l a y  of suppor t .  e.g. Lord Mayor's Day parade;  
b) t h e  r e p o r t e r ' s  imputat ion of suppor t  o r  r e j e c t i o n ;  c )  a r t i c u l n t i o n  
of a  sent iment  through chee r ing ,  j ee r ing .  and s o  on, however, a  s imple  
t o a s t  (e.g. "To t h e  King") doe8 no t  q u a l i f y  i n  i t s e l f ,  even i f  par- 
t i c i p a n t s  cheer .  
7. Gather ings  e x p l i c i t l y  conducted t o  suppor t  o r  condemn an a c t i o n  
of government s t a t e  q u a l i f y i n g  c la ims i f  t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  themselves 
a r t i c u l a t e  s en t imen t s  by pass ing r e s o l u t i o n s .  chee r ing  speeches ,  and 
s o  on. 
8. Simple expres s ions  of suppor t  o r  r e j e c t i o n  do not q u a l i f y  i f  t h e  
o b j e c t s  a r e  a )  non-governmental i n s t i t u t i o n s  o r  o f f i c e r s  i n  B r i t a i n  
o r  e lsewhere ,  b) governmental i n s t i t u t i o n s  o r   officer^ o u t s i d e  of 
B r i t a i n .  I f  a  g a t h e r i n g  makos f u r t h e r  c la ims on e i t h e r  of t h e s e  
c a t e g o r i e s  of o b j e c t s ,  however, t h e  c la ims q u a l i f y .  For example, a  
banquet i n  honor of t h e  deposed king of Spain  would not  q u a l i f y  un le s s  
t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  d i r e c t l y  s t a t e d  t h e  demand t h a t  he be  r e i n s t a t e d .  
BOUNDARIES OF CONTENTIOUS GATHERINGS 
Most CGs w i l l  occur  on one day a t  one l o c n t i o n ;  however, many w i l l  
l a s t  l onge r  and lo r  w i l l  t ake  p l a c e  a t  s e v e r a l  s i t e s .  s o  we must d e l i n e a t e  
boundar ies  i n  time and space. A c t i v i t i e s  w i l l  be considered t o  be p n r t  
of t h e  same CG i f :  
1. they occur  on t h e  same day. o r  on consecut ive  days & 
2. t h e r e  i s  s t r o n g  evidence of over lapping personnel  w i th in  t h e  
c i t i z e n  fo rma t ion ( s ) ,  such a s  cont inuous  i n t e r a c t i o n  between 
two o r  more of t h e  format ions  i d e n t i f i e d  i n  t h e  i n i t i a l  a c t i v i t y  
3. the activities involve the same issue, or some directly related 
issue (e.g. the escalation of demands). 
Activities that meet the above criteria will be defined as one CG even 
througl~ they occur in different locations (e.g. different towns). 
If on event qualifies on the grounds of,the kind of action and kind 
of group involved, but we lack sufficient information to assign it a time 
and place in Britain from 1828 through 1833, we exclude the event pending 
further information. If only one of these elements -- time or place -- is 
uncertain, we'include tlie event pending further information. 
GENERAL AGENQA FOR CODING 
This is a provisional set of plans for the preparation of a machine- 
readable description of each CG. The record for a single event will con- 
tain the following sections: 
) 
. 1. EVENT as a whole, including identification and summary description 
of all major features. 
2. PLACE: one unit per place in which the event occurred. 
3. FORMATION: one unit per formation participating in the event. 
4. ACTION-PIIASE: one unit per action by any formation. 
5 .  SOURCE: one unit per source 'from which information concerning this 
event was drawn. 
6. COMJIENTS: one unit per comment. All keyed to specific locations 
in sections 1-5. . 
1. Event Section 
identification number: starting date plus sequence number on that date 
occuracy of starting date 
day of week on which event began 
date on which event ended 
accuracy of ending date 
duration: days 
duration: hours 
low estimate of total participants 
high estimate of total participants 
best estimate of total participants 
best estimate of person-days +margin of error 
best estimate of person-hours + margin of error 
best estimate of arrests during even + margin of error 
best estimate of arrests after event + margin of error 
best estimate of wounded during event + margin of error 
best estimate of killed during event + margin of error 
number of formations 
sunnnary of formation type(s) 
summary of participation by authorities 
smlacy of repression exercised durina event 
summary of repression exercised after evonb 
s u m r y  of major target(s) of action 
broad event type 
summary of background 
summary of outcome 
2. Place Section 
one unit per place in which the action occurred. A "place" 1s any named 
location, plus any unnamed location in whlcl~ we have strong reason to he- 
lieve that some portion o l  the action occurred. We produce a i1111t for 
"?omeplace" in two circumstnnces: 1) we cannot locate tlie action in at 
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l e a s t  one s p e c i f i c  pa r i ah ;  2) we have stro,ng reason t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  some 
po r t ion  of t h e  a c t i o n  occurred o u t s i d e  t h e  p l a c e s  f o r  which t h e  account  
c o n t a i n s  s p e c i f i c  names. A "name" can be ve ry  gene ra l :  by t h e  r i v e r ,  on 
t h e  road. a t  t h e  market,  and s o  on. 
l 
a )  f o r  i n i t i a l  cod ina  
p r i n c i p a l  name of p l ace ,  a lphabe t i c .  P a r i s h  t akes  p r i o r i t y .  I f  i t  is i m -  
pos s ib l e ,  name county; i f  county is impossible ,  country .  P l ace  i n f e r r e d  
l o c a t i o n s  i n  pa ren thes i s .  Thus OXFORD means t h e  account  s p e c i f i c a l l y  men- 
t i o n s  Oxford, (OXFORD) t h a t  we have i n f e r r e d  t h e  l o c a t i o n  from t h e  account  
o r  i t s  con tex t .  I 
d e t a i l e d  name of p lace .  a lphabe t i c .  Blank i f  we have a  p a r i s h  name and 
no o t h e r  p l a c e  informat ion.  SOMEPLACE i f  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  p l a c e  is a  county 
o r  a  country  (England, Scot land,  Wales) and we have no f u r t h e r  informat ion ! 
on l o c a t i o n  wi th in  t h e  county o r  country;  a  more s p e c i f i c  des igna t ion  such I 
a s  "near Norwich" ( i n  pa ren thes i s  i f  i n f e r r e d )  t akes  precedence over  SOME- I 
PLACE. SOMEPLACE EI.SE f o r  a d d i t i o n a l  p l a c e s  n o t . s p e c i f i c a l l y  named. 
b) f o r  coding a f t e r  a l p h a b e t i c  s o r t  of p l a c e  s e c t i o n s  
sequence number f o r  g r i d  squa re  loca t ion :  0 i f  some po r t ion  d e f i n i t e l y  I 
took p l ace  i n  t h i s  g r i d  squa re  l o c a t i o n ,  1 t o  9 i f  one of a  c l u s t e r  of 1 I 
t o  9 poss ib l e  cont inuous  g r i d  squa re  l o c a t i o n s ,  used t o  d e s c r i b e  i r r e g u l a r  
shapes ,  e .g .  a  s t r e e t ,  town, r i ve rbank ,  road.  Note: t h i s  means t h a t  a  
s i n g l e  p l a c e  record may con ta in  1 t o  9  subrecords  f o r  g r i d  squa re  l o c a t i o n .  I 
g r i d  squa re  l o c a t i o n  pe r  Gaze t t ee r :  two l e t t e r s  p l u s  f i v e  d i g i t s  I 
v e r t i c a l  l o c a t i o n  w i t h i n  g r i d  square:  0 i f  no t  k n 6 ,  1 t o  9  i f  known 
I 
h o r i z o n t a l  l o c a t i o n  w i t h i n  g r i d  square:  0  i f  no t  known, 1 t o  9  i f  known 
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l o c a t i o n  i n  B r i t i s h  census  of 1831: n i n e  d , ig i t a  
NOTE on t h e  P lace  Sec t ion .  Th i s  is no t  t h e  on ly  informat ion on p l aces  
t h a t  we w i l l  even tua l ly  have a v a i l a b l e  f o r  a n a l y s i s .  We plnn t o  c o n s t r u c t  
a  s e p a r a t e  P l ace  F i l e  i nc lud ing  a t  l e a a t  a l l  p a r i s h e s  i n  which even t s  oc- 
cu r r ed  and a l l  coun t i e s ,  whether o r  no t  even t s  occurred i n  them. The sdd- 
i t i o n  of f u r t h e r  p l a c e s ,  i f  any, w i l l  depend on coa t .  convenience end ana- 
l y t i c  urgency. The l i k e l y  i tems of informat ion i n  such a  f i l e  a r e :  
name of t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  u n i t  ( p a r i s h ,  e t c . )  
proper  name of t h e  p l a c e  
p o s i t i o n  w i t h i n  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  h i e ra rchy :  p a r i s h ,  hundred, county. e t c .  
g r i d  squa re  l o c a t i o n  pe r  Gaze t t ee r  
l o c a t i o n  i n  1831 census  
populat ion i n  1831 
o t h e r  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of t h a t  p lace:  presence o r  absence of market.  
e x t e n t  of manufacturing, e t c .  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of s p e c i f i c  l o c a t i o n  w i t h i n  t h a t  p lace:  i nn ,  church. 
pub l i c  aquare;.shop, e t c  . 
enumeration o f  a l l  even t s  occu r r ing  i n  t h a t  p l a c e  
3. Formation Sec t ion  
One u n i t  pe r  format ion k n w n  t o  be  p re sen t .  Every participant must he  ss- 
s igned t o  a t  l e a a t  one format ion.  So must every a c t i o n :  i f  we know some 
a c t i o n  occurred,  bu t  c a n ' t  a s s i g n  i t  t o  a  s p e c i f i c  format ion,  we c r e a t e  a  
format ion named SOMEONE. There may be more than one SOMEONE. I n  t h a t  
c a s e ,  we name them SOMEONE 1, SOMEONE 2. .... 
A format ion i s  a  s e t  of people  who a c t  t oge the r  and lo r  i n t e r a c t  w i th  anot-  
h e r  format ion i n  t h e  cour se  of t h e  even t .  The f i r s t  format ion named must 
margin of e r r o r ' f o r  g r i d  squa re  l o c a t i o n  
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liavc 10+ members. We d i v i d e  t h e  remainder i n t o  a s  few fo rma t ions  a s  poss ib l e :  . ' 
I 
g e n e r a l l y  one format ion f o r  each s e t  of people  wlio a c t  d i s t i n g u i s h a b l y  i n  t h e  1 
c o u r s e  of t h e  even t .  
format ion numbers: two d i g i t s  
o v e r l a p  wi th  o t h e r  fo rma t ions :  l i s t  of o t h e r  fo rma t ion ' s  numbers 
r c l n t i o n  of t h i s  format ion t o  event :  p a r t i c p a n t ,  s p e c t a t o r ,  e t c .  
nnme(s) of format ion:  a lp l i abe t i c ,  i n c l u d i n g  SOMEONE ( i n  p a r e n t h e s i s  i f  
t h e  name i s  i n f e r r e d  r a t h e r  t han  g iven  e x p l i c i t l y )  
s o c j u l  composi t ion of format ion:  a l p h a b e t i c ,  i n c l u d i n g  DK ( d o n ' t  know) 
o t h e r  words d e s c r i b i n g  format ion:  a l p h a b e t i c ,  i n c l u d i n g  NONE [ i n  p a r e n t h e s i s  
i f  i n f e r r e d  from accoun t ,  e .g .  (LED BY TAILOR)]. 
p l a c e  of o r i g i n  o r  normal r e s idence :  a l p h a b e t i c ,  i nc lud ing  DI; 
words used t o  d e s c r i b e  maanitude of format ion:  a l p h a b e t i c ,  i n c l u d i n g  NONE 
[ i n  p a r e n t h e s i s  i f  i n f e r r e d  from account ,  e .g .  (GROUP FILLED SQUARE)] 
number of p n r l i c i p a n t s :  low e s t i m a t e  (50+ = a t  l e a s t  50. 101+ = more than  
100, e t c . )  
number of p a r t i c i p a n t s :  h igh e s t i m a t e  I 
number o f  p a r t i c i p a n t s :  b e s t  e s t i m a t e  
sou rce  of b e s t  e s t i m a t e :  code (when t h e  a v a i l a b l e  accoun t s  c o n t a i n  more 
than one e s t i m a t e ,  w r i t e  COblMENT) 
number of person-days: b e s t  e s t i m a t e  (00 - unknown, 01 = p a r t i c i p a t i o n  
, l a s t e d  l e s s  t han  one day) 
number of  person Ilours: b e s t  e s t i m a t e .  00 = unknown, 01  = l e s s  t han  1 hour .  
I'erson-days and person-hours a r e  a d d i t i v e .  For example. 025, 075 means 
25 person-dnys + 75 person-hours, a r ea sonab le  e s t i m a t e  f o r  a format ion 
of 25 people  i n  con t inuous  a c t i o n  t o r  1 day p lus  t h r e e  more hours .  01,  
75 means 0 person-days + 75 person-liours.  Note a l t e r n a t i v e  e s t i m a t e s  
a s  COMMENTS. 
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sou rce  of b e s t  e s t ima te :  code 
b e s t  e s t i m a t e  of number a r r e s t e d .  Note a l t e r n a t i v e  e s t i m a t e s  a s  COMMENTS. 
sou rce  of b e s t  e s t ima te :  code 
b e s t  e s t i m a t e  of number wounded. Note a l t e r n a t i v e  e s t i m a t e s  oe COMMENTS. 
sou rce  of b e e t  e s t ima te :  code 
b e s t  e s t i m a t e  of number k i l l e d .  Note a l t e r n a t i v e  ee t ima tea  a s  COHMENTS. 
sou rce  of b e s t  e s t ima te :  code 
NOTE: b e s t  e s t imn tes  of person-days, person-hours. a r r e s t s ,  wounded, k i l l -  
ed, must each sum t o  t o t a l s  g iven i n  EVENT SECTION 
4. Action-Phase Sec t ion  
An event  begins  a t  t h e  f i r s t  po in t  a t  wllich a t  l e a s t  ten  of t h e  people  wlio 
even tua l ly  make a c l a im which would q u a l i f y  t h e  event  f o r  i n c l u s i o n  i n  our  
sample a r e  gathered wi thout  d i s p e r s i n g  be fo re  they make tlie c la im.  The 
event  ends when t h e  l a s t  s e t  of people  which has  made such a c la im i n  tlie 
cou r se  of t h e  event  d i s p e r s e s .  I f  new cla ims by 1 O t  people  which would 
independent ly  q u a l i f y  t h e  event  f o r  i n c l u s i o n  a r i s e  i n  t h e  cour se  of t h e  
even t ,  they keep t h e  event  going.  
A new act ion-phase  begin  when format ion begins  a new a c t i o n .  A t  l e a s t  
one phase must d e s c r i b e  a c t i o n  be fo re  t h e  even t s  begins;  when poes ib l e ,  
t h e r e  should be  one such u n i t  f o r  each formation p re sen t  a t  t h e  beginnjng 
of t h e  event .  A t  l e a s t  one phase must d e s c r i b e  a c t i o n  a f t e r  t h e  even t  
ends; when p o s s i b l e ,  t h e r e  should be  one such u n i t  form each format ion 
which survived t o  t h e  end of t h e  event .  
I f  more than one formntjon changes a c t i o n  a t  t h e  same time. we mnke a 
phase u n i t  f o r  each format ion and a s s i g n  each u n i t  t h e  same time. 
The minimtlm record c o n t a i n s  a t  l e a s t  one phase each: 1 )  b e f o r e  t h e  event  
b e g i ~ ~ s ;  2 ) a t  t i le beg inn ing  oC tile e v e n t ;  3 )  i n  t h e  cour se  of t h e  e v e n t ;  
4 )  a t  t h e  end of t h e  e v c n t ;  5) a f t e r  t h e  e v e n t .  
Every format ion namecl must appear  i n  a t  l e a s t  one act ion-phase .  
Sequence number: f i r s t  new phase  a t  t h i s  t ime.  Two d i g i t s ;  00 = sometime 
Order number f o r  m u l t i p l e  phases  which s t a r t  s imu l t aneous ly :  one d i g i t  
d a t e :  yea r ,  month, day 
c lock  time: 2400 - midnight ;  0000 = unknown 
r e l a t i o n  t o  cven t :  1 = b e f o r e  even t  beg ins ;  2  0 a c t i o n  i n i t i a t i n g  e v e n t ;  
3 - i n  cou r se  of cven t ;  4  = a c t i o n  ending even t :  5 - a f t e r  even t  ends  
f o r m t i o n  number: 00 - someone ( i f  u sed ,  we must enumerate a  SOMEONE forma- 
t i o n :  99 - a l l  fo rma t ions  
a c t i o n :  a l p h a b e t i c ,  i n c l u d i n g  DK ( d e f i n i t e l y  pe rmi t s  ph rases  such a s  
ATTEMPT TO . . . .; i n  p a r e n t h e s i s  i f  our  summary o r  i n f e r ~ ? n c e ,  wi thout  
p n r e n t l ~ e s i s  i f  d i r e c t  t r a n s c r i p t i o n  of words i n  account)  
o b j e c t  of a c t i o n :  a l p l ~ a b e t i c ,  i n c l u d i n g  DK, NONE, FOREli\TlOPl 23,  e t c .  
immediate consequences  f o r  o b j e c t :  a l p h a b e t i c ,  i n c l u d i n g  D K ,  NONE (conse- 
quences o c c u r r i n g  d u r i n g  same act ion-pi lase  on ly ;  use  a f t e r - e v e n t  p l ~ a s e s  f o r  
l a t e r  consequences) .  
5. Fourcr  SccLio:; -
One u n i t  per  sou rce .  In  p r i n c i p l e ,  t h e r e  should be one sou rce  u n i t  per  
name of sou rce :  a l p l ~ a b e t i c .  Standard o b b r c v i a t i o ~ ~ s  f o r  major sou rces  
l o c a t i o n  w i t h i n  sou rce :  i n fo rma t ion  w i l l  va ry  wi th  type  of sou rce .  For 
newspapers,  f o r  example, l o c a t i o n  w i l l  t y p i c a l l y  be d a t e ,  page,  l o c a t i o n  
on page. 
f u r t h e r  i d e n t i f y i n g  informat ion:  i n c l u d e s  NONE. Hay c i t e  h e a d l i n e ,  i n d i c a t e  
l o c a t i o n  i n  f o o t n o t e ,  and s o  on. 
comments on sou rce :  a l p h a b e t i c .  l n c l u d e s  NONE. May mention q u a l i t y ,  con- 
t r a d i c t i o n  of o t h e r  sou rces ,  use  made i n  coding.  
6. Comment S e c t i o n  
One u n i t  pe r  comment. May be keyed t o  nny l o c a t i o n  w i t h i n  EVENT, PLACE, 
FORMATION, ACTION-PHASE, OR SOURCE s e c t i o n s .  In  some c a s e s .  t h e  codebook 
w i l l  r e q u i r e  t h e  coder  who uses  n c e r t a i n  code t o  make a  CONMENT 
J 
l o c a t i o n  i n  r e c c r d :  numerical  code 
comment: a l p h a b e t i c  
cover  s h e e t  and one cover  s h e e t  pc r  s o u r c e  u n i t .  
APPENDIX 4. MATERIALS FROM THE STUDY OF CONTENTIOUS GATHERINGS IN GREAT 
BRITAIN 
The materiala concern February 1828. First comes a provisional list 
of all contentious gatherings reported in our six sources (Morning Chronicle, 
The Times. Hansard's, The Mirror of Parliament. Gentlemen's and Annual Re- -- -
gister) for that month. In the list, two events are underlined. The mn- 
terials which follow are readers' reports and copies of some of the relevant 
articles in the periodicals. 
Type of CC Place - - - Date Issue 
meeting Weymouth 02-02 parliamentary election 
meeting London 02-03 protection of victualler trade 
meeting Poultry 02-04 test corporation acts 
meeting . Edinburgh 02-04 petition king about political favors 
gathering Liverpool 02-05 election to parliament 
gathering Durham 02-05 local election 
gathering Dover 02-06 election to parliament 
violence ~ b n d o n  02-06 crowd attacks informer 
parade Weymouth 0 2 - 0 7  election 
meeting Sheffield 02-07 vestry, church rates 
violence Newbury 02-07 crowd attacks informer 
demonstration Weymouth 02-09 election 
meeting Windsor 02-10 tax on carts 
gathering-crowd Weymouth 02-11 election 
gathering-mob   on don 02-13 threatens informer 
gathering-crowd Durham 02-13 county elections 
meeting London 02-15 licensed vs. non-licensed sellers - -
violence Atherstone 02-16 poaching affray 
meeting Leicester 02-18 coin laws 
























February (approx. ) 
February (approx. ) 
February (approx. ) 
February (approx. ) 
February (approx. ) 
February (approx.) 
Issue 
election victory celebration 
parish rates 
smuggling affray 
test and corporation acts 
test and corporation acts 
test and corporation acts 
teat and corporation acts 
test and corporation acts 
stamp duties 
~ -. 
Tndav': d a t r  - - 197h 
: ) I lansnrd  ( ) IIVP ( ) S c l ~ w e i ~ z e r  
, ) L0NlK)W 'PIIIES p;lge column 2- ( w o r d  ( ) G u e s t  
2 ( ) E a t o n  , ) L e w i s  
: 5 MORNING CI!RONI<:l,E d a t e  d -//- d- 8/ d a y  + Bottom ( ) G r e e n  ( ) D u n k l e  
( )Anderson  ( ) B a r b e  
F i r s t  Lint:- - -&_~ ;~Y- .Q&~~/ -C  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
GENERAL DESCRIPTION: CllECK AS MANY AS APPLY(see memo /! 6 )  
(1)  VIOLENCE ( ) 
p r o p e r t y  damage ( ), s e i z u r e  o f  p r o p e r t y ,  s p a c e s  o r  p e r s o n s  ( ) .  
p e r s o n a l  i n j u r y  ( ), t h r e a t  o f  a n y  o f  t h e  a b o v e  ( ). 
( 2 )  ElEETlNGS ( ) 
( ) E l e c t i o n  
( ) V e s t r y  
f L i v e r \ .  
( ) s u p p o r t  f o r  enemy o f  government  
( ) c o n t r o l  o f  l o c a l  g o v e r n m e n t l i n s t i t u t i o n  
( ) o t h e r  g r i e v a n c e s  and  d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n s  . , 
( ) D i n n e r  ( ) o p p o s i t i o n  t o  o t h e r  p e o p l e s  o r  g r o u p s  
( ) P o l i t i c a l  c l u b l p a r t y  , ( ) o b j e c t i v e s  u n c l e a r  
( ) w i t h  p r t i t i o n ,  a d d r e s s ,  e t c .  ( ) n o t i c e s ,  r e q u e s t s ( f o r  p a s t  o r  f u t u r e  m e e t i n g s )  
( ) o p p o s i t i o n  t o  government  ( ) o t h e r ( 1 i s t )  
( ) s u p p o r t  f o r  government  
(3-8) GATHERINGS 
d e m o n s t r f l i n n s  (/I: p a r a d e (  ) ,  ass-es, c r o w d s ,  mobs (4, g a t h e r i n g s  ( ) I  
r a l l i e s  ( ) ,  s p e c i a l  celebrations ( ) .  
o t h e r  ( )- 
( 1 0 )  LADllR ACTI\'ITIES ( ) 
s t r i k e ,  t u r n o u t  ( ). l o c k o u t  ( ), c o m h i n a t i o n  o r  u n i o n  m e n t i o n  ( ) ,  
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